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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the role of the Bank of England as
a lender of last resort (LLR) in the 1870-1914 period. It
also considers how the Bank reacted to the failure, or the
possibility of failure, of financial institutions. This
concern with crises arises out of fractional reserve
banking: banks keep only a small proportion of their
deposit liabilities in the form of cash, and thus are not
able to supply all depositors with cash at any one time. If
a sudden demand for cash arises, institutions with no
solvency problems can fail due to a lack of liquidity in
the financial markets, and widespread problems of this sort
may lead to a collapse in the money stock. The role of the
LLR is to provide sufficient liquidity to enable
institutions to overcome their liquidity problems.
The importance of the LLR in the late nineeenth
century is that it was only in this period that the Bank
of England started to take on the characteristics of a last
resort lender. In the last thirty years of the nineteenth
century there was an absence of financial crises as
compared to the previous two centuries, and it is therefore
possible that the Bank of England had by this time altered
its behaviour so as to remove the possibility of widespread
crisis occurring. It is this question which this thesis
examines.
A primary objective of the analysis in this study was
to identify moments of crisis or potential crisis in the
London financial markets between 1870 and 1914, with a view
to assessing how the Bank of England dealt with them: did
it satisfy our idea of an efficient LLR? We therefore
collected data from the Bank's archives which showed the
exact pattern of the Bank's discount and advance activities
on a daily basis. These data were subjected to a rigorous
statistical examination to enable identification of moments
of financial tension. The Bank's behaviour was then
analysed with respect to the theoretical framework.
The results reinforce the conclusions of earlier
studies, in that although there was no stated policy stance
from the Bank it was prepared to act as a LLR in this
period. In addition, it was prepared to "bail-out"
institutions which could prove themselves to be solvent but
were in need of liquidity. The study provides a great deal
of detail as to how the Bank's LLR operations were carried
out.
Another important factor influencing the Bank's
behaviour seems to have been the personality of the
Governor. Firm, interested Governors were likely to take a
definite policy stance on issues relating to the financial
markets whereas weak ones were not.
xii
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following symbols and abbreviations have been used in
the thesis:
Data:
TVB = Total value of bills discounted
TNT = " number of discount transactions
TVA = " value of advances on bills (=VAOB)
VAOS = " value of advances on securities
TNAT = " number of advance transactions
TNR = " number of refusals
TVR = " value of refusals
R	 = Interest rate for the discount and advance
transactions
Statistics:
R2	= Correlation coefficient
R2a = Correlation coefficient adjusted for the degrees
of freedom of the regression
DW	 = Durbin-Watson statistic
xiii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1: Introduction - Definition of a Lender of Last Resort.
This thesis sets out to throw light on the evolving
role of the central bank in Britain in the late nineteenth
century. This encompasses in the main a study of the Bank
of England's policies towards and actions during financial
crises, in addition to an analysis of its behaviour as a
central bank in more "normal" times. It is in particular a
study of the Bank's role as a Lender of Last Resort (LLR).
A Lender of Last Resort can be defined as an
institution which stands ready to aid the financial system
in times of need. 1 This aid is necessary in order to break
the link which causes a loss of confidence in fractional
reserve banking to lead to large falls in the money
supply. These falls can occur as a result of an en masse
liquidation of deposits by depositors, who are worried
about contagion: the idea that the failure of one bank may
lead to failures of similar institutions. If all depositors
in a bank do this simultaneously, the bank itself will
close, because the essence of fractional reserve banking is
that banks keep reserves to cover only a small part of
their liabilities.
1 Classical LLR theory indicates that this aid should
take the form of making cash injections into the system as
a whole, not to particular institutions, in order that
"bail-outs" of specific banks are avoided. This is the most
efficient form of intervention, since it reduces the extent
of moral hazard, a concept that will be discussed in
section 5.1 of Chapter Five.
"Need" in the context of this thesis refers to times when
the means of payment are under threat. See Schwartz (1986)
for further details and discussion of the distinction
between "real" and "pseudo" financial crises.
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Thus the classical rationale for central intervention
in the financial system is derived from the danger of a
precipitate fall in the money stock as a direct result of
a financial crisis. Whilst twentieth century British
economic experience is devoid of such an occurrence, the
U.S. in the early 1930s suffered a severe financial crisis
when over 9000 banks failed, leading to a fall in the money
stock of over 30 per cent. More recently, the U.K. debate
has moved away slightly from the possibility of widespread
failures leading to falls in the money supply, since our
banking system is highly concentrated, but in the U.S. the
likelihood of bank runs, especially within States, still
remains high.
Although there has been a vast quantity of work on
t e history of the Bank of England and on the cpntemporary
effects of bank failures and the role of the LLR, there has
been little attempt to bring these two areas together. Both
Claphain's and Sayers' histories of the Bank are full of
detail about what the Bank was doing in these years, but
they cover the whole range of the Bank's activities,
whereas here we concentrate on only one: the role of the
Bank of England as a Lender of Last Resort.
2: Contemporary Sicinificance of the LLR
The role of the LLR has great significance for
contemporary events in monetary policy and for the
financial system. The importance of the LLR in the 1980s is
3
being widely discussed, both in a domestic and in an
international setting, the latter with reference to the
establishment of some sort of international LLR which it
its claimed could deal with the international debt problem.
The role of the domestic LLR Is very pertinent, not only in
academic circles, but also in the financial and non-
financial press: in the U.K.: the Bank of England's rescue
of Johnson I4atthey Bankers resulted in the passing of the
1987 Banking Act, which changed the Bank's supervisory role
slightly. In the United States bank failures have been
extremely frequent in the last few years, and not all of
these failures have involved small, uninfluential banks. In
the autumn of 1984 the Federal Reserve stepped in to help
Continental Illinois, the fifth largest bank in the States,
and in 1988 what promised to be an even bigger rescue took
place, when, as part of the widespread problems suffered by
Texas banks as a result of the downturn in the energy
sector, the First Republic Bank Corporation appealed to the
Federal Reserve for aid.
The problem of bank failures, and the associated one
of the appropriate policies a LLR should follow, cannot
therefore be regarded as an irrelevancy, or as a problem
resolved in 1873 when Bagehot laid down his two rules
telling central bankers how to react to a financial
crisis. 2 In this thesis we will consider both the
2 Bagehot's two rules were to "Lend freely at a high
rate" (in the case of an internal drain), and to "Protect
the reserve" (for a drain that was external in origin).
These two, and the problems associated with them, will be
discussed in detail in a later chapter.
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theoretical issues involved and the implications these have
for the study of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century financial system in the U.K.
3: Historical Background
The question of the appropriate policies a central
bank should follow in the face of a financial crisis is one
which has great significance in both a historical and, as
already discussed, in a current context. In the hundred
years previous to 1870 financial crises occurred
frequently, 3 and thus there was much discussion as to the
correct solution to the problem of the lack of stability
apparent in the financial system. In the course of its
evolution the Bank of England had taken on many of the
haracteristics associated with a LLR, although this
process had been slow and uneven, and it is important to
establish what the Bank, as opposed to the other
institutions in the financial system, felt was the extent
of its responsibilities at this point.4
There were ten major crises between 1770 and 1870:
1772-3, 1782-3, 1793, 1797, 1825, 1836, 1839, 1847, 1857
and 1866.
A common feature of all the financial crises up to
1866 was the inconsistency apparent in the actions of the
Bank of England: people were never sure how it was going
react when faced with the threat of a financial crisis,
since on several occasions it changed its policy in the
course of the crisis itself. For example, in 1.825 the Bank
first refused to lend and then lent freely, and in 1836 and
1847 it refused to lend on certain types of securities,
which served only to add fuel to the panic, forcing it to
revert to discounting and advancing freely.
5
LThe established view in the literature5
 is that the
Bank of England had accepted its role as a LLR by the
early l870s. 6
 During the Overend-Gurney crisis (1866), the
Bank had "lent freely" without any backsliding, and it
seemed that from this point onwards there would be no doubt
as to the appropriate policies for the Bank to pursue when
a financial crisis threatened. However, it took the
publication of Lombard Street (written by Walter Bagehot)
in 1873 for this institutional practice to become an
established theoretical proposition, since there was a
considerable amount of dissent from the view that the
Bank's duties towards the financial system were any greater
than, or different from, those of other commercial banks.7
For example, Fetter (1965,
	 arjr	 3),
Clapham (1945), Morgan (1943), Sayers (1957).
6 For example, Fetter states that:
"The Bank of England as a lender of last resort
was, like the Gold Standard and the freedom of
deposit banking, accepted as the foundation of
monetary and banking orthodoxy." (pp.275)
In A Treatise on Money , Keynes discusses the role of the
Bank of England and the monetary system, and states that
one of the advantages of the pre-1914 monetary system was
that:
"...everyone knew quite clearly what principles
would govern the Bank of England's actions and
what they would have to expect in certain
circumstances." (Vol.II,pp.232).
This dissent came mostly from Thomson Hankey,
supported by G.W.Norman, both influential Bank of England
Directors. In 1867 Hankey published a lecture first given
in 1857, to which he added a new preface. In this he
referred to the idea that the Bank should stand ready to
aid the financial system in times of need as being "the
most mischievous doctrine ever broached". See section 5.1
of Chapter Five for further discussion.
6

implications for the Bank of England's role as a LLR, since
it is easy to envisage a situation where high levels of
domestic Bank Rate, implemented perhaps in an attempt to
stem an internal drain, could be detrimental to the
maintenance of international equilibrium. In fact,
Bloomfield concluded that, on the basis of a comparison of
annual data on international and domestic interest earning
assets, central banks did not play by the "rules of the
game" .
This then is a brief overview of the historical
background of the period covered by this study, and of some
of the important issues arising in this period, which the
Bank had to consider when making policy decisions, in
addition to its "normal" central banking procedures. They
will be discussed in far greater detail later in the
thesis.
4: Time Span of the Analysis
The starting point for this analysis is 1870. This is
not an arbitrary date:'° it could be argued that around
this time there was a change from the previously rather "ad
The results for the Bank of England were slightly
more ambiguous than for other central banks. See Bloomfield
(1959) for further details.
10 This does not mean however that there is no
discussion of earlier events. The point the Bank had
reached by 1870 with regard to its role as a LLR had been
arrived at as a result of the cumulative experience
gathered during previous crises, and thus it is important
to consider this experience in order to fully understand
later events.
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hoc" behaviour of the Bank with respect to financial crises
towards a full recognition of what Bagehot had to say on
this subject. Policy decisions in this area had hitherto
been taken somewhat arbitrarily, and any successful policy
stance had been arrived at largely as a result of trial and
error. The first formulation of a set of "rules" concerning
what action should be taken by the central bank during a
financial crisis that attracted any attention caine, as
previously discussed, from Bagehot, although Henry Thornton
had advocated very much the same sort of policies three-
quarters of a century earlier. Thornton, though, did not
possess the advantage of being editor of one of the most
important vehicles for the dissemination of commercial and
financial information at the time, The Economist, and thus
Thornton's ideas did not receive the same level of popular
recognition as did Bagehot's.
The end date of the analysis here is 1914, the year
Britain entered the First World War, the outbreak of which
caused a massive financial crisis in London, then the
centre of the international financial system which revolved
around the Gold Standard. Although initially the aim was to
extend the study beyond this date, it was soon realised
that there was so much to cover in the 1870-1914 period
that an continuation beyond this point would be impossible.
1914 is in any case a convenient and logical point at which
to stop, since the Bank's actions in wartime were slightly
different, at least in emphasis, and thus 1914 in many
respects marks the end of an era.
9
5: Aims and Methodoloqy
The underlying aim of the thesis is to determine
whether the Bank of England, explicitly or implicitly,
altered its behaviour with respect to the financial system
in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This may have
come about as a result of a general acceptance of its duty
to provide the system with liquidity in the event of need.
If it did change its behaviour, how and why did this
arise?11
The main reason for postulating that the Bank of
England changed its behaviour in the latter part of the
nineteenth century is the absence of financial crises in
these years, as compared with the earlier period. In terms
of the analysis of the Bank's role, there are two possible
explanations for this phenonomen: either there were g
problems in the financial markets which needed the Bank of
England's intervention, or the Bank's behaviour changed to
allow for the implemention of policies that would either
prevent crises from arising, or would mitigate the effects
of them once they arose. Since, as stated above, it is
unlikely that there was a complete absence of periods of
tension, we can accept the second hypothesis: that the
Bank's behaviour somehow altered in order to take account
11 One way of examining whether or not the Bank
altered its behaviour is to determine whether there are any
moments in this period when the Bank took actions to
prevent a period of financial tension developing into a
fully blown crisis. This possibility will be discussed more
fully at a later point.
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of what many contemporary bankers, economists and
politicians felt to be its "duty": to provide an injection
of liquidity into the financial system in times of
financial crisis.
Once we accept the postulate that the Bank's behaviour
did change we then have to consider the ways in which this
is likely to have occurred. This encompasses the study of
two different types of actions: those policies which were
implemented in an attempt to prevent crises occurring, and
the actions taken when a crisis was looming. These two
types of policies are very different, and therefore we must
examine the Bank's actions both in times of tension and at
points where a crisis had become a possibility, where the
Bank might be faced with having to act as a LLR.
Ideally, we would not have to surmise what policies
the Bank was pursuing at certain times and for what
reasons, since policy documents would be available that
told us how and why the Bank was acting. These are not,
unfortunately, readily available, so we have to be content
with considering the options that were open to the Bank at
certain times.
The first of the actions outlined above concerns, in
effect, the regulatory environment in which the LLR
operates. This is an issue that is always addressed when
considering the LLR in a contemporary context, but is
frequently overlooked by historical studies. It is
currently a very important issue, and it is interesting and
illuminating to examine whether moral suasion was exercised
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in the nineteenth century. At this time, the major means
that the Bank had of influencing the behaviour of the
financial sector was to attempt to exert influence on the
commercial banks and other institutions, in order to
persuade theni that their best course of action was to
follow the Bank's "advice" and do as they were told. The
ways in which moral suasion was implemented, together with
its effectiveness in the 1870-1914 period, are issues
which will be considered in one chapter of the thesis.
Apart from moral suasion, the Bank's only other method
of imposing its will on the markets involved the
regulation of its discount and advance operations, and it
is for this reason that a major part of this thesis is
spent on a consideration and analysis of the Daily Discount
data. 12 These are collected from the Archives of the Bank
of England, emanate from the Daily Discount Books, and
give (daily) quantitative information on the Bank's
transactions with the financial markets, encompassing
discounts, advances, refusals, and the interest rate at
which these transactions were carried out.
These data can be utilised in two ways. Firstly, we
can look at certain components of these data, especially
when it is aggregated annually, to trace how the Bank's
discount and advance operations were changing gradually
over the period. Secondly, it allows us to look
specifically at how the Bank was injecting liquidity into
12 These data will be described fully in later
chapters of the thesis.
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the financial markets in times of stress. Although, as
already mentioned, in the 1870-1914 period there were no
major financial crises, this does not mean that there were
no moments at which the Bank acted in order to prevent a
failure, in itself possibly a relatively minor event, from
developing into a fully blown financial crisis. The first
step in a study of these times is to identify them. Then,
individual episodes are studied in order to determine the
Bank's role in each of them, since with hindsight we know
that there were no major crises and therefore at' ir
points of tension must either have been q'elled by an
outside agency or have faded away of their own accord.
Answering questions about these two different aspects
of policy will indicate firstly the extent to which the
Bank of England was aware of the possibilities open to it
in the field of the prevention of financial distress, and
to what extent it made use of the options open to it. In
addition, we should be in a position to know whether the
Bank did actively intervene in the financial markets in
order to quell any possibility of widescale financial
disruption. The juxtaposition of these two aspects of the
problem will enable us to answer the underlying question of
whether the
	 Bank altered its behaviour towards the
financial system, and if so in what way.
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6: Thesis Structure.
The thesis is divided into nine chapters, two of which
are accounted for by this introduction and the thesis
conclusions. The structure of the remaining chapters is as
follows.
Chapter Two discusses the theory of the LLR,
concentrating on examining its current state and extending
it beyond its current boundaries. It outlines the way in
which widespread bank failures can have a detrimental
affect on the money supply, and then continues by offering
various solutions to this problem, one of which is of
course the LLR. It also encompasses a discussion of the
current institutional setting in the U.K. and U.S. as
regards deposit insurance, one alternative way of avoiding,
or at least reducing the effects of, financial crises. The
chapter concludes by outlining certain changes that could
be made to the operation of the LLR as it currently stands,
which would make it function more efficiently.
Chapters Three and Four comprise a historical
narrative, tracing the development of the Bank of England
and the related growth of the commercial banking system
from the time of the establishment of the Bank (1694) until
1914, the end point of the analysis here.' 3 The discussion
in both of these chapters centres on the moments of crisis,
looking in detail at how the Bank of England reacted to an
13 Chapter Three covers the period up to 1870, and
Chapter Four 1870-1914.
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increase in financial activity and tension. In the period
up to 1866, the aid the Bank gave the system was piecemeal
and non-previously declared, with the result that financial
institutions could never be sure that the Bank was going to
provide the much needed liquidity, and thus panic was not
prevented. However, during the Overend-Gurney crisis in
1866 the Bank for the first time acted as a LLR in a
comprehensive manner, refusing no prospective discounter as
long as they could offer acceptable security.14
The remaining four chapters of the thesis are
concerned with a discussion and analysis of the Daily
Discount data, the major components of which have been
previously mentioned. The primary aim of the analysis was
to identify moments of increased market pressure, that is,
times when the banks, discount houses, and other financial
institutions were coming to the Bank of England for aid in
the latter's capacity as a LLR. These periods will show up
in the data as unusually large figures for discounts and
advances.
Whereas Chapters Six and Seven are concerned with
direct analysis carried out on these data, and the
discussion of the results obtained, Chapter Eight
concentrates more specifically on two related aspects of
the LLR which are rather more qualitative: the existence
14 Both of these chapters contain a certain amount of
primary evidence, but the major part of the information
comes from secondary sources.
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and effectiveness in this period of moral suasion,' 5
 and an
examination of the role of the Governor of the Bank of
England. Regarding the latter, the emphasis is particularly
on addressing the question of whether certain Governors had
a greater influence on the Bank's policy making than
others. This utilises the Daily Discount data, but in a
slightly different manner to the analysis contained in the
previous chapters.
The last chapter of the thesis (Chapter Nine)
discusses the conclusions obtained from all the analysis
carried out, together with suggestions for future work.
7: Summary
The main aim of this research project is therefore to
examine a historical question in the context of an explicit
theoretical framework, without losing sight of the
historical circumstances. It is thus necessary to first
examine whether the concept of a lender of last resort is
valid: whether central banks perform this function
effectively or whether there could be a more efficient way
of achieving its objectives. One of the most important
themes of any consideration of the LLR is that of
uncertainty and loss of confidence leading to a financial
crisis, and it is this that lies at the heart of any
analysis of the subject, since if a catastrophic fall in
15 That is, the Bank's regulatory activities which
were based on custom rather than law.
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the money supply was not the possible outcome of a
financial crisis, bank failures would only attract the same
sort of (academic) interest as do failures of other types
of economic unit.
The great need within this subject is to specify both
the optimal operating conditions and the limits of any
authority acting as a LLR, since, when analysing recent
cases of LLR intervention, it is all too frequently
possible to criticise monetary authorities for reacting to
a bank failure or financial crisis in a sub-optimal manner.
Thus, the aim of this research project is to specify these
"optimal conditions", both present but particularly past,
in order that the theory and practice of the LLR may be
more clearly understood.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORY OF LAST RESORT LENDING.
1: Introduction.
The aim of this chapter is to present a coherent
framework in which the role of the Lender of Last Resort
(LLR) can be analysed. Since in essence this is a
historical study, we should address questions not just from
a theoretical perspective, but also with respect to their
importance in a historical context.
With this in mind the structure of the chapter is as
follows. Firstly, there is a discussion of the reasons why
we treat bank failures differentially from the failures of
other institutions. Then, following directly from this we
outline a framework for the analysis of the effects bank
failures have on the money supply: the base/multiplier
framework. This section concludes with some objections to
the hypothesis that bank failures can ultimately lead to
large falls in the money supply.
Once we have established why bank failures are
important, we can then discuss appropriate policies to
prevent bank failures becoming bank runs: how to avoid
contagion. This is undertaken in the next section of the
chapter, when deposit insurance, more information and the
LLR are considered. The last two sections deal respectively
with the question of illiquidity versus insolvency and
problems with the LLR. We conclude with a discussion of
measures intended to improve the functioning of the LLR.
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2: Why do Bank Failures Matter?
On first consideration it seems slightly odd that
failures of banks and financial institutions are studied in
so much depth and are regarded as being so important,
whilst failures of other types of economic units are
frequently accepted as a necessary, although sometimes
unpleasant, fact of life. In fact, optimal resource
allocation theory suggests that banks should certainly fail
in order that the financial system becomes more efficient.
However, although the optimal allocation of resources is
one of society's primary goals, another is that of
stabilisation, and unfortunately these two are sometimes in
conflict. Both economic theory and history suggest that
allowing banks to fail, particularly if they are large and
important, may lead to bank runs and perhaps to a collapse
in the money stock.
It has been argued (Benston, 1983) that in some ways
failures of enterprises other than banks are less socially
desirable than bank failures, since banks are not unique
institutions and the gap left by the failure of one bank
would quickly be filled by another. The only people
directly concerned with a failed bank who suffer as a
result of the failure are its senior officers, since they
will to a certain extent be held responsible for the
failure. Bank employees should find work with other similar
institutions since their skills are generally applicable
within the field. However, Benston goes on to argue that in
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one important area banks are very different from other
enterprises: they have creditors who are able to withdraw
their funds on demand. If a large number of depositors
(creditors) withdraw large sums simultaneously, the bank
concerned may be forced to sell assets at loss making
prices, perhaps engendering a suspension of payments.
Therefore, if depositors fear for the solvency of their
bank they are acting entirely rationally when they decide
to remove their funds, since otherwise they may be faced
with a loss. Benston finally concludes that bank failures
must be treated differently from other types of business
failure, especially since in the case of financial
institutions the emphasis is on fear and loss of
confidence, which can in itself promote failures.
However, others (for example Beenstock, 1987) argue
that financial institutions should not be treated as a
special case when discussing business failure, since oneof
the characteristics of a rational society is the complete
disclosure of information. In such a society bank runs
would be extremely rare, occurring only in the event of
world war or other catastrophes affecting the whole
financial system. The reason for this is that the "domino"
aspect of financial crises is removed once completeness of
information exists. 1 Whilst depositors with a failed bank
However, the extent to which the domino analogy in
terms of asset prices may apply to today's financial
markets was well illustrated by the October 1.987 collapse
in world stock market prices when, although firms were not
failing, price falls were quickly, and sometimes
irrationally, transmitted from one market to another.
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are affected by its failure, other depositors realise that
the problem is local to the failed institution, and thus
they do not withdraw their deposits and contagion does not
result. This assumption of perfect information is a very
powerful one however, and its implications will be
discussed more fully at a later stage.
The classical rationale for central (government or
bank) intervention in the banking system is therefore the
serious consequences that can arise as a result of a
financial crisis. In recent years various objections to
this prevailing orthodoxy have been raised: these will be
discussed later. It is helpful however if the process of a
bank run is set in a more formal structure, and in this
case the most suitable tool is that of the Base-Multiplier
framework.
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2.1: Methods of Examining the Importance of Bank Failures:
the Base Multiplier Framework.
A clear method of analysing the way in which bank
failures may cause a collapse in the money stock is through
the use of the base-multiplier framework. This is related
to the theory of fractional reserve banking: that banks
keep only a relatively small proportion of funds deposited
with them as cash or near cash, lending out the remainder.
The proportion retained as cash was originally determined
by "good banking practice" and was established as a result
of trial and error. The significance of the "liquidity
ratio" historically was that it was an indicator of an
institution's ability to withstand a cash drain.
The framework is best expressed as a series of identities,
where:
M = money stock
m = money multiplier
B = monetary base (high powered money)
C = non-bank public's holding of notes and coins
D = (sum of) time and demand deposits
R = banker's balances at the Bank of England
Therefore by definition
M=C+D	 (1)
That is, the money stock is the sum of the public's cash
and their bank deposits. The money supply however is
determined not only by the commercial banks and by the
public but also by the monetary authorities. This can be
expressed by the following identity:
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M=mB	 (2)
The monetary base (B) itself is defined as being not just
actual reserves (R) but also potential reserves, that is,
currency in the hands of the public:
B=R+C	 (3)
Dividing identity (1) by identity (3) and dividing through
by D gives the result:
C/D+ 1
11=
	
	
B	 (4)
R/D + c/D
The money multiplier, in, is the first component of the
above, and it is the value of this multiplier that we wish
to consider when examining the effect that a financial
crisis has on the money supply.
The most important feature of a financial crisis is
the massive reduction in the public's confidence in the
financial system. After the failure of one or several
banks, depositors in other banks seek to cash their
deposits, believing cash to be a safer form in which to
hold their wealth. This leads to an increase in the
cash:deposit ratio, C/D. The banks themselves will try to
increase their ratio of reserves to deposits, R/D, in order
to try to meet the extra demand for cash.
If both these ratios are increasing the money
multiplier will fall, as can be seen from equation (4).2
2 Obviously, the extent of the fall in the money
multiplier is dependent on the relative fall in the two
(continued...)
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The effect of this can be seen from identity 2: with a
constant monetary base and a falling money multiplier, the
money supply inevitably falls. The extent of the fall in
the money supply will be dependent on the magnitude of the
increase in the two ratios: the higher the proportion of
wealth held in cash and the higher bank reserves, the
smaller will be the money multiplier.3
This analysis shows how changes in the volume of cash
held by the public, or in the extent of reserves held by
banks, can affect the money multiplier and thus the money
supply. As stated at the beginning of the chapter, it is
this fear of significant falls in the money supply as a
direct result of the failure of financial institutions
which has resulted in attempts being made to prevent the
aforementioned failures. In the next section we will
discuss possible objections to this analysis before going
on to detail ways to prevent financial failures engendering
falls in the money supply.
2(. . .continued)
ratios: if banks are unable to increase RID to cope with
the drain, the fall in the multiplier will be greater.
It should be noted that it is always possible for
changes in the ratios to offset one another. Examples of
this for the U.K. are described in Capie & Rodrick-Bali
(1983), and for the U.S. in Friedman & Schwartz (1963) and
Cagan (1965) among others. In a study of the U.S. banking
crises of the 1930s Laidler (1971) found that both the
reserve and deposit ratios rose significantly, so that even
though the monetary base also rose, there was a fall in the
money stock of approximately 35 per cent.
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2.2: Objections to this Analysis.
The above analysis explains why bank failures have always
been regarded as being far more serious than failures of
other economic units: the necessity of taking preventive
measures to avoid financial crises that may cause a
collapse in the money stock is generally agreed upon.
Before discussing ways in which the problem can be avoided,
it is first necessary to outline two instances when the
above process (bank failures/financial crisis leading to a
reduction in the stock of money) may not occur.
Firstly, the position of the failed bank/banks within
the banking system will have some bearing on the outcome of
the failure. If the concerned banks are small and thus
relatively unimportant, their failure will probably cause
little panic. 4 However, if the banks are large, 5 the
resulting panic will be on a large scale with an en masse
withdrawal of deposits.6
Although of course the size of the failed bank will
also affect the authorities' reaction to the failure.
For example any of the London Clearing Banks in the
U.K.
6 A point that should be made here however is that
whereas individual depositors may keep their withdrawn
deposits at home or in a safe deposit box, large companies
and corporations, where massive sums of money are involved,
are faced with a problem as to what to do with their now
liquid funds. It could be surmised that they are faced with
no other choice than to re-deposit the funds in the bank
they judge to be least affected by the crisis. In this case
there would be no overall change in the level of bank
deposits, and thus no fall in the money supply; the only
change would be a re-distribution in the destination of
deposits.
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Secondly, the validity of the loss in confidence/
increasing ratios/fall in money supply process has lately
been questioned (Beenstock, 1987) as previously mentioned.
This criticism hinges on the assumption of perfect
information, which, if it is applicable, makes the domino
analogy of bank failures false: there will be no
widespread collapse in confidence since individual
depositors realise that the failure of one bank does not
necessarily imply the collapse of the banking system. With
complete information, the only way a real financial crisis
can be triggered off is by a worldwide catastrophe of some
sort.7
However, it is questionable whether such a strong
assumption holds, since historical evidence suggests that
bank failures did produce a flight into currency, 8 although
it could be argued that the present day knowledge of
individuals as to the strength of banks and financial
institutions is greater than at any time in the past,
implying that people would be able to ascertain the real
extent of the problem.9
For example, the severe financial crisis that
erupted on the outbreak of the First World War in August
1914.
8 See, for example, Friedman & Schwartz (1963) and
Schwartz (1986).
The "perfect information" argument does not deny
the possibility of bank failures occurring however, since
they are likely to occur simply as a consequence of both
changes in the level of business activity and of
inefficiencies in financial management. What the argument
does not allow for however is that these failures will be
followed by contagion.
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3: How to prevent bank runs from occurring.
The crux of the problem of bank failures is not the
failure of the institution in itself but the problem of
contagion: the failure of one bank leading to the failure
of others, some of which will have no insolvency problems
but are simply affected by the loss of confidence in the
financial system. Thus, the solution to the problem of bank
runs is to avoid the possibility of contagion occurring. In
this section we will consider three possible methods of
avoiding contagion: deposit insurance, increasing the
information available about financial institutions, and the
role of the LLR.
3.1: Deposit Insurance to Prevent Panic.
An oft-cited mechanism to prevent the occurrence of
bank runs is the implementation of a system of deposit
insurance. This takes the form of a premium paid into a
central fund by commercial banks and financial
institutions, 10
 the fund then being administered by a
central body, which has the task of settling claims made
against it in the case of a bank failure.
The main theoretical argument providing a rationale
for deposit insurance is that it increases the degree of
stability in the financial system. If complete deposit
10 The scope of the schemes can vary: some include
only commercial banks, others a wider range of financial
institutions.
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insurance exists then there is no reason for a flight from
deposits into currency, since people know that their
deposits are protected. However, this rationale has several
problems associated with it which will be developed at a
later point.
It has been argued (McCarthy, 1980) that deposit
insurance increases competition between banks. If the
danger of loss to depositors is removed, then, according to
this argument, the monetary authorities can afford to
reduce regulations intended to safeguard the system,
permitting easier admittance of new entrants and a greater
undertaking of risk by the participating banks. Deposit
insurance could also go some way towards suppressing the
belief that large banks are inherently more stable than
smaller ones. 11 However, the opposing argument asserts that
deposit insurance could be said to decrease competition.
Smaller banks gain from deposit insurance because it
enables them to compete on a more equal footing, the public
viewing them to be as "safe" as larger banks, since all
deposits are protected.12
One of the original reasons for instigating deposit
insurance schemes, in addition to that of increasing
financial stability, was to introduce some notion of equity
into the banking system (McCarthy, 1980). This has obvious
political aspects: the introduction of a scheme of deposit
11 This idea will only be eliminated completely if
100 per cent coverage of deposits exists.
12 However, the extent to which they gain is obviously
dependent on the terms of the insurance.
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insurance can be expressed as an instance of the government
championing the needs of small savers who have little
access to the sort of information needed on which to base a
rational assessment of the financial position of a
particular bank. This consideration explains why many
deposit insurance schemes have relatively low cut-off
points, enabling small depositors to be refunded while
those with larger deposits, who, according to this view,
should be able to construct a more informed opinion about a
bank's position, are not covered to the same extent.1-3
Opinion as to the merits of deposit insurance is, as
on most economic questions, divided. Milton Friedman is of
the opinion that its existence brings about substantial
benefit to society, as voiced in the following quote:
"Federal Deposit Insurance has performed a
signal service in rendering the banking system
panic proof......l4
For him, the introduction of Federal deposit insurance was:
"the most important structural change in our
monetary system in the direction of greater
stability since the post-Civil War tax on
13 There are always instances that confuse this point
however: Kareken(1983) reports an instance during the
aftermath of the Penn Square Bank failure when the Chairman
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was
told of a Methodist Congregation who over many years had
accumulated a building fund of $150,000 and had kept it on
deposit at the bank (the cut-off point for deposit
insurance was $100,000). Obviously, this situation could be
avoided if depositors split their funds into separate
accounts kept at different banks, but this demands a level
of financial sophistication not possessed by many small
depositors.
14 Friedman (1959), pp.38. The context in which these
remarks were made should be noted however; Friedman was
commenting on the failure of the Federal Reserve to act as
a LLR during the 1930s financial crisis.
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State bank notes."15
In his view, the implication of the introduction of Deposit
insurance is that the lender of last resort is no longer
necessary. This over-simplifies the issue however: although
individual deposits may be insured, a run on the system as
a whole would induce a move en masse to convert deposits
into currency and thus would imply the bankruptcy of the
underwriters. 16 In this situation, the only possible
underwriters are the government/central bank, since the
latter is endowed with the ability to create currency and
thus satisfy a (temporary) increased demand.
One of the major criticisms of banking systems covered
by deposit insurance is that the existence of insurance
increases the likelihood of moral hazard. This argument is
eloquently proposed by, among others, Flarmery (1982). He
asserts that the existence of deposit insurance gives
participating bankers:
"..an artificial incentive to undertake more
risk than they would do in an unregulated and
uninsured free market. Bankers insured by FDIC
can benefit privately by undertaking risks that
15 Op cit, pp.21.
16 f course, the incentive to cash in deposits exists
only if coverage of deposits is not 100 per cent, or if the
cut-off point is sufficiently low such that it is in the
interest of large numbers of people to liquidate their
deposits. Otherwise, in a rational society with 100 per
cent deposit insurance, bank runs should never occur. This
should be so even though, it can be argued, the incidence
of individual bank failures may be higher due to the moral
hazard effects of deposit insurance. Thus, the trade-off is
between preventing bank runs occurring and increasing the
incidence of moral hazard such that the number of bank
failures increases.
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society as a whole considers excessive. n17
An alternative way to try and bring about the optimal
allocation of resources involved in deposit insurance is to
make premia dependent on portfolio risk. This has been
proposed by many economists and rests on the assumption
that if premiums are independent of portfolio risk then
banks will hold the riskiest portfolios of assets available
to them. 18
 However, the problem here is how to set the
insurance premiums. Kareken (1983)19 identifies lack of
knowledge of individual bank portfolios and agreement of
opinion20 as being two problems associated with calculating
the risk of a particular portfolio. Up to the present
time, 21 no risk-dependent deposit insurance systems have
been established, even though it is widely agreed that they
would be beneficial. This is mainly due to the practical
17 Flannery (1982), pp.18.
18 A slight variant on this is proposed by Mayer
(1975). He suggests that risk dependent deposit insurance
premiums should make up only a component of total deposit
insurance. This, he argues, would be sufficient to reduce
moral hazard effects. For example, a bank could be required
to obtain private insurance for the first $lOm or 5 per
cent of deposits, with the FDIC covering losses above this.
Of course, in this case insurance companies would charge
higher premiums on what they considered to be higher risk
portfolios.
19 This article is entitled rather aptly "Deposit
Insurance Reform or Deregulation is the Cart, not the Horse."
20 That is, the lack of independent benchmarks with
which to judge banks.
21 Summer 1988
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problems involved.22
We will now continue by taking two examples (the U.S.
and the U.K.) as an illustration of the different ways in
which deposit insurance is implemented in practice, in
order that its theoretical implications may be examined in
the context of practical cases.
3.1.1: Deposit Insurance in the United States.
The U.S. currently has a far wider deposit insurance
system in operation than exists anywhere else in the world.
According to McCarthy (1980) the first formalised system of
deposit insurance was set up in 1829 in New York State. It
was inspired by a Cantonese merchant's "mutual guarantee"
scheme, and it insured both notes and deposits. It was
short-lived however: the panic of 1837 caused several such
schemes to collapse, and by the late nineteenth century
there were no schemes in existence.
The official American deposit insurance scheme was
largely based on a system of credit and deposit insurance
set up in Czechoslovakia in 1924, which was intended
22 One way in which it may be possible to implement
risk dependent deposit insurance has been outlined by Ronn
& Verma (1986). They outline a method for calculating risk-
adjusted premia, using data on the market value of equity,
and produce a table (page 882) of risk-adjusted deposit
premia for forty-three U.S. banks for 1983. It is
interesting to note that several banks which have had
problems since 1983 would have had to pay higher than
average deposit premia, had this system been in force. This
method and calculation of premia has the advantage that it
relies on data which is market determined, not data which
are provided by bank management.
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primarily to aid illiquid (but solvent) banks. When a bank
failed the deposit insurance fund covered up to 80 per cent
of deposits. The first move towards establishing a similar
institutional framework for deposit insurance in the U.S.
took place in 1932 when the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation was set up in an attempt to combat the massive
number of bank failures that had occurred in the 1920s and
early l930s. 23 This was formalised in the 1933 Banking Act
which established a deposit insurance system under the
direction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). The aim of the FDIC was to:
"purchase, hold and liquidate..... . the assets
of banks which have been closed; and to insure
the deposits of all banks."24
Thus it was hoped that deposit insurance would go some way
towards strengthening the banking system and stabilising
the economy. This aim was achieved to a certain extent,
since there has been no repeat of the 1930s phenomenon.25
In its operations to sort out a bank failure the FDIC has
the use of four possible procedures:
(1)	 The direct repayment of insured deposits.
23 There had been more than 11,000 bank failures
between 1921 and 1933. For further details see Friedman &
Schwartz (1963).
24 See Varvel (1976).
25 In the twelve years after the establishment of the
FDIC (1934-46) there were only 497 bank failures (see Table
1, pp.590 in Horvitz, 1975). However, recent experience has
substantially added to this total.
It is possible, of course, that conditions may have changed
during these years, so as to make any re-occurrence of the
1930's experience unlikely, independently of any FDIC
stabilisation policies.
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(2) The protection of all deposits by organising a merger
or takeover of the failed institution. This is known
as deposit assumption.
(3) Making loans direct to the troubled institution in
order that it is able to continue operating.
(4) Operating a "Deposit Insurance National Bank" for a
maximum of two years in order to provide a breathing
space before final arrangements are made.
The second method is that which is most frequently used,
since it is often much cheaper for the FDIC to do this than
to pay off depositors. In fact between 1985 and 1987, the
FDIC followed this option in 80 per cent of bank
insolvencies. 26
In the post Second World War period deposit insurance
has been very important in the United States. At the end of
1980, 98.2 per cent of all conunercial banks were eligible
for FDIC protection, and by 1982 79.8 per cent of all bank
deposits were insured. 27
 In addition to a deposit insurance
fund, the FDIC has a "blank cheque" on the U.S. Treasury:
it can draw up to $3b immediately and any additional funds
needed after a short delay. The insurance fund is financed
by annual contributions levied on member institutions; each
institution pays 0.083 per cent of its total deposit
balances, some of which may be refunded after running costs
and fund-additions have been subtracted. In recent years
this refund has reduced the premiums to between 0.03-0.04
26 International Business Week, April 4th 1988, pp.26.
27 Flannery (1982), pp.18.
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per cent of total deposits. 28 As is usual in deposit
insurance systems, there is a cut-off point above which
deposits are not covered. This has increased since the
establishment of the FDIC: in 1933 it was $2,500, in 1976
$40,000, and at present it is $100,000. However, unlike
certain other systems of deposit insurance, coverage up to
this threshold is 100 per cent.
Bank failures, together with those of Savings and
Loans (S & Ls) 29 have occurred frequently in the U.S. in
recent years. For example, in 1987 184 American banks
failed, which was the single largest number in any year
since the establishment of the FDIC, and it is possible
that 1988 will see an equivalent or even greater number
fail, since in the first quarter there were 44 failures
recorded. 3 ° These failures were mainly in specific sectors,
such as agriculture or energy, and/or in specific
geographical areas, such as Texas or the Midwest. Since the
economy of these areas is so dependent on the industries
concerned, it can be argued that the externalities
associated with bank failures in these areas are much
greater. In addition, the other major reason explaining
28 Op cit, pp.18.
29 These institutions are similar in status and aims
to U.K. Building Societies, and are regulated by the S & L
equivalent of the FDIC: FSLIC (Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation). According to a recent article in
The Observer (3rd April 1988), FSLIC itself is now
technically insolvent, having "rescued" 345 insolvent S &
Ls in 1987.
30 Data from International Business Week, April 4th
1988, pp.44.
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both recent American bank failures and the downturn in bank
profits internationally is of course the Third World debt
problem.
However, many other countries are afflicted with the
same economic problems as the U.S. 31 without suffering from
a great spate of bank failures. 32 This can be explained by
the nature and history of the American financial system.
Until recently interstate banking was not possible in the
U.S., 33 with the result that hundreds of banks grew up,
serving small communities, some of these banks having
perhaps only one or a few branches. These banks, confined
to one State, could not grow sufficiently in order to widen
their asset base and escape from concentrating their
activities in one economic sector. Thus as soon as there
was a downturn in the property sector, or a fall in
agricultural or oil prices, or whatever, banks heavily
dependent on these sectors start failing, and, if contagion
sets in, the financial system of the State can almost "go
under"
31 For example the falls in energy and primary product
prices generally.
32 Of course, in most countries smaller numbers of
banks exist so that failures on the scale seen in the U.S.
are impossible.
3 This had been prohibited by the McFadden Act of
1927.
An example of fairly widespread financial distress
is occurring at the present time in Texas. In September
1987 the First City Bancorporation appealed to the FDIC for
aid, and a plan was set into motion whereby the ailing bank
was to be taken over by the First Republic Bank of Dallas,
the thirteenth largest bank in the States. However, in mid
(continued...)
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Over the last few years there has been a great debate
(mainly concentrated in the U.S.) as to the relevance of
deposit insurance, as discussed earlier. Many economists
assert that it increases banker's risk portfolios, others
that in order for it to bring some positive benefit to
society at least some of the insuring of deposits should be
undertaken by private companies rather than (as at present)
completely by a government agency. The central point of all
debate about deposit insurance however has to remain the
fact that as a deterrent to bank runs it protects only the
individual depositor. Once a run has gathered steam and
become system wide, deposit insurance is irrelevant and
only the Central Bank can intervene in its capacity as a
lender of last resort to halt the run and prevent any
substantial decline in the money supply. It is in this way
that deposit insurance can be considered only as a
prevention (and then sometimes only partial) rather than as
a cure to the problem of bank runs. 35 Furthermore, as long
as there is no 100 per cent coverage of deposits 36 and/or
34(. . .continued)
March 1988 it was announced that First Republic itself had
appealed to the FDIC, as it had problems apparently
resulting from its takeover of First City. In one week,
just before the announcement of its problems, $600m was
withdrawn from its major branch in Dallas.
The only way deposit insurance is an alternative to
the LLR is if coverage is 100 per cent and without an upper
threshold, and even then there may be a delay in the
repayment of funds, leaving some incentive to cash
deposits. The problem here of course is that moral hazard
has increased: there is no incentive for banks to operate
safely.
36 As exists in some countries, for example the U.K.:
see later section.
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a lag in receiving insurance claims, the initial incentive
for depositors to withdraw their funds from a bank they
believe to have problems still exists, thus in some cases
giving rise to a run.
3.1.2: Deposit Insurance in Britain.
Deposit insurance did not exist in Britain until 1982,
although the first mention of it was made at governmental
level in the 1976 White Paper on ume Licencing of Deposit
Taking Institutions". 37 This was the precursor to the
Banking Act (1979) which achieved two aims: licencing
deposit taking institutions in Britain and providing for
the introduction of a deposit protection scheme. The main
intention of the latter was to protect small depositors,
hence the relatively low cut-off point of £lO,000,38 and in
order to try to reduce the effects of moral hazard only 75
per cent of a single deposit is protected. 39 It was not a
voluntary scheme: all banks wishing to be considered as
deposit taking institutions were forced to subscribe.
The first stage towards the implementation of deposit
Cinnd. 6584, August, London: HNSO.
38 This limit was raised to £20,000 in the 1987
Banking Act.
The 1979 Act was in fact repealed by a new Act,
which came into force on October 1st 1987, and developed as
a response to the Johnson Matthey affair. This new Act left
the deposit protection element of the 1979 Act largely
unchanged, except that the protection limit was increased
to 75 per cent of £20,000. It also allowed for these
figures to be altered by "statutory instrument".
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insurance under the 1979 Act was the authorisation of
deposit taking institutions which took place in the
eighteen months after the passage of the Act. About six
hundred institutions were authorised; certain overseas
banks with U.K. branches were exempted from the scheme. The
requirement for exemption was that they should be at least
as well covered by deposit insurance schemes in their
country of origin as they would be under the British
scheme.
Contributions to the deposit insurance fund in the
U.K. are levied in a slightly different way than in, for
example, the U.S. Apart from an initial contribution,
member institutions are not expected to make annual
contributions irrespective of the size of the fund. Initial
contributions when the fund was initiated in February 1982
were worked out in order that the cash fund should have a
balance of between £5m and £6m. The exact amount that each
institution paid varied between £2,50040 and £300,000, and
was determined by their deposit base (that amount of
deposits that were eligible for protection should the
institution fail), with a maximum contribution (initial
plus any further contributions they may be asked to make)
of 0.3 per cent of the institution's deposit base. This
reveals a potential weakness in the scheme, since the
present total deposit base of all member institutions is
approximately £lOObmn, whereas the total possible amount of
40 This minimum payment figure was raised to £10,000
in the 1987 Banking Act.
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contributions is approximately £290m. The wide disparity
between these two figures would mean that if a run on the
banking system as a whole did occur, the Bank of England
would have to be relied upon as a lender of last resort,
since the Deposit Protection Fund would be very quickly
bankrupt. This illustrates the general problem with deposit
insurance: it works well at insuring against occasional
bank failures but if its coverage is not complete, leaving
the incentive for deposit withdrawal still in place, it is
useless in protecting the system as a whole. 4 ' As
previously stated, in the case of a system-wide run, the
only possible underwriter is the government or central bank
itself.42
Since its inauguration, the Deposit Protection Board
has dealt with fourteen failures of small licenced deposit
taking institutions, paying out between £7,500 and £2m.
This meant that by the end of February 1988 the deposit
protection fund stood at almost £4.8m.43
Thus the primary aim of the Deposit Protection Fund is
to safeguard the interests of small depositors, whilst at
the same time limiting the opportunities for moral hazard
by covering only 75 per cent of deposits eligible for
41 The aim of the U.K. scheme was to protect deposits,
not to avoid runs, which is one reason why coverage is not
complete.
42 This is particularly true in the British case,
where coverage is only 75 per cent and thus there is still
a significant incentive for the public to encash their
deposits.
£ Reports of the Deposit Protection Board (1985-
1988), Bank of England.
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insurance. It seems to have worked moderately well since
its inception, although the feeling still remains that any
major failures would be handled directly be the Bank of
England without recourse to the Deposit Protection Fund, as
was the case in autumn 1984 with Johnson Matthey Bankers
Ltd. 44
 In addition, one of the major problems with the
scheme is that it is not heavily publicised: most people
are unaware that it exists, and thus in the event of a
major crisis it is doubtful whether it would play any major
role.45
One final point that should be made here is that the
idea of deposit insurance was strongly opposed by the
London Clearing Banks, 46 who felt that such a scheme was
unnecessary since a LLR already existed. What they had
overlooked however was that banks did fail, with a
consequent loss to depositors, and it was the prevention of
these losses that the Bank of England was attempting to
In this case the Bank of England stepped in and
bought, for a nominal fee of £1, an insolvent licenced
bank. The justification for this action was apparently the
instability that may have resulted in the London Gold
Market had the bank been allowed to fail. Johnson Matthey
Bankers was a subsidiary of Johnson Matthey Bullion
Dealers, one of the five inenthers of the London gold market.
Another member was Samuel Montagu, a subsidiary of Midland
Bank, which was itself experiencing slight difficulties at
the time after its purchase of Crocker National Bank of San
Francisco. It was this link that the Bank of England felt
was sufficient reason to intervene and save the insolvent
bank.
Only if a deposit insurance scheme is known about
can it have any hope of preventing a run. The U.K.
situation can be contrasted with that of the U.S., where
every bank insured by the FDIC displays a prominent notice
giving details of the coverage provided.
46 These banks hold 90 per cent of insurable deposits.
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achieve with Deposit Protection Scheme. 47 In effect,
deposit insurance was intended by the Bank to be a
complement rather than a substitute to the LLR. 48 The same
antipathy towards the introduction of deposit insurance was
never apparent in the U.S. because of the large number of
banks (ie a smaller concentration). If banks are much
smaller, it is far harder to offset losses suffered by one
section of a bank elsewhere in its organisation.49
3.2: Greater Information on Banks.
It can be argued that if information available about
banks and financial institutions were more complete, bank
runs would not be a problem. To a certain extent this point
has been made earlier in this chapter: if sufficient
information is available for people to differentiate
between problem banks and ones that are under no insolvency
threat, mass panic is avoidable. At present however, this
sort of information is generally unavailable, both in the
As previously stated, the Bank of England dealt
with fourteen failures of licenced institutions between
1982 and 1988. The real argument here is why the sort of
banks which failed are protected in the first place. The
institutions concerned are on the whole small and not well
known, thus in order for depositors to use them in the
first place deposit/borrowing conditions must be
favourable. If this is so, why should depositors gain from
favourable conditions without taking on any extra risk?
48 This is, of course, not the role that deposit
insurance is intended to play in theory.
In contrast to the U.K. experience, the system of
deposit insurance in France is run by the banks themselves,
with no direct intervention from the Banque de France.
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U.K and in the U.S.A., and so runs remain a possibility.
Writers proposing an increase in the information
available (for example Beenstock, 1987) believe that the
role of government in the financial system is not to act as
a LLR but to make markets more efficient by removing
inhibiting regulations and to enforce financial
institutions to disclose information more fully. 50 Under
these conditions the need for the LLR is redundant.
There are problems with this argument however. Even if
information were available, there would undoubtedly be a
time lag before its publication, thus making it out of date
and possibly inaccurate, and furthermore, now that
institutions can shift enormous sums of money in a matter
of seconds, it is conceivable that accurate and up to date
information can never be available to the general public.51
It seems therefore that a world of complete and
perfect information would not only imply that a LLR is
unnecessary, but also that bank runs would never occur.
Although this situation would seem to be "ideal", it is
hypothetical, and it must be doubtful whether such a
50 An interesting practical point here is how to make
financial institutions disclose more information: might
this not involve more legislation that would inhibit market
efficiency?
51 This situation can be contrasted with that which
occurred in the nineteenth century when, although
information dissemination through the press was less
prevalent, the use of banks was generally confined to
people who were likely to be aware of the financial
situation. Now however, with the majority of the adult
population possessing a bank account, the media has come to
play a much more vital role in informing the public about
financial affairs.
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situation can exist in the foreseeable future.52
3.2.1: "Free Banking" as a Substitute for the LLR.
It has been argued (eg Smith,1936, White,1984) that
free banking53 can in itself be a substitute for the LLR.
This is so, it is argued, because inherent in any free
banking system is an element of self-regulation: the degree
of competition in the system implies that banks do not
indulge in unnecessary risk-taking.
White (1984) studies the system of free banking in
existence in Scotland in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century and found that, compared to the English
system during the same period, the Scottish financial
system displayed a high degree of stability. This, he
concludes, was a direct result of the unregulated system in
operation in Scotland, and occurred despite, or perhaps
52 In a study of the operation of American Nineteenth
century commercial-bank clearing houses (CBCH), Gorton and
Mullineaux (1987) look at the ability of "the market" to be
self-regulating. They analyse the role of the CBCH as a
regulatory institution, which it became, even though it was
originally established in order to reduce the costs of
cheque clearance. They conclude that, on this evidence, the
existence of information asymmetries in banking make it
unlikely that markets can self-regulate, and further that
the development of CBCHs was an example of "...an
endogenous 'regulatory' response to the problems associated
with the asymmetric distribution of information in the
banking industry".
"Free" banking can be defined as a "...system under
which there are no political restrictions on the business
of issuing paper currency convertible into full-bloodied
coin" (White, 1984,pp.l). It basically describes a
situation where there is no government or central bank
monopoly of the issue of legal tender.
44
because of, the fact that there was no LLR in the Scottish
system: no one bank standing ready to provide liquidity in
the event of need. 54
 He gives two major reasons to explain
the low level of failures:
(1) The competitive pressure on banks to "make themselves
solid". This they achieved by a combination of
establishing a corporate identity and by holding as
low a level of other bank's liabilities as possible.
The latter was accomplished by frequent "note
exchanges" and by holding their own reserves.
(2) Unlimited liability: in the event of a failure there
was no reason for depositors to rush for currency,
since there was never any doubt that shareholders'
personal wealth was great enough: Scottish banks had
hundreds of shareholders. 55
 The possibility of
illiquidity whilst claims were being sorted out was
negated by the competition for the customers of the
failed institution, which led other banks to accept
the notes since their eventual redemption was not in
doubt.
In Scotland, as in England, there was a preference for
locally issued notes; with these notes the issuer was
frequently known by the holder of the note. In Scotland
however, this preference was countered by an extensive
Eugene White (1987) finds a similar result for the
brief Free Banking episode that occurred during the French
Revolution.
This did not apply in England where the country
banks had relatively few shareholders.
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branching network, whereas the problem in England was that
the high risk of failure associated with country bank notes
had to be traded off against the fact that Bank of England
notes were subject to forgery.
It may seem at the outset therefore that one of the
reasons for the relative stability of the Scottish system,
as compared to the English experience in the same period,
was that there was more information available on the
Scottish banks, and that this may have implications for
current policy. However, in the Scottish case the
information was provided by the existence of a large number
of branches, 56 whereas the contemporary problem of
insufficient information is not tied up with a bank's lack
of "brand identification", but rather with a lack of
knowledge as to the real state of their balance sheet.
Bagehot of course preferred free banking as a system,
but felt that the English institutional structure was too
well established for it to be altered, and so sought to
make the best of the existing situation.
3.3: The Lender of Last Resort.
Another method of avoiding financial crises, that
which is the major subject of this study, is the lender of
last resort (LLR). The term itself is a description of the
56 Wood (1984) makes the point that it is not only the
large number of branches possessed by Scottish banks but
also their local nature: it was easy to acquire information
as to the banks' status.
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central bank's action to preserve the liquidity of the
financial system, and is first found in the early
nineteenth century in France, 57 but the policy prescription
itself was primarily publicised in Walter Bagehot's Lombard
Street, published in 1873. In this book Bagehot argued that
the Bank of England had a duty to act as the financial
system's final source of liquidity: since it held the "sole
banking reserve of the country" it was under an obligation
to "make unlimited advances on proper security to anyone
who applies for it". 58 However, these advances should be
made at a penal rate which will:
"operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable
timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of
applications by persons who do not require it."59
This rule has long been remembered in the form "lend freely
at high interest rates".
Although Bagehot's outspokenness was criticised by
some of his contemporaries, 60
 his "rule" was fairly soon
accepted. The idea that central banks should stand ready
and willing to aid the financial system in a period of
financial crisis is now part of economic orthodoxy, but the
worldwide problems of the banking system, both in the
57 In fact, "dernier ressort" is a French legal term
meaning the point beyond which it is impossible to make an
appeal.
58 Lombard Street, pp.159-160 (first appeared in The
Economist of September 22nd 1866, of which Bagehot was the
editor.)
9 op cit 1
 pp.187.
60 See Hankey (1867) and discussion later in this
section.
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l970s and presently, have led to a lively debate as to the
appropriateness of Bagehot's policy prescription, together
with an attempt to develop a more precise definition of
what to do and when.61
Humphrey (1975) specified four main points that need
to be addressed when considering the role that the LLR
should play in the control of financial crises. Firstly,
should the central bank direct its actions towards avoiding
the initial bank failure, or towards containing the panic?
The first of these implies that the central bank's main
responsibility is to individual banks rather than to the
market. This draws on the illiquidity-insolvency debate
which will be discussed later in this chapter.62
Linked to this is the second point: what is the
primary objective of the LLR? Here Humphrey identifies four
possibilities:
(1) to prevent bank failures per se.
(2) to prevent financial institutions from having to
sell assets at "fire sale" prices (ie the price
that can be obtained immediately, normally
below the equilibrium price). If this happened
on a wide enough scale it would lead to a
general fall in asset prices.
(3) to ensure financial institutions are able to
61 Another phenomenon that has increased debate is the
so-called Global Debt Crisis, that is, the situation many
Lesser Developed Countries are experiencing with regard to
their massive foreign debts.
62 Section 4.
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cover their loan commitments.
(4)	 to prevent a collapse in the money stock caused
by multiple bank failures and widespread panic.
This final objective is regarded by economists as being by
far the most important.
Once action has been decided upon by the central bank,
the next question is how to implement it. Here there are
two main methods: open market operations and loans though
the discount market. The latter may take place at or above
market rates; as previously mentioned Bagehot favoured
penal rates in order to deter borrowers who were not
desperate for funds. This implies a rationing of credit by
price rather than non-price methods, and might well improve
the allocative efficiency of the financial system, since
institutions will not be prepared to pay a penalty rate if
cash is available anywhere else at a cheaper price. The
former method however does not attempt to allocate cash to
particular institutions; the central bank merely injects
cash into the market through the purchase of government
securities. It has been argued (Barth & Keleher,1984) that
this method of implementing a policy for a financial crisis
is superior to the use of the discount window since it is
both consistent with and a fundamental part of long run
monetary control.
Humphrey's final point with regard to the role of the
LLR is whether the latter's role in averting multiple bank
runs and financial crisis is in conflict with its monetary
control function. Here the vital question is whether it is
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possible for a central bank to act as a LLR: to increase
the monetary base suddenly and quickly, whilst maintaining
a long term trend of stable monetary growth. In theory this
is possible, since the central bank's cash injection into
the system is essentially temporary, lasting only as long
as the crisis. Thus there is no real conflict between the
actions of the LLR and monetary control. 63
 In practice
however it is debatable whether the central bank would be
willing (or able) to reduce the monetary base by the
relevant amount and thus return to trend growth.64
Bagehot's own view on some of these questions is
illuminating. He did not conceive of the role of the LLR as
being to bail out banks that had been mismanaged; rather,
its purpose was to minimise the secondary effects of severe
crises affecting the whole banking system. He gave several
examples of events that could provoke such crises, 65 and
concluded that:
".. .no cause is more capable of producing a
panic,.., as the failure of a first-rate joint
stock bank in London."66
Bagehot's emphasis was thus on the market rather than on
63 See Barth & Keleher (1984).
64 Since H = mB, all the central bank is doing is
counteracting the fall in the money multiplier by
increasing the monetary base, and so the only other action
needed is to reduce the base by the appropriate amount once
the reserve and deposit ratios, and thus the money
multiplier, have recovered.
65 "... a bad harvest, an apprehension of sudden
invasion, the sudden failure of a great firm which
everybody trusted...." 	 (Lombard Street pp.118.)
66 Op cit, pp.251.
50
particular institutions; he sought to generate a means by
which the system as a whole could be provided with extra
liquidity. 67 He also stressed the difference between the
central bank giving ex-post support to the system during a
crisis, and ex-ante assurance that aid would be available.
The latter, he felt, would greatly increase confidence in
the system, which would help to avert future panics.68
So far we have concentrated on the Bagehot rule of
"lending freely at high interest rates". However, this is
in fact the appropriate response to only an internal drain;
he made a distinction between the suitable policies for
internal and external drains. The respective policies are
in fact totally different and to a certain extent mutually
exclusive. In the face of an external drain the central
bank should, he said, "protect the reserve": increase the
discount rate sharply to both attract foreign capital and
retain domestic funds. This move was necessary to protect
the gold reserve in order that the convertibility of the
paper currency into gold could be maintained. This second
"Bagehot Rule" is frequently forgotten in contemporary
discussion of Bagehot however, since the demise of the gold
standard has meant that the distinction between internal
67 Another indication that, had they been developed in
Bagehot's time, he might have preferred open market
operations to re-discounting, since the former are intended
to help the market as a whole.
68 This idea was to cause much future controversy: see
section 5.1.
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and external drains does not carry the same importance.69
Thus it can be argued that the need for a LLR arises
from the combination of two characteristics of the existing
financial system: fractional reserve banking 7 ° and the
government monopoly of the issue of legal tender. 71 As
already argued however, there are alternatives to the LLR
(eg deposit insurance and greater information), and there
are also serious problems with the Bagehotian view of the
former which we will now go on to consider. Firstly
however, we will discuss how Bagehot's idea of giving aid
only to the system has in practical terms come to mean only
distinguishing between insolvent and illiquid institutions.
69 The problems raised by these two (sometimes
conflicting) policy rules will be discussed in section 5.2.
Currently, if a cash drain from the banking system goes
overseas, there may well be pressure on the exchange rate,
as well as a fall in the money supply, but under floating
exchange rates this pressure does not matter in itself,
unless there is an implicit floor below which the
government/central bank does not want the exchange rate to
fall.
70 Under 100 per cent reserve banking bank runs would
not be possible, and because no other institution can meet
an abnormal demand for cash the responsibility inevitably
falls on the LLR. The case for 100 per cent reserves is
proposed by Friedman (1960), taken up by him after it had
been originally proposed by Simons (1936).
71 The situation under Free Banking has already been
discussed. For an excellent discussion of the issues
arising from an economy with private money, together with
an analysis of the Scottish experience, see White (1984).
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4: Insolvency Versus Illiquidity.
At the heart of any contemporary discussion of bank
failures and the lender of last resort is the difference
between illiquidity and insolvency. This is of vital
importance when analysing the actions of a central bank or
indeed when defining the role of the lender of last resort.
What has come to be known as the "Bagehot" case for last
resort intervention allows the granting of emergency aid by
the central bank to the system as a whole, not to a
particular institution that finds itself to be short of
funds. This implies that if the financial markets find
themselves to be illiquid (for whatever reason) the central
bank will stand ready to make liquidity available by
advancing on or discounting "good paper": securities that
are regarded both by the Bank and by the market to be
sound. To quote Bagehot himself:
"...that it (the Bank of England) must in time of
panic do what all similar banks must do; ...it
must advance freely and vigorously to the public
out of the reserve. And with the Bank of England,
as with all other Banks in the same case, these
advances ,. ., should be made so as if possible
to obtain the object for which they are made. The
end is to stay the panic; and the advances
should, if possible, stay the panic... The only
safe plan for the Bank is the brave plan, to lend
in a panic on every kind of current security, or
every sort on which money is ordinarily and
usually lent. This policy may not save the Bank,
but if it do not, nothing will save it." 72
Bagehot's preoccupation with the granting of emergency last
resort aid to the system as opposed to giving it to an
72 Lombard Street, pp.98.
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individual institution has in recent years become
overshadowed by the related but more complicated debate
about illiquidity versus insolvency. 73 A consistent policy
towards bank failures can be regarded as one which
concentrates on distinguishing whether a bank is insolvent
as opposed to being merely illiquid. If the former is the
case, a central bank is not theoretically justified in
granting any emergency last resort aid to the institution
concerned, although it may still support the system as a
whole through the use of discounting or advancing on
acceptable paper. The troubled institution should be
allowed to fail, with consequent losses suffered by
shareholders, management and perhaps by depositors. 74
 If
the problem institution is found to be merely illiquid
however, action taken by the central bank to ease the
institution's liquidity problems may in practice, although
not in theory, be justified. The problem which then arises
is how to distinguish between a sound and an unsound
institution, since there have been many examples of cases
It can be postulated that the reason for this is
the fear central banks have about the externality effects
of bank failures, which are arguably sometimes over
exaggerated. In addition, we have seen cases in the U.S.
recently when it has been cheaper for the Federal Reserve
to bail out banks, rather than let them fail and then pay
out deposit insurance, due to the prohibitive costs
involved in executing the latter option. However, in this
case we have to think about our definition of "cheaper".
Although in the short run it may cost less in monetary
terms for a central bank to take over a failed institution,
this policy may have long run costs associated with it that
are difficult to quantify, in that bank bail outs may
increase moral hazard among bank managers.
Depending on the existence and coverage of deposit
insurance.
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where the issue has been somewhat unclear, such as the
rescue of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) by the Bank of
England in 1984 and the Federal Reserve's actions in saving
Continental Illinois also in 1984. In these two cases a
clear question of insolvency was involved and thus it could
be argued that the central banks concerned were wrong in
their decision to intervene.75
In theoretical terms, distinguishing between solvent
and insolvent institutions is relatively simple. An
institution becomes insolvent when the current value of its
net worth declines to zero. Following the analysis outlined
above, it is at this point that there is no justification
for the granting emergency aid to the institution
concerned. In practice the exact point at which an
institution's net worth reaches zero is difficult to
pinpoint. In addition, a bank that is initially solvent may
be rendered insolvent as a direct consequence of a run on
the banking system, making clear definitions of solvency
difficult.
The first of these problems, the difficulty in
establishing the state of an institution's balance sheet,
arises because of the difficulty in forcing institutions to
reveal the necessary information. To take the case of
Johnson Matthey, returns that should have been made to the
Bank of England in March 1984 were delayed until June of
that year. This delayed the diagnosis of the bank's
Of course, in both these cases the central banks
concerned will defend their actions on externality grounds.
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problems until early August, a meeting between JNB
Directors and the Bank's supervisory department having been
delayed front July at the request of JNB (Moran, 1986). Even
at this point a complete report of the bank's balance sheet
was not made available and so the full extent of its
position was not realised.
Established theory implies that in the above case JMB
should have been declared insolvent as soon as the Bank of
England established the true position of the bank. 76
 This
would have limited the secondary effects on the financial
community as a whole, since if complete information had
been given on the nature of JMB's problems it would have
been obvious that the problems were specific to 3MB and
thus there would have been no danger of contagion. This
then would have been an alternative policy to that followed
by the Bank of England (which was to step in and indemnify
the bank's losses), a policy that was in fact costly to the
tax payer.
Returning to the question of the determination of an
institution's solvency, the difference between illiquidity
and insolvency is more easily identifiable if "fire sale"
definitions of asset prices are used (Benston et al, 1986),
where the "fire sale" price is the price obtained for an
asset if it is sold immediately, taking into account the
lack of time available for search efforts and also
76 An indication of the scale of JMB's problems was
that the Bank of England could find no single institution
(or even a consortium) which was willing to take JMB
aboard. (Moran, 1986).
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information costs. This concept is useful when taking into
account the problems of a financial institution faced with
a deposit drain. The first reaction of a bank in this
situation is to sell assets in order to increase their
supply of cash. They may have to sell at fire sale prices
however, since the over-riding objective of the operation
is to obtain cash quickly, not allowing for time spent in
search efforts. Thus, what started off as a liquidity
problem may end up as a solvency problem if the difference
between equilibrium price 77 and fire sale price is large
enough to reduce the bank's net worth to zero.
In the above case, the decision as to whether an
institution is solvent or not should be judged with respect
to its position at the time of the initiation of the bank
run rather than at the time at which it is requesting aid,
to see whether it was solvent at the initial point in terms
of equilibrium, not fire sale, prices. If it was solvent in
terms of equilibrium values but has trouble meeting a
deposit drain due to the effect of lower fire sale prices,
emergency aid is justified since all the institution needs
in order to recover is time.
There are other related reasons why aiding insolvent
institutions is economically inefficient. One of these is
that aiding insolvent institutions impairs market
discipline in two ways: firstly because it makes other
institutions believe that they will never be allowed to
'' ie the price that would be obtained if "reasonable"
search time was available. (Benston, 1986,pp.43)
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fail no matter what they do (an increase in moral hazard),
and secondly because the granting of emergency aid to a
troubled institution gives a signal to the rest of the
market that the institution is fundamentally sound and is
experiencing only temporary problems. Thus the market
itself may be more willing to grant aid.
Given that theory clearly states that in an ideal
world central banks should only grant aid to the market as
a whole, but that there are certain cases whereby the
provision of liquidity to an institution that is illiquid
may be justified (where there is no question of
insolvency), why is it that examples abound whereby banks
which are widely known to be insolvent have emergency last
resort aid granted to them? Several reasons explaining this
phenomenon can be identified. Firstly, as already mentioned
it is often very difficult to establish whether or not an
institution is insolvent. Many banking regulation systems
do not require financial institutions to reveal all the
information necessary to determine the level of solvency,
and even when they do it is often relatively simple for
banks to evade information deadlines, as amply demonstrated
by JMB in the U.K. Even when information is available time
is often so short that a proper examination is not possible
if containment of any panic is a primary aim.78
Another reason given for last resort aid being given
78 In addition, solvency information will always be
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain due to the
highly flexible nature of the prices of the tradeable
assets on which measures of net worth are based.
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to insolvent institutions is the fear of social costs
associated with the failure of banks, especially if they
are large. To a certain extent this fear is mitigated by
the existence of deposit insurance, since many depositors,
especially those with only a small amount deposited will be
covered, but in some cases coverage is only partial, 79 and
so depositors still suffer.
Thus many of the reasons why central banks intervene
and grant aid to even insolvent banks are the same as those
describing the need for the existence of a lender of last
resort in the first place. As stated elsewhere, any
justification for intervention in the case of insolvent
banks can be denied if enough information is released about
a problematic bank to enable the market to realise that
there is no danger of contagion. Until central banks are
forced to make this sort of information public, even
insolvent financial institutions will continue to have
access to emergency funds from the lender of last resort.
However, it could be argued that it is the market that
should decide whether a bank that is experiencing liquidity
problems should be allowed to fail through suffering fire
sale losses. In this case the central bank would support
only the system as a whole, through its discount and
advance operations, leaving other institutions in the
financial markets to decide whether or not a problematic
institution is worthy of their support. If the market as a
whole decides not to shoulder the extra risk incurred in
See earlier section on deposit insurance.
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aiding a troubled institution then it remains a possibility
that the ailing institution will in fact fail, with
consequent effects on shareholders, management and
depositors. This argument carries with it the implication
that everyone associated with a financial institution must
be very aware of the financial position of the institution
with which they are involved, even if the limit of their
involvement is holding a deposit. It is thus assuming a
level of knowledge not normally associated with the general
public: how many people who open a bank account with a U.K.
commercial bank have any idea of the true financial
strength of the bank concerned? Most people are rather more
concerned with the number of branches a bank has, its
convenience etc, rather than with the likelihood of it
failing. It is important to note however that the reason
why the general public in the U.K. has not been worried
about bank failures is because it has not needed to be: the
U.K. high street banks are regarded to be above suspicion
where matters of financial stability are concerned. Because
of this it would seem to be rather unlucky if depositors of
a bank are made to suffer for something that they had
little control over. The other problem is of course that if
depositors of a bank were once made to suffer as a result
of a bank failure, the proportion of the population that
used banking facilities would decline, bringing about a
move back to the greater use of cash and less frequent use
of cheques in the economy as a whole.
Another problem with letting the markets make a
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decision on the solvency or otherwise of an institution is
the fragile nature of the financial markets as a whole: it
can be argued that they are very risk averse where matters
of confidence are concerned. 80
 This again is fundamentally
caused by the lack of information available about troubled
institutions. For example, it is said that in the case of
the JMB failure certain portions of the Far East financial
markets reacted almost immediately to the news that an
important member of the London gold market was under threat
and thus were refusing to deal with any British houses
until they were sure of the exact situation (Moran,1986).
Because of this it has been argued that to a certain extent
the Bank of England 'had its hands tied' in its reactions
to the JMB problem: it was forced to step in and save the
bank because otherwise the situation could have
deteriorated to affect other members of the London Gold
market and possibly other sectors of the financial system.
The alternative view however is that if the Bank of
England had made public enough detail about JMB's situation
to enable people to discount the fear of contagion then the
Bank would not have needed to rescue JMB in the first
place.
In conclusion, the whole focus of the liquidity versus
solvency debate, like so much discussion about the role of
the lender of last resort, seems to revolve around the
question of the amount of information that is revealed
about the institutions concerned. As has been stated
80 Hence the "domino" analogy of financial crises.
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elsewhere, if enough information is available about the
true financial position of a troubled institution to enable
individuals and the market as a whole to dismiss the
possibility of contagion, then the instances when a lender
of last resort bails out an institution that is insolvent
are avoided. However, the current level of information
publication is not sufficient for the markets to formulate
any accurate picture of an institution's real position, and
thus it is at this point that the distinction between
insolvency and illiquidity becomes important, if we accept
the view that there should be some differential between
reactions to an institution that finds itself in
difficulties depending on whether it is judged to be
insolvent or only illiquid. Moreover, the definitions of
solvency and illiquidity used should be those based on fire
sale rather than equilibrium values.
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5: Problems With the LLR.
The difficulties with both the theoretical concept and
the implementation of a policy involving a LLR can be
divided into three main areas: moral hazard, the "Rockoff"
problem and the definition of a penal rate. These will be
dealt with in turn.
5.1: Moral Hazard.
Moral hazard is a problem common to all insurance systems.
In short, it relates to the decrease in care taken by
individuals if they know that they are covered by
insurance. In a non-financial context for example, an
individual whose house contents are insured may take less
care in making sure it is secure.81
The problem of moral hazard in banking was identified
by Thomson Hankey, a Director of the Bank of England, even
before the publication of "Lombard Street", in response to
an article in the "Economist", 82 commenting on a statement
by the Governor of the Bank after the Overend Gurney crisis
and calling for the Bank to be prepared to act as a LLR
whenever necessary. Hankey's views appeared in his book Th
Principles of Bankinc, published in 1867. Bagehot quotes
81 It is obviously for this reason that insurance
companies introduce "excess loadings" on policies: this
shifts some of the burden of cover back onto the insured
individual.
82 Written by Bagehot.
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them extensively in "Lombard Street":
"The Economist newspaper has put forward what is
in my opinion the most mischievous doctrine ever
broached in the monetary or banking world in this
country.....Until such a doctrine is repudiated
by the banking interest, the difficulty of
pursuing any sound principle of banking in London
will always be very great. But I do not believe
that such a doctrine as that bankers are
justified on relying on the Bank of England to
assist them in time of need is generally held by
the bankers in London." 83
Hankey's argument was that if bankers felt that they could
rely on the Bank to help them in time of crisis then their
behaviour would be affected, making them think "good
banking practice" less important and therefore making them
more liable to periods of illiquidity or even insolvency.84
In his era Hankey lacked much support, perhaps because his
views were so opposed to those of Bagehot, which were
becoming the prevailing orthodoxy. However, recent analysis
has put much more stress on the problem of moral hazard and
it now seems that Hankey was not as backward looking as
Bagehot thought.
Current research into moral hazard and the LLR has two
main applications: whether the existence of the LLR makes
bankers less conservative in their behaviour, and the
effect that deposit insurance has on their conduct. The
problem with the latter, as already mentioned in a previous
section, is that in common with all types of insurance its
existence can make bankers more willing to take risks,
83 Lombard Street, pp.162.
84 This is a very early statement of the problem of
moral hazard.
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which in itself can have major consequences for the LLR.
In some ways moral hazard is an insurmountable
problem, since both deposit insurance and the existence of
a LLR are bound to affect bankers' behaviour. This does not
imply however that both methods of preventing bank runs are
redundant, merely that this important problem should not be
forgotten in policy evaluation. Economic theory does not
presently seem to provide any answer to the problem: it
appears that there can be no steps taken towards avoiding
(or at least reducing the effects of) bank runs without
increasing moral hazard.
However, there are certain steps that can be taken in
an attempt to "check" moral hazard. 85
 One of these is the
so-called "English" route, which relies on the "club
spirit" of the City of London. Under this route, the Bank
of England is said to possess the necessary degree of
"moral suasion" to impose its will on the financial
markets. 86
 Thus, if a financial institution were involving
itself in activities thought not to be beneficial to the
system as a whole, the Bank would be able to reprimand the
company concerned and prevent them from continuing with
this policy.87
85 See Hirsch (1977).
86 The extent of the Bank of England's powers in this
regard in the nineteenth century will be discussed in
Chapter Eight.
87 It is often postulated that the Bank of England's
powers in this regard are far more limited now that the
City is increasingly international in emphasis. However,
its degree of control of British institutions is not really
(continued...)
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The second check to moral hazard has already been
mentioned: to include a significant portion of "self-
insurance" in any deposit insurance system. 88 This though
means that the major reason for introducing deposit
insurance in the first place, which is to eradicate the
possibility of bank runs occurring, has been lost.89
5.2: The "Rockoff" Problem.
Another problem with the Bagehotian view of the LLR is that
it was conceived under the Gold Standard. Bagehot had no
experience of any other system of international payments,
and thus his experience under gold was all important in his
policy recommendations.
This problem was first noted by Rockoff (1986), and is
based on the fact that although, as previously mentioned,
Bagehot gave us two policy rules ( to "protect the reserve"
and to "lend freely at high interest rates"), to be used
according to the state of the market, he gave us no
objective criterion on which to judge the latter. The
problem therefore for a central bank is that political
pressure may force it to define a period of market tension
87	 continued)
in doubt: witness the resignations of some of Morgan
Grenfell's top management when only a few of the details of
the Guinness affair were made public.
88 ie to have less than 100 per cent coverage of
deposits.
89 And of course that the problems of deposit
1nsurnce, as already discussed, still apply.
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as a panic, and thus act accordingly, whereas with
hindsight it may appear that the wrong decision was taken.
Rockoff argues that the main problem for the Bank of
England was the Gold Standard: the world supply of gold was
finite, and although the 1844 Act could be suspended, at
the end of the day, if the panic continued, the only choice
available to the authorities was to leave the Standard and
have an inconvertible currency, as occurred from 1797-1821.
To quote Rockoff:
"It is the finite limit to the stock of high
powered money that forces the Bank of England to
constantly look over its shoulder at its
reserves. Under a fiat standard, it could always
lend freely in a crisis." 90
Rockoff also argues that a similar problem to that outlined
above still exists in a world without a fixed exchange
standard, since a central bank's function as a LLR is
likely to conflict with other policy goals, for example
maintaining a trend growth of the money supply.91
His general conclusion is thus that Bagehot's policy
prescription is not as clear as it might seem to be on
first sight: it is not the all-encompassing answer to
banking crises that perhaps it was once hailed to be.
90 Rockoff (1986), pp.?4.
91 However, in an earlier section we have seen that
there is not necessarily a policy conflict here.
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5.3: The Definition of a Penal Rate.
A key component of Bagehot's policy recommendations is the
use of a penal interest rate to ration out central bank
lending. He foresaw no problem in determining the level of
this rate, since in his era inflation was low and
expectations of it were fixed by the Gold Standard. 92 In
recent years however neither of these has been true:
although inflation is now in single figures in all major
Western countries, the experience of the late 1970s and
early 1980s has been such that expectations of inflation
have almost certainly increased, perhaps permanently so.
The problem then in relating Bagehot's penal rate to a
contemporary situation is to determine what constitutes a
penal rate. 93 It is easy to envisage (and in the U.K. we
have in fact experienced) a situation whereby nominal
interest rates are approaching 20 per cent and yet in real
terms are negative ex-post.
In a sense however this problem is fairly easily
overcome through trial and error: 94 if a given "penalty
rate" appears to be insufficiently high for a given crisis,
92 Mills & Wood (1988) argue that although the price
level in the long run was fixed by the Gold Standard, there
could be short run fluctuations in the level of prices.
We would normally expect a penal rate to be judged
in real terms, although in itself there is nothing to
prevent a penal rate from being negative in a real sense.
All that is required is that it is higher than rates
offered elsewhere in the financial markets.
And thus it is not envisaged that it will be a
problem in the context of this thesis.
68
the central bank has only to increase the discount rate
until the required differential between the discount rate
and market rates is reached. 95 For this reason, this third
"Bagehot problem" is perhaps the least serious of those
outlined, and is certainly the easiest to deal with from a
policy perspective.
6: The Time Inconsistency Policy Rule.
In recent years there has been much discussion about
the optimality of economic policy and whether in fact it is
possible to implement a particular policy and obtain the
desired results. The origin of these discussions lies in
the rational expectations and policy ineffectiveness
proposition literature of the mid 1970s, and has led to
the definition of two types of economic policy. It is
useful here to examine these two types and to apply them to
the Bagehot policy rule.
A time consistent policy can be equated to the policy
ineffectiveness proposition whereby in the long run
This interest rate differential argument, mentioned
implicitly but not explicitly by Bagehot, was further
developed by Wicksell (1907) in his work on interest rates
and prices. He argued that high interest rates were
coincident with high prices, but that it was the relative
level of the rate of interest that was significant rather
than its absolute level. Prices were related to the
difference between changes in the real ("natural") rate of
interest and in the nominal rate, and since the central
bank has an important influence over interest rates,
through its discount rate, it also has an input into
prices.
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government policies have no real effect on the economy. In
this situation the government has no credibility: it may
say one thing in the short run and in the long run follow a
completely different policy course, since at some point in
the future it becomes optimal for the government to renege
on its stated policy. However, if a policy is
time-consistent the private sector realises that the
government will renege, and thus adjusts its behaviour
accordingly, including in its expectations of the future
what it calculates to be the long run policy. 96
 The
opposite applies for a time inconsistent policy: the
government has credibility, because it does not succumb to
short run temptation, and thus if the private sector
believes a government will not renege on a given policy the
effects of this policy will be included in their
expectations and will thus have real effects.
Bagehot's main criticism of the Bank of England
Directors was that they showed a lack of precoinmitinent:
they were not prepared to say definitively how they would
react to a financial crisis. 97 His solution was for the
Bank to state that it would act as a LLR, since panics
occurred because people did not know how the Bank would
react. In essence this is a time inconsistent policy rule,
since people know with certainty in advance what the
96 See Currie (1985) for examples of time consistent
and inconsistent policies.
This was one of the major differences between
Bagehot's proclamations on the role of the LLR and those of
his predecessors, for example Henry Thornton, who did not
emphasise the importance of pre-coiiunittment.
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central bank's reaction will be, and the latter does not
change its behaviour dependent on the event's outcome. In
practice however there are two ways for a central bank's
reaction to a financial crisis to be time consistent:
(a) If the central bank's reaction is not known with
certainty in advance.98
(b) If the central bank says it will do one thing and then
does another, for example if it says it will not
intervene and then does so. It can be argued here
that the public knows that whatever the central bank
says in advance it will eventually intervene, and so
they include this in their present behaviour, thus
increasing the possibility of moral hazard.
Another problem is that even though the Bagehot rule is
initially time inconsistent, there is no way that
governments or central banks can be bound to keep to the
rule: governments have shown a great tendency to renege on
past policy commitments. For Bagehot, the optimal policy
here is time inconsistent, in that the central bank makes
some pre-commitment, and he did not recognise that it may
be in the bank/government's self interest to renege on
their stated policy.
98 Neltzer (1986) makes an interesting comment on the
LLR and the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) debt crisis.
He argues that if one or more of these countries defaulted
on their debts there would almost certainly be financial
distress, but whether or not this would be followed by
panic is unknown, due to the fact that the reaction of
central banks and governments is unknown. Thus, uncertainty
is greater than it has to be: the pre-Bagehot position.
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7: Conclusions.
In this chapter we have sought to present a theory of
the role of the LLR. Before examining how the role of the
LLR evolved in the U.K., we have first to be clear about
the theoretical reason why it exists in the first place:
namely due to the fear of the contagion effects of bank
failures leading to large falls in the money supply. Having
outlined the nature of this mechanism, discussed possible
solutions and problems with these, we will now conclude
with a consideration of practical measures designed to
improve the operation of the LLR.
An ideal financial system would be highly developed,
and would include a high degree of competition between
banks. These banks would also have a widespread branch
network, in order to diversify their activities, that is,
some combination of the current situations in the U.K. and
U.S. However, in addition to this there would be complete,
or as near to complete as possible, disclosure of
information. On its own this would be enough to ensure a
far greater level of financial stability than exists
currently, and would eradicate the risk of contagion except
where, as earlier cited, there was a worldwide disaster of
some sort. In this case there would be a need for a LLR,
but this is the only case where the function would be
needed.
However, given that we do not live in an ideal world,
the following are a list of proposals intended to make the
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operations of the LLR more efficient.
(1) Deposit insurance: this should cover 100 per cent of
deposits and should be risk-dependent, in an attempt
to discourage moral hazard. In addition, it should be
efficiently administered in order that there was no
significant delay between the failure of a bank (and
thus the "freezing" of deposits) and repayments to
depositors from the deposit insurance fund. In this
way there should be no incentive for the public to
withdraw deposits from banks and runs would not
therefore occur. In this situation the only function
of a LLR would be to provide liquidity to the system
as a whole in the event of a worldwide catastrophe of
some sort. Other than this, it would be redundant. The
problem here of course is the increase in moral hazard
that may result, even with risk-dependent premia, if
coverage is 100 per cent.
In the U.K., where deposit insurance exists already
but is not publicised, attempts should be made to
increase awareness of its coverage, in order that in
the event of a financial crisis the public realise
that at least a proportion of their deposits are
covered.99
The publicising of the existence of deposit
insurance could be achieved at a very low cost (a notice in
bank branches for example), and would surely have some
positive results, even though the prevention of bank runs
was not one of the stated objectives when the deposit
insurance system was instituted. Rather, the Bank of
England wanted to protect small depositors from the costs
of bank failures.
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(2) LLR: if it is not possible for coverage of deposit
insurance to be complete, or for premia to be risk-
dependent, or that it is judged that the increase in
moral hazard is too great, the role of the LLR becomes
far more important. In this case, the latter should
concentrate on giving aid to the market as a whole,
rather than to particular institutions. It should thus
avoid such "bail-out" operations such as have been
seen occasionally in the U.K. and frequently in the
U.S. in recent years. Aid should be given through a
combination of re-discounting and open-market
operations, in order that the liquidity injection is
as large as possible without favouring particular
institutions.
(3) Precommitment: in order to remove as much uncertainty
as possible, central banks should make explicit
statements about their attitude towards financial
failures. In this way there would be no doubt or
uncertainty about the repercussions of a bank failure,
and, if sufficient information was revealed, the
danger of system-wide contagion would be eradicated.
(4) Information: linked to the above point, as much
information as possible should be revealed about
individual failures, in order that it can be
established that the problem is specific to the failed
institution and not endemic to the financial system as
a whole. Again, this will reduce the possibility of
contagion.
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The above measures, some of which are substitutes for one
another, would contribute to the improved functioning of
the financial system in times of crisis, and of course to a
more efficient allocation of LLR resources. If the LLR
function was executed in this manner, much of the
controversy surrounding financial failures would be
eradicated since central banks would have a clear and
coherent policy on this subject.
In the following chapters we will examine the
development of the role of the U.K. LLR both prior to and
after 1870, in an attempt to establish how and why the Bank
of England reached its present position with respect to its
role as a LLR.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 3RITISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM,
1694-1870.
1: The Origins of Banking
The origin of banking in its modern form can be said
to lie in the late seventeenth century. It was at this time
that the issue of bank notes came into existence and began
to be circulated, particularly in London, thus initiating
the evolution of banking as we know it today.
Although very little is known about the origins of
banking, it is thought that deposit banking had long
preceded the issue of notes. A problem facing possessors of
wealth was where to place it in order to ensure its safety.
It obviously had to be kept in a safe place where risk of
theft would be reduced. For this reason the places where
money was minted and those State institutions which already
possessed large quantities of bullion were often used.
However, after Charles 1 had closed the Mint and
confiscated deposited funds in 1640,1 any implication this
practice may have had for the emergence of banking went
unrealised, since it was felt that the government could no
longer be relied upon.
Merchants then began to keep their funds themselves,
although this too was open to abuse: during the Civil War
several cashiers (those to whom the cash was entrusted)
deserted to Cromwell, taking the funds with them. Thus,
merchants began depositing cash with goldsmiths, a practice
1 At this time merchants engaged in the practice of
using the Mint as a depository for their funds. The money
confiscated by the King was eventually returned to its
owners, but the reputation of the State for trustworthiness
deteriorated.
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next twenty years 4 , only to reappear again when the
government's need for a new source of- revenue became
pressing in order to support its efforts in the war of the
Grand Alliance against France (1689-97). By now, wars were
too expensive to be financed out of current taxation.
2: The Establishment of the Bank of England
The first initiative towards the formation of the Bank
of England was taken in 1691, when William Paterson
proposed a scheme for the establishment of a Bank, which
would be privately owned but would take on certain
responsibilities for state funding. This was not very
favourably received by the government at the time.
Subsequently however, the need for funds became ever more
urgent, and at the start of 1692 Parliament appointed a
Committee to examine the situation.
Another of Paterson's proposals found success in 1693,
when Charles Montagu, one of the Commissioners to the
Treasury, accepted in principle a scheme whereby £l.2m
would be lent to the government at 8 per cent, with a sum
of £4000 allowed for management. The question was debated
in Parliament, and in early May 1694 the Bank of England
was given its Charter under a Ways and Means Act. The 8 per
cent rate of interest agreed on was very moderate with
4 In fact, during this time no new banking companies
were formed. See Horsefield (1982) for further details.
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respect to the fairly urgent position the government was
in, 5
 but in return the subscribers to the- loan received a
considerable privilege. They were to be incorporated as a
joint stock banking company with the right to engage in
banking business: to receive money on deposit, to deal in
Bills of Exchange, etc.
The first installment of the loan was made on August
1st 1694, when £720,000 was paid in cash, including
£480,000 in notes under the seal of the Bank, which were
despatched to the country to purchase much needed army
supplies. These notes were soon accepted as payment in all
parts of England, although they did not circulate in the
north of England in significant quantities until the second
half of the eighteenth century.6
It is clear that although at the time the flotation of
the Bank was successful, with widespread City support, from
a governmental point of view the Act was only passed
because of the desperate need for funds: money was needed
immediately and there appeared to be no other way of
obtaining it. The possibilities emerging from the
foundation of a Bank that would be used to generate the
country's credit were not generally realised: it was this
that was to cause so much controversy in later years.
Although this was a loan secured on State taxes: a
funded loan.
6 An exception to this was during the 1797 crisis when
some of the shortlived £1 and £2 notes appeared. This
incident is explained fully in T.S. Ashton, "The Bill of
Exchange and Private Banks in Lancashire, 1790-1830" in
Ashton & Sayers (1953).
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Although the first Royal Charter of Incorporation was
originally granted to the Bank of England for a period of
eleven years, in 1697 the government renewed and increased
the privileges of the Bank, in return for increased
advances to the government. The working capital of the Bank
was increased by inviting subscriptions, the proceeds being
lent to the government at 8 per cent. In return, the Bank
was granted a monopoly of the possession of government
balances, an assurance that no other bank would be
established by way of a special Act of Parliament, and
finally that the subscribers of the Bank were subject only
to limited liability, a benefit other bankers were not to
enjoy until the mid nineteenth century.7
The Bank suffered its first setback in 1697 when it
was forced to suspend payments. A shortage of si1ve and
gold meant that it was unable to honour its notes in metal,
but it was decided to pay a proportion on each note and
promise by endorsement to pay the rest later. This was a
lesson to the Bank of the need to keep an adequate reserve,
and can be said to be the origin of the bank reserve.
The process of increasing the Bank's capital 8 in return
for increased privileges continued when in 1708 it was
given a virtual monopoly of joint stock banking business.
This was achieved through the exclusion of any bank with
more than six partners from the issue of notes payable on
See Crick & Wadsworth (1936), pp.31.
8 And thus its note issue and advances to the
government.
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demand or within the following six months. Hereafter, the
Bank's Charter was periodically renewed in return for loans
to the government, which was viewed by many as being a fair
exchange between the City and the government.
3: The Development of the Country Banks
From the time of the establishment of the Bank of
England, the English credit system was characterised by the
combination of two formerly separate transactions: the
granting and receiving of credit. Bank of England notes
were created on the basis of its capital, thus it was using
future capital as the basis of its banking operations. This
was true also for the emerging country banks: loans were
made in notes and thus they too were providing future
capital against future capital.
The first country banks had been set up in the early
eighteenth century, largely as a by-product of the main
business of merchants. When banking became more profitable
than their original business, merchants began to specialise
in the former. Their early growth however was slow: records
show that in 1750 there were only twelve country banks in
existence.- 0 The period after 1750 was one of rapid growth
of the banking sector, coinciding with the revolutions that
were occurring in the domains of transport and industry: by
See Pressne].l (1956).
10 Powell (1915) pp. 118.
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1776 approximately 150 country banks were in existence.11
Although the country banks first developed as banks of
deposit, they did not follow the same path of development
as the goldsmith-bankers. Instead, their note issue arose
from the issue of promissory notes. 12 By this time the
country banks could be split into two broad categories
based on function. The banks found in rural areas acted
mainly as banks of deposit, as large balances deriving from
agriculture were placed with them, whereas banks in
industrialising areas were always needing cash in order to
make advances to industry. Since there was a liquidity
imbalance in the system, it was essential that there should
be some means of transferring cash from areas of excess
supply to those of excess demand. This link was provided by
the London (private) bankers. Country banks in rural areas
kept accounts with the London bankers in order that they
could deposit excess funds with them, which enabled the
London banks to accept bills from industrialising areas.
Thus a geographical division between borrowing and lending
counties was established at a very early stage.
This division had important implications for the
development of the Bank of England as a Banker's bank, and
for its future role as a lender of last resort. Since note
issue in London was restricted to the Bank of England, the
private bankers were forced to either have an account at
Op cit, pp. 118.
12 That is, a promise to pay the depositor a certain
sum out of sums deposited.
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the Bank of England or hold Bank of England notes as part
of their reserve. Country bankers sent all their surplus
cash to their London banker, keeping virtually no reserve
of their own. Thus, if a situation arose when they faced a
sudden increased demand for cash, they were obliged to rely
on the London bankers to fulfil these needs. However, since
the London bankers regarded themselves only as
intermediaries between lenders and borrowers of funds, they
kept no special reserves to supply the needs of the country
bankers, and had therefore to rely on the Bank of England
to supply them with the necessary funds. In contrast to all
the other members of the system, the Bank of England was
forced to keep a larger than usual reserve because of its
note issue, extensive governmental operations and duties
with regard to the exchanges. It was thus able to provide
the extra liquidity the system needed, through the cashing
of its notes or by allowing the London bankers to draw on
their Bank of England accounts and supply specie to the
country banks. This is succinctly put in the following
quote:
"...the localisation of manufacturing industry
and the division of the counties into borrowers
and lenders set up at a very early date the
framework of the modern banking system, and
placed the Bank of England, whose notes and coins
formed the reserves of the London bankers, and
whose stock of guineas was the final reserve
against all credit issues, in a controlling
position."13
At this time the circulation of the Bank of England was
confined to London and the immediate environs, which is why
13 Feaveryear (1963) pp.167.
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it was necessary to receive supplies of coin rather than
Bank of England notes when faced with a rui. It was in the
interest of the country banks to exclude Bank of England
notes from a countrywide circulation, since this would
imply a reduction in their profits from note circulation.
In this they were aided by the fact that until 1759 there
w re no £15 or £10 Bank of England notes, and thus, as
small notes were the ones most needed for everyday
transactions, their circulation was limited. Later, in
1794, £5 notes were issued, and later still (1797) came £2
and £1 notes, but this issue was not prolonged due to the
easy forgery of the notes, even though this offence was
punishable by the death penalty.
Thus the origin of the English one reserve system of
banking can be found in the eighteenth century country
bankers' practice of relying on London as their ultimate
source of liquidity. At this time, the theory of banking
was lagging a long way behind banking practice, and thus
the correct course of action had to be learned from
experience, at the expense of many mistakes. 14
 The stature
of the Bank of England was growing throughout this period,
even though there was no formal acknowledgement of its
central position, and when it appeared that the Bank was
untouched by the late eighteenth century crises, confidence
in it as an institution and in its notes increased
14 The Bullion Committee revealed that the Bank of
England Directors did not have a very detailed knowledge of
the principles by which an institution such as their own
should operate.
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enormously.
4: The Crises Of The Late Eighteenth Century
The crisis of 1763 was mainly commercial in nature and
not very serious, in contrast to that of 1772-73, which has
been described as "one of the fiercest financial storms of
the century". 15 There had been large amounts of investment
in canals and housing, without an equivalent amount of
saving. Speculation was at its greatest in Scotland, where
the crisis originated, before spreading to England. By the
time it reached London cash was very scarce, but the Bank
of England discounted liberally at the height of the crisis
and confidence was maintained in it as an institution. Both
these crises were followed by legislation intended to
protect the public from the dangers of the abuse of the
power of note issue.
The next serious financial crisis occurred in 1783. A
few years before this the Bank had adopted in principle a
policy of contracting its note circulation when faced with
an efflux of gold, thus enforcing an inflow of specie due
to the scarcity of the circulating medium. However, the
note circulation can only be contracted by reducing the
amount of re-discounting at the Bank of England. It was
this that was to (at worst) provoke the 1783 crises or (at
best) accentuate it.
In the second half of 1782 the Bank of England's
15 Ashton (1959) pp. 127.
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reserve had fallen dramatically, 1- 6 as a result of gold
exports to finance military expenditure in the American war
of Independence. The arrival of peace was followed in early
1783 by a trade boom, implying an increase in the number of
country bank bills needing discounting in London. All notes
issued by the Bank against these discounted bills were
cashed by the London bankers in order to send coin into the
country. With the reserve still falling the Bank of England
began to ration its discounts through the use of
discrimination. Instead of drawing gold into the Bank, this
action had the opposite effect: fearing a widespread panic,
bankers started to increase their cash reserves, thus
demanding even more gold. By May 1783, when cash in hand at
the Bank of England had fallen to £475,000, the Bank
resorted to more drastic measures and refused to finance a
large portion of the loan of that year. 17 Thus the
remainder of the loan was put onto the open market,
reducing speculation and causing a credit contraction, thus
bringing about a turn in the exchanges in favour of
England. Gold flowed in from abroad and the Bank of England
was able to apply the reverse of its theory, to increase
the note issue in proportion to the extra bullion. The
crisis was averted, but not before there had been many
failures.
16 From £4.2m in August 1780 to £2m in August 1782.
17 The normal practice of merchants when wishing to
subscribe to a loan was to draw a short term bill on their
bankers and then to discount the bill at the Bank of
England.
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This crisis was very important for the development
both of the banking system in general and of the central
role of the Bank of England within that system. By 1783 the
banks were heavily involved in the commercial and
industrial world, thus any change in circumstances
affecting either sphere was bound to influence events in
the other. During the 1783 crisis it became obvious that
the majority of the system looked to the Bank of England
for support in times of need. The latter was well placed to
fulfil the function of being the system's ultimate source
of liquidity, but as yet had not accepted the fact that it
was bound to act in a particular manner in order to fulfil
this function.
5: The Crisis of 1793
The crisis of 1793 was of a different magnitude from
those preceding it, and was to have rather more serious
consequences, both for the Bank of England and for the
banking system as a whole. It was triggered off by an
increase in the demand for Bank of England notes by the
country banks, due to widespread anxiety about the state of
relations between England and France. 18
 By this time the
country banking sector had increased enormously: there were
now approximately four hundred country banks, all of whom
18 The crisis had been preceded by a trade boom,
especially in canal building and cotton, and so it might
well have taken off at some point anyway, irrespective of
the uncertainty of the war.
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issued notes and give credit liberally, though not always
on a sound basis. 19 Their cash reserves had not risen
however, thus there existed a rather unstable situation,
which needed very little to bring about a financial panic
on a large scale. In addition, the past decades had seen a
vast increase in trade and commerce associated with the
discovery of new markets, and a new period of speculation
had set in.
The declaration of war by France on England in
February 1793 precipitated a complete collapse of the
credit of the country banks. Many firms fell very quickly,
including that of one of the Bank's directors. The Bank of
England gave what assistance it could, 2 ° but it was not
really enough since the demand for gold was so great.
Confidence in the country banking system was by this point
at such a low level that everyone wanted to hold onto
their coin and refused to discount. Industry had no cash to
pay wages and so ground to a halt. It was a perfect example
of a liquidity crisis: firms that were solvent were failing
due to a lack of immediate cash.
By April 22nd 1793, the situation had deteriorated to
such extent that City leaders appealed to the government
for help, and a Select Committee was appointed to look into
the problem. The outcome of this was a decision to issue
19 A parallel can be drawn here to present day U.S.
banks, since the country banks of the late eighteenth
century were normally very small and highly localised, and
thus their risk burden was not widely spread.
20 This included the rescue of Sir James Sanderson,
M.P and Lord Mayor of London.
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£5ni of Exchequer Bills in denominations of £100, £50, and
£20, bearing interest at the rate of 2d per day, 21 with the
proceeds to be lent at 5d per day to suitable applicants.
This plan was executed on May 8th, and was enough to ease
the situation immediately. Only £202,000 worth of bills
were issued, even though a figure of £3,856,000 had been
applied for. As in so many later cases, the public in
general did not actually need the cash, they just wanted to
be assured that it was available if they wanted to draw on
it. 22 The influx of bullion from France, which had started
earlier in the year continued and by the end of 1783
interest rates in London had fallen as low as 4 per cent.
The effects of the crisis on the financial system were
considerable and long lasting. There had been a major fall
in the note circulation of the country banks from which the
market never really recovered. The major problem was that
there was no time for real recovery: England and France
were still at war and were to be so for the next twenty
years, thus large amounts of money were needed to finance
this war expenditure. 23 Pitt, the Prime Minister,
considered it to be in England's best possible interest to
21 This is approximately equal to 3.75 per cent per
annum.
22 This, of course, is the essence of the problem of
fractional reserve banking: panics can be precipitated
purely by a confidence crisis, not from any real need for
currency.
23 These heavy governmental demands were to cause much
"crowding out" of private spending as long as
convertibility was maintained, since this implied a
restricted money supply. For more detail of this mechanism,
see D.M Joslin's contribution to Pressnell (1960).
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win the war and therefore the financing of it was of the
highest priority, which put a considerable- extra burden on
a credit system that was already weak.
The first major governmental demands for finance from
the Bank of England came at the end of 1794. This had a
negative effect on the reserve, which, although it had
recovered somewhat from its trough of 1793, was still below
its normal level. 24
 These demands increased during 1795
when Pitt augmented the number of short term bills that the
Bank was expected to discount. As a consequence of the
remittances abroad, the exchanges moved downwards and gold
flowed out of the country - an external drain. This was
intensified by two events in 1795: a bad harvest and the
collapse of the French Assignats. The latter caused an
increasing mount of coin to be used in France in place of
the by now valueless notes, thus adding to the gold drain
from England.25
All this resulted in the Bank starting to restrict its
discounts in early 1796,26 and in protest against the high
level of borrowing the Bank Directors threatened to refuse
the government's next demands. This threat was never
carried out however, but eventually the government tried to
finance some of its loans itself. The restriction of
discounts did procure the desired results: the exchanges
24 The bullion reserve had been £4m in 1793 - half its
norma]. level - but had risen to £6-7m by 1794.
25 See Hawtrey (1919).
26 See Clapham (1944) vol.1, pp. 269-270.
90
improved and gold flowed in.
Although the external drain had been halted, the Bank
then had to cope with the problem of an internal drain.
Because of the general lack of confidence in the country
banking system, the inflow of gold went straight to the
country, not into the Bank of England's reserve. Since in
1793 the mere declaration of war had been enough to bring
down many country banks, and the country note issue was
only two thirds of its 1793 figure, it is understandable
that the public feared the worst in the event of a
threatened invasion. Thus at this point the system only
needed a relatively minor event to make it break down
completely, and on Saturday February 18th 1797 Newcastle
farmers sold their livestock and produce with no regard as
to the prices they fetched, as a result of a local invasion
rumour. The notes they received they converted into specie
at the local banks, which was enough to cause the Newcastle
banks to suspend payments on Monday 2 0th, an action soon
followed by other banks in the north east of England.
The news of the Newcastle stoppage reached London on
the following Thursday, and sent the price of consols
plummeting. On Saturday 25th, reports reached London of a
landing of a French force of 1200 men at Fishguard in
Wales, which accentuated the drain and decreased the Bank
of England's reserve still further: by the 25th February it
stood at only £1,272,000. On Sunday 26th, the King met
Pitt, the Governor and the Deputy Governor of the Bank, a
meeting which resulted in the issue of a Declaration
91
forbidding the Bank from making Payments when it re-opened
on Monday morning.27
Thus began a period of twenty-four years during which
Bank of England notes were not convertible into gold on
demand. What would in other situations be a temporary
measure, and was in this case intended to be so, since
initially arrangements were renewed regularly, became
almost a permanent fixture.
It can legitimately be argued that a large proportion
of the blame for the events leading up to the necessity for
the Restriction can be placed on the government. Although
the terms of the original Charter had specified that the
officials of the Bank were to be penalised if any advances
were made to the Crown on the security or anticipation of
revenue without the prior agreement of Parliament, this
rule was soon broken. Ministers obtained sizeable loans
from the Bank without Parliamentary sanction.
By the time of the Restriction, the Bank had
developed two distinct relationships with different bodies:
the government and the rest of the banking system. The Bank
was always the underdog in its relations with the
government, a situation further intensified when it was
rescued from disaster twice in the 1790s, once by an issue
of Exchequer Bills and then by the suspension of
convertibility. This close relationship with the government
strengthened the role of the Bank of England at the centre
27 The meeting was initiated by the Bank, and on
Sunday 26th, the King approved a "Bank Plan".
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of the banking system however, and increased public
confidence in it, so that when it became clear that, under
a system of fractional reserve banking, some institution
must assume responsibility in a crisis, the Bank seemed the
obvious candidate. It is clear that the Bank itself did not
recognise its this to be the case, since in fact it did
not fully accept its responsibilities until well into the
nineteenth century. 28 However, after the time of the
Restriction the fact that other banks kept their reserve
chiefly in Bank of England notes made it clear that they
recognised the importance of the Bank within the system: by
1797, institutional realities were no longer compatible
with legal provisions.
6: The Early Years of the Nineteenth Century
The suspension of convertibility in February 1797
marked the commencement of a new period in British
monetary history. The fact that the issue of an Order in
Council ordering the suspension was actually agreed to by
the government, proved that when the occasion demanded it,
the Bank of England would step in to help the banking
system. However, the role of this central agency had not
yet developed into its modern form: as at the time of its
formation, the Bank saw its central role as being to
supply the government with money to fight the French, this
time in the Napoleonic wars. Its central position was
28 See later chapters.
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accentuated during the twenty-four years of the Restriction
however, in that Bank of England notes -became far more
widespread. When payments were restored in 1821, it was by
far the most important note issuing bank.
Once inconvertibility had been imposed, the Bank held
strictly to it, not allowing the conversion into specie of
even notes of small denominations. This caused great
difficulty for bankers, particularly those in London, since
it became very difficult for them to accumulate enough coin
to pay out even the smallest sums in specie. The situation
was eased slightly by the introduction of notes of smaller
denominations (Cl and £2) in 1797. However, this issue did
not last long due to its susceptibility to forgery.29
The imposition of inconvertibility can generally be
viewed as a retrogressive rather than a progressive step.
Much pressure was taken off the Bank since it no longer had
to maintain convertibility. Until the recommendations of
the Bullion Committee came to be accepted, generally judged
to be sometime in the late second or early third decade of
the 1800s, its policy stance was based around a belief in
the Real Bills Doctrine. 30 This had first been associated
with John Law at the start of the Eighteenth century, and
was later given rather more respectability by Adam Smith in
29 The history of the doomed £1 and £2 notes is told
fully in Mackenzie (1953). In brief, there were so many
engravers without work (around 9000) that it was likely
that many/most would resort to forgery, even though this
was an offence that was punishable by death.
30 This was also known as the Needs of Trade Doctrine.
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the 1770s. 31 The basic theoretical premise behind this
doctrine was that there could be no overissue of money if
the Bank of England limited its discounts to an amount
consistent with the legitimate "needs of trade": only
those representing "real" transactions. As to what
determined whether a need was legitimate or not, it seems
that there was a generally accepted standard by which this
was judged: if good paper having less than sixty days to
run was presented at the Bank of England, it would be
discounted at 5 per cent. 32 The argument here was that if
merchants did not need the cash, it would be irrational for
them to pay a rate of interest of 5 'per cent for it. It
appears that the rate of interest charged was specified at
5 per cent because this was the maximum permitted by the
Usury laws. The Bank tended to take this interest rate as
given, and then ration out discounts accordingly.
Bank of England discount policy in these years was
interesting, since it altered fairly radically around the
time of the formation of the Bullion Committee in February
1810. Up to this point the Bank had certainly followed the
orthodoxy of the Real Bills Doctrine, with the result that
by 1809 the U.K. was experiencing rapid (for the time)
31 Smith believed in a rather tighter version of this
doctrine, since he believed that prices were determined in
world markets and thus were exogenous to the domestic
economy.
32 Morgan (1943) pp. 68.
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inflation, 33 culminating in an economic crisis in July
1810. A report of the Discount Committee early in 1809
warned that a continuation of liberal discounting would
lead to problems both for the Bank and for the financial
system as a whole, and thus suggested the level of
discounts should be severely restricted. However, this was
not achieved: the demand for discounting facilities was so
high that Bank Directors felt it was their duty to give aid
to the financial community. Thus even before the Bullion
Committee Report it seems that the Bank was aware of the
invalidity of the Real Bills Doctrine, and efforts to
change its behaviour were thwarted, not by a lack of
knowledge of monetary theory, but by practical
considerations.
Contemporary opposition to the Real Bills Doctrine was
embodied in the report of the Bullion Committee, instigated
by Francis Homer34 in February 1810, after sharp falls in
the value of sterling on the European foreign exchanges.
This formed the first protracted discussion of money and
monetary policy since the Restriction, and formed the basis
of a debate which was to last many years.
The Bullion Committee was set up with the aim of
considering two phenomena: the high price of gold bullion
Clapham (1944) vol II, pp.19, calculates that the
first quarter of 1810 carried an index number for prices of
184 (1790=100), as against 136 in 1797.
With contributions from William Huskisson and Henry
Thornton, whose Paper Credit, published in 1802, was one of
the most important expositions of monetary theory of the
period.
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and "the state of the circulating medium and the
exchanges". Their conclusions were brief and to the point:
the high price of gold had been caused by an over-issue of
Bank notes, and thus the exchanges could only be brought
back to "normal" if convertibility was restored as soon as
possible. This would reduce the Bank of England's power to
alter its note issue in a discretionary manner.
One contemporary criticism of the Bullion Report was
its recommendation of an early return to convertibility,35
since this would have meant the restoration of gold
payments in a wartime situation. The problem here was that
it was felt that the existence of inconvertible paper
released specie for export and prevented the occurrence of
panics such as had been seen in the 1790s, which would
obviously have detracted from the war effort. The arguments
against restoring convertibility were far more powerful
from a practical viewpoint; in fact, had it been restored
in 1812 it would have occurred just at the time when
Napoleon was victorious over the Russians and Prussians.36
In retrospect it is obvious that there was to be no
chance of a return to convertibility until the Napoleonic
wars had ended. The Bullion Report did serve a very useful
purpose however in providing a catalyst for a debate in
monetary economics that was to last for most of the
century. It questioned the prevailing Bank orthodoxy,
including the now widely acknowledged invalidity of the
3 It had recommended a return in 1812.
36 See Clapham (1944) Vol.11 pp.28.
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Real Bills Doctrine, and brought out into the open the
rather lax attitudes of the Bank of England, which at this
time was content to try to absolve itself from its
responsibilities to the banking system. The question of
whether or not it could be relied on to act as a lender of
last resort was now a matter for debate, as was the status
of Bank of England notes.
After several postponements, convertibility was
finally restored in March 1821, thus allowing the Bank of
England once again to repay its notes in gold.
7: The Crisis of 1825
This was one of the more serious crises of the
century. The first signs of a boom had become obvious late
in 1824: increased stock market speculation, price rises,
and unfavourable exchanges, which implied an external
bullion drain. However, since the reserve at the Bank of
England was very large by contemporary standards, 37
 the
Bank continued to discount freely, allowing its own note
issue to increase, and continued to do so even when the
bullion reserve commenced its downward slide in mid 1824.
The dangers of the situation were foreseen by contemporary
commentators: in March 1825 Lord Liverpool had warned
speculators that if a crisis arose they must not expect the
government to give them relief.
37 Approximately £14.2m at the start of 1824. (Morgan,
1943)
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By the autumn of 1825 the extent of the impending
crisis became clearer, and the Bank of England started to
restrict its discounts, and thus its note issues, since by
now the reserve had fallen to a little over £31n. This
action precipitated a general collapse of credit and the
fall of many banks, and the crisis reached London on 7th
December 1.825 when the well established house of Sir Peter
Pole & Co. 38 applied to the Bank of England for help. Up to
now the Bank had refused to give assistance to anyone, but
since this particular house was an agent for approximately
forty-four country banks, 39 its collapse would have
endangered a large part of the banking system, and thus the
Bank lent £300,000. However, in spite of this aid, Sir
Peter Pole & Co. could only continue in business until the
next week when they stopped payment, marking the beginning
of a major panic.
It was only at this point that the Bank of England
increased Bank Rate by 1 per cent to 5 per cent, the
maximum permitted at this point by the Usury laws. 4 ° By now
however this move was useless, since even at this level
Bank Rate was too low to be a deterrent to those wishing to
discount bills. Thus the Bank embarked on a complete policy
change and decided to discount freely to all those who
presented eligible bills, in short to act as a lender of
last resort. In meetings between the Bank and the
38 This was Henry Thornton's old bank.
39 See Bisschop (1910), pp. 196.
40 The Bank was subject to these laws until 1832.
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government the latter agreed with the policy of discounting
freely but completely ruled out the possibility of a second
suspension of payments. The reserve was by now almost non
existent, but the Bank was saved from a temporary stop by
two factors: the discovery at the Bank of a box of £1 notes
that had been withdrawn from issue in 1821, and the
Rothschild's efforts in securing gold from the Bank of
France. The £1 notes were distributed and did much to calm
the panic, as did the extra gold supplies. These had been
brought from France by the Rothschilds, and were turned
into coin at the Mint. The extra coin meant that the Bank
could continue discounting freely: in three weeks,
discounts increased from £5m to £15m, but the public's
confidence was beginning to return. The demand for
discounts started falling, and by February 1826 the panic
had completely subsided.
In the aftermath of the crisis, it was felt by many
people that a large part of the blame for the events which
had occurred should be borne by the Bank of England. This
was for two reasons, firstly, because it did not react
quickly enough to the external gold drain, and secondly
that it waited too long before acting to restrict its
issues. The crisis did make the Bank aware of two factors
however: firstly that it must take into account the level
of the exchanges, and seccndly the difference between an
internal and an external drain. This was something that
Thornton had remarked upon a quarter of a century earlier.
Although the Bank of England was responsible to a
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certain extent for the crisis, 41 a large part of the blame
must also be put on the country banks, of which there were
many, all with their own independent note issues. A quote
from William Cobbett illustrates the difficult position the
Bank was in:
NThe Bank is blamed for putting out paper and
causing high prices; and blamed at the same time for
not putting out paper to accommodate merchants and
keep them from breaking. It is the fellows who put
out the paper and then break that do the
mischief.41
This was the view held by Parliament in its post crisis
debates, and led to legislation aimed at improving the
situation. This consisted of two Acts: the first, dated
22nd March 1826 entailed the banning of all notes of less
than £5, including those of the Bank of England. 43 The
second allowed for the formation of joint stock banks
outside a radius of sixty-five miles of London, thus ending
the monopoly of the Bank of England, although the latter
was encouraged to start opening provincial branches. 44 The
country banks were not happy with this prospective new
competition, since they foresaw a proportion of their
business disappearing. 45 These fears were to a certain
41 If not for its causes then at least for its
propagation.
42 Cobbett (1830), Vol.II,pp. 25.
This did not apply to Scottish small notes however.
It opened eleven branches in the following years,
the most important of which was in Liverpool.
' Complaints as to Bank of England competition at the
branches never completely subsided. Even in the 1890s
there were numerous complaints from country bankers who
(continued...)
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extent unfounded, since the Bank confined its discounts to
bills of the highest quality. However, there were some
co plaints of the Bank "poaching" the best business from
the branches, 46 and thus leaving the riskiest business to
the local banks. As far as the Bank was concerned, the
s tting up of branches was never intended to compete with
the Bank in London: their role was rather to act as a
support and to provide some Bank of England presence
outside London.47
8: The System During the late 1820s and early 1830s:
Palmer's Rule
From the time of the legislation following the 1825
crisis until the Bank Charter Committee Hearings of 1832,
discussions of monetary and banking matters were overtaken
by other questions that were considered to be of greater
importance. 48 The main feature of the period was the growth
of joint stock banking: between 1826 and 1836 approximately
a hundred joint stock banks were created, 49 and it was this
growth, regarded by some to be excessive, that was blamed
45.. .continued)
feared losing business to the Bank. See Chapter Eight for
further details.
46 See Clapham (1944) vol.11, pp.227.
47 These branches were intended to function in much
the same way as the American Federal Reserve Banks,
established much later.
48 Such as the Reform of Parliament.
See Smith (1936) pp.16.
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by many for the crises of the l830s.
The Bank Charter Committee first sat in 1832. This was
set up with the aim of examining the position of the
banking system with respect to the Bank Charter Act, which
was to expire in 1833. This was the first official vehicle
for the statement of what came to be known as "Palmer's
Rule", named after the Governor of the Bank of England at
the time, John Horsley Palmer. This theory held that the
volume of securities possessed by the Bank should be held
constant, allowing the volume of gold and notes held to
vary. It was expounded by one of the Directors of the Bank,
George Warde Norman, in his evidence to the 1932
Committee, 5 ° and worked on the principle that when the
circulation was "full", at the onset of an external drain,
the Bank's reserve should be approximately one third of its
note and deposit liabilities. 51 It was at this moment that
its liabilities and its reserve should be at their highest
level. The remaining two-thirds of deposits should be held
as securities, and it was this amount which should be kept
constant.
Palmer and Warde Norman believed that this would guard
against the possibility of having to resort to
inconvertibility, at least on most occasions, since the
public would deposit or withdraw notes consequent on the
state of the exchanges. In this way the exchanges would be
50 B.P.P. 1831-32, Vol.vi, Q.2391. Reprinted in
Gregory (1929).
51 Deposits in the widest sense.
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regulated through the fluctuation of the circulation. They
did not rule out the need for special action however; in
response to a question as to the Bank's reaction to an
external drain, Warde Norman gave the following reply:
"... there might possibly be extraordinary
circumstances, in which a forcible and more rapid
contraction of liabilities would be requisite."52
Although this rule of "keeping the securities even" was
accepted by the Bank, in practice it consistently failed to
uphold the rule, since the volume of securities held
fluctuated considerably. Because of the business in which
the Bank was involved, in practice it was very difficult
for it to hold the volume of securities constant.
Despite the fact that the evidence given to the 1832
Committee never appeared in the form of a report, the main
body of it was used in the formulation of the 1833 Bank
Charter Act. This Act made Bank of England notes over £5
legal tender, and contained a declaratory clause confirming
the fact that non-issuing joint stock banks were legal
within a radius of sixty-five miles of London. It also
repealed the Usury Laws for bills payable within six
months, thus allowing for the use of the Bank of England's
discount rate in a positive manner when the Bank was trying
to impose credit stringency. 53
 The overall effect of the
Act was to improve the position of the Bank of England at
the centre of the banking system, and to aid it in
controlling credit.
52 
op cit, Q.2393.
The Usury Laws were completely abandoned in 1854.
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9; The Crises of 1836 and 1839
The events of 1836 and early 1837 had the major
hallmark of a classic example of a crisis: an external
drain, which had it been neutralised at an early enough
stage would probably been fairly harmless, but which
provoked a domestic loss of confidence and an internal
drain. In this case the external drain was caused by an
export of gold to the United States: America needed to
import gold to facilitate a re-arrangement of currency
parities that was occurring at that time.54
The growing internal loss of confidence prompted the
Bank of England to increase its discount rate to 4½ per
cent in July, a rise of ½ per cent. This was followed by a
further ½ per cent increase at the start of September. It
was also accompanied by a rationing of discounts: the Bank
refused to discount any bills carrying the name of a joint
stock bank of issue. This move was inspired by a general
distrust of the new joint stock banks as a class, but its
effect was merely to add fuel to the fire, culminating in
November 1836 in the failure of the Northern and Central
Bank of England, a new joint stock bank based in
Manchester. Its directors appealed to the Bank of England
for help, which was given to them, but on very strict
preconditions: due to irregularities in the bank's
management, it was to be liquidated. The depositors were
Gold had been overvalued relative to silver, thus
ensuring that gold would be drawn in.
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paid in full, but shareholders suffered heavy losses.
This failure was followed soon after by that of
Esdailes, a London private bank, which had been in
difficulties for three months and was the London agent for
over seventy country banks. This time the bank was found to
be solvent but illiquid, and so was lent £150,000 on the
s curity of a guarantee signed by ten of the London
bankers, and a run on the country banks was avoided.
By now the Bank's bullion reserve had fallen from a
level of £8m in April 1836 to approximately £4ni in February
l837, which was to be its lowest level. By the start of
1837 however, the worst moments of the crisis were over,
although bankruptcies were still high during the first six
months of the year. Even though the crisis seemed to have
subsided, the Bank of England still had to help out the
"Three W's" (Wildes', Wiggin's and Wilsons'), one of the
largest the American houses which came to the Bank for aid
in late February 1837. The Bank first refused to aid them,
but succumbed as American merchants decided to appeal to
the government to overrule the Bank, and eventually
£200,000 of "abnormal" discounts were granted. 56 The Bank's
actions in rescuing Esdaile's seemed to prevent the crisis
from reaching epic proportions: at no time was it anywhere
near as serious as that of 1825.
In the same way that everyone tried to blame everyone
else after the 1825 crisis, in the discussion as to the
See Clapham (1944) Vol.11, pp.153.
56 on personal and other security.
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origins of the crisis of 1836-7 the Bank of England blamed
the country banks and especially the new joint stock banks,
who in turn put the blame onto the Bank. Although it was
certainly true that the joint stock banks had over extended
their note issue, the case against the Bank rested on the
fact that only once since 1832 had it implemented Palmer's
constant securities rule, and in general the proportion of
liabilities in bullion and coin varied between a quarter
and a seventh instead of the third specified by Palmer. In
addition, the Bank had delayed increasing interest rates
until it was too late, and so had effectively rationed
discounts by refusing to accept certain bills, thus
aggravating the general state of alarm.
Unlike the crisis that immediately preceded it, that
of 1839 was characterised by two phenomena that were not
typical of the financial crises previously experienced.
Firstly, it was not followed by any major banking or
financial failures, which were normally expected as part
of a crisis and secondly, the decline in prices experienced
was very gradual, in contrast to the rapid falls that had
occurred after other crises. In other ways however, the
crisis itself was actually more serious than that of 1836.
At one point, the reserve of the Bank of England was on the
point of disappearing, 57 and was only saved by the actions
of a French syndicate of bankers who, together with Thomas
Baring and the Banque de France, organised a £2m credit.
ClOm at the start of 1838; £2.5m by August 1839.
(Feaveryear 1963, pp.255.)
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This transaction took the form of Barings drawing bills on
the syndicat, which were then discounted by the Banque de
France.
By the end of the l830s it seems that the Bank was
starting to accept the need for it to act as a Lender of
Last Resort, but that it was not very skilled at executing
the appropriate policies: its usual actions were late and
insufficient. If the financial system had been allowed to
develop after this point without any outside interference
it might have arrived at its modern structure rather
faster, but the orthodoxy underlying the 1844 Act led to a
certain degree of retrogressive development of the banking
system, and in particular of the development of the Bank of
England's role as a LLR.
10: The Bank Charter Act. 1844
The Bank Charter Act of 1833 had renewed the
privileges of the Bank of England for a further twenty-one
years, although it included a "break clause" under which
there could be a reconsideration of the position within six
months of August 1844. It is possible that had the Bank
managed to conduct itself successfully according to
Palmer's "Rule" of 1832 no such reconsideration would have
taken place, but the crises of 1836 and 1839, with
associated blame attached to the Bank of England, meant
that the public held the Bank in very low esteem, and it
was felt that something had to be done in order to give
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more stability to the banking system. The legislation that
resulted from the discussions at this time was the Bank
Charter Act of 1844. Debate as to the appropriateness of
this Act was to last for more than thirty years: it was not
until the late 1870s that it was overshadowed by the
bimetallic discussions. Its influence was far-reaching and
inspired a whole generation of debate of monetary and
banking questions.
The discussion which preceded the passing of the Act
had centred on the issues involved in the Currency and
Banking School controversy. The specific points of theory
associated with these two Schools are not the concern here,
but the main practical points emerging from the controversy
were twofold: firstly, whether there should be some control
over the note issues of the joint stock banks, and secondly
the extent of the Bank's control over the banking system
and whether its note issue too should be fixed in some
way. 58
 Associated to this second point was the question of
the Bank's responsibility to the system: should it be
prepared to act as a "lender of last resort" and aid the
financial system in times of difficulty? One of the aims of
the Bank Charter Act was to eradicate the need for this
function. Peel, the architect of the Act, said at the time
that although he recognised that the provisions of the Act
58 The debate between the Currency and Banking schools
can also be seen in terms of the Rules versus Discretion
debate in monetary policy. The Currency School were in
favour of a "rule", and it was their opinion that finally
triumphed. This was not the only example of a nineteenth
century monetary rule however; Palmer's Rule and the Gold
Standard can also be regarded in this light.
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might make it difficult for the Bank to act as a LLR, he
hoped that this would be irrelevant since the need for last
resort lending would be eliminated by forcing the system to
change its behaviour. He did consider the question of
whether to have a relaxing clause in the Act however, and
decided against it, in case it encouraged what later became
known as "moral hazard".59
The main specification of the Act was the separation
of the Bank of England into an issue and a banking
department, first suggested by Ricardo. The issue
department was to have a fiduciary issue of £l4mn, which was
the value of the securities it was to take over from the
banking department, together with any specie not required
by that department. An important point about this issue was
that it could be allowed to decrease but not increase. The
banking department would then be free to carry on its
banking business in a similar fashion to any other
commercial bank.
Discussions as to the implications of the Act were
protracted and at times bitter. They revolved around four
main issues: firstly, did the Act in fact enable the
banking department of the Bank of England to act like that
of any other bank? This was closely linked to the second
issue: that of the conflict between the Bank's actions in
times of prosperity and in times of crisis. Thirdly, did
the existence of the Act actually accentuate panics rather
than attenuate them? Finally, what would be the position of
This has been discussed in the previous chapter.
110
the rest of the banking system after the passage of the
Act?	 -
The Bank's main problem regarding the first issue was
that its set of customers was not as well defined as those
of other banks. Although there were obviously some people
who did business with the Bank on a regular basis, it also
had occasional customers and those who only came to it in a
crisis, for although the event of a crisis had been
theoretically eradicated, the possibility of one occurring
was still there. In addition to this, "acting like any
other bank" implied that the Bank had no greater
responsibility to the system in a crisis than a bank's
normal responsibility to its customers, which again
precluded the possibility of the Bank acting as a LLR. It
also implied the continuous search for profit maximisation,
with the consequence of keeping a lower reserve, since no
more cash than the necessary minimum would be left idle.
Opponents of the Act felt that instead of decreasing
the chances of the occurrence of a crisis, it actually
increased them. This was due to the fear that apprehension
would actually be increased as the reserve was approaching
the critical £l4m mark, and thus the crisis of confidence
would be amplified. They argued that this fiduciary level
of £14m was entirely false: it was purely because it was
felt that the Bank of England could not increase its
discounts above this level that people panicked more. 60 The
60 See Footnote 22. Again, this is the very essence of
a crisis of confidence: the desire that cash should be
(continued...)
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practical outcome of this situation was the agreement of
the government in particular situations to suspend the Act,
and thus to relieve the Bank's predicament and the public's
confidence crisis.
The possibility of the suspension of the Bank Charter
Act allowed for the continuation of what was becoming
perhaps the Bank's most important function, that of being
the source of the ultimate reserve of credit: the lender of
last resort. Contemporary critics such as J.Horsley Palmer,
John Stuart Mill and James Wilson, 61 regarded the Act as an
evil that would do little else except aggravate panics. It
was felt that if certain situations necessitated the
suspension of the Act, the implication was that it would
fail in avoiding the very situations that it was designed
to control. This made the implementation of the Act seem
somewhat unnecessary. Even the spokesmen of the Currency
School, such as Overstone, agreed that the suspension of
the Act must remain a possibility because of the difficulty
of controlling the issues of the country banking sector.
60	 continued)
available, even if it is not actually needed. With
hindsight, this is fairly obvious, but unfortunately it was
not so obvious at the time.
61 Wilson had just become the founding editor of The
Economist.
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17: 1847 Crisis 62
No sooner had the first bout of debate as to the
merits of the 1844 Act died down than it was put to the
test by a serious crisis, sparking off a whole new series
of discussions. This crisis had two phases, in early and
late 1847. The first phase was initiated by two successive
bad harvests in England, compounded by the failure of the
Irish potato crop in 1845 and 1846. This meant that the
price of agricultural products increased, followed by an
increase in corn imports, implying both an increase in the
volume of bills presented for discount at the Bank and an
external gold drain. This led to a drain on the Bank's gold
reserve, which had stood at £lOm in August 1846 but had
fallen to £7m by January 1847 and to £3m by mid April
1847. 63
 Even in January 1847 the discount rate was still
below market rates, implying that the discount rate could
not be used as a weapon to attract funds to London.
Once the crisis had become serious, in April 1847, the
Bank of England started to limit its discounts, refusing to
act as a LLR. This was an example of it using direct credit
rationing rather than an indirect interest rate mechanism
62 For a detailed explanation of the financial aspects
of the 1847 crisis see Boot(1984) pp.42-57. In addition,
Dornbusch & Frenkel (1984) discuss the crisis in the
context of the workings of the Gold Standard as a whole,
with particular reference to the question of whether the
requirements of the Gold Standard mitigated or exacerbated
the severity of financial crises.
63 See Fetter (1965), pp.204.
113
for limiting discounts. With hindsight, the expected
occurred: the only effect of credit rationing was to
aggravate the panic. What the Bank physically did to limit
credit was to only accept very short term bills in London,
to halve the volume of discounts in the provinces and to
start selling consols.
The increased interest rates did have their desired
effect however, and the external gold outflow slowed down.
This was the end of the first phase of the crisis, and for
the next few months the markets returned to a more or less
normal condition, with favourable prospects for a good
autumn harvest.
The second phase of the crisis began in the late
summer of 1847 when there were a spate of failures of firms
involved in the corn trade. The Bank increased the discount
rate to 5½ per cent, but this was not sufficient to halt
the incidence of failing firms. On August 21st the Governor
of the Bank of England was forced to give up his position
as he had to sell his Bank stock when the failure was
announced of W.R.Robinson & Co., a firm of corn merchants
of which he was the senior partner. The same fate was soon
to befall two other Bank Directors, and the panic then
spread to the bill brokers in the middle of September, with
the failure of Sanderson & Co., who had liabilities in
excess of £750,000. At this point the Bank announced that
it would no longer advance on stock or exchequer bills, and
would charge a 5 per cent minimum on bills payable within
one month and 6 per cent on others. This action gave rise
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to a panic on the stock market, with plummeting share
prices, and large falls in the Bank's reserve. Because of
the precarious position of the reserve, the Bank refused to
give aid to the first crop of banking failures. 64 The Royal
Bank of Liverpool was the first to stop payment on October
18th, together with a smaller Liverpool bank. This was the
start of the panic amongst the country banks, which soon
spread to Newcastle and the rest of the country. The London
banking sector however was free from failures, even though
the commercial sector suffered greatly.
Throughout these weeks the government was faced with
demands for the suspension of the 1844 Act so that the Bank
of England would be free to extend its discounts. The
Chancellor, Sir Charles Wood, resisted these demands for a
few weeks, but on October 23rd a letter from the Government
was sent to the Bank of England telling the Bank to
discount as freely as it wished to, with the guarantee that
if the fiduciary issue was exceeded an Act of Indemnity
would be passed by Parliament. It was suggested that the
Bank should charge at least 8 per cent on its discounts.
However, once the government's decision was made
public, it seems that the panic died down almost
immediately, as illustrated by this quote from Samuel
Gurney:
"The effect was immediate. Those who had sent notice
for their money in the morning now sent us word that
they did not want it - they had only ordered payment
by way of precaution.... . .From that day we had a
64 Until this point the banks had withstood the crisis
very Well.
115
market of comparative ease."65
Reserves at the Bank fell for another week, - but in fact the
fiduciary issue was never exceeded and so the Act of
Indemnity was unnecessary. This was seen by contemporary
critics of the Act as proof of its invalidity: what bankers
wanted to be sure of was that cash was available should
they need it. It was a classic crisis of confidence since
at no point in the crisis was there any significant demand
for notes.
In the aftermath of the crisis the Bank was criticised
on two counts: firstly for maintaining its discounts at too
high a level in the early months of 1847, and secondly for
not increasing the discount rate early enough in order to
curb speculation. It was not possible to make any final
judgement on the efficacy of the 1844 Act since legitimate
arguments existed amongst both the supporters and the
critics of the Act. Peel, who was by this point no longer a
member of the government, was forced to admit that his
theory that the Act would render action to prevent crises
unnecessary was not borne out in practice, but he still
believed that it was a net good: that it was up to the Bank
of England to control its discounts and reserves in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
65 Select Committee of 1848 (reprinted in Morgan,l943,
pp.151.)
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12: The Crisis of 1857 66
In 1855 the period during which the 1844 Act was to
continue unaltered expired. In evidence given to the
Commission of Enquiry, Weguelin, then Governor of the Bank
of England, explained the Bank's policy as being not to
lead the market but to increase the discount rate whenever
th reserve was threatened. This implied that there was no
attempt to curb speculation before it arose. It also
implied however, rather more positively, that Weguelin
accepted that the Bank could not afford to take a passive
view of events in the markets: it was directly affected by
them and as such at times had to take direct action.
Given that during the previous crisis the Bank had
managed to contain the panic, the crisis of 1857 came upon
it very suddenly. The source was in the United States,
where there had been enormous railway investment, and in
late August 1857 the price of railway securities started
falling. During September these falls were transmitted into
bank failures, firstly in the South West but then further
north. During October 1857 1415 banks failed throughout the
U.S.A. 67
During this period there was very heavy investment in
66 An excellent discussion of the monetary aspects of
the 1857 crisis can be found in Hughes(1960), chapter 10
and also appendix 5.
67 clapham (1944), Vol.11, pp.227.
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u.s. railway bonds by British investors, 68 and so news of
the American panic affected the British banking sector
quickly and severely. Its effects were first felt in
Liverpool and Glasgow, the two cities through which most
American trade passed. At the start of October (8th), the
Bank of England increased the discount rate to 6 per cent,
as the bill brokers tried to off-load securities and the
banks call in loans. There were further increases in the
discount rate on October 12th and 19th (to 7 per cent and 8
per cent respectively), and also the failure of the
Liverpool Borough Bank on October 27th. This failure spread
the panic to London, as most of the failed bank's
rediscounted bills were held by the London bill brokers,
and from then on the Bank of England was besieged from all
quarters of Britain by the pleas of organisations wanting
to be sure that the Bank's assistance could be relied on if
needed.
By the end of October the reserve was less than £3ni
and the panic had become very serious, especially in
Scotland. Bank Rate was increased again on November 5th (to
9 per cent), and on the 11th November news broke of the
stoppage of Sanderson & Co., a firm of bill brokers which
had also been involved in a temporary stop during the 1847
crisis. This time they stopped with liabilities of almost
£5.3in, 69
 and the reaction of the Bank was to increase Bank
68 More than 50 per cent of total American railway
capital was held in Britain, and a fifth of Britain's
exports went to the U.S. (Feaveryear,1963, pp.227.)
69 Clapham (1944), Vol.1, pp.229.
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Rate to an unprecedented level: 10 per cent. These were the
worst moments of the crisis: the reserve was now less than
£l.5m, and even though the Bank seemed to have been
reacting correctly, 70 the drain did not cease and the
reserve continued to fall. On November 10th alone the Bank
a vanced £661,000, half of which went to Overend Gurneys,
and much of the remainder to other bill brokers.
By now the centre of the banking crisis was Scotland,
where the Western Bank had already stopped payment
and there was some doubt as to the ability of the City of
Glasgow Bank to continue operations. 71 The Governor and
Deputy Governor of the Bank held discussions with the
Chancellor on November 10th, and concluded that they would
try to avoid the issue of a Letter of Indemnity, even
though the government was quite prepared to do this.
However by November 12th the situation had become untenable
and a Letter was issued excluding the Bank from its
responsibilities under the 1844 Act. The discount rate of
10 per cent was continued and the Bank lent a total of £2m
in discounted bills.
Unlike the 1847 crisis, the issue of the Letter did
not lead to an almost immediate cessation of the panic:
this time events had progressed rather further. Although
the Bank's discount rate policy had succeeded in halting
the external drain, the panic had spread so far into the
70 By continuously increasing Bank Rate.
71 This bank was to experience severe problems in
later years. See Chapter Four for further details.
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country that it was a while before it could be contained.
£2m of notes in excess of the legal limit were transferred
from the issue to the banking department (in exchange for
securities), and of these £928,000 were put into
circulation, a figure that was reached on November 20th. By
the end of November the circulation had decreased to the
legal amount and the crisis was finally officially declared
to be over on December 24th, when the discount rate fell
from 10 to 8 per cent.
In contrast with the 1847 crisis, that of 1857 took a
far more serious toll on the commercial world, even though
its monetary consequences were comparatively unimportant.
Its monetary causes were considered by a Parliamentary
Committee and their conclusion, on the positive side, was
that the main effect of the 1844 Act had been to force the
Bank to keep a larger bullion reserve than previously, as
shown by the following figures:
Crisis	 Bullion Reserve
1825	 £ 1,261,000
1836/7	 3,831,000
1839	 2,406,000
1847	 8,313,000
1857	 6,080,000 72
These figures show clearly that the reserve after the
passage of the 1844 Act was significantly higher than it
had been previously, even though it reached its peak in
1847 and was below this figure by 1857.
72 Source: Feaveryear (1963), pp.296.
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The Committee recommended that there should be no
alteration in the Act, but that the Bank should alter its
discounting practice. In recent years the Bank had extended
discount facilities to the bill brokers. 73
 However, in the
1857 crisis it had been the bill brokers which had imposed
the greatest strain on the Bank. Thus the latter announced
that it would undertake no discounting from bill brokers,
although it would continue to lend to them in the quarterly
periods of pressure. 74 It also accepted that it should make
loans to the brokers in times of crisis. This was an
attempt by the Bank to withdraw from the market: its
intention was to make the bill brokers hold their own
reserves and be less dependent on the Bank of England, thus
decreasing the latter's responsibilities as a LLR. In
Neave's words, 75
 the aim was to make the Bank's reserve
"more within her own compass".76
This showed a misunderstanding about the position of
the Bank within the system, as in a period of stress the
same pattern of events would occur even with the bill
brokers holding a reserve: they would attempt to increase
their reserve (as the banks did already) by liquidating
bills and securities, and thus the Bank of England would be
forced into the same position. This was basically a final
The precursors of the Discount Houses.
When the gilt edged market was tight due to the
closure of transfer books in order to make up dividends.
The Governor of the Bank of England.
76 Quoted in Wood (1939), pp.132.
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hopeful attempt by the Bank to evade a certain part of its
responsibility as a LLR. After this time -the validity of
this role was never really questioned by the vast majority
of bankers, both inside and outside the Bank.
13: The Crisis of 1866
The events of 1866 depict a crisis very different from
any other so far discussed. This time the cause of the
crisis could not be found in an external drain or an
ov r-export of bullion: it was purely and simply a credit
pa ic, with the failure of Overend Gurney threatening the
st bility of the whole system. Even though in reality most
of the banks and other financial intermediaries were sound,
this panic was the most severe of any of the nineteenth
century crises.
Overend Gurney were a very well established firm of
bill-brokers, set up in the late eighteenth century as the
result of & r the Gurney Bank (based in Norwich)
and Richardson Overend & Co., a London bill-broker. The
resulting firm expanded rapidly over the next fifty or so
years, becoming one of the major London bill brokers, well
respected throughout the City. However, during the
inid-1850s the original heads of the firm, under whose
direction the expansion had taken place, retired or died,
and their replacements soon showed that they were lacking
in some of their predecessors' business acumen. Their
problems started in 1860 when they fell foul of the Bank of
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England's change in discount policy with respect to the
bill-brokers, and later started to get involved with the
emerging finance companies, lending on extremely dubious
security. An attempt to remedy their uncertain situation
was made in July 1865 when a decision was made by the
partners to go public, a move which was successful in
attracting increased share capital.
At this point most people felt Overend Gurney to be
the very model of a successful firm, but to insiders it
c me as no surprise when the firm was forced to appeal to
the Bank for assistance on May 10th 1866. This was the
culmination of a period of very heavy trading on Overend
Gurney shares in particular, but also on finance securities
in general. Interest rates increased from 3 to 8 per cent
during the second half of 1865, but the event that actually
prompted Overend Gurney's failure was in fact unrelated to
them: in January 1866 the firm of Watson, Overend & Co., a
Liverpool railway contractor, went down, and although there
was in reality no connection between the two companies,
rumours were rife as to the possible failure of Overend
Gurney.
Overend Gurney's request on May 10th for an immediate
loan of £400,000 was refused by the Bank of England, who
judged them to be insolvent, and so they failed, with
liabilities in excess of £5in. To certain Bank Directors who
had inside knowledge of the deterioration of Overend
Gurney's fortune, the failure of the famed bill brokers
came as no real surprise; in fact, they had been expecting
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it for months. With this in mind, the Bank had taken the
precautionary measure of building up its- reserve in the
early months of 1866, and by May the bullion stock stood at
approximately £12m, thus establishing a reserve that would
probably have been sufficient to cope with the crises of
1847 or 1857.
Overend Gurney's failure sparked off a wave of crises
in other banks and finance houses in two distinct strands:
firstly the country banks with direct links with Overend
Gurney, and secondly these country banks then initiated a
run on London banks and the Bank of England. This all
occurred very quickly: the Bank's note issue fell by an
amount in excess of £3m in a single day. Bank Rate was
immediately increased from 8 to 9 per cent, and the Bank
continued to discount freely. However, late on Friday May
11th the issue of a Letter of Indemnity was announced,
after Gladstone (the Chancellor) had been besieged by
requests for such a measure from various groups of bankers.
This step was taken even though the Bank itself tried to
avoid it, but its note reserve was now below £3m and so it
was in effect faced with no choice. Bank Rate was increased
to 10 per cent on May 12th, when the reserve stood at
£l.2m, but the fiduciary limit was never broken, even
though between May 10th and 14th the Bank advanced
This is an important point, since it shows that the
Bank of England was taking the initiative with respect to
its actions as a LLR. Had the crisis when it eventually
arrived been less serious, the Bank would probably ridden
the storm fairly easily.
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£2,874,000 on securities and £9,350,000 in discounts. 78 The
reserve was slow in returning to its previous level: Bank
Rate stood at 10 per cent until August 16th, when it fell
to 8 per cent, at which point the reserve was still only
£4. 6m.
The report of the Bank of England's Special Discount
Committee on the State of the Discounts for the year 1866
shows, unsurprisingly, an increase in most of the relevant
discount variables over their values in the previous year.
There were sixty-five more firms discounting in 1866 and an
increase of over £7m in the amount discounted. The interest
income received by the Bank for discounts and for advances
also increased. Although the highest level reached by Bank
Rate was 10 per cent, the Bank did carry out some business
at rates higher than this: 1.32 per cent of its discounts
for the year took place at 10.5, 11 or 12 per cent. By far
the greatest proportion of its discounts (47 per cent of
the annual total) were carried out at 10 per cent however.
A total of thirty-six of the Bank's discounters suspended
payments over the year, compared with twenty in 1864 and
eighteen in 1865.80
The Bank of England's conduct throughout the crisis
was seen from all sides as being very good, with the
exception of a short period on Friday May 10th when a
78 Morgan (1943), pp.180.
Op cit, pp.180.
80 All the data given here comes from the Minutes of
the Special Discount Committee, 13th March 1867: Bank of
England Archive reference C35/5 pp 49-59.
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rumour circulated that the Bank would not advance on
government securities. This was subsequently denied by the
Bank. In general though, even erstwhile critics of the
Bank, such as The Economist magazine, felt its conduct to
be satisfactory, as voiced in the following quote:
their policy has been sound, cautious and
admirable. They have given mercantile and banking
accommodation, as their accounts show, to an
unprecedented extent, considering the shortness of
the time under consideration, and the rapidity of
events within it."81
The Bank had discounted freely throughout the crisis, and
could not be blamed, as it could on other occasions, for
failing to react early enough or not following the correct
course of action: in short, for not acting as a lender of
last resort. As for Overend Gurney, it could be postulated
that they were in some senses just unlucky: they had been
badly managed and so deserved to fail, but there had been
other tensions in the banking system in the early 1860s,82
and it is possible that a serious crisis would eventually
have arrived irrespective of the Overend Gurney failure.
81 The Economist, 19/05/1866.
82 For example the American Civil War.
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14: The Position of the Banking System by 1870
Over the period of two centuries so far discussed the
British banking system progressed extensively, to the point
where it demonstrated an increasingly high level of
sophistication. In the area of the relationship between the
Bank of England and the rest of the financial system, the
situation by 1870 was very much as we know it today, with
the Bank at the centre of the system, acting as a lender of
last resort when necessary, having accepted, at least
partially, its responsibilities in that sphere.
However, this transition was not smooth or even well
established by 1870: as late as 1866, Thomson Hankey, a
Director of the Bank of England, in answer to The
Economist's statement that it was the duty of the Bank of
England to provide liquidity o the banking system whenever
it needed it, called this "the most mischievous doctrine
ever broached". 83 Hankey was supported in this by
G.W.Norman, 84
 another influential Bank Director. Their
general view was that in its management the Bank should be
made to resemble as closely as possible a well run private
bank. Furthermore, they felt that the system as a whole
should not be allowed to be dependent on the Bank of
England to rescue it in times of trouble. Although at the
time these arguments were seen to be somewhat out of step
83 See Hankey's Princi ples of Banking (1857): a
republished text of a lecture given in 1858.
84 The Economist, 22/12/1866.
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with contemporary thinking, since it seemed that by this
point the Bank had accepted its lender of last resort role,
with hindsight it could be postulated that Hankey was
merely postulating the problem of moral hazard.85
Hankey's outburst can be regarded as the final episode
in the discussion as to the relevance of the 1844 Act.
After 1870 there was never again any serious proposal of
the Currency School doctrine as embodied in the Act. It was
generally accepted by bankers and financiers that the
position of the Bank of England was quite different from
that of any other bank in that it held the system's only
sizeable reserve and was the ultimate source of its
liquidity. The Bank itself seemed to have accepted that in
times of difficulty it should support the system by
"lending freely at high interest rates". This did not mean
however that there was any formal announcement or dramatic
change in the Bank's policy with respect to the rest of the
system. The way in which these changes occurred, together
with their effects, are the subject of the remainder of
this thesis.
85 See Chapter Two.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1870-1914 AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ROLE OF THE LENDER OF L1ST RESORT.
1: Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to detail the
development of the lender of last resort and of the U.K.
banking system over the period 1870-1914, that period
during which Bagehot's ideas were being assimilated into
the normal practice of the Bank of England. This involves a
consideration of the extent to which the Bank had accepted
the "Bagehot rules", 1 either implicitly or explicitly.
B fore Bagehot, policy decisions had been taken somewhat
arbitrarily, and any successful policy stance had been
arrived at largely as a result of trial and error.
Although Bagehot himself was responsible for the
formulation of the first set of "rules" concerning what
action should be taken by a central bank during a financial
crisis, Henry Thornton had been advocating very much the
same sort of policies three-quarters of a century earlier2.
He, though, did not possess the advantage of being editor
of one of the most important vehicles for the dissemination
of commercial and financial information, The Economist.
The discussion below will in general be drawn from
secondary historical sources, although some material from
the Bank of England's archives is included.
1 To "lend freely at high rates" in the case of an
internal drain, or to "protect the reserve" for a drain
that was external in origin.
2 in Paper Credit, published in 1802.
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2: The Position at the Start of the Period.
By the early 1870s, the pre-eminent position of
London at the centre of the international capital markets
was well established. The trend towards external domination
of the UK financial markets had started in the 1850s, but
had especially gathered momentum after the Overend-Gurney
crisis in l866.
Until the French defeat at the hands of the Prussians
in January 1871, Paris had been the only major competitor
for London's central position. The war however, together
with the agreement of the French indemnity, which was
largely financed through London, effectively put a stop to
the development of Paris as a major financial centre.4
Domestically, the Bank of England was established as
the central pillar of an increasingly sophisticated
financial system. In the words of Leoni Levi, the Bank was
a u...banquue de luxe in ordinary times, and of dernier
ressort in times of crisis". 5 The latter duty was generally
recognised to have been accepted by the Bank of England by
the early 1870s, as a result both of its actions during
External in this sense means that many of the
determining influences in the London financial markets had
their origins abroad, rather than being solely home-based.
This was due to the fact that most of France's
internal financial resources were utilised in organising
the payment of the indemnity to Germany, which had been set
at approximately £200m. There was little time, energy or
resources left for the continuing development of Paris as a
major financial centre.
Gilbart lectures, 1878. Quoted in Powell (1915),
pp.492.
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the Overend Gurney crisis and of the publication of Walter
Bagehot's Lombard Street in 1873. There was however some
dissent from this view of the Bank's overall responsibility
to the financial system, voiced mainly by Thomson Hankey,
as has already been discussed in an earlier chapter.
The strengthening of London's position in the
international sphere can be regarded with hindsight as the
single most important development affecting the Bankts
management of the London money markets throughout this
period. By 1870 London was the sole place of refuge for
what was known as "hot" money: fluid international capital,
and was also the greatest free gold market of the world.6
The latter factor meant that newly mined gold would at
least pass through London, with much of it remaining there,
especially if there was a favourable change in the
exchanges. The negative aspects of this situation were
substantial however: the Bank of England's reserve was
subject to much greater fluctuation than might otherwise
have been the case as a result of these swiftly changing
external influences, especially when gold imports and
exports did not coincide.
The realisation of the power of Bank Rate in
influencing the movement of both internal and external
capital flows and thus affecting the size of the Bank of
England's reserve came about during the third quarter of
the nineteenth century. Initially its power was only
6 That is, gold could be obtained at all times and in
any quantity.
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recognised during a period of market tension as being
important in strengthening the reserve, but later it came
to be realised that the reserve could be protected at all
times through the pursuit of an active Bank Rate policy.7
The pursuit of this policy was not helped in the early
1870s and lBBOs however by several institutional factors
that served to weaken the link between Bank Rate and market
rate. Firstly, one consequence of the move by the Bank in
1858 to make the discount houses more self reliant was the
loss of much of the day-to-day i'arket contact that the ?,an5.
had previously enjoyed, thus making it more difficult for
the latter to make its views felt in the market. Secondly,
the Bank's position as the 11market leader" had eer
completely eroded as a result of the massive growth of the
joint stock banks and of the discount houses, with a
corresponding decline in its market influence. Finally,
throughout this period and especially in the last two
decades of the century, the Bank was at all times concerned
about its income, a constant preoccupation being that its
dividends were rising at a much slower rate than those of
the joint stock banks. 8
 This last factor was a force that
An active Bank Rate policy can be regarded as one
where the central bank utilises changes in its discount
rate in order to influence the course of the foreign
exchanges. Thus if the Bank of England wanted to attract
gold to Britain, and more particularly into the Bank's
vaults in order to strengthen the reserve, it would
increase Bank Rate. The opposite applies when the aim is
the reverse.
8 Various attempts to increase the Bank of England's
volume of business were made: in 1878 it was decided to
give discounts at market rate (less than Bank Rate) to
(continued...)
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did not generally act to the benefit of the Bank itself or
the system as a whole. It frequently prevented the Bank
taking an independent position, especially with regard to
the use of open market operations in order to make Bank
Rate effective with respect to market rate.
The combination of these three factors meant that the
Bank of England's level of market control in the latter
part of the nineteenth century was not perhaps as great as
it might have been. The Bank was helped however by the fact
that the linkages between market rate and its gold reserve
were particularly strong during this period. This was
partly due to the importance of London in the international
sphere: foreign lending was very sensitive to changes in
the market rate and to disparities between rates in the
various financial centres, and also because high rates in
London had a powerful effect in drawing cash in from the
country bankers. The latter followed a policy of sending
cash to London when interest rates were relatively high,
especially now that transport and communication networks
had improved sufficiently for transactions costs to be less
important.9
8	 continued)
those customers keeping their sole discount account at the
Bank of England. This privilege was extended to such
customers at the branches in 1888. The discount houses were
re-admitted to re-discounting facilities at the Bank in
1890.
The importance of this phenomenon was at its peak in
the third quarter of the nineteenth century. By the start
of the twentieth century its effects were insignificant.
For further information on this subject see Sayers (1957)
chapter 2.
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3: 1870-1879 - Description and Market Control
This period saw the occurrence of two periods when
there was an increase in tension in the financial markets,
one fairly minor but the other rather more serious, and
both very different in nature. The decade started with the
outbreak of war between France and Prussia (July 1870),
which was accompanied by a slight (precautionary) rise in
interest rates, although this war did not have serious
implications for Britain: she was at all times merely a
spectator. 10
After 1873 the decade was characterised by falling
prices, the major facet of the period which has been
described as the SiGreat Depression".- 1
 From the middle of
the century up until 1873 prices had been rising,
especially after 1866, reaching their peak in 1873.
Thereafter, there was a fairly rapid fall until the end of
the 1880s, followed by a somewhat slower decline.
The first period of market tension occurred in 1873.
It originated on the continent, and was accentuated by the
pressures the financing of the French war indemnity was
putting on the system. By this point the effects of the
crisis were being felt all over Europe, and by September it
10 The fact that Britain would not be involved in the
Franco-Prussian war was not known with certainty at the
outset of the war, hence the precautionary rise in interest
rates.
11 For example, Morgan (1943), chapter 9. This trend
of falling prices was of course superimposed on cyclical
fluctuations.
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had spread to the New York markets. The Bank of England had
felt fairly safe during the continental problems, and after
increasing Bank Rate to 7 per cent in June, lowered it (by
½ per cent falls) to 3 per cent in August.
However, by September the continental crisis had once
again gathered momentum and was greatly affecting the
American markets, especially in New York, leading the Bank
of England to increase Bank Rate once more: from 3 to 4 per
cent on September 25th and 4 to 5 per cent on the 29th,
eventually reaching 9 per cent on November 7th. In London
the panic was confined to the Stock Exchange: there was no
generalised financial or credit panic, although in New York
the situation was rather more serious, with large scale
bankruptcies of both financial and commercial firms.
The period of large scale activity on the London Stock
Exchange was shortlived: by the beginning of January 1874
Bank Rate was once again back at 3½-4 per cent, the
"normal" level for the period. The Bank of England had
discounted where necessary, but the reserve was always
large enough to cope with any difficulties.
The next few years were quiet, both at the Bank and in
the markets as a whole. In the economy prices were falling,
especially between 1873 and 1875 and at the end of the
decade, and Bank Rate hovered around the 3-4 per cent
level, although market rates were somewhat lower than
this. 12
 By 1876 the reserve had climbed to an unprecedented
12 One reason for the (relatively) high level of Bank
Rate compared to market rates was that the Banque de France
(continued...)
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peak of almost £22m, though it fell later in the decade
after an efflux of gold.
The second period of marked financial tension occurred
in 1878-9, with the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in
October 1878. This bank had been viewed as being "suspect"
by the Bank of England since the 1857 crisis when it had
first suspended payment, at which time the Bank had refused
to help it. Some observers felt that it had never been
totally solvent since its initial problems, and by the time
it failed completely it was a clear case of fraud and bad
management. Its manager and directors were successfully
prosecuted and jailed: only the second time in British
joint stock banking history that bank management had been
punished in this way. 13
Shareholders in this problem bank suffered greatly
from its failure: for every £100 share they had to find
£2750, and only 254 of the 1819 shareholders were still
solvent when the bank's business was finally sorted out.14
Data on the bank's position when it failed makes fairly
startling reading: against its liabilities of £12.4m it had
assets of only £7.2ni, with advances at 132.7 per cent of
deposits. Of its liabilities almost a half were owed to the
bank by only three firms: Morton & Co. (f2,173,000), Smith
12( .continued)
was trying to attract gold to Paris, to the detriment of
the Bank of England's reserve. This was especially so in
1874-5, but equally applied at any time when other European
banks were keen to attract gold to swell their reserves.
13 See Clapham (1944), Vol.11, pp.410, footnote 2.
14 Checkland (1975), pp.471.
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Fleming & Co. ((:1,968,000) and James Nicol Fleming & Co.
((:l,238,000). 15
 Depositors with the bank were however
eventually paid in full, and the episode marked the end of
unlimited liability in banking: hereafter there was a move
towards limited liability.
The combination of all this bad banking practice led
to a succession of adverse rumours regarding the bank's
precarious financial position, and culminated in its
stoppage on October 1st 1878. This precipitated a financial
crisis that was however by and large confined to Scotland,
with a higher than normal number of bankruptcies in the
following two years. A committee was established to divide
up the City of Glasgow's branches, one hundred out of one
hundred and thirty-three of which were re-opened under the
ownership of the remaining S O+f5	 banks.
The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank did not have
any major repercussions on the English financial and
commercial world. The Governor of the Bank of England,
Edward Howley Palmer, raised Bank Rate from 5 to 6 per cent
on October as a precaution against the Glasgow failure,
which had in any case coincided with the normal period of
autumnal pressure, and this rate remained for five weeks.
There were fairly large demands made on the Bank of
England's reserve, but not enough to cause a crisis in the
15 Op cit, pp.470. An account of events preceding the
failure can be found in the above book. See also Anderson &
Cottrell (1974) pp.308-312, where an extract from the
Banker's Magazine is reprinted, and Collins (1987), who
gives a detailed analysis of the country-wide effects of
the failure.
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financial markets, and the reserve quickly recovered: it
fell to £8.5m in October 1878, but had risen to over £2lm
by July 1879.16 Bankruptcies in England were high, but no
higher than the previous year.
Thus by the end of the 1870s it seemed that the Bank
of England had gained control of Bank Rate as a weapon with
which to influence the size of its reserve. Its hostility
towards the bill market had reached a peak after the 1857
crisis, many of the causes of which were blamed on the bill
brokers. By the late 1870s this hostility had receded,
partly as a result of the Bank's concern over its income,
although full re-discount facilities were not restored to
the discount houses until 1890. This concern about its
income arose after a period of slow increase in its
dividends. As long as market rate was above the Bank of
England's discount rater'
the Bank had no real worries about its income
since Bank Rate was low enough to ensure a continual supply
of bills without any reliance on the business of the bill
brokers. However, once the reverse occurred (ie Bank Rate
lower than market rates, as the case after 1872), concern
over income became prevalent. It was at this point that
various suggestions were made to increase the eligibility
of the bill brokers, for example to let them become regular
customers of the Bank and thus keep a reserve there. This
proposal was never taken up however, although when, in
16 Morgan (1943), pp.200.
17 See Figures 6.0(a) and (b) in Chapter Six.
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1878, the Bank decided to start discounting at less than
market rate for those customers keeping their sole discount
account at the Bank of England, 2- 8 the Court decided to
revert to the pre-1858 policy with respect to the bill
brokers. Discount facilities were still withheld: the bill
brokers were to be allowed to receive only advances at the
B nk. This facility was again withdrawn from them in 1883,
w n the Bank decided to restrict advances, except at the
q arterly shuttings, since it was felt that the bill
b okers had again come to rely on the Bank far too much.19
This last change was made even though the Bank's
c ncerns about its income had not receded. In fact, by the
mid 1880s there was an even greater margin between Bank
Rate and market rate, 20 implying that the Bank had even
more difficulty in attracting business than previously.
This led to calls in the financial press for the Bank to
intervene in the money markets more frequently in order to
make Bank Rate more effective. 21 The end result of these
demands was the decision on July 24th 1890 to re-admit the
18 By now a relatively small number. This move was
another indication that Bank Rate was frequently higher
than market rate.
19 See Table 3.2 later in this chapter for a summary
of Bank of England discount regulations.
20 Gregory (1929), Vol.1, pp.xxxiv.
21 The Statist, 29th November 1890, pp.613. In this
sense "making Bank Rate effective" is concerned with the
extent of the Bank's influence on the market: market rates
should be seen to be "ruled" by Bank Rate in an attempt to
avoid situations where market rates are at significantly
lower levels than Bank Rate, which could cause problems for
the Bank's management of the Gold Standard.
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bill brokers to discount facilities, initially on short
terni bills (fifteen days inaxixnum) but later on longer dated
paper. 22
The decision to re-admit the bill market was taken by
William Lidderdale, one of the most active of all the
Bank's Governors, who realised that in order to make Bank
Rate effective in the market the Bank could not remain
aloof from it. Thus the new policy had two advantages: it
facilitated an increase in the Bank's income, and it gave
the Bank a greater level of market control.
The fact that during much of the 1880s Bank Rate and
market rate were not very closely correlated is a
confirmation of the reasons why, when writing Lombard
Street, Bagehot did not place much faith in the possibility
of a Bank Rate policy bringing about an increase in the
reserve. 23 He was aware of the weakness of the links
between Bank Rate and market rate, as already outlined, but
the change in discount rules in 1878 (after his death)
enabled the Bank to increase its market contact. More
importantly, the fact that the Bank's reserve was very
responsive to changes in market rate meant that as soon as
the Bank did act to get a change in Bank Rate reflected in
the market rate, 24 the change in the reserve was brought
22 The term was extended to sixty days in 1895 and
later to three months, which is the modern practice.
23 Bagehot was in favour of an increase in the reserve
per se.
24 Through the use of open market operations
(borrowing money at call on the open market) to force up
(continued...)
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about quickly and was substantial. This enabled the Bank to
control the level of its reserve far mOre easily than
previously.
4: The Market in the 1880s
In the first year of the decade it seemed as though
there might be a check to the general fall in prices, but
this proved to be slight and shortlived: prices recovered
in 1880 but resumed their downward trend soon after,
reaching a much lower level in 1884 than had existed in
1879. Interest rates were in general low, market rates
being frequently lower than Bank Rate, and the level of the
Bank of England's reserve continued to be of worry to
financial commentators.
As might be expected given the low rates prevailing at
the time, the Bank's problems as to the level of its income
did not recede during the 1880s. The level of discounts
and advances was low, the number of discounters having
fallen from 450 in 1840 to 206 in 1888.25 Various attempts
were made to increase the Bank's business, such as the
decision in 1884 to make the 1878 change in discount rules
for customers keeping their sole discount account at the
24 • • continued)
interest rates, the price of bonds being inversely
proportional to the rate of interest.
25 Clapham (1944), Vol.11, pp.321-2.
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Bank, 26 apply not only to those customers at Threadneedle
Street but also to those at the branches. This had
negligible effects however, since the discount business at
the branches was not, and never had been, great.
The most important event of the decade concerning
relations between the Bank of England and the government
was Coschen's debt conversion in March 1888, which dealt
with almost £600m of debt. The reason it was carried out at
this time was that interest rates were very low: Bank Rate
stood at 2 per cent. One benefit accruing to the Bank from
the conversion was a limited amount of income, something
always welcomed by the Bank, concerned as it was about its
level of dividends. The Bank's final commission was
£112,000, a fairly modest amount considering the extent of
the work undertaken by Bank staff.27
The early months of 1888 marked the end of the period
of low interest rates: Bank Rate was not to stand at 2 per
cent again until April 1892. The era of cheap money was
followed directly by an economic boom, leading to a fall in
unemployment and an improvement in trade. Throughout 1889
loans to both English industries and to foreign countries
were very high, a factor that was to contribute towards the
propagation of the Baring crisis in November 1890.
26 They were allowed to receive discounts at less than
Bank Rate.
27 Clapham (1944), Vol.11, pp.319-321.
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5: The Baring Crisis - Causes. Passa ge and Aftermath 28
The Baring Crisis is one of the most important and
well documented episodes of British banking history. The
house of Baring, one of the greatest of City names 29 and
one that had frequently supported and aided the Bank of
England (especially regarding the purchase of gold from
other central banks), 3 ° was forced to appeal to the Bank
for help on the 8th November 1890.
The origin of the firm's problems lay in heavy
investment abroad, especially in South America. Barings was
not the only company involved in South American investment,
but it was certainly the one most deeply implicated by the
area's problems. Loans had been issued to many South
American companies, the status of some of which was, at the
very least, dubious, but the loans appeared more secure
because they were underwritten by London Issuing houses.
Out of approximately £lOOm of sterling loans made to the
River Plate Republics between 1880 and 1890, Barings was
28 For excellent accounts of the crisis see Clapham
(1944), Vol.11, pp.326-39, and Pressnell (1968).
29 In 1819 the Duc de Richelieu had said "there are in
Europe six great powers - England, France, Russia, Austria,
Prussia and the Baring Brothers".
30 In 1825, and again in 1839 Barings, together with
members of the Parisian "Haute Banque" (a group of
approximately twenty institutions specialising in monetary
affairs and especially in dealing in bills of exchange) had
set up transactions whereby the Haute Banque sent gold to
England. In 1839 for example, the Haute Banque sent some
FF48-50m to the Bank of England, which helped the latter
maintain payments during the 1839 crisis.
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involved in approximately 30 per cent, 31
 the greatest
involvement of any individual bank. 	 -
By late 1890, three-quarters of Baring's asset
portfolio consisted of Argentinean and Uruguayan loans.
Thus, when the South American countries started
experiencing problems in servicing their debt in early 1890
Barings were immediately involved. 32 The South American
situation deteriorated over the following few months: a run
on the banking system in Argentina was followed by the
dispatch to London of a representative of the National
Government, Dr. Plaza, to discuss the situation. Dr Plaza's
aim was to secure further loans for Argentina to enable
them to continue interest payments, but Barings refused
this. By this time (early November) their situation had
become precarious: the value of their assets had fallen
substantially due to the significant decline in the value
of the South American securities, and their income had also
fallen due to the absence of much of the revenue from the
River Plate financing. The Directors of Barings had begun
to realise the extent of their problems before Plaza's
arrival in early November: it was common knowledge in the
city that Baring Brothers had received a sizeable loan from
another large company in October.33
31 Batchelor (1986).
32 There is a obvious parallel to be drawn here with
the Latin American Debt crisis of the 1980s, when Western,
particularly North American, banks lent huge sums to South
American countries.
Claphain (1944), Vol.11, pp.327.
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On Friday November 7th there was a state of general
uneasiness in the financial markets, with speculation as to
the possible difficulties of a major house. Baring Brothers
bills were coming in fast. The following day one of the
Directors of Barings, Lord Reveistoke met with Lidderdale
and with Everard Hambro, 34
 at Threadneedle Street. At that
meeting Reveistoke informed Lidderdale of Baring's
difficulties. A meeting with the Chancellor was arranged
for the following Monday (November 10th), when a clearer
picture of Baring's situation was to be presented.
At the Monday meeting Goschen, the Chancellor, offered
Lidderdale a Chancellor's letter, 35 which was refused. The
Bank's reserve at this point stood at only £10,815,000, a
level inadequate to meet the vastly inflated demand for
discounts that would result if doubts arose as to the
worthiness of Baring Brothers credit. It was decided that
the Bank and the government would act only it were found
that Baring's were in fact solvent, and to this end
Benjamin Bucke Greene and Bertram Currie 36 were dispatched
to undertake an "audit" of Baring's position, in order to
determine whether they were insolvent or merely illiquid.
Lidderdale also asked Goschen to try to arrange for
Rothschilds to obtain an amount of gold from the Banque de
E.C.Baring, the Governor of the Bank of England,
and a Director of the Bank respectively.
Releasing the Bank from the constraints of the 1844
Banking Act.
36 A former Governor (1874-6) and a director of the
firm Glyn, Mills, Currie, respectively.
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France. By Wednesday 12th £3m of gold had been borrowed in
Paris and a further £l.5m bought from Russia
By the middle of the week the precarious nature of
Baring's position had still not been made official. The
financial press knew that something was happening, since
the existence of the loan from the Banque de France was
common knowledge, and many people suspected that the
trouble might involve Baring Brothers, since many of the
latter's bills were being brought in for discount. By
Friday 14th November it seemed that the markets were more
certain as to Baring's involvement, since there was heavy
discounting of their bills, and on the 15th an official
statement was made.
Baring's real position had been ascertained the
previous Wednesday morning, when Greene and Currie had
presented their report. It seemed that the firm was
fundamentally solvent (in terms of assets exceeding
liabilities), but that a large injection would be needed to
ensure their survival: Revelstoke had mentioned £6m as an
appropriate figure, but Greene put it at between £8-9in. The
latter thought it was unlikely that Barings would be saved,
as the amount needed was so great, but Lidderdale was of
the opinion that they should continue in business provided
that a guarantee could be organised. In this way the Bank
could execute its aim of making sure that the firm was
reasonably solvent and then organising a fund to ensure its
continued existence.
From the start of the episode it was certain that
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neither the Bank nor the government would act,
independently or together, to save Barings: the scale of
their business was too great for either of them to
undertake responsibility. The only solution lay in the
formation of a guarantee fund, and, with this end in mind,
on Friday 14th November Lidderdale asked the government to
assume joint responsibility with the Bank for the risk of
loss on Baring's liquidation. The government was not keen
to accept this responsibility, and the Prime Minister
repeated his offer of a Chancellor's Letter, which was
again refused. Eventually they acquiesced and agreed to
bear half the cost incurred on any Baring Brothers bills
discounted between that time and 2pm the following day.
Lidderdale himself set about raising the guarantee fund.
The Bank headed the list of guarantors with Lim, and
by 5.3Opm Lidderdale had promises of a further £2,250,000.
The final total, reached in December, was over £17m and was
made up as shown in Table 4.1.
The formation of the guarantee fund was presented as a
"fait accoinpli" to the press and public at large, thus
avoiding any real panic. Bank Rate never rose above the 7
per cent that was announced on November 7th. By July 1891
it stood at 2½ per cent.
Baring Brothers itself was liquidated and a new
Company, Baring Brothers and Co. Ltd was formed with a
share capital of Lim. The terms of the original guarantee
allowed for a liquidation period of three years, but by the
beginning of 1893 it had become obvious that Baring's
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affairs were not going to be cleared up inside the three
year period, and so the Bank of England started
negotiations for an extension to the guarantee period. This
proved to be a more difficult task than was first thought:
several of the original subscribers to the guarantee were
unhappy at the rate of progress being made in the
liquidation. A years' extension was eventually obtained
however, with an option allowing the Bank to extend it for
a further twelve months.37
By the summer of 1894 renewed doubts were being
expressed as to the slowness of the liquidation: in a
letter to Barings, Powell, who had become Governor in 1892,
noted that there had recently been relatively few sales of
securities, even though there were securities available
that could be sold. 38 This comment is an indication of the
pressure that the Bank was starting to exert on Barings,
for by this point even the former felt that progress should
be faster.
The liquidation process was finally completed in
January 1895, two months into the extra year allowed for
under the extension agreement. Letters of thanks were
exchanged between Baring Brothers and the Bank, between the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lidderdale, and between
Goschen and Lidderdale, congratulating the latter on a
successful completion of the liquidation operation.
Up to November 1895.
38 Baring Papers, Bank of England Archive Reference
G15/192, folio 71a. (26/07/1894)
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The guarantee had enabled Baring Brothers to pay off
all their liabilities at maturity: Barings were never
insolvent, merely illiquid. There had been a problem during
the initial stages of the liquidation however: a mistake
was made in the initial "audit" in calculating the extent
of Baring's liabilities. 39
 Six weeks after Greene and
Currie had established what they thought was Baring's true
position, Francis Baring informed Greene that the
liabilities were approximately £lm more than Barings had
stated, an oversight that was apparently the result of a
genuine mistake. By that point it was too late to stop the
process of liquidation as backed by the guarantee fund, and
in any case the apparent surplus was still considerable. In
the event, the underestimation proved to be less than was
first thought: the 14th November statement gave a surplus
of £3,807,328 which was corrected to £3,220,125 on 11th
December, a difference of £580,000.40 The eventual surplus
was much less than either of these two figures, at around
£lm.
Contemporary comment on the affair was practically
unanimously favourable towards the Bank, but with some
criticism of Barings for allowing their business to
deteriorate to such an extent that the support of the whole
financial system was necessary. The Economist in particular
was critical of Barings:
Letter from B.B.Greene to Lidderdale, 12/02/1900.
(Reference Gl5/192, folio 177.)
40 Op cit, folio 178.
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"We feel unable to join unreservedly in the
chorus of condolence which has been raised this
week over the collapse of Messrs. Baring
Brothers. It is, indeed, a pity that such a great
house should have been brought so low, but it
would have been still more to be regretted if the
punishment for the errors that have been
committed should have fallen, not upon those
responsible for them, but on innocent parties.
Had Messrs. Baring Brothers been able to shift
the burden of their South American obligations
upon the investing public they would now have
been standing erect. ...We do not seek to blame
Messrs. Baring Brothers because they were not
satisfied with the safe and magnificent business
that their splendid merchant banking business
yielded. It is now seen that they acted very
unwisely, but temptation to add riches to riches
is hard to resist, and for whatever errors of
judgement they committed they are no'
to suffer... we feel bound to say
better that things should have turned
have done, than that the Barings
succeeded in relieving themselves fi
consequences of their own rashness in
of wealth, at the expense of
investors. 4l
They also felt that the terms of the guarantee were too far
reaching and that there was some indication that the assets
of the firm were to be "nursed" over a period of time,
together implying the problem of moral hazard. There was a
warning too from The Times:
"What happened in their (Baring's) case must not
be taken as a precedent applying to smaller firms
or institutions. Neither would it apply to an
equally large firm if its liabilities were the
result of something more than a "lock up". It
must be remembered that Messrs. Baring possessed
a large amount of really valuable assets, though
many of them were of practically no value for the
moment, as they were useless as security for
loans, being at present unmarketable.
41 The Economist, 22/11/1890.
42 The Times, November 25th 1890.
i being made
that it is
out as they
should have
om the evil
the pursuit
confiding
150
It was therefore generally agreed that the Bank of England
was justified in its actions in initiating and organising
the rescue of Baring Brothers in November 1890. The new
company formed, Baring Brothers & Co. Ltd. ,went on to enjoy
continued success, taking up where the liquidated company
had left off. Lidderdale's reputation was made by his
actions, which had started to bring in a new spirit of
co-operation between the institutions in the financial
markets. These institutions had for the first time come
together in order to secure the common good - the stability
of the financial system, without thought to commercial
rivalries. This was in marked contrast to their behaviour
during previous crises, such as in 1866, when their actions
had been de-stabilising rather than stabilising. The
episode as a whole was to inspire a new outburst of
discussion of banking matters, much as had happened after
the 1866 crisis, as will be seen in the next section.
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Table 4.1 The Baring's Guarantee Fund.43
Bank of England
Banks: London
Country
Scottish
Colonial and Foreign
Discount Houses
Finance Houses, Merchants, etc
Individuals
Cl 000 000
5 650 000
1 685 000
2 100 000
1 700 000
890 000
3 145 000
935 00?
£17 105 000
Source: Bank of England Baring Papers, File 3,
folio 78.01.
152
6: After the Baring Crisis - The Bank in the 1890s
Although the panic element of the Barings affair was
quickly dampened, the repercussions of the crisis continued
for some time. As previously mentioned, the original firm,
Baring Brothers, was not fully liquidated until January
1895, although the new company, Baring Brothers and Co.
Ltd. had been in operation since soon after the launching
of the guarantee fund.
The major influence that the crisis at Barings had on
the financial system was to re-open the question of the
level of bank reserves and the extent to which the
financial institutions should be dependent on the Bank.44
As the initiator and later co-ordinator of the guarantee
fund, Lidderdale, towards the end of his Governorship,
which had been extended for a year in 1891, was keen to
further the new spirit of co-operation that seemed to have
emerged between the Bank of England and the rest of the
financial system during the crisis. His primary concern was
that the reserves of both the Bank of England and the
commercial banks were inadequate, and in an attempt to make
the banks hold larger reserves he was keen to force them to
publish regular accounts, preferably on a monthly or even
weekly basis. Goschen, too, was involved in trying to
force higher reserves: in a notable speech given to the
Leeds Chamber of Commerce he spoke of the need for larger
For an extensive discussion of Lidderdale and
Goschen's efforts to increase both Joint Stock and the Bank
of England's reserves, see Pressnell (1968), pp.208-217.
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reserves to guard against unforseen circumstances.
At the same time that pressure was being brought to
bear on the commercial banks to keep higher reserves,
Lidderdale was also trying to bring about an increase in
the Bank of England's reserve. With this end in mind he
suggested to the Bank's Court that a committee should be
set up to consider the current and future state of the
reserve, together with any possible measures that could be
utilised in order to improve its position. In Lidderdale's
words, this committee was to report on whether
"... it is possible to introduce amendments in
the practice of the Bank as regards the
facilities granted to the public, especially with
regard to the admission of brokers and discount
houses for advances."45
Thus it was to be a "special committee with respect to the
maintenance of an adequate reserve". The committee was
appointed and was to consist of Benjamin Buck Greene,
Lidderdale, Goschen, Wallace and Birch. 46 However it made
no formal report back to the Court and thus it is doubtful
whether it ever formally met. Lidderdale t s attempts towards
bringing about a strengthening in the Bank's reserve
position, a move which after all had been regarded as being
of fundamental importance by Bagehot in the early 1870s,
' Lidderdale to the Bank's Court of Proprietors,
19/0l/1893.(Court of Proprietors' Minutes, Bank of England
Archive Reference G4/15, pp.180-6.)
46 John William Birch was a Bank Director for much of
the period between 1860 and 1897, and was Deputy Governor
and then Governor between 1877 and 1881. Alexander Falconer
Wallace was a Bank Director between 1887 and 1903 and
between 1907 and 1918, and Deputy Governor and then
Governor between 1903 and 1907.
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were therefore defeated, at least for the present.
Another committee was initiated and did meet several
times in 1895 however: the Committee on Advances, appointed
on 18th April 1895. This was set up with the aim of
examining the methods currently used by the Bank in
allocating discounts and advances, and to see if any
improvements could be made. The background to the
appointment of this committee was a desire on the part of
the Bank to increase the volume of bills it held under
discount, a move partly motivated, as previously, by
concerns over its income.
At a meeting of the Committee on July 18th 1895 it was
decided that the discount market was to be re-admitted to
Bank of England discount facilities, subject to certain
conditions, namely that the rate charged would be at least
market rate, that bills submitted had less than sixty days
to run, and that discount facilities would not be granted
to the Discount Houses as of right, but rather would only
be available as and when the Governor judged it to be
expedient. It was also decided to allow discount houses
advances on bills, 47 but that these transactions would be
charged at least ½ per cent more than the current discount
rate. The discount/advance figures were to be presented
weekly before the Committee of Treasury.48
As opposed to only on securities.
48 Data to be presented were as follows:
(1) total volume of discounts made to the
discount houses since the previous meeting.
(ii) amount granted to each firm/company.
(continued...)
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In this way an attempt was made both to increase the
Bank's income from discount/advance business and to
increase its importance in the day to day financial
markets. The latter was important as a weapon with which to
influence interest rate movement, and thus the foreign
exchanges, as already outlined. The new measures introduced
with respect to the discount houses were an extension of
the decision made by Lidderdale in July 1890 to re-admit
the brokers to discount facilities, but in this case for
bills with less than fifteen days to run and for
transactions carried out at not less than Bank Rate.
Antipathy towards the erstwhile bill brokers, at its peak
after the 1857 crisis, had receded almost completely by
this point and it was no longer felt that they would
necessarily be propagators of any financial crisis.
48( . .continued)
(iii)average value of bills taken.
(iv) total amount of discounted bills taken from
the discount houses.
Source: Court of Proprietors Minutes, 5/9/1895 (G4/l18 PP.
135-6.)
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Table 4.2: Summary of Discount Regulations, l830-l93l.
Nov 18th 1830	 Bill brokers not excluded from
applying for discount accounts.
June 3rd 1841	 Discount accounts for bill brokers
closed.
Governor empowered to discount/make
advances to bill brokers at his
discretion.
March 11th 1858	 Bill Brokers only allowed advances at
certain periods - no discounts.
June 24th 1890	 Bill brokers allowed to discount bills
having less than 15 days to run.
Dec 31st 1891	 Discounts from bill brokers may
average 15 days.
Feb 8th 1894	 Average currency of discounts from
bill brokers extended to 30 days.
July 18th 1895	 Bill brokers may offer for discount
bills having less than 63 days to run.
Sept 9th	 1897	 Extended from 63 to 90 days.
Oct 7th	 1907	 Bank of England takes only short bills
from brokers.
Oct 24th 1910 Short loans and 7 day discounts at 5½
per cent (Bank Rate = 5 per cent). No
other discounts for brokers.
August	 1912	 Governor restricts discounts for bill
brokers.
Aug 29th 1912	 Brokers receive 30 day bills at Bank
Rate.
Feb 6th 1930 Governor agrees that the minimum
average currency of bills to be
accepted for discount should be
increased from 21 to 28 days.
Oct. 14th 1931	 Average currency reverts to 21 days
(minimum = 15 days)
Source: Bank of England Archive reference C29/2
folio 24.
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7: Market Conditions Durin g This period
As earlier discussed, the financial markets were
fairly quick to recover after the disruption of the Barings
affair. Bank Rate had fallen to 4 per cent by early January
1891, and the average daily discount figure for December
was only £30,800, as opposed to £181,000 in November. 50
 In
fact, the decade as a whole was characterised by low
interest rates: 51 between February 1894 and September 1896
Bank Rate stood constant at 2 per cent for the whole
period.
One of the major events affecting the Bank in this
period was the scandal in November 1893 over its Chief
Cashier, one of the most senior of Bank appointments, who
was alleged to have been involved in several irregularities
with respect to various companies. The man concerned, Frank
May, had been employed in this post for over twenty years,
and it was this apparent disloyalty from a long serving
employee, together with the fact that his misdemeanors had
been occurring for several years without discovery, which
inspired most of the rumours that quickly spread about the
City. Stories of the imminent resignation of Bank Directors
quickly proved to be unfounded however, and the cashier
50 Source: Daily Discount Books, Bank of England
Archive reference C28. See Chapter Five for an extensive
discussion of these data.
51 Bank Rate rose above 4 per cent only once between
1891 and 1899.
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resigned and left the Bank. 52 The Bank itself allowed for a
sum of £250,000 to cover any losses from any of the
investments or overdrafts authorised by the miscreant, and
the full story was published by The Economist, which
finally put paid to rumours of more serious turn of
events.
By the middle of the decade the Bank's reserve was
reaching new peaks: in September 1895 the reserve of coin
and bullion in the Issue Department stood at £401n, 54 which
reflected the fact that this was a period of "cheap money",
thus implying a very low level of income for the Bank
itself. The latter reached its lowest level of the decade
in 1895-96, when the dividend was only 8 per cent, 55 as
compared to 10 per cent from 1897-1904, and its profit fell
to £1.375m in 1895 and £l.l6Oin in 1896.56
Successive Governors were forced to take account of
the Bank's low income position and to push for an increase
in business, at both Threadneedle Street and at the
branches. In both places what was occurring was an increase
in "private" banking business, something that the Bank
52 It was, apparently, this event which led to the
implementation of a system of internal audit at the Bank of
England.
For a more detailed description of the episode, see
Clapham (1944), Vol.11, pp.358-63, and also The Economist.
4 Claphain (1944), Vol.11, pp.365.
Sayers (1976), Vol.1, pp.18.
56 This profit position can be compared with that of
1890, when the Bank declared a profit of £1.495m, or with
1908, when it was £2.06m.
Source: Sayers (1976), Vol.1, Appendix 35.
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itself was keen to foster as long as it did not conflict
with any of its central banking objectives. This increase
was most obvious at the branches, since it was here that
the Bank was least demonstrably a "central bank" and most
like the joint stock and private banks against whom it was
competing: the branches had been set up, after all, with
the aim of extending the Bank's sphere of influence. In the
last few years of the century, the Agents at the branches
worked hard in an attempt to retain their customers, and to
this end took advantage of the fact that jobbers on the
Stock Exchange were willing to pay very high daily rates on
money borrowed at call from banks, which they would then
use to finance their buying and selling of stocks and
shares. Bank Agents started to "manage" customers funds by
lending a proportion to a jobber, using the branches' own
broker as an intermediary. The customer gained the
advantage of a high interest rate (less a ½ per cent margin
that the Bank took as its commission). In this way the Bank
did not violate its rule of paying no interest on deposits,
and yet still kept its customers, since one of the
attractive benefits of holding an account with a joint
stock bank was that they frequently paid interest even on
current accounts.57
During the 1890s these types of transactions were
widely undertaken by the Bank on a customer's behalf, both
at the branches and in London. The practice was widened in
A later chapter will consider in more detail the
country banks' feelings on the Bank's increased presence at
the branches.
160
1893 when the Bank itself started lending directly to
brokers, a lucrative source of income which peaked in the
late 1890s when transactions were generally large and
frequent. In the early years of the twentieth century this
method of raising income was used less frequently however,
as concern over the Bank's income had receded. Another new
type of business was undertaken from 1895 when the Court
authorised Governors to make advances to urban district
councils and to school boards. This reached its peak in
1899 when the Bank's total lending to these borrowers was
£4 . 5m. 58
In these ways the Bank struggled to maintain its
income and thus its dividend throughout the quiet years of
the mid and late 1890s. One of the reasons why it was not
as vigorous in its search for new business and its
nurturing of old customers at the turn of the century was
the commencement of the Boer war in October 1899. Although
this war was not to affect British society in the same way
as did the later World Wars, all the same it had effects on
the London financial markets
Rumours of war in September and October 1899 had led
to a drain on the Bank's reserve and to an increase in Bank
Rate from 3½ to 4½ per cent on October 3rd and to 5 per
cent on October 5th. This was followed by an increase to 6
per cent at the end of November, but these relatively high
rates did not continue: by late January 1900 Bank Rate
stood once again at 4 per cent and generally remained at or
58 Sayers (1976), Vol.1, pp.23.
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below this level for the duration of the war.59
Interest rates had been raised at the onset of war as
a precaution against any surprises the war might bring, a
normal occurrence or precaution under the circumstances.
They fell back when it became obvious that the war was not
going to upset domestic life to any large extent, and this
movement was encouraged by the Bank of England, which was
trying to keep rates as low as possible in order to ease
the Treasury's burden of war finance. In fact, government
finance was the dominant influence in financial markets
during the course of the war, with total government
borrowing increasing from £l.4ni in 1899-1900 to £62m in
l900_l901. 60
 This caused additional strains on the Bank's
income, for not only did it try to keep interest rates as
low as possible, but also had to manage the increased debt,
a time consuming task that brought only a limited source of
income.
Besides the effect on the rate of interest, the other
main effect that the South African war had on internal
finance was in the interruption of South African gold
supplies that followed upon the commencement of
hostilities. In 1898, South Africa provided approximately a
quarter of the world's gold supplies, although at this time
gold discoveries in other parts of the world meant that
These rates were relatively high for the period
concerned: the average interest rate for the preceding five
years had been around 3 per cent.
60 See Table xxii in Morgan (1943), pp.220.
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South African mines were becoming less important. 61 Even
after making allowances for this reduced reliance on South
Africa, the war meant that the Bank of England's gold
reserve was becoming seriously depleted. The normal Bank
reaction to this would be to increase the discount rate in
an attempt to draw gold into London, but as discussed above
it was loath to do this because of the demands of
government debt financing. Thus from 1899 onwards the Bank
commenced direct operations on the gold market which
included giving interest free advances to importers of
gold, sometimes referred to as the use of gold devices. An
example of this occurred on August 15th 1900 when Barings
were given an advance of £1.58m against gold, 62 a
transaction that was non-interest bearing. King (1936)
explains this mechanism which the Bank of England used as
an alternative to increases in Bank Rate as follows:
"...the authorities, following the example of
several continental banks, began to allow
importers of gold the free use of money for up to
a fortnight free of interest, against an
undertaking to repay the loan in gold, thereby
attracting bullion before the normal gold point
was reached."63
This was therefore a method of attracting gold to London
from elsewhere without recourse to increasing the discount
rate, and thus prevented movements in internal interest
61 New sources of gold were found in, for example, the
U.S.A. and Australia.
62 Source: Daily Discount Books, Bank of England
ArchiV€ Reference C28.
6 King (1936), pp.315.
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rates being determined solely by external factors. The
practice was also described in the evidence given to the
U.S. National Monetary Commission in 1909.64
The first use of the so called "gold devices" was
discussed in The Statist on June 6th 1891, when it was
declared that the Bank had paid for a shipment of gold from
a road before it arrived in England, the advance being
secured on stock from the importer, which was returned when
the gold arrived at the Bank. Transactions of this sort
were not always non-interest bearing however: on January
1st 1900 Deutsche Bank had £100 000 advanced to them at 2½
per cent, when other transactions that day carried a rate
of 6 per cent. In this case the incentive given to the gold
importer to encourage them to import gold into Britain was
not as great as giving them an interest free advance, but
it was still considerable.
Thus by the start of the twentieth century the Bank of
England had established itself not only as the pillar of
the British banking system but also as the most important
central bank in the world. It was increasingly regarded as
being not only the keeper of the domestic gold reserve but
also as the source of the gold necessary for the efficient
functioning of the international gold standard. It had
coped admirably with the major financial crisis of the
preceding period (Baring's) and had established a means of
market control: the use of Bank Rate in order to attract
gold to London, backed up with the use of gold devices.
64 See Sayers (1976), Vol.1, pp.73.
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Finally, it had survived the low income years of the 1890s
intact, and had even managed to find new sources of income.
In short, it had prepared itself well for the events that
were to follow in the subsequent decades.
8: The First Years of the Twentieth Centur y and the Crisis
of 1907
The Boer war ended in May 1902, bringing the
restoration of South African gold supplies. This however
seemed to make little difference to the level of the Bank
of England's gold reserve which was never consistently high
during these years, even though the world's output of gold
in 1904 was more than twice what it had been in 1893.
The first four years of the century were fairly
uneventful, the general fall in prices up to 1902 having
been checked, with Bank Rate hovering about the 3-4 per
cent mark. There was no post war boom: within weeks of the
signing of the peace treaty everything had returned to
normal. This situation remained until the end of 1905, when
some signs of financial stringency appeared: Bank Rate was
increased from 2½-3 per cent on September 7th and then to 4
per cent on September 28th, a level at which it remained
for six months. These increases were in response to an
export of gold. The Bank decided to make this 4 per cent
"effective" both by borrowing in the market and by charging
a higher rate for certain advances. Most of the market
borrowing was carried out by Messrs. Mullens, the Bank's
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broker, and in general it was the joint stock banks that
lent to the Bank of England. These transactions were costly
to the Bank however: £77,268 between October 1905 and
February 1906.65
Bank Rate stood at 4 per cent until April 1906, when
for four weeks it fell to 3 per cent, fluctuating between
the two rates until October 11th when it finally increased
to 5 per cent. In the spring attention was concentrated on
the west coast of the United States, where on April 18th an
earthquake followed by a fire had destroyed most of San
Francisco. This disaster had significant effects on the
London insurance market, which was said to have suffered
losses of up to £lOm.66
The 5 per cent Bank Rate of October 11th lasted for
only one week, increasing to 6 per cent on October 19th.
This further increase was in response to two factors: the
fact that market rates were continually exceeding Bank Rate
and because heavy demands were being placed on the Bank and
the reserve was still falling. By this point financial
stringency had reached other European financial markets:
rates had been high all year in Berlin, and in Paris the
Banque de France was worried about the effect a further
increase in Bank Rate would have on their markets. With
this in mind the Banque de France relaxed its restrictions
on gold exports and it discounted a large number of English
bills, in an attempt to stave off further increases in Bank
65 Clapham (l944),Vol.I, pp.384.
66 The Economist, 11/08/1906.
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Rate that would have endangered its own position. This move
was in itself enough to ease the Bank of England's
position, thus avoiding (for the present) the need for a 7
per cent Bank Rate, although 6 per cent held for six
months.
Market tension did not recede to any great extent
however: early in 1907 the Bank was still experiencing a
drain of gold, and the situation in New York, where there
had earlier been a large degree of speculation, was still
causing disquiet in London. It was expected that the New
York boom would soon come to a halt, a view that was
confirmed in March when there was a panic on the Stock
Exchange, although this proved to be just the first stage
of a much longer drawn out crisis. This phase calmed by
early summer, when the Bank was able to reduce Bank Rate
first to 4½ per cent and then to 4 per cent, with the
reserve staying fairly constant. However, by late summer
1907 the final phase of the American crisis gathered
momentum: the demand for copper and steel fell greatly and
a crash was expected imminently. This did not arrive as
quickly as expected however, but when it eventually did so
it was violent in its intensity. It was centred on New
York, although its repercussions were felt all over the
North American continent, as well as in Europe. The
catalyst was the failure on October 22nd of the
Knickerbocker Trust, the third largest trust investment
company in New York, with deposits of over $62m, and it was
this failure that was to send the American banking system
167
into disarray, since once deposits had been withdrawn from
an institution the proportion that were re-deposited with
an alternative institution was very small, leading to a
large withdrawal of money from circulation.
Meanwhile, the Bank of England had increased Bank Rate
to 5½ per cent on October 31st, 6 per cent on November 4th
and 7 per cent on November 7th, the highest level it had
reached since November 1873. It was faced with a massive
drain of gold (mainly external), but the high Bank Rate was
very successful in attracting gold into Britain, especially
from the gold producing countries. Despite the gold drain
there was no panic on the London markets and only a few
failures, none of which concerned important houses. This
was not the case in the U.S. however, where there were
widespread failures and a restriction in cash payments
throughout the system. The large incidence of money
hoarding made it very difficult however to calculate the
true extent of the fall in the money supply.67
The American crisis was regarded as a banking failure:
an indication of the flaws that existed in the fabric of
American banking. 68 The Economist felt that the American
system's greatest weakness was its lack of a central bank,
since it was the existence of the Bank of England, an
institution that was strong, well-respected and free,
67 Although attempts have been made: Friedman &
Schwartz (1963) estimated that the money stock fell by 2½
per cent between May and September, and 5 per cent between
September and February.
68 For an excellent account of the American crisis see
Sprague (1908).
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theoretically, at least, from manipulation by self
interested parties, which was felt to ensure the continued
strength and stability of the British banking system.
Furthermore, the same magazine 69 suggested that a run on an
English bank, similar to those experienced in October 1907
in the States, would not produce a panic induced collapse
in the money stock, since peoples' reaction would simply be
to withdraw money from one bank and to re-deposit it
immediately in another, or, if the panic was very serious,
in the Bank of England itself. In this way the aggregate
level of the money stock would have been preserved: the
only result would have been a re-distribution of deposits
among institutions.70
As in 1906, the Bank of England was helped during the
crisis by gold from the Banque de France. The initiative
for this aid is said to have come from the Bank itself, but
like the previous year the incentive for the Banque to help
came from the fact that it wanted to avoid having to raise
its own discount rate in response to further increases in
Bank Rate. 71 In fact, £3m of gold was sent, not an
inconsiderable amount, but a fairly small proportion of the
69 The Economist, 26/10/1907.
70 This is a fairly startling thesis, both when
considering when it was written, and in that we are still
today discussing the sequence of events that would ensue as
a consequence of a run on the financial system.
71 In fact, it avoided increasing it above 4 per cent.
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total of £19m that was sent to London during the crisis.72
The American response to the crisis was to instigate
an overhauling of their banking and financial system, which
took the form of the formation of the National Monetary
Commission which reported in 1910. This Commission took a
large amount of evidence from the Bank of England, and
concluded by recommending the formation of the Federal
Re erve System, which finally came into existence in 1913.
The evidence submitted by the Bank of England regarding
British banking practices gives interesting insights into
the position of the British system as regarded by
contemporary bankers, and will be considered in the next
section.
9: 1908 Until the Outbreak of War
The tightness that had characterised the London
markets had receded by the end of December 1907, although
the Bank of England did not start to reduce Bank Rate until
the start of January in order to protect the reserve over
the normal period of increased end of year pressure. 73
 By
the middle of March Bank Rate stood at 3 per cent, around
which level it hovered for the following eighteen months.
Low interest rates, together with the implied low level
72 These payments were not made directly by the Banque
de France to the Bank of England: the former was forbidden
by its statute from doing this. Instead, intermediaries,
such as Rothschilds, were used.
See other references to the commercial bank's
practice of "window dressing".
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of discount and advance business at the Bank, had their
usual implications for the level of the Bank's income.74
Income from the discounts fell from £462,000 in 1907-08 to
£151,000 in 1908-09, and from short loans and advances from
£322,000 to £200,000 over the same period. 75 The branches
continued to be important in the generation of steady
income, as earlier discussed, to the annoyance of some of
the competing commercial bankers, and the Bank was able to
declare a dividend of 9 per cent in 1908-9.
The evidence given to the U.S. National Monetary
Commission covered a wide range of central banking matters,
from the organization of the Bank and its officials,
through its discount regulations, to the regulation of the
reserve by the manipulation of Bank Rate. Fairly detailed
answers were given to many of the questions by the then
Governor of the Bank, Reginald Eden Johnston, particularly
as regards the last mentioned mechanism - the relationship
between Bank Rate and the state of the reserve. Johnston
stated that he regarded the raising of Bank Rate as the
most effective way of attracting gold to the Bank, and that
in his experience this method had never failed, provided
Bank Rate is kept effective, at least in attracting gold
' This is an example of an important conflict of
interest inherent in the Bank's discount operations: a low
level of activity brought with it the problem of a reduced
income for the Bank, whereas the alternative was infinitely
worse: a high level of activity implying problems for the
Bank in its management of the financial system.
Clapham (1944), Vol.11, Appendices C & D.
Figures given are a total of the branches and Threadneedle
Street and are for a year of August to August.
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from places other than the continent. 76 As an example of
this mechanism in action he gave the most recent occurrence
- the Bank of England's actions during the gold drain in
November l9O7.
Johnston also stated the Bank's position on other
aspects of reserve and gold policy and on the Bank's
position as a lender of last resort. He admitted that
interest free advances to gold importers had been used as a
policy weapon with which to attract gold to London, and
described what he felt to be the Bank's reactions to a
financial crisis: to increase Bank Rate rapidly whilst at
the same time extending credit liberally to the financial
system, considering on merit each set of bills offered to
them. He also stated that the Bank did from time to time
borrow money in the open market with the express purpose of
increasing market rate.
The statements made to the National Monetary
Commission may seem fairly simplistic, since most of what
the Governor revealed was in practice common knowledge at
the time. The evidence is interesting however from a
slightly different perspective: this was the first time for
over thirty years that there had been any official
statement on the activities of the Bank of England. The
last report of a Select Committee had been in 1875, when
76 Johnston went on to explain that due to the absence
of free continental gold markets, gold was not released
until interest rates reached a level which disturbed
continental countries' financial position.
The American crisis.
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there was a report on note issues, but the evidence given
to the Select Committee of 1858, set up in the aftermath of
the 1857 financial crisis, was of more relevance to the
Bank of England's discount practices. Thus this formal
statement of the Bank's activities is of great benefit in
illuminating its attitude towards the financial system.
The years between the 1907 American crisis and the
heightening of international tension that led to the
outbreak of war in August 1914 were in general without
major upsets both for the Bank of England and for the
economy as a whole. The economy experienced steady growth:
prices were rising and unemployment falling. There were
several minor bank failures, 78 but despite the fact that
the institutions concerned were small and had in general
been badly managed and were known to be weak, the Bank
found itself to be involved in the sorting out of their
affairs. The first mention in the Bank's records of its
involvement in one particular failure comes in the minutes
of the Court of Directors in August l9l1, when the Court
was told that the Bank had subscribed £250,000 to the fund
that had been launched to provide an injection of capital
into the Yorkshire Penny Bank. Later (September 7th) the
Governor laid down a full statement before the Court
detailing the events involved in the rescue.
78 For example: Charing Cross Bank - October 1910.
Birbeck Bank - November 1910.
Yorkshire Penny Bank - later
reconstituted as a joint stock bank.
Court Books le, Bank Archive reference G4/134,
pp.106-B.
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The Yorkshire Penny Bank had been established in 1859,
with deposits amounting to only £3,252 in its first year of
operation. Thereafter it experienced fairly rapid
expansion: after three years it held £50,000 in deposits
and had 18,000 accounts, rising to Lilu and 120,000 accounts
by 1880. At the time of the onset of its troubles it could
boast 700,000 accounts and over £18.5m in deposits. It had
been established as a savings bank, 8 ° and as such was
without share capital, although it did include a reserve
fund of £500,000 on its balance sheet. Its assets
consisted of high class investment stocks, loans, mortgages
and cash.
Because of the way it was constituted it had never
been regarded as the most secure of institutions, with
fairly low reserves, but in July 1911 it faced the prospect
of a deposit run after the failure in June of the Birbeck
bank and consequent rumours as to its own safety. The
origin of the firm's problems initially seemed to lie in
the depreciation of gilt edged securities, in which a large
proportion of the bank's assets were held. This
depreciation had already increased market apprehension, the
fear being that certain institutions might run into
liquidity problems were they faced with any prospect of a
run, since the value of their assets would have fallen.
The Governor's attention was first drawn to the
80 This explains the large number of accounts that
were held with it relative to the volume of deposits. These
banks tended to attract small savers, as the name of the
YPB suggests.
174
situation when he received a telegram at his weekend
residence from the Bank of England's Chief Cashier telling
him that Edward Holden of the London City and Midland Bank
wanted to see him urgently in London. Holden was concerned
about the possibility of the failure of the Yorkshire Penny
Bank (YPB) and had become involved because his own bank
shared the same auditors as the troubled institution. The
position of the YPB was apparently that there was a
shortfall of assets over liabilities of some £600,000,
possibly more if their securities depreciated to any
greater extent. Holden had already spoken to the chairmen
of the Union of London and Smiths Bank, the London Joint
Stock Bank and the National Provincial Bank, and laid out
his ideas for a consortium of bankers to take over the
business of the troubled bank. However, in order to , put
this scheme into practice £2m was needed to ensure the
future of the reconstituted bank, and it was help with the
organization of this task that Holden was requesting from
the Governor of the Bank of England.
In order to acquaint himself more fully with the facts
the Governor of the Bank, A.C. Cole, arranged to meet the
General Manager of the YPB, and the fears that Holden had
expressed were confirmed: the bank was expecting a run.
The Governor had meetings with various influential
joint stock bankers,and it was decided that provided a
guarantee fund could be organised to protect subscribers,
an appeal for a fund to help the YPB would be launched. The
Governor had met with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and
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informed him of the problems that might arise if the YPB
was to shut. The Chancellor was of the opinion that the
Government should not get involved unless it was absolutely
necessary: all possible efforts to raise the fund should be
made without government intervention.
The £2m that Holden had decided was necessary to
secure the future of the YPB was reached fairly quickly,
all the major banks with dealings in Yorkshire pledging
money with the exception of the National Provincial Bank.
The amounts pledged were as shown in Table 4.3. The
guarantee fund to cover subscriptions was then organised by
Holden and the Governor. The Bank topped the list of
Guarantors with £250,000, for reasons that the Governor
outlined to the Court some five weeks later:
"In view of the seriousness of the situation that
would be produced in the banking world and the
further heavy depreciation in securities which would
be bound to follow any forced liquidation of the
securities of the Yorkshire Penny Bank, after
consultation with the Deputy Governor and with some
members of the Treasury Committee I decided to head
the Guarantee fund by subscribing £250,000 for the
Bank of England."81
The target of £lm was reached within two days, other
institutions being quick to follow the Bank's lead. In
fact, the target was slightly exceeded and so initial
contributions were scaled down accordingly, as shown in
Table 4.4. The contributors were all Clearing and Joint
Stock Banks, although N.M.Rothschild offered £500,000 if
private firms were to be asked to contribute, and Coutts &
81 Bank of England Archive Reference G4/134 (Court
Book le).
176
Co. would have given £50,000 had £lm not been obtained from
the Clearers and Joint Stocks.
Although the depreciation in the value of consols
acted as a catalyst for the development of the liquidity
problems of the YPB, its problems were in fact associated
with the fact that in structure it was a savings bank, with
little or no reserve and a complete absence of share
capital. Despite the rather lowly position of the bank
there was no contemporary criticism of the actions of the
bank's management. Rather, opinion seemed to hold that it
was unfortunate, but surprising, that the management had
not foreseen the problems that the nature of the bank's
structure would eventually entail, and thus restructured
their activities accordingly. The Bankers Magazine said
that they had "no word of complaint against the management"
of the bank, and in fact the existing management did
continue in office when the new joint stock bank was
formed, although additional directors were appointed. 82
 The
Economist was slightly more critical of the YPB, but there
was still no entertainment of the idea that perhaps the
bank should have been allowed to fail; the accepted view
was that the Bank of England was justified in reacting to
Holden's request for a rescue mission.
The Economist however did express a view that there
should be a more adequate system of supervision of the
savings banks, or alternatively that they should be taken
over by the joint stocks. It added that although when banks
82 Bankers Magazine, September 1911, pp.333-339.
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such as the YPB had been established there had been a real
need within the community for such institutions, that need
had now passed and the customers using these banks would be
better served one of the joint stocks or even by the Post
Office.
This was the first time since 1890 that the Bank of
England had intervened in the banking system to stop a bank
failing, although this time the initiative came not from
the Governor of the Bank but from Holden, who was amongst
the most active and influential members of the financial
community at the time. There are certain parallels that can
be drawn between the events depicted above and those
occurring twenty-one years previously: in both cases the
Bank undertook the organization of a rescue fund to prevent
a bank failure, with the co-operation of the financial
community as a whole. On this occasion however, the
business of the bank concerned was on quite a different
scale to that of Baring's. Another similarity was that to a
certain extent the management of both institutions were not
held to blame for their respective troubles, nor were they
penalised very much for their mistakes.
Holden was also taking an active role in banking
affairs generally, especially regarding the gold holdings
of the commercial banks. He was a dynamic and independent
figure, and wanted the banks to hold their own reserves,
separately from those held by the Bank of England, in order
that the deposits of the commercial banks would be more
secure. Other voices in the City felt that increased
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reserves would help promote the stabilisation of interest
rates. These proposals never resulted in very much
however, since other banks were not very willing to follow
Holden's lead, even though they had been worried enough
when faced with the failure of one of their number to
subscribe to a rescue fund. The mood of the time among the
commercial banks was still very much that they would prefer
to act when a crisis was looming, rather than attempt to
take preventative measures in advance of any problems.
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Table 4.3: Subscribers to the Yorkshire Penny Bank
Relief Fund83
Institution	 Amount
London City and Midland Bank 	 £500,000
London Joint Stock Bank
	 £250,000
Barclay & Co.	 £250,000
Lloyds Bank
	 £250,000
Union of London & Smiths Bank	 £250,000
Beckett & Co.	 £100,000
Bank of Liverpool	 £100,000
Manchester & Liverpool District Banking Co £100,000
Williams Deacons Bank	 £100,000
Lancashire & Yorkshire Bank 	 £ 50,000
Manchester & County Bank	 £ 50,000
£2,000,000
Table 4.4: Yorkshire Penny Bank Guarantee Fund.
Original Amount Reduced To
Bank of England	 £250,000
London County & Westminster Bank £250,000
Parrs Bank	 £100,000
Capital & Counties Bank
Glyn Mills Currie & Co. 	 "
United Counties Bank	 "
London & South Western Bank	 £ 50,000
Metropolitan Bank of England & Wales
National Bank
London and Provincial Bank	 "
Robarts & Lubbock & Co.	 £ 10,000
Martins Bank
	 I'
£223,314
£223,314
£ 89,286
I,
I,
I,
£ 44,643
II
'I
'I
£ 8,928
I,
£1,120,000 £1,000,000
83 Source for both tables: Bank of England Archive
Reference G4/134, pp.107-108.
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10: The Position by 194
The confidence with which the Bank of England had
handled the problems of 1906 and 1907 seemed to imply that
by the end of the pre-war era it had established itself
completely at the centre of the British banking system, as
the single most important constituent of it. The Bank had
received congratulations from many quarters for its role in
the Baring's affair, but its handling of the later crisis
seemed to exude a new level of confidence.
Aside from its handling of periods of crisis, by 1914
the Bank had arrived at a position of market control that
was greater and more complete than ever previously. Having
recognised the power of changes in Bank Rate in attracting
gold both to London and into the Bank of England,. the Bank
proceeded to exploit this mechanism to the full, until the
position as described to the U.S. Monetary Commission was
reached. The Bank had also learned that they could
influence the level of the reserve in other ways, for
example through the use of gold devices.
The Bank owed some of its success, together with some
of its problems, to the fact that it was the focal point of
the international gold standard, which had functioned very
efficiently during these decades. With this in mind, it had
a "duty" to the international community to ensure the
smooth operation of the standard, a role which sometimes
took precedence over its obligations to domestic industry
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CH.APTER FIVE
BANK OF ENGLAND DISCOUflT AND ADVANCE OPERATIONS
AND "DAILY DISCOUNTS", 1870-1914
1: Introduction
In this chapter we deal exclusively with primary
material retrieved in the main part from the archives of
the Bank of England.1
There is a vast amount of data available in the Bank's
archives, although much of the material is subject to
restricted access. In addition, much of the useful
information available is statistical: there is a dearth of
descriptive detail explaining why the Bank took particular
actions at particular times. For example, changes in Bank
Rate were agreed upon by the Committee of Treasury, but the
mnutes of this Committee reveal no discussion as to the
reasons for the change. Sources which at the outset appear
promising, for example the minutes of the Committee of
Treasury of the Bank, prove not to contain anything of
interest, in this case because there was no secretary in
attendance at meetings and thus the Governor was able to
reveal only that which he chose.2
Of course, in an ideal world we would not have to
surmise what policies the Bank was pursuing at certain
times and for what reasons, since policy documents would be
available that told us how and why the Bank was acting.
Unfortunately, these are not available, and so we have to
With some additional information from commercial
bank archives and from the British Library.
2 In my experience, the most depressing sentence found
in bank archives, which is repeated with annoying
regularity, is "after a full and frank discussion it was
decided that. -."
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be content with considering the options that were
available to the Bank at certain times. We will do this
through a consideration of its behaviour both at moments
when it was under a certain amount of pressure in the
financial markets, and at times which could be regarded as
being "normal". 3
 Much of the data available in the Bank's
archives with regard to how the Bank behaved with relation
to the discount market are numerical, and thus it is
analysis of these data that will be carried out in order
to determine what actions the Bank took and when.
With this in mind, the structure of the chapter is as
follows. Firstly, we will discuss the nature of the
discount administration of the Bank of England at this
time, with special attention to the means by which
discounts and advances could be obtained at the Bank and to
the types of customers involved. This is important in order
that we can establish how discounts and advances could be
obtained, both by regular customers and others. At a later
point we will consider whether in times of pressure the
Bank discriminated against non-habitual customers. 4 This
will be followed by a discussion of the type of data
Another issue that will be considered in a later
chapter is the regulatory environment in which a LLR
operates.
Theory suggests that LLR facilities should not be
discriminatory, other than on grounds of the quality of
paper presented for discount or as security for an advance.
However, during this period the Bank of England was
frequently searching for new methods of raising income, and
thus its regular customers became very important. One can
therefore envisage a situation whereby habitual customers
got preferential treatment over those with no discount
account at the Bank.
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collected from the Bank's archives, together with a
graphical and written description of them. Finally, we will
conclude with a brief review of what the chapter has
achieved.
2: Discount and Advance Administration During this Period
Besides considering the analysis (empirical and
descriptive) undertaken on the data set, it is also useful
to consider in greater detail the discount administration
of the Bank. To this end, in this section we will consider
the way in which discount and advance transactions were
dealt with by the Bank's Discount Office, how those
individuals or companies with discount accounts were
classified according to their status, and the various
Discount Committees that were in existence before, during
and after the period.
2.1: Procedure for Discounting
The discounting of bills and the granting of advances
were administered at the Bank of England by the Discount
Office. A person or company wishing to obtain discount
facilities lodged his bills with the Discount Office
together with the appropriate form, at which point the "Day
Book" 5
 was written up, leaving space however for any bills
Daily Discount Books: Bank of England Archive
reference C28/30 - C28/74 (1870-1914).
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that were refused. The submitted bills were then
scrutinised by the Principal of the Discount Office, who
checked that the limit placed on discount facilities for
any one name had not been exceeded and that the bills
conformed to the Bank's standards on length and
acceptances. The next morning the bills were submitted to
the Committee of Daily Waiting, and if found to be
acceptable were passed back to the bill office. Any bills
that were unacceptable were entered in the Day Books under
"refusals" • 6
Advances to brokers were made along similar lines,
normally for seven days at an interest rate of current Bank
Rate plus ½ per cent. They were secured on either bills or
securities.
2.2: Discount and Advance Committees
Several discount and advance committees were in
existence in the nineteenth and twentieth century. They had
a "watching brief": their function was to consider both the
past and future state of the discounts and to discuss any
possible future changes and improvements. For example, the
agenda for a particular meeting might include discussion as
to unusual advances at the branches, discounters exceeding
6 A reason was sometimes, although not always, given
explaining why a bill or package of bills was refused.
Examples of reasons given are:
"cannot collect"	 "beyond 90 days"
"irregular"	 "insufficient security"
"wrong stamp"
	 "has only 1 British security".
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their limits, changes in the rating of discount accounts,
etc. A summary of the main changes in the development of
the committees is shown below:7
16th April 1804: Special Discount Committee appointed,
with the aim of considering the state
of the discounts and reporting from
time to time to the Court of
Directors.
15th February 1810: It was decided that the Discount
Committee would be appointed annually
as soon after January 1st each year as
was practical, in order to examine the
state of the discounts in the previous
year.
11th July 1895: Advances Committee appointed as a
permanent conumittee to meet yearly and
to consider the existing advances at
Head Office, to examine the "nature of
the securities" and generally to
report to the Court on any subject
relating to advances which they
thought should be brought to their
notice.
5th April 1906:	 Discount and Advances Committees
combined to form the Committee on
Source: Bank of England Archive reference G15/62,
Folio 33A (Committee on Advances and Discounts: General).
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Advances and Discounts, which
continued reporting annually (in
February) but also had regular
meetings which were held quarterly or
sometimes even monthly.
March 1946:	 Committee on Advances and Discounts
disbanded, since the Bank's advances
business was small and its discount
accounts were confined to eleven
Discount Houses whose demands were
subject to little variation.
The Reports of the Committees on Discounts and on Advances
are important from a historical perspective because they
are one of the few sources where we can find more detailed
information on the Bank's activities. Even so, the minutes
of their meetings are not ideal information sources; for
example, the minutes of the Special Discount Committee of
13th March 1867,8 reporting on the state of the discounts
in 1866, make no reference to the Overend-Gurney crisis
that took place in May of that year, although the fact that
twice as many discounters suspended payments in 1866 as
compared to the previous year was mentioned. If a crisis as
severe as we know Overend-Gurney to be does not merit a
mention in the minutes of the Discount Committee meetings,
it is possible that other events too were omitted, and thus
we cannot regard the omission of any event as being an
8 Bank of England Archive Reference C35/5 (Minutes of
Special Discount Committee).
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indication of the relative unimportance of that particular
event.
The number of discounters suspending payment was part
of the normal report on the discounts both at Head Office
and at the branches. Every Annual Discount Report started
with Head Office data on increases and decreases in the
volume of advances and discounts of that year over
preceding years, and then continued by giving the number of
discounters utilising the Bank's discount facilities and
the number of discounters suspending payment. The same
information was then given for the branches.
Graphical representation of the number of Bank of
England Discounters (l87O-l9l4) and of the number of
discounters suspending payment are given in figures 5.1 and
5.2 1 0 The first graph gives confirmation of the fact that
the number of Bank customers was falling significantly over
the period: the figure for 1909 is only 17 per cent of its
1871 value. This fall was fairly smooth over the period as
a whole, the only major deviation from trend occurring in
1876 when there was a fall of 33 per cent in the number of
discounters, followed by a recovery over the subsequent
three years.11
The simple implication of this fall in the number of
Source: Bank of England Archive reference C30/3
(Discount Operations of the Bank, 1844 - 1928).
10 The data available on the number of discounters
suspending payment do not cover the whole period: for some
reason data are not given after 1896.
The Bank's records provide no explanation of
possible reasons for this fall.
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discounters over the period as a whole is that the Bank was
engaged in less discount business, at least with its own
customers. When the total volume of discount business over
the period together with the number of bills discounted are
considered however, it is immediately obvious that this is
not true. 12
 What was in fact occurring was that the average
value of each bill discounted was rising fairly steeply
over the period, especially between 1889 and 1913.13 This
is depicted in figure 5.4, and occurred as a direct result
of the increase in the volume of discount business, since,
as is shown in figure 5.3, the number of bills discounted
did not fall significantly, except during the first
decade. 14
The data on discounters suspending payment displays
large peaks in 1876 and 1878, and after 1882 follows a
downward trend. 15
 However, the data source gives no
12 These can be seen graphically in figure 5.9 later
in the chapter and in figure 5.3 below.
13 Between 1870 and 1888 there is no trend growth in
the average size of each bill discounted, the value
fluctuating around £400. In 1914 there is a fall of some
20 per cent in the average value of each bill discounted.
This can be explained by the fact that a huge number of
bills were submitted for discount during the crisis of the
summer of that year. Many of these were of small
denominations, and they thus had the effect of decreasing
the average value of bills in 1914 as against the figure
for 1913.
14 The sharp increase in the number of bills
discounted in 1914 is obviously not part of the secular
movement. Rather, it can be explained by the financial
crisis that occurred in the summer of 1914. See later
sections for further details.
15 of course, these data on discounters suspending
payment concern only firms with a discount account at the
(continued...)
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indication of the size of the institution concerned, and so
we have no idea of their degree of importance.
2.3: Classification of Discounters
People applying for discount facilities at the Bank of
England were graded according to the type and extent of
their business, in order that the Bank might have some
"prudential" control over the amounts each company received
in discounts. In 1804 it was decided that the limit of
discount accommodation that was to be given to any one
house should not exceed £30,000 in general, irrespective of
the scale of their business. However, it was decided at the
same time that this limit could be exceeded in particular
cases if the Special Discount Committee felt it to be
appropriate.16
The Special Discount Committee of 1815 17 specified
five classes of discounter together with their associated
15( . .continued)
Bank, and so can be looked upon only as an indication of
the failure of financial firms in general. Data on bank
failures is shown in comparison with that on discounters
suspending payment in Figure 5.5. It can be seen here that
there is some sign of a positive relationship between the
two data sets, although this is not very strong.
The source of the data on bank failures is an unpublished
series collated by Dr.A.R. Webber, of City University
Business, School, London, during the preparation of Capie &
Webber, (1985)
16 The problem here of course was that the Special
Discount Committee always met "after the event": after
limits had been exceeded. There is no explanation of how
this inconsistency was to be resolved.
17 Bank Archive Reference C35/5: Minutes of the
Special Discount Committee.
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limits:
(1) Bankers, merchants and persons of extensive business.
This class was to have no "mark" against their name,
but it seems that the upper limit of £30,000 was
intended to apply to them.
(2) Wholesale dealers: "persons of the greatest respect
and opulence". This category was given the mark "B"
which signified a discount limit of £20,000.
(3) Middle men - those with business that could be
classified as being one level lower than (2). These
were given the mark "A" indicating a limit of
£15, 000.
(4) Persons engaged in a more prudent scale of business
were given a mark of "N" signifying an upper limit of
£10, 000.
(5) People of little business who were low in the
estimation of the Bank and of their peers. They were
thus given a limit of £5000 with the associated mark
"K".
This classification system was intended to be regarded as
the "proportion of credit which it would be proper to allow
to each account", and the categories of discounters were to
be revised annually by the Special Discount Committee. It
is doubtful however whether they were ever treated as the
absolute limits that perhaps they were intended to be,
since four years after they were initiated, the 1819
Special Discount Committee was given a list of 118
discounters whose accounts exceeded their marks by a total
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of £900,000 on discounts of £2.5m. Thus in certain cases
the authorities obviously decided, consciously or
unconsciously, to disregard the limits that had been
previously set. However, we have no idea as to the
criterion by which these decisions were made.
2.4: "Exceptional" Discounts
"Exceptional" discounts were defined as bills
discounted and advances made at a rate of interest below
Bank Rate. Details of these transactions were kept in a
separate ledger from other discount and advance business
and were considered by the Special Discount Committee at
their annual meetings. The first entry in this ledger
appears in January 1893, and discounts and advances are not
treated separately: with each entry there is no indication
as to whether the transaction recorded is a discount or an
advance. The only indication is given by the value of the
sum recorded. For example, one would imagine that a
transaction of £l50,26618 would refer to a package of bills
discounted, since this represents the total of the amounts
received for each bill, whereas one of £435,000- would be
an advance since the latter are normally given in "rounded
off" figures.
18 This transaction took place on 5th November 1906,
and the recipient was the Canadian Bank of Commerce. The
discount rate was 5 7/8 per cent, when Bank Rate stood at 6
per cent.
19 To Hambros, 3rd December 1896, at 3½ per cent, when
Bank Rate was 4 per cent.
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Graphical representation of the percentage of bills
discounted at less than Bank Rate is given in figure 5.6.
As would be expected, in known periods of financial
stringency, 20 the percentage of bills discounted at rates
of interest lower than the current Bank Rate declines, for
reasons discussed below. In addition, throughout the
"quiet" years of the late 1880s and 1890s, this percentage
increases, as the Bank at this time was searching for ways
to increase its income.
Whilst over the period as a whole 18.24 per cent of
discounts and advances were given at rates lower than Bank
Rate, during the summer of 1914 there were only four
instances where companies received discounts or advances at
these preferential rates. 21 These were:22
A.Ruffer & Co.
	
£43,503 at 6%, Bank Rate = 	 8%
Morton Megaw & Co. Ltd.	 £5178	 "	 "	 I'
Chartered Bank of India 	 £151,247 "	 "	 "	 "
Ryder & Co.
	
£162,887 "	 "	 "	 "
Thus, when market conditions were very tight the Bank gave
very few advances and discounts at preferential rates, as
one would expect, since these discounts and advances at
rates lower than Bank Rate were intended really as a bonus
20 For example, 1878, 1890 and 1914.
21 Between weeks 31 and 42 of 1914 (July end-
September end) only 1.65 per cent of bills discounted by
the Bank of England were transacted at rates less than Bank
Rate.
22 Source: Bank of England Archive Reference C30/5
(Discount Office, Exceptional Discounts).
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for Bank customers when there was no particular pressure on
the Bank's resources. 23 At the other extreme, when the Bank
was trying to impose a high Bank Rate on the markets, it
was obviously not in its interest to grant loans or
discount bills at lower rates, no matter who the recipient
was.
2.5: Summary
This section has shown in rather more detail how the
administration of the Bank of England's discount and
advance activity actually worked. The Discount Office was
the main administrative department responsible for Bank
discounts and advances, and it was overseen in turn by the
relevant discount and advance committees. The "watching
brief" function of the discount and advance committees must
not be over-estimated in terms of the day-to-day running of
the Bank however: the infrequency of meetings left no real
possibility for any extensive regulation. Because of the
inevitable time lag between events occurring and their
later discussion by the appropriate committee, 24 the best
that the committees were able to do was to reprimand the
personnel of the Discount Office: they were too far
removed from the daily activities of the Bank to be
23 And, of course, at times when the Bank was under
pressure to increase its income, these transactions were
seen as a way of encouraging customers to use the Bank, at
times when facilities could frequently be obtained cheaper
elsewhere.
24 Sometimes a delay of up to a year.
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consulted on events as they were occurring. The Conmittees
did execute the important function however of deciding on
any changes in discount administration that members of the
Committees felt were appropriate in order to prevent the
re-occurrence of mistakes. In this sense they were
important in shaping future policy.
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3: The Data
In this section we will consider the data that are
available in the archives of the Bank of England,
discussing more fully that which was selected as being most
appropriate and most likely to supply the answers to the
questions proposed in this study.
3:1 Data Available
The material concerned in this section 25
 are data from
the Daily Discount Books, covering the period 1870-1914, a
total of forty-five years. 26 Data collection was limited
to this pre-first world war period because of the vast
scale of the operation: in all data were collected on eight
variables, a total of approximately 13700 observations in
all.27
The main aim behind data collection on such a vast
scale is an attempt to trace how the Bank was behaving
during the period under consideration, 28 utilising methods
25 This data set will also be the subject of a large
part of the analysis contained in much of the rest of the
thesis.
26 Bank of England Archive Reference C28/30 - C28/74.
These data are given in Appendices A and B.
27 This gives some idea of the scale of the data
collection: daily data on eight variables for a period of
forty-five years give a total of well over 100,000 data
points in all.
28 1870 - 1914.
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which will be detailed at a later point. In brief, it was
decided that in order to document the interventions in the
financial system that were undertaken by the Bank of
England it was first necessary to gain a detailed knowledge
of the latter's discount and advance operations during the
period. Once this data had been collated, it would then be
possible to identify moments of financial tension or
crisis, and these moments could be examined in greater
detail.
Although there is a vast amount of data available in
the Bank of England archives, it was felt that the wealth
of data contained in the Daily Discount books was by far
the best means of obtaining detailed information about the
Bank's actions, especially since because it was in a
numerical form empirical analysis of it would be possible.
Daily Discount data available in the archives are presented
in the form of the original Al size ledger books, with one
page allocated to each day. Trading occurred six days a
week, with fewer public holidays than there are now, thus
giving a total of approximately 305 trading days per year.
A list of the companies concerned appeared on the left hand
side of the page, together with the number of bills
discounted (if applicable) and the interest rate at which
the transaction took place. Further to the right of the
page appeared the amount of discount business transacted or
the amount of the advance, whichever was applicable to the
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transaction. 29 At the top of each page was the date,
figures for the amount of discounts and advances "going
of f", 3 ° together with the days' totals for discounts and
advances, which also appeared at the bottom of the page
under the list of transactors. The average number of
transactions per day was approximately eight to ten,
although there would be occasional days when there would be
none (especially during "quiet" years such as 1895), and
others when more than one page would be needed to cover the
day's business. A good example of the latter case is August
1914, during the financial crisis caused by the onset of
World War I which threatened the whole system of
international payments, when some days required three or
more pages.
The volume of data caused considerable collation and
estimation problems. Ideally, there would have been no
aggregation of the data since the essence of these data is
that they appear in a daily form, but it was decided that
due to the large number of observations the data would be
aggregated on a weekly basis, thus reducing the number of
observations from 13700 to 2340. Initially, data were also
aggregated on an annual basis in order that a complete
picture of Bank of England discount and advance behaviour
during the period could be presented in a graphical form.
The graphs of the annual series are presented in figures
29 Until 1894 there was only one advances variable,
but after this point a distinction was made between
advances on bills and on securities. (See below.)
30 That is, maturing.
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5.7 to 5.17.31 All these graphs will be discussed in
section 3.4 later in this chapter.	 -
Because of the novelty of the daily discount data,
other empirical work related to this subject is not
extensive. 32
 Work has been done however on certain related
issues: Hoppit (1986) has studied financial crises in
eighteenth century England using data on bankruptcies;
Duffy (1982) has worked on Bank of England discount policy
but again during an earlier period.33
The importance of this data set should not therefore
be underestimated. Because of its extensiveness (in terms
of the period covered and its frequency and volume) it is
at the very least an addition to the literature on the
period, which although voluminous is almost completely
concentrated on descriptive accounts of events occurring.
Empirical work on this period is therefore needed in order
to redress the balance and illuminate any differences
between what the Bank said it was doing and what it
actually did during these years. At the present time there
is a gap in the existing literature that it is hoped will
be filled at least partially by the analysis undertaken
here.
The variables on which data was collected describe a
data base that had never been exploited prior to this
31 The raw data is presented, in weekly form, in
Appendices A and B.
32 See however section 3.2 which deals with the work
of Love].l (1957).
During the suspension of Cash Payments, 1797-1821.
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exercise and are as follows:
TVB
TNT
TVA
VAOS
VAOB
TNAT
TVR
R
Total value of bills discounted
" number of discount transactions
" value of advances on bills
" value of advances on securities
" value of advances on bills34
" number of advance transactions
" number of refusals
" value of refusals
Interest rate for the discount and advance
transactions
3.2: Seasonality
When analysis of the data is being undertaken certain
other factors besides the time path of the data have to be
borne in mind. One of these factors is seasonality, which
in terms of Bank of England discounts shows up as the
commercial bank's practice of "window dressing", re-
arranging their asset portfolio in order to present the
strongest possible balance sheet at the end of each half
year.
Seasonality is an important concept to take into
account when considering Bank of England behaviour during
this period, as the volume of discounts and of advances
could vary by enormous amounts depending upon the time of
year. The problem is best illustrated through the use of an
Up to the end of 1894 there had been only one
advances variable shown: advances on bills, although it was
not specified as such (it was labelled merely "advances").
From 1894/95 onwards advances were split up into advances
on bills and on securities (VAOS and VAOB), the latter
referring to loans made on "floaters", which were prime
bearer securities. See footnote 59 for further discussion.
See Goodhart (1972) pp.34-36 for further details.
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example: a comparison of the level of transactions at the
months' end for two months in 1895.
30th November 1895	 31st December 1895
Total value disc. (C)	 2000	 599 000
Mv. on securities (C)	 0	 1 515 000
Adv. on bills	 (C)	 0	 1 490 000
1895 was in fact a "quiet" year, when Bank rate stood at 2
per cent for the whole year, but even given this low level
of activity throughout the rest of the year the commercial
bank's practice of building up their balance sheets for the
end of the year is clearly illustrated in the above data.
The figure for November 30th is fairly typical of that
year's level of transactions.
In addition to window dressing, there were other
seasonal drains on the Bank of England's gold reserve. For
example, there was frequently an autumnal drain of gold to
New York which was linked to the harvest. These drains were
not always external in destination: there were also drains
to Scotland and Ireland necessitated by changes in their
circulation. 36 The Bank of England itself was well aware of
these seasonal variations and was thus able to take account
of them in its discount and advance operations by providing
36 In the second volume of A Treatise on Money , Keynes
(1930) comments that it is "remarkable to observe that
nothing has been done to mitigate the seasonal flows of
gold." He estimated that the autumnal drain would decrease
the Bank of England t s reserve by as much as 20 or 30 per
cent, and that this drain never worried anyone.
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the market with extra funds at the appropriate times.
However, an interesting question concerns what would
have happened if there had been a failure of a major
financial institution occurring at a time when the Bank was
already fully stretched in dealing with a seasonal drain.
It could be postulated that extra demand on the Bank at
these times, whether internal or external in origin, would
have caused serious problems. The Bank of England's gold
reserve was after all finite, and so it is possible to
envisage a situation whereby unanticipated drains when
added to those that are anticipated could exhaust the
Bank's reserve.37
3.3: Previous Empirical Work Dealing With Bank of England
Discounts
As mentioned at an earlier point, Lovell (1957)
addressed the question of whether the Bank of England was
behaving as a Lender of Last Resort in the eighteenth
century. His conclusion, derived from a consideration of
the literature and simple statistical analysis of data
presented in Clapham (1944) and Hoffman (1955), was that
in many ways the Bank could be regarded as acting as a LLR
in the eighteenth century. 38
 In this section Lovell's
Miron (1986) provides evidence for the U.S. showing
that an event such as a large loan default was more likely
to precipitate a financial crisis if the market was already
stretched due to seasonal pressure.
38 This is perhaps a somewhat surprising conclusion,
since one of the aims of this study is to determine to what
(continued. ..)
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analysis will be examined and then duplicated using data
from the 1870-1914 period. 	 -
The data used by Lovell were that presented in
Appendix E of Clapham's first volume and in Table 54A of
Hoffman's book, and covered the period 1758 to 1798. The
volume of bills discounted is not reported directly in
Clapham, but the income received by the Bank on such
business is included. Lovell's procedure was thus to
calculate the volume of discounts by dividing the income
received by the discount rate, assuming a constant 5 per
cent interest rate. 39 He then used this generated series in
a regression equation relating the volume of discounts to
the number of bankruptcies and to the level of industrial
production. He found the level of bankruptcies but not the
level of industrial production to be statistically
significant in determining the volume of discounts,
although there was some evidence of autocorrellation in the
residuals. 40
A further estimation was conducted by Lovell in order
to analyse short run fluctuations in bankruptcies and
38( . .continued)
extent the Bank was fulfilling this function during the
nineteenth century.
This was the maximum possible rate at this time
because of the Usury Laws. In fact, 5 per cent was the
appropriate discount rate for this period: see Lovell
(1957) pp.19.
40 It should be noted at this point that the analysis
was being undertaken in the mid 1950s, when mechanical
aids to empirical work were not readily available, and
further that econometrics had not reached its (relatively)
advanced present state.
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industrial production by specifying variables in terms of
first differences. In this estimation autocorrellation was
not a problem, and bankruptcies were still significant in
the equation. There was however a reversal of the sign on
industrial production (positive to negative), 41 suggesting
that short run falls in industrial production below trend
levels were bringing about an increased demand for discount
facilities at the Bank of England 42 From these results
Lovell concluded that the Bank was acting as a LLR, since,
as illustrated by the second estimation, both bankruptcies
and industrial production performed in a way consistent
with the hypothesis that the Bank was acting as a LLR by
providing liquidity to the market in times of stress.
The duplication of Lovell's analysis was carried out
using data from the "Daily Discount" series which has
41 Industrial production was still statistically
insignificant in this equation however.
42 Lovell's estimated equations were as follows:
Sample 1758 - 1798:
(a) Dt = 84.01 + 2 .3 OPt + 2.44 Bt	 R2 = 0.403
(1.01)	 (2.68)
where:
Dt = estimated volume of discounts
= level of production index (1913 = 100)
Bt = bankruptcies (1913 = 100)
all, at time 't'.
't' statistics are in parentheses.
Sample 1759 - 1798:
(b) Dt = 92.84 - 1.45Pt +3.O4Bt
(-0.35)	 (5.53)
where:
Dt = Dt - Dt_1	 etc.
R2 = 0.522
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already been described. 43 Data for bankruptcies and
industrial production were available from the same source
as used by Lovell, 44 and the equations were estimated for
the period 1870-1914. The only difference between the
analysis for the later period and that of the original one
was that the Hoffman data source gives two series for
industrial production (industrial production including and
excluding building), and Lovell gives no indication in his
paper which of the two he uses. Thus the equations were
estimated separately for this period using both series.
The main area of disparity between the equations for
the earlier (eighteenth century) and later (late nineteenth
-early twentieth century) periods was that the coefficient
on bankruptcies was consistently negative throughout the
estimation for the later period, implying that the volume
of bills discounted decreases as the number of bankruptcies
increases. This is obviously not as one would expect, and
so a series representing bank failures 45 was substituted
into the equation, but with indifferent results. 46 However,
the variable representing bank failures carried a positive
coefficient rather than a negative one in these equations,
indicating that Bank of England discounts do in fact
£ This is in fact the same series as that generated
by Lovell for use in his analysis.
Hoffman (1955) Table 54, Part B.
As opposed to failures of all types of business
units. The series used was that reported in Capie & Webber
(1985), Appendix II. See figure 5.5.
46 In the sense that the results were of similar
magnitudes but with smaller R 2 s and ttl statistics.
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increase as failures of banks increase, as would be
expected, in contrast to the previous analysis. The
coefficient on industrial production was positive in both
long and short run estimations, implying that the influence
of rising industrial production creating an increased
demand for Bank of England accommodation outweighs the
effects of shortfalls in production necessitating
extra-ordinary funds from the Bank, even in the short run.
There was no real difference in the equations irrespective
of which industrial production term was used47
47 Examples of the estimated equations are as follows:
Sample = 1870-1914:
(a) TVBt = 33639 - 573 Bruptt + 7l3 I Pinbt R2 = 0.31
(-3.47)	 (3.79)	 DW = 1.08
Where: TVB	 = Total volume of bills discounted at the
Bank of England (f000's)
Brupt = bankruptcies (1913=100)
IPincb = industrial production including building
(19 13=100)
(b)TVBt = 22527 - 4 69Bruptt + Bl6 llPexbt	 R2=O.35
(-2.98)	 (4.21)	 DW=1.25
Where: IPexb = industrial production excluding building
(1913=100)
(c)TVBt = -30298 + 638B Ft + 6O6lIPinbt	 R20.12
(0.47)	 (2.83)	 DW=0.8l
Where: BF = bank failures (number)
Sample 1871-1914:
(d)TVBt = -51632 + 117OBFt + lO24lIPexbt + O.44AR(l)t
(0.93)	 (2.42)	 (1.63)
R2=0.29, DW=1.51
(e)DTVBt = 16905 - l54DBruptt - l3O26DIPinbt R2=0.14
(-0.73)	 (-2.80)	 DW=1.99
(continued...)
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Lovell's conclusion that the Bank of England was
acting as a LLR is derived partly from his analysis of
written sources and partly from the statistical analysis
undertaken. The application of this analysis to a later
period (1870-1914) does not produce the sort of results one
would expect: not only does the inclusion of bankruptcies
as a explanatory variable produce a negative coefficient on
the variable, but the inclusion of bank failures instead,
possibly more relevant for this analysis, produces
coefficients that are of the appropriate sign but are
insignificant. However, in the light of these results it is
not possible to conclude either that the total volume of
bills discounted was inversely proportional to the
incidence of bankruptcies, or that the incidence of bank
failures had no influence on the extent of Bank of England
accommodation. Rather, it would seem that analysis in
annual terms is inappropriate here, since it "misses" too
much of the activity at the Bank.
Lovell's analysis has much to recommend it, since it
tests whether the Bank of England was acting as a LLR in
the "Classical" sense: as an aid to the market in times of
stress. The analysis is testing whether the liquidity
' (.. . continued)
Where: DTVBt = TVBt - TVBt_1 etc.
(f) DtVbt = 17252 + 157DBFt - l32O7DIPirlbt	 R2=0.l2
(0.18)	 (-2.82)	 DW=1.00
In equation (d) an AR(l) term is used in attempt to
eradicate some of the autocorrellation that is present, as
indicated by the low Durbin Watson statistic in the earlier
equations.
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injections that the Bank makes into the market are high
firstly when market conditions are tight (as proxied by
both bankruptcies and bank failures), and secondly when
there is a downturn in the economy as a whole (as proxied
by industrial production). However, the main problem, which
is a recurrent one in analysis of the Bank of England's
behaviour in relation to the markets in times of financial
tension, is that the study uses annual data, which is too
low a frequency to capture much of the market activity
occurring on a day-to-day basis. In effect, what •is
happening is that much important information is lost when
Bank discount data are aggregated into an annual form.
However, the reason that studies use annual data is again a
perennial one: the unavailability of much of the production
and bankruptcies data, not to mention a reliable income
series, 48 in higher frequencies.
In conclusion then, the investigation performed both
above and thirty years ago by Lovell is valuable mainly
because it forces us to consider firstly which variables
might affect the demand for Bank of England accommodation,
and secondly whether analysis of this sort using annual
data is worthwhile at all. Unfortunately, in some ways we
are forced to conclude that the analysis misses far more
than it is able to pick up.
48 Data on income is available quarterly, but none of
the other variables are available at even this frequency,
making analysis impossible.
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3.4: Graphical Description of the Data
In this section we will describe more explicitly the
pattern of the data over the forty-five years under
analysis, starting with the annually aggregated series and
then continuing with the data which has been aggregated on
a weekly basis and is graphed annually.
These graphs are presented in figures 5.7 to 5.17,
eleven graphs: two showing a comparison of the annual
trends (the volume of discounts, advances and refusals on
one and the number of transactions variables on the other),
and the other nine depicting the time path of the
individual variables, including that of the average (daily)
interest rate at which these transactions were carried
out. 49
 In addition, the data aggregated into annual form is
shown in Table 5.1 overleaf, together with the annual
average and standard deviations.
' The volume and number of transactions variables are
totals: weekly or annual sums of all business taking place
in that time period. However, it makes no sense to have an
aggregated interest rate, and so the weekly or annual rate
has been averaged over the appropriate time period.
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Table 5.1: Annual Daily Discount Data.
TVB	 TNT R
	
TVA TNAT	 TVR TNT
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
18935968
18819097
24810114
30733684
12391567
13525260
7103781
7420878
13026771
9304862
6649206
6913860
5246258
8349348
5728038
3928596
3558691
3061377
4651233
4233431
13208236
11429514
6540290
38531721
703902
5530656
8307895
9833041
10719165
19855048
23116832
10301294
11565831
10409245
11778775
25077244
38531721
36244643
23985923
20695352
23385272
32363850
58186576
41585828
154112109
4676
4144
4128
4772
3365
3347
2447
2478
2624
2388
2347
2253
1953
2051
1719
1613
1327
1202
1246
1167
1368
1353
1082
970
904
824
842
857
792
949
991
624
592
609
589
740
970
939
664
563
651
667
1053
785
3240
2.63
2.42
3.45
4 . 18
3.06
2.73
2. 17
2.42
3.16
2 . 09
2.29
2.91
3.35
2.96
2.41
2.41
2.48
2 . 63
2 .59
2.70
3 .55
2 . 64
1.88
3.19
1.59
1.38
1.74
1.85
2.49
2 . 65
2.93
2.61
2.51
2.71
2.25
2 . 04
3.19
3.50
1.99
1.89
2.48
2.29
2.70
2 .97
2.72
25384884
25127274
28086527
22368601
10979877
10827203
5053150
4856141
13484555
4165872
15169737
15456463
16372257
10741884
10091967
4449277
5178659
947653].
12487554
10424536
15289270
3413717
4242119
59911542
11351289
14094752
14726866
31509711
71636379
55343813
86662908
104118046
201882702
186381357
59204423
77244444
59911542
42822894
42053354
38621378
68818538
59755815
47387740
41381165
44068705
917
874
827
655
357
388
279
251
397
254
391
305
273
234
236
167
146
183
188
176
245
123
121
672
160
195
179
344
1008
744
1128
1202
2043
1757
576
731
672
487
470
396
563
525
434
349
305
479480
709585
1550184
2380141
619845
569880
283249
664006
1543957
264955
182299
532152
132101
142218
770163
269069
925658
51555
413481
531970
1429458
1095358
84826
32142
33603
197508
119234
39589
21819
609024
692238
9854
2193
5083
11047
46082
32142
42563
25739
48126
382180
77228
216872
151318
7391995
617
649
40
839
494
507
352
371
469
351
267
227
164
203
199
169
134
76
118
89
117
104
76
27
74
54
48
44
45
57
44
16
8
11
9
25
27
20
18
15
31
29
75
64
1322
Avge	 19119822 1664 3 . 00	 37822609 509 573626	 209
STD	 23718115 1162 1. 00	 42117311 408 1145438 271
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3.4.1: Annual Series: 1870-1914
These graphs give an indication of the changing
pattern of the Bank of England's discount and advance
behaviour over the period 1870-1914, depicting in part the
changing relative importance of discounts and advances.
Until 1896 discounts and advances follow a similar time
path, both experiencing the same peaks and troughs,
although advances were in general larger in volume than
discounts. In addition, advances show a greater standard
deviation than discounts. 5 ° Between 1897 and 1910 however
advances become much more important: whereas discounts
fluctuate between approximately £8 and £40m annually,
advances vary between £35 and £200m and are in general over
£50m. Advances peak in 1902 at a value of slightly over
£200m, followed by £l9Om in 1903.
Between 1911 and 1914 discounts become predominant,
especially in 1914 when advances accounted for only 22.25
per cent of total advance and discount business. 51
 This
particular concentration on discounts rather than on
50 For the period 1870-1914, using annual data, the
figures for the mean and standard deviation of discounts
and advances are as follows:
Discounts	 Advances
Mean	 £19,119,822	 £37,822,609
Standard deviation	 £23,718,115	 £42,117,311
Thus the mean discount figure is just over half that for
advances, with a significantly lower standard deviation.
51 Compared with advances accounting for 94.58 per
cent of the total in 1902.
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advances can be accounted for mainly by the fact there was
an agreement made in the summer of 1914 between the
government and the Bank of England that the latter would
discount any approved bill of exchange that had been
accepted before August 14th 1914, in an attempt to
stabilise the financial system which was under great strain
at the time due to the outbreak of war. Furthermore, the
Bank agreed to lend money to the acceptor (at a rate of
interest of 2 per cent above Bank Rate) if the acceptor was
not in a position to pay when the bills itatre. Any
balances that were not recovered by the acceptor would not
be claimed by the Bank until one year after the end of the
war. This had the affect of stabilising the financial
position of the U.K. trading sector, but was at the cost of
an enormous increase in the monetary base.52
The number of transactions variables do not in general
display the same characteristics in their time paths as
their associated volume variables. The total number of
discount transactions (TNT: figure 5.10) shows a steady
downward trend over the period, except for a sudden
increase in 1914, and the total number of refusals variable
(TNR: figure 5.14) follows a similar pattern. 53
 However,
52 changes in the Monetary Base (MO):
1914 - increased by 21.68 per cent
1915 - increased by 16.37 per cent
The greatest increase occurred in Quarter 3 of 1914 when
MO increased by 27.48 per cent, followed by 21.88 per cent
in Q4.
Source: Capie & Webber (1985) Table 1.(1)
3 This relationship between the number of discount
transactions and the number of bills refused would be
(continued...)
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the total number of advance transactions (TNAT: figure
5.13) follows a time path that is much more highly related
to its associated volume variable, TVA, with peaks and
troughs occurring at roughly the same time. There do not
therefore seem to have been the underlying changes
occurring in the market for advances as were occurring in
the market for discounts.
We will now continue with a discussion of the weekly
aggregated data: the figures given are thus weekly totals.
3.4.2 - 1870
1870 shows a large variation in advances: 0 to £490,000.
Discounts are not as active, but there are far more
discount than advance transactions. There is a large leap
in advances in July (f430,000) with an associated movement
in discounts, although this is less accentuated. This
increase in discounts and advances may be explained by the
outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in July, which was
accompanied by a slight precautionary rise in interest
rates. Seasonal pressure (SP) at June and December end.
3.4.3 - 1871
Jumps in discounts and advances in weeks 8 and 37 and 38
(. . . continued)
expected, since it is logical that as the number of bills
presented for discount increases, the number that are
refused will increase also. It is also possible that the
ratio of bills refused to bills presented will increase as
the volume of bills increases, as people who are anxious to
obtain cash present bills to the Bank for discount that
they would not normally bother with.
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(February and September), but refusals and interest rates
are fairly steady. Transactions variables follow much the
same pattern.
3.4.4 - 1872
1872 shows lower maximum values for all variables, and thus
the trends depicted on the graph are exaggerated. There are
two periods of SP, June and December. Weeks 6-18 are busy,
especially for the number of discount transactions
variable, TNT. There is less activity by the middle of the
year, but it becomes busier again in July and August, when
there is a maximum of £300,000 on both discounts and
advances.
3.4.5 - 1873.
Low maximum values, especially for advances (around
£350,000), with a large degree of fluctuation in both
discounts and advances. There is little SP in June, but
more in December. The maximum value of TVB occurs in week
39 (1430,000), with a similar peak in TNT. However, there
is not as much variation in the number of transactions, and
therefore the size of transactions is varying significantly
over the year, as shown by figures 5.18 and 5.19 which
illustrate the average size of discount and advance
transactions respectively. It is obvious from this graph
that, aside from the fact that advance transactions are in
general significantly larger than those of discounts,
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advances also display a greater variation than discounts.54
3.4.6 - 1874.
1874 marks the beginning of a period of four years when
there was significantly less discount and advance business
at the Bank of England. 55 The maximum volume of
transactions occurs as SP at the end of December (f280,000
on advances), with the maximum apart from SP standing at
£200,000 (discounts).
3.4.7 - 1875
1875 was even quieter at the Bank than the previous year:
even at the end of December there was only a daily average
of £200,000 of advances and £55,000 of discounts. Interest
rates are steady at around 4 per cent, but there is
slightly more variation in the number of discount
transactions, TVB, than in the nuiither of advance
transactions.
In 1873 (and in general throughout the period),
advances display a larger standard deviation than
discounts: the figures for 1873 are 16106 for advances as
opposed to 2884 for discounts.
A comparison between the average yearly advance and
discount figures for this and the preceding period reveals
the following data:
'lVB	 TVA
	
1870-3	 £23,324,716	 £25,241,822
	
1874-7	 £10,110,372	 £7,929,093
ie there is a 57 and 69 per cent fall in the average yearly
discount and advance total respectively in the middle years
of the 1870s.
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34.8 - 1876.
Very quiet - the only time there is more than an £80,000
daily average of business is at the end of December (SP),
when advances are equal to £140,000. Between weeks 16 to
51, interest rates are steady at 2 per cent.
3.4.9 - 1877.
Still very quiet, but big leap in week 12 when TVA is equal
to £290,000. For the rest of the year TVA is never greater
than £90,000 and TVB than £70,000, even at the end of July
and of December. Interest rates rise as high as 5 per cent
(weeks 42-46)
3.4.10 - 1878
The maximum values of transactions are not a great deal
higher in 1878 than they have been in the previous few
years, but there is a great deal more business being
undertaken at the Bank. There are several large peaks, in
discounts as well as in advances: weeks 8-11 (peaks of
around £160,000), SP at the end of June (especially on
advances), and a bigger peak in week 41 (October): the week
of the City of Glasgow Bank failure. Interest rates stand
at over 5 per cent from week 41 until week 46.
3.4.11 - 1880.
Two periods of SP - June and December ( around £320,000,
nearly all the business being on advances). The markets are
quiet after June. Interest rates are steady at
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approximately 3 per cent.
3.4.12 - 1881.
Apart from SP, the only other significant point is the leap
in advances in week 13 (f260,000). There is little other
business.
3.4.13 - 1882
Seasonal pressure is far more significant: more than
£500,000 in December and £350,000 in June (both on
advances). Discounts are very quiet all year. There. is a
moderate amount of advance business between weeks 4 and 15,
with an average daily TVA of approximately £124,000,56 but
it is quiet in the second half of the year. Interest rates
vary from 3 to 6 per cent (weeks 4-6).
3.4.14 - 1883
Again, it is busier in the first half of the year,
especially on advances. SP occurs in June and December.
Non-seasonal advances peak at £270,000 in week 13 (late
March). Interest rates are steady all year at around 3½ - 4
per cent.
3.4.15 - 1884
Another quiet year, which is typical of the mid l880s when
discount business in particular is minimal. Advances peak
56 As against a daily average for the whole period of
£126,827.
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at £250,000 in late March. Interest rates climb towards the
end of the year, to stand at 5 per cent in December.
3.4.16 - 1885
Again, there is a minimal amount of business on discounts.
The maximum value of advances is low (fl50,000 in March).
Little SP.
3.4.17 - 1886
The peak in advances occurring in March (33O,00O) is very
noticeable, more especially since there is very little else
happening. Little SP.
3.4.18 - 1887
Two periods of SP. The maximum value of advances 57 is
£140,000, occurring in March. Little else.
3.4.19 - 1888
Very little discount business. Advances peak at £280,000
(March and September), aside from SP. Interest rates range
from 2½ to 5 per cent (December).
3.4.20 - 1889
The advances peak of £360,000 occurs at the end of
December, and thus is SP. There is little else over
£150,000 on advances and nothing noticeable on discounts.
Interest rates finish the year at slightly over 5 per cent.
Aside from SP.
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3.4.21 - 1890
In 1890 there is much more business carried out at the Bank
of England, especially on discounts, although there is
little SP. The maximum volume of discounts occurs in
November (weeks 46-48), which is accounted for by the
Baring Crisis, during which period TVB is equal to
£370,000. 58
 The increased amount of discounting at the Bank
is shortlived however: whereas the average daily volume of
discounts is equal to £190,000 in November, by December it
has fallen to £26,000. Interest rates reach a peak of 6½
per cent in late November.
3.4.22 - 1891
Less business again and little SP. Discounts are more
important than advances for the first time in more than ten
years, and reach a peak of £250,000 in March. There are
very few advance transactions: more business is done on
discounts.
3.4.23 - 1892
Advances take over from discounts again: their peak again
occurs in March (C250,000). Interest rates hover around 2½
per cent. There are very few advance and refusal
transactions.
58 Compared to other points in the data, this is not
an enormous volume of discounts, as we will see in the next
chapter. This thus prompts the question of whether, in
rescuing Barings, the Bank of England "over-intervened", or
whether it was so successful in its actions that it
suppressed the pressure before it got out of hand. We will
consider this in more detail in the next chapter.
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3.4.24 - 1893
It is busier in the first half of the year, especially in
weeks 12 until 22, when there is frequently an average of
more than £100,000 of advances or discounts. Interest rates
are fairly steady at around 3½ per cent.
3.4.25 - 1894
Less busy: most of the years' business occurs in weeks 8 to
19. After this point the only two instances of any variable
exceeding £11,000 are June and December's SP. Both
discounts and advances are active in the early part of the
year, with an advance maximum of £240,000 and discounts of
£150,000. Interest rates stand at 2½-3 per cent throughout
the year.
3.4.26 - 1895
The maximum values are much higher: £550,000 on advances
and £460,000 on discounts, both at the end of December.
Advances show three other jumps: in late February, March
and at the end of June, of the order of approximately
C15C-2CC,000. Apart from these movements, there is
practically no business at the Bank. Interest rates are low
all year (1½-2 per cent), and there are few discount and
advance transactions except during the busy end of year
period. However, this is the first year that there were two
sorts of advances available at the Bank: on securities and
on bills (VAOS and VAOB), and therefore the figure for
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total advances is the sum of these two variables.59
3.4.27 - 1896
Very little activity in the first half of the year. SP
occurs in June, and there is increasing business from mid
September onwards, culminating in fairly heavy SP at the
end of December (55O-6OO,OOO on both advances and on
discounts). Interest rates are steady at around 1½ per cent
and then climb towards the end of the year to around 3½-4
per cent.
3.4.28 - 1897
SP in June and December is fairly heavy. There is little
business before the SP in June, but it is busier from
September onwards. Interest rates are steady an there are
a fairly low number of discount and advance transactions.
3.4.29 - 1898
1898 is the year that marks the beginning of a much heavier
period of activity at the Bank of England, as can be seen
from the following figures:
59 In May 1894 it was decided that all applications
for short term loans on securities, whoever they originated
from, should be handled by the Discount Office, rather than
as previously by the Chief Cashier's Office (Court Books
Rd, 24.5.1894, Minutes of the Bank's Court of Directors).
The aim of this was to achieve some greater degree of unity
between the Bank's discount and advance operations.
Centralising these on the Discount Office was seen as a
second best solution however; the original aim was to have
all business carried on in the Chief Cashier's Office, but
"structural difficulties" apparently prevented this.
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Average Yearly Totals
TVB	 TVA
	
1891-1897
	 £12,411,003	 £19,892,856
	
1898-1905
	 £15,352,929	 £105,309,259
Average size of transaction
TVB	 TVA
	
1891-1897	 £12,715	 £77,621
	
1898-1905	 £20,867	 £91,696
It is obvious that the greatest increase in business comes
from advances, which show a 162 per cent increase between
the two periods. Note also that there is a fairly
significant increase in the average size of both discount
and of advance transactions, which is a reflection of the
fact that the number of clients with access to facilities
at the Bank was declining over these years, but that the
amount of business that these clients were involved in was
increasing. 60
SP at the end of December reaches close to the Lim
mark on both VAOS and VAOB (ie a total value of advances of
approximately £1.8m). There is heavy discounting and
advancing from mid February until mid May, reaching a peak
of £660,000 (vAoS), £420,000 (discounts) and £320,000
(VAOB), all around the middle of March. It is quieter for
the rest of the year. Interest rates are steady at 3-4 per
cent throughout the year, with not very much variation in
the transactions variables, except for a large number of
advance transactions (24) during the end of year SP.
60 See section 2.2 for further discussion.
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3.4.30 - 1899
SP is very heavy in June and in December. There are other
large maxima however: £680,000 in March (VAOS) and over
£500,000 of advances on bills in successive weeks at
around the same time. Discounts are of a lesser magnitude
but are active throughout the year, reaching a maximum of
almost £500,000 in late September. Peaks in the
transactions variables coincide with peaks in their
ass ciated volume variables. Interest rates creep up
towards 6 per cent by the end of the year: this is a
precautionary rise associated with the onset of the Boer
War.
3.4.30 - 1900
Advances are still significantly larger in volume than
discounts, but the latter are larger than they have been in
previous years. Advances reach a maximum in week 11
(L'l.4zrr), at which point discounts and the number of advance
transactions also have their maximum values for the year
(C920,000 and 30 respectively). This early period of
pressure might be due to the continuing speculation as to
the nature of the Boer War. SP is much less important: in
neither June nor December do discounts/advances reach
anything like their March levels. Interest rates fall back
quickly from their early peak of 6 per cent to hover around
4 per cent for the rest of the year.
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3.4.31 - 1901
sp is more pronounced: maximum values are reached in June
and December. However, a period of consistently heavy
advance business occurs from February to May: the average
advance on securities is £319,450 and on bills is £230,075
per day, 4.3 times the average total advance figure for the
period as a whole. The average size of advance transactions
is smaller in these months than for the period as a whole
however: £46,550 as against £74,243, implying that the
pressure on advances came from many different sources and
was not concentrated on a few large firms wanting advance
facilities at the same time. Interest rates are steady at
around 4 per cent for the whole year.
3.4.31 - 1902
Even larger maximum values for SP (mostly advances on
securities: £l.45m in June and £1.7in in December). Advances
on securitIes are heavy all year, but particularly for the
first six months, coming to a peak of £1.3m towards the end
of March. Over the year as a whole total advances reach
their maximum value for the period 1870-1914: £205m, since
although the weekly maximum is not as large in 1902 as it
is in other years, there is a consistently large volume of
business being carried out at the Bank over several months.
Discounts and advances on bills are noticeably quieter this
year, and interest rates are fairly constant at 3 per cent.
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3.4.32 - 1903
SP is almost absent compared to the maximum value reached
by advances on securities in week 19 (beginning of May) of
£3.lin, accompanied by £l.3m on advances on bills but only
£0.lin of discounts. Over the first half of the year the
mean daily figure for VAOS is £747,950, dropping to
£121,589 for the second six months, giving a figure of
£434,769 for 1903 as a whole. For example, on 8th May 1903
a total of £ll.5m was advanced (C8m on securities and £3.5m
on bills), with the average size of transaction equal to
£140,000. 61
 The greatest proportion of the business on
advances came in the first half of the year, with very
little occurring in the second six months. This pattern is
repeated in the time paths of the other variables: what
activity there is occurs before the end of June. Interest
rates do not vary a great deal over the year from their
initial level of 3 per cent.
3.4.33 - 1904
Quieter than the previous year: SP is noticeable again,
especially in June. Discounts are still quiet: activity is
centred once again on advances on securities, which reach
£600,000 in early April and £550,000 in late July. Interest
rates vary between 2 and 3½ per cent, giving an average
daily rate over the year of 2.68 per cent.
61 According to the Bank's records, this was the
highest amount discounted or advanced in one day. (Bank of
England Archive Reference C29/2, folio 14.)
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3.4.34 - 1905
Most of the year's activity is concentrated into the two
points of SP in June and December and there is very little
other business taking place. Discounts are still very
quiet, and interest rates stand at 2-3 per cent all year.
3.4.35 - 1906
Busier, but SP is still dominant. Discounts are active
again in the first few months of the year, but are
overtaken by advances at the SP points. However, discounts
are increasing in relative importance from here on.
Interest rates vary between 3 and 6 per cent (end of year).
3.4.36 - 1907
The yearly totals for advances and discounts are closer
together in 1907 than they have been in any year since
1896: discounts exceed advances in value for much of the
year, but advances are dominant at the SP points.
Associated with this, the number of discount transactions
is greater than it has been for several years. Interest
rates vary between 2 and 7 per cent (end of year).
3.4.37 - 1908
Slightly quieter than the previous few years on both
discounts and advances, 62 and advances on bills are more
62 As shown by the following figures:
Av. Daily Vol. Discounts	 Av.Daily Vol. Advances
1906	 £740,995	 £194,113
(continued...)
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important than on securities for the first time. There is
one peak (apart from SP) - £550,000 of advances on bills in
March; similar lower peaks on securities and discounts. In
general there is a low number of transactions. Interest
rates decrease over the year (4 - 2 per cent).
3 4.38 - 1909
Advances are slightly higher than discounts over the year:
most of the advances are on bills rather than on
securities. High SP in June and December - nothing over
£400,000 apart from this. During the quiet few months of
July, August and September the daily average for discounts
is £17,617, for advances on bills £1577 and advances on
securities average zero on a daily basis over the period.
Activity is similarly quiet as regards the transactions
variables with only the SP providing any significant
movement. Interest rates hover around 2 per cent until
November when they start to rise, reaching 5 per cent by
the end of the year.
3.4.39 - 1910
Here we see higher maximum values than in recent years,
although mainly concentrated on the SP points. Other maxima
occur in March (C700,000 of advances on securities) and
October (C500,000 of advances on bills). Discounts are
fairly low. The average number of transactions per day
62( . .continued)
1907	 £697,012	 £140,403
1908	 £78,642	 £137,879
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across all variables is less than 3. Interest rates vary
between 2 and 4 per cent.
3.4.40 - 1911
Discounts reach a peak of £l.43m at the beginning of March,
but SP is greater than this: £l.7m in June and £2.6m in
December, both on advances on bills.Interest rates hover
around 3-4 per cent.
3.4.41 - 1912
Discounts exceed advances in value for the first time since
1891. Although SP is concentrated on advances (on bills),
most other business throughout the year is carried out on
discounts: peaks in March (9OO,OOO) and in early June
(fim). The number of discount transactions reach similar
peaks at these points. Interest rates vary between 2 and 6
per cent over the year.
3.4.42 - 1913
There is a lower volume of discounts and of advances than
the previous year, and a fair amount of activity on
discounts in February and March: the average daily volume
of bills discounted is equal to £363,899. SP occurs in
June and especially in December, when advances take over
from discounts as the dominant variable. Rather more
activity on the number of transactions, echoing the pattern
of discounts. Interest rates are very variable between 2½
and 5½ per cent.
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3.4.43 - 1914
The pattern of business in 1914 is obviously very different
from previously. Discounts overshadow advances throughout
the year, with the former reaching their maximum value for
the period 1870-1914, but advances only total just over
£44m for the year, 22 per cent of their peak value of 1902.
Discounts reach a maximum value of almost £4.8m in the
third week of August; 89 per cent of the total discounts
for the year occur in the seventeen weeks between August
and mid November, with the average daily discount figure
being equal to £1,380,592, compared to £505,284 for the
year as a whole. For almost the first time, the total value
of refusals are noticeable: in 1914 they are equal to
almost £7.4m, as opposed to an annual average over the
preceding forty-four years of only £428,400.
Transactions variables also show much more activity in
1914. The number of discount transactions reach a maximum
of 67 at the same point as the maximum in the volume of
Oiscouris is reached, and remain high for the remainder of
the year. Advance transactions similarly increase, and the
number of refusals rises simultaneously with the rise in
the volume of refusals. Interest rates, having risen at the
beginning of August, 63 stabilise at 5 per cent, a level at
which they remain almost until the end of the year.
63 Bank Rate rose from 3 to 4 per cent on July 30th,
to 8 on July 3 1st, and finally to 10 per cent on August
1st, where it stood for four days during the extended Bank
holiday, until it was brought down to 6 on August 5th.
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4: Conclusions
This chapter has achieved several things: firstly, the
way discount and advance business was handled at the Bank
of England has been discussed, and in addition the setting
under which the analysis of Bank of England Daily Discount
data will take place has been set out, the data source has
been discussed and there has been a description of the raw
data itself.
As in most types of historical analysis, the
historian's biggest complaint is that the ideal records do
not exist, and those that do exist do not provide enough
information. In the case of the Bank of England's discount
and advance behaviour, it is a great pity that the Discount
and Advance Committee Minutes do not give any analysis of
why changes in the Bank's regulations were made. Because of
this, the best we can do is to surmise what may have been
the reasons, and to use the data we have to prove or
disprove certain hypotheses.
The next chapter will discuss the empirical analysis
that has been carried out on the data set, together with
successful and unsuccessful attempts to carry out certain
types of other econometric estimations. The main reason for
the failure of some of the estimation methods was the
length of the data series. This issue will be discussed in
full in the next chapter.
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CIIAFI'KR SIX
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DAILY DISCOUNT DATA.
1: Introduction
The analysis undertaken in this and in the following
chapter is fundamental to the research project as a whole,
the aim of which is to determine whether the Bank of
England changed its discount policy at the end of the third
quarter of the nineteenth century with respect to its role
as a LLR and its relationship with the market. If the Bank
did alter its behaviour, was it as a result of Bagehot's
proclamations on what the Bank should and should not do,1
or as a result of its cumulative experience in dealing with
crises over the preceding half century, or, perhaps the
most likely case, resulting from a combination of both the
aforementioned factors, together with other factors.
Thus, the analysis undertaken in an attempt to prove
or disprove these possibilities must centre on the Bank's
handling of any moments of financial tension and on its
relationship with the discount market, the institutional
changes of which have already been discussed. If any
periods of tension can be found that were previously
unknown, then by definition the Bank must have altered its
behaviour, since with hindsight we are fully aware that
these moments of tension did not develop into full blown
financial crises. However, if no "mini crises" are
discovered then the situation is rather more complicated.
In this case there are two possibilities: either the Bank
was faced with no tests, which would make this period
1 See Bagehot (1873) and Chapter 2, section 3.3.
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totally different from the years which preceded it which
were crisis-ridden, or, more interestingly, it responded so
quickly and so efficiently that it curbed any crisis before
it got underway.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. We will
start with a discussion of the aims underlying this
analysis. We will then consider the expected pattern of the
data 2 during a crisis or pre-crisis period. The empirical
analysis is introduced in section four, when we undertake
various statistical procedures in order to identify periods
when there was an abnormal amount of discount and advance
activity undertaken at the Bank of England. These
proc dures fall into three categories: tests to indicate
the presence of a LLR, ARIMA analysis 3 and, most
importantly, polynomial analysis. Finally, there is a
discussion of tests carried out on the residuals from the
polynomial estimations.
2 The "data" refers to the Daily Discount data
introduced in the previous chapter unless otherwise
specified.
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average.
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2; The Aims of the Analysis
The primary aim of this data analysis is to identify
periods of market pressure: times when the banks, financial
institutions and other commercial companies were coming to
the Bank of England for discount and loan facilities in the
latter's capacity as a lender of last resort. The easiest
way to achieve this objective is to trace the numerical
pattern of the Bank's discount and advance operations, in
order to distinguish any abnormal changes which are not
explained elsewhere.
The only alternative to a data-based approach would be
painstaking search through fl the written records of the
Bank, such as Court, Committee of Treasury minutes and
other records in an attempt to pick out odd facts that,
when pieced together, might present perhaps only a
partially complete picture of the whole story. In addition,
the main problem with such an approach is that initially we
have no idea of the information that might be available and
thus have no idea finally of how complete a picture we
have.
The literature on certain moments of crisis between
1870 and 1914 is extensive, for example on the near failure
of Barings in 1890 and on the problems in North America in
1907. Whilst attempts were made to uncover any more
information other than that which was already available
about these particular episodes, of more interest was an
attempt to reveal the existence of any other moments when
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the Bank of England acted in a way that could be described
as being a lender of last resort, or occasions when the
Bank's interventions were actually more far reaching than
was at first thought, or even perhaps when it was guilty of
"bailing out" institutions. Analysis of discount and
advance data thus provides a means of studying events
rather more closely than might otherwise be possible, and
enables a more detailed study of episodes that seem to be
of greater interest.
During the period 1870-1914 there were g major
financial crises, at least not on the scale of the
Overend-Gurney crisis in 1866. The major question that has
to be addressed is thus why there was this absence of
crises as compared to the experience of the preceding
century? 4 In terms of the analysis of the LLR we are left
with two possibilities: either there were fl2 problems in
the financial markets which needed the Bank of England's
intervention, or the Bank's behaviour changed to allow for
the implementation of policies that would either prevent
crises from arising, or would mitigate the effects of them
once they arose. Since it is unlikely that there was a
complete absence of periods of tension, we can pursue the
second hypothesis: that the Bank's behaviour somehow
altered in order to take account of what many, although not
The preceding hundred years could fairly be
described as being "crisis-ridden": major financial crises
occurred in 1772-3, 1783, 1793, 1797, 1825, 1836, 1847,
1857 and 1866. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of these
crises.
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all, 5 contemporary bankers, economists and politicians felt
to be its "duty": to provide an injection of liquidity into
the financial system in times of a shortage of liquidity.
At the outset it would appear that there are two
methods which could be utilised to determine how the Bank
of England may have changed its behaviour. The first of
these involves starting from a macro-economic viewpoint and
studying how the behaviour of the Bank might have changed
with respect to changes occurring in the rest of the
financial system. The second takes the form of a
qualitative investigation and involves an intimate study of
all the records of the period. Since all good history
involves a combination of these two approaches, this study
has tried, in a sense, to combine the two: the starting
point of the analysis is the relationship between the Bank
and the rest of the system, but in addition to using a
data-based approach there has also been an attempt to
integrate information derived from historical sources such
as the archives of the Bank of England and other commercial
banks.
Once we pursue the hypothesis that the Bank's
behaviour did change, we then have to consider the ways in
which these changes are likely to have come about. This
relates mainly to two different types of event: firstly,
policies pursued in order to prevent crises from taking
place, and secondly policy measures taken as an immediate
See, for example, the views of Thomson Hankey (1867,
and discussed in Chapter 2, section 5.1).
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reaction to the possibility of a financial crisis
occurring, in order to reduce its secondary effects. Thus,
we need to look at two different types of policy:
(a) those dealing with the Bank of England's relationship
with the markets in general and with the Discount
Market in particular, at times: how the Bank was
shaping the regulatory environment in an attempt to
prevent the failure of financial institutions, rather
then dealing with them once they had arisen.
(b) the Bank's policy and reactions with respect to
moments of financial tension, when it is actually
faced with the possibility of having to act as a
lender of last resort.
The obvious source of information regarding the behaviour
of the Bank of England is the Bank's archives. However,
this information source brings with it certain problems, as
detailed in the previous chapter. 6 Of course, in an ideal
world we would not have to surmise what policies the Bank
was pursuing at certain times and for what reasons, since
policy documents would be available that told us how and
why the Bank was acting. Unfortunately, these are not
readily available, and so we have to be content with
considering the options that were open to the Bank at
certain times. We will do this through a consideration of
its behaviour both at times when it was under a certain
6 See the introduction to Chapter 5.
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amount of pressure in the financial markets, and at times
that could be regarded as being "normal".
As outlined above, one of the issues that is always
addressed when considering the LLR in a contemporary
context, but is frequently overlooked in historical
studies, is the regulatory environment in which it
(normally, but not exclusively, a central bank) operates.
This is an important area since it involves prevention
rather than cure. Formal bank regulation is a comparatively
recent development, occurring as a result of the advent of
the increasingly sophisticated financial systems of the
late 1960s and early 1970s, and in policy terms is
associated with the implementation of monetary policy.
However, the Bank of England has for many decades used what
informal powers it possessed to influence the behaviour of
the financial sector, through the use of "moral suasion":
the exertion of influence on the commercial banks and other
institutions in order to persuade them that their best
course of action is to follow the Bank's "advice" and do as
they are told. The ways in which moral suasion was
implemented, together with its effectiveness in the
1870-1914 period, are issues which will be considered in
Chapter Eight.
Apart from moral suasion, the Bank's only other method
of imposing its will on the markets involved the regulation
of its discount and advance operations. Thus, in order to
determine the extent to which these operations were used as
a regulatory device we need to know, for example, how the
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eligibility requirements for bills were decided on, and
whether they were ever relaxed, either in times of tension
or perhaps to the Bank's own customers at other times. We
also need to be aware of how effective Bank Rate was as a
control weapon, and to consider from what time it could
said to be effective, if indeed it ever was. The
effectiveness of Bank Rate has obvious relevance for the
study of Bank of England policy in these years, since its
manipulation was the Bank's major tool in influencing the
flow of funds in order to ensure the smooth operation of
the Gold Standard.7
The other aspect of changes in Bank of England
behaviour, and the one that we will concentrate on here, is
its reactions to financial crises. Although, as already
mentioned, in the period 1870-1914 there were no major
financial crises, this does not mean that there were no
moments at which the Bank acted in order to prevent a
failure, in itself possibly a relatively minor event, from
developing into a fully blown financial crisis. The first
step in a study of these times is to identify them, an
exercise that will be described at a later point. Then,
individual episodes are studied in order to determine the
Bank's role in each of them, since with hindsight we know
that there were no major crises and therefore any minor
points of tension must either have been quelled by an
outside agency or have faded away of their own accord.
The type of questions needing answering in this area
See Bloomfield (1959).
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are those concerning the Bank of England's discount and
advance policies at specific moments of tension: what was
the pattern of its transactions over the period - was the
average size of transaction large (implying market
concentration in the demand for discounts) or small
(implying the diffusion of pressure)? Did the Bank, for
example, discount more freely to one particular institution
than another? We also need to address the question of
whether the Bank adhered to Bagehot's first "rule" (ie to
"lend freely at high interest rates" in the case of an
internal drain). 8 Were the interest rates charged by the
Bank on discounts and advances sufficiently high to promote
an efficient allocation of funds? The implication of this
is that high interest rates would deter any person or
institution from borrowing at the Bank if they wexe able to
obtain funds elsewhere at a lower rate. In this way the
Bank would really be acting as a last resort lender rather
than one of first resort.
The answers to these two sets of questions will tell
us firstly the extent to which the Bank of England was
aware of the options open to it in the field of the
prevention of financial distress, and to what extent it
8 A problem with Bagehot's rules, first identified by
Rockoff (1986), is that whilst Bagehot clearly states the
two rules, he gives us no objective criterion by which to
judge the state of the market and thus to decide which rule
to apply. Political pressure may force a central bank to
define a period of market tension as an internal drain,
leading it to "lend freely", when with hindsight the drain
may have been external in origin and thus a better policy
would have been to "protect the reserve". For a more
detailed discussion of this problem see Chapter Two,
section 5.2.
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made use of these options. In addition, once the answers to
the second set of questions have been resolved we should be
in a position to know whether the Bank did actively
intervene in the financial markets in order to quell any
possibility of widescale financial disruption. The
juxtaposition of these two aspects of the problem will
enable us to answer the underlying question of whether the
Bank altered its behaviour towards the financial system,
and if so in what way.
There is one side issue that must always be borne in
mind when analysis of the Bank of England's behaviour in
any period before 1946 is undertaken, namely the conflict
between the Bank's aim, as a private institution, of
niaxiinising profits, and its role as a central bank. This
was a consideration which must have always been of central
importance to those governing the Bank, and is important in
the context of this study for the implications that the
conflict has for its behaviour during periods of tension.
After all, any prolonged period of higher than normal
levels of discounting, probably taking place at increased
interest rates, was obviously beneficial to the Bank's
income, however detrimental it might have been to the
financial system as a whole. Related to this is the issue
of why the number of personal customers at the Bank was in
steady decline over these years, given that it was still a
private, profit making institution. Although it was under
obvious commercial pressure from the other banks, one would
have thought that it would have made every effort possible
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to retain its customers in an attempt to bolster its
income.
One other aspect of the problem that should be borne
in mind is the question of the time consistency of policy
actions (how much faith people have in the governing body's
ability to carry out a stated policy) 9 and the level of
confidence in its actions that the Bank of England had
managed to instill in the system. Bagehot's main criticism
of the Bank Directors was that they were not prepared to
say definitively how they would react to a financial panic.
His solution was for the Bank to state categorically that
it would act as a lender of last resort, since panics
occurred for the very reason that people did not know how
it would react. Uncertainty is thus greater than it has to
be: the pre-Bagehot position. It is possible that over a
number of years the banking system as a whole had acquired
such a large amount of confidence in the Bank that it was
able to curb any period of dangerous speculation or loss of
confidence-induced over-trading before it reached the panic
stage.
Having discussed possible outcomes of the analysis, we
will now consider in more detail the expected pattern of
the data, both in "normal" times and in periods of
financial tension or crisis. This consideration will take
the form of the outlining of a number of hypotheses which
aim to describe the physical characteristics of a crisis.
9 See Section 6 of Chapter Two.
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3: Expected Pattern of Data During Crises
First we frame a number of hypotheses relating to the
expected behaviour of the data during a crisis or
pre-crisis period, in order that something can be
established which can be used as a "yardstick" which to
compare different periods of data.
3.1: Hypotheses
The hypotheses developed are basically descriptions of
how we would expect the data to behave if a crisis were in
progress.
They are as follows:
(1) The demand for discounts and advances is directly
related to the level of market pressure. Thus, in a
crisis or pre-crisis period we should observe:
(a) An increase in the number of transactions.
(b) An increase in the total value of discounts and
advances.
(2) That the time path of the average size of transactions
during a crisis will give some idea of whether market
pressure is diffused: an increase in the average size
implies that individual people or institutions want a
greater volume of bills discounted or a larger value
of advances, that is, market concentration during a
crisis, whereas a decrease in the average size of
transaction implies that market pressure is being
243
diffused throughout the system as smaller customers
come in for discounts and advances. This question of
the diffusion of market pressure may have consequences
for the LLR since it has implications for the methods
the Bank of England uses to aid the system. If market
pressure is diffused, the best method of aid is
obviously going to be to aid the market as a whole
whereas if pressure is concentrated then more
attention may have to be paid to particular
(3) During a period of crisis interest rates will rise
significantly, normally to at least 6 per cent
although much higher rates were recorded at various
points in known crisis periods.
(4) Linked to this last hypothesis, it is possible that
interest rates during a period of financial tension
will show a greater spread, since they will be
changing by a larger amount and will reach higher
levels. For example, a normal rise in a quiet period
may be a change from 2 to 2½ per cent, whereas in a
period of financial tension it may be 3 to 6 per cent.
In addition to these hypotheses that relate to specific
10 This in turn brings out the main problematic area
of the theory of the LLR, as detailed in Chapter One: the
distinction between illiquidity and insolvency, and the
question of whether central banks should aid solely the
system as a whole, or should provide liquidity to specific
institutions. There is no doubt that on efficiency grounds
LLR aid should certainly not go to insolvent institutions,
which are suffering problems as a result of their own
mistakes. These banks should be allowed to fail, "pour
encourager les autres".
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moments of crisis, there are many questions that can be
asked of the data relating to the discount and advance
activities of the Bank itself. These questions can be split
into three sections: those relating to the volume of
discounts and advances, those relating to refusals and
those relating to the interest rate.
3.2 - Discounts and Advances
When discussing the volume of discounts and advances
we need to establish some sort of "yardstick" by which to
judge normal and abnormal behaviour. This would mean that
if discounts or advances were greater than this value then
we could regard them as being abnormal and make further
enquiries about the period concerned. There are several
possible measures that could be used to judge this concept:
the mean, the median, the mode, or even a modal range. The
problem with using a measure of central tendency such as
the median is that if this is calculated for the period as
a whole then the effect of any trend is lost; if, for
example there is a rising trend over the sample period then
the range of values over which the median is taken will be
very large, and thus the value obtained may not be a good
reflection of what was abnormal in the early period. For
this reason, when empirical analysis of the data was
undertaken, they were split into five sub-periods, in order
that the summary statistics for each period would not be as
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distorted by the effects of the trend.1'
Besides looking at the average size -of transactions
during a crisis, it is also interesting to look at this
pattern over the sample as a whole, since it gives an
indication of the changing nature of the Bank of England's
customers. The number of customers keeping their sole
discount account at the Bank fell during this period, and
so we might reasonably expect the average size of
transaction to show an increasing trend over the same
santple. 12 Why the Bank had fewer personal customers is not
immediately obvious, since it was still a private, profit
making institution. Indeed, in many of these years it had
constant problems in keeping its income at levels that were
acceptable to its shareholders, so one might think that it
would have done everything in its power to keep as many
customers as possible, especially in the "lean" years of
the mid lB9Os. It seems however that by this time the Bank
of England was already more of a public bank than a private
one, a question that will be addressed more explicitly at a
later point.
There are other customer-related questions that can be
addressed by these data. Did, for example, discounts and
advances attract different customers? We know already that
these two types of transactions had different interest
See later discussion of the empirical analysis. A
further reason for splitting the sample was the limitation
imposed by computer memory: a sample comprising of 2340
observations was too large for many packages to handle.
12 See Chapter Five, section 2.2.
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rates applying to theni, but it would be interesting to
discover whether customers holding their sole discount
account at the Bank also received advances there. In
addition, it is possible that during a period of market
pressure, for whatever reason, the Bank's own customers
were given preferential treatment concerning the granting
of discounts and advances.
Unfortunately, the answers to many of the questions
concerning the Bank's customers are not available, since
the Bank itself is extremely sensitive about the nature of
its relationship with its customers, even when the period
concerned has long since passed. Information about general
discount and advance activities is freely available, but as
soon as a matter of customer confidentiality is concerned
the information source quickly becomes extinct.
The last question concerning discounts and advances
that needs to be addressed concerns advances on securities,
commonly known as "floaters". These were brought into the
Discount Office in 1894, and thereafter are included in the
data as a separate advances variable, the volume of
advances on securities (VAOS). There is no indication in
the Daily Discount Books as to the nature of these advances
and as to why they were transferred to the Discount Office
at this point, and yet it is obvious from the data that the
inclusion of these advances on securities in the total
advances variable makes a fairly large contribution to the
overall magnitude of the variable in the subsequent
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years. 13
3.3 - Interest Rates
The second set of questions that we can attempt to
answer through the use of these data concerns interest
rates. The most interesting issue here concerns the
"effectiveness" of Bank Rate. When the Bank of England, as
part of its management of the Gold Standard, wanted to
influence the inflow and outflow of gold to and from
London, it needed a mechanism through which it could be
fairly sure of controlling domestic market interest rates.
In this way an outflow of gold could be arrested before it
became too serious by increasing Bank Rate, which would
then tend to bring about an increase in market rates
generally. Gold would flow into London, attracted by the
higher rates to be earned there. Thus the link between Bank
Rate and market rate was of crucial importance: without it,
the maintenance of the Gold Standard may not have been
possible. 14
Open market operations of a sort had been utilised by
the Bank for many years: the Daily Discount books show
frequent transactions undertaken by Messrs. Mullens, the
Bank's brokers, when the latter was operating in the
13 See footnote 59 in Chapter Five. Because of the
distortion introduced by the transfer of advances on
securities to the Discount Office, equations for the two
types of advance were estimated separately.
14 See Sayers (1976) Vol.1, pp.37-43 for an excellent
discussion of this subject.
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markets on behalf of the Bank. 15
 If the Bank wanted to
induce market rates to increase it would sell government
stock on the market, in order to reduce the volume of funds
remaining on the market that could be used by the banks and
discount houses for bill financing. 16 Withers (1910)
outlines the actions taken by the Bank of England in an
attempt to make Bank Rate effective, and also comments that
the reason why the mechanism linking Bank Rate with market
rate was so indirect was due to the fact that the Bank of
England was no longer so important in day-to-day market
activity as it once had been. It was thus less influential
and less able to enforce its will on a sometimes unwilling
market. 17
In order to see if Bank Rate was effective we have to
look at additional data than that which is contained in the
Daily Discount Books, since it is necessary to examine the
pattern of market rates in addition to that of Bank Rate.
If Bank Rate were effective, we would expect the difference
between this and market rate to be positive, since the Bank
would be charging a higher rate and thus leading all other
15 For Example:
August 4th 1902 - Mullens Marshall had £800,000 advanced to
them (on securities) at Bank Rate (=3 per cent), and on
August 8th 1902 they had £650,000 at 3 per cent.
16 In fact, the Bank would usell consols spot and buy
for the account" (de Koch, 1974, pp.175): sell government
stock for cash now and at the same time purchase them
forward for the date of the monthly Stock Exchange
settlement.
17 For further details, see Chapter Three of this
thesis and also Sayers (1936) and Gregory (1929).
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rates. 18
Thus in order to look at the effectiveness of Bank
Rate we need to look at the relationship between it and
market rate. Given that one of the Bank's roles was to
manage the Gold Standard and that this necessarily involved
the manipulation of domestic interest rates, it could be
postulated that if the Bank failed to make Bank Rate
effective, it also did not succeed in manipulating rates.
However, with hindsight we know that there were no major
crises of the international monetary system during this
period, and therefore if the Bank was unable to make Bank
Rate as effective as it might have wished, this did not
seem to have been as problematic as it could have been,
given the circumstances under which it was operating.
One point that must be made here is what we mean by
"market" rate. During this period perhaps the best measure
of market rates was the "prime bank bill" rate, the rate of
interest charged on top quality bills held by the
commercial banks, which was a three month rate. An
alternative market rate representative would have been the
money at call rate, but this was closely related to the
deposit account rate, which in turn was fixed at between 1
and 1½ per cent below Bank Rate. Furthermore, there was no
short term government debt at this time and so no default-
18 We have concentrated here on ways of forcing market
rates upwards, rather than downwards, since that was the
usual problem faced by the Bank. The option of increasing
the supply of (low interest) loanable funds to the market
was of course always there, and would be one method of
engineering a fall in market rates.
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free rate. Thus the prime bank bill rate was the most
flexible of the available rates, since it reflected
day-to-day activity in the markets.
Figures 6.0(a) and (b) overleaf depict Rdiff: the
difference between Bank Rate and market rate for the period
1870 to 1914.19 This gives some measure of the degree of
effectiveness of Bank Rate, since if Rdiff was equal to
zero for long periods Bank Rate and market rate would be
equivalent, and thus Bank Rate would have been fairly
"effective". However, as is obvious from the figures, Rdiff
was rarely zero, and in general it was positive,
occasionally reaching fairly large values. If Rdiff was
positive for prolonged periods, the implication is that the
Bank was attempting to force market rates upwards, but with
little success. There are several points at which Rdiff is
negative, implying that Bank Rate was slow to respond to an
increase in market rates, but when this occurs it is not
prolonged; Bank Rate is soon increased to a level more
appropriate to the situation.
3.4 - Refusals
The final set of variables with which we are concerned
is refusals. 2 ° Each package of bills that were presented
for discount may have contained some bills which did not
19 The source of these data is Capie & Webber (1985),
Table III. (10).
20 The variables TVR and TNR refer to discount, not
advance transactions.
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meet the Bank's eligibility requirements referring to
quality or length. These were refused, whilst the main body
of the bills were discounted. Thus the variable TVR
describes the volume of bills that were refused in the day
(or average daily figure over a week if we are dealing with
the aggregated data), and TNR describes the number of
transactions that involved bills being refused. However,
when people went to the Bank to ask for an advance it was
either granted or refused, depending on the status of the
person or company requesting the loan, and there seems to
be no record of advances that were not granted.
During a crisis it would be expected that both the
volume and the number of refusals would increase, since in
desperation people would bring all sorts of bills into the
Bank hoping to get them discounted, and only some of these
would come up to the Bank's rather stringent
requirements. 21
 Conversely, given that the discount
requirements were widely known, in periods when there was
an absence of market pressure refusals would be fairly low
since most people would only present bills for discount at
the Bank that they knew were eligible: there was no
pressure on them to obtain cash in any way that they could.
Did the Bank of England relax its eligibility
requirements in times of crisis? If this occurred then it
could be seen as being equivalent to the Bank helping some
institutions more than others, in that it was no longer
just discounting "good paper". Once the fixed discount
21 See Chapter Five.
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regulations are dropped, we have no idea by what criteria
the Bank decided on its discounting behaviour; it is
possible that the Bank was actually giving preferential
discounts to some customers.
We will now move on to a discussion of the empirical
analysis.
4 - Empirical Analysis
In this section we will examine in greater detail the
empirical analysis undertaken on the data, starting with
the simplest analysis aimed at showing the existence of the
LLR, and then continuing by looking at other ways of
examining Bank of England behaviour on a slightly more
sophisticated level.
4.1 - Indication of the presence of a LLR
At the simplest level, a simple positive correlation
of the total amount of discount business at the Bank of
England with Bank Rate would be enough to show that the LLR
function existed, albeit at its most basic level. This is
so since if financial institutions were utilisinq the
Bank's discount and advance facilities solely in "normal"
times, 22 we would expect there to be a negative
relationship between the two variables. If a positive
22 That is, periods when there is no significant
increase in financial tension.
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relationship exists, then, even if the explanatory power of
the regression is not very high, it is at least an
indication of the presence of a LLR.
It is a relatively simple operation to carry out
using annual data. There was a positive relationship, both
between Bank Rate and the total volume of discounts and
advances as separate variables, and when they were
aggregated to form one "LLR facilities" variable. 23
 These
results suggest that the Bank of England was acting as a
LLR during this period. 24 However, as already mentioned
23 The estimated equations were as follows:
Sample 1871 - 1914:
(1) TVBt = -29600024 + 14300205BRt
(-1.781	 (2.98)
R2 = 0.17	 R2a = 0.15	 DW = 0.94
(2) TVAt = -5342900 + 1266902BRt
(-0.17)	 (1.38)
R2 = 0.04	 R2a = 0.02	 DW = 0.50
(3) DIS+ADt = -34942923 + 26970l07BRt
(-0.95)	 (2.54)
R2 =0.13	 R2a=0.11	 DW=0.66
('t' statistics in parentheses)
24 One problem with these estimations, as is obvious
from the equations above, is that there is evidence of a
high degree of autocorrellation in the residuals, as shown
by the low Durbin Watson statistics. One remedy for this is
to re-estimate the equations using the Cochrane-Orcutt
technique, which includes an autoregressive term in the
equation. The equations resulting from this estimation are
as follows:
Sample 1871 - 1914:
(1) TVBt = 68434868 + 3529l28BRt
	
(0.16)	 (0.83)
0.35 R2a = 0.31	 DW = 1.63
(2) TVAt = 18098902 + 6144540BRt
	
(0.63)	 (0.95)
(continued...)
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any analysis carried out on annual data has a major
disadvantage in that it loses a great deal of detail.
Besides, most periods of tension are over in a matter of
weeks, or even on occasions in days, and furthermore, it is
possible that either the increase in discount and advance
activity is not enough to increase significantly the annual
totals, or that a period of high activity is followed by a
period of low business, thus smoothing out the annual
total. Thus, a period of greater activity may not
necessarily show up in annually aggregated data. It is for
this reason that any further work was, wherever possible,
carried out using higher frequency data, normally the
weekly aggregated series.
4.2 ARIMA Modelling
In considering the appropriate statistical analysis to
apply to this data set it was important to remember that
the initial aim of the analysis was to identify any moments
24(. . .continued)
R2 = 0.59 R2 a = 0.57	 DW = 1.93
(3) DIS+ADt = 29884429 + lll50744BRt
(0.77)	 (1.32)
R2 = 0.53 R2 a = 0.51	 DW = 1.97
('t' statistics in parentheses)
As is obvious from these results, although the inclusion of
an AR term improves both the DW statistic and R 2 , the 't'
statistics become insignificant. Conclusions have to be
"two-handed" therefore: Bank Rate is important as an
explanatory variable in these regressions, (explaining
between 30 and almost 60 per cent of the variability in the
dependent variable) although it is not statistically
significant.
255
of market pressure that had hitherto gone unnoticed. For
this reason an attempt was made to estimate an ARIHA
(Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average) mode]. for the
data. The aim here was to separate foreseen from unforeseen
components of the Bank of England's behaviour: by
definition, if a particular event was foreseen and thus
accounted for in the Bank's actions it could not be a
crisis, for a crisis by its very nature is unexpected.
Thus, the procedure was to estimate an ARIMA model for
the whole time series 25 (45 years = 2340 observations) and
then to split the sample and start a one step ahead
forecast: to estimate the model for 1870 - 1879, obtain
values for the autoregressive and moving average
parameters, and then add a year at a time obtaining a
forecast for the variable in each period. It would then be
possible to compare actual and simulated values for the
variables and the difference between the two series would
therefore be an indication of the unexpected component of
Bank of England policy.26
Although in theory this procedure seemed to be very
promising, in practice there were many problems associated
with it. These problems were in the main associated with
the length of the time series: the estimation was being
attempted using a time series of 2340 observations, a
number far too high for most computer software packages to
25 For both discounts and advances.
26 The actual process of estimating an ARIMA model for
this data was a complicated process and one which was
extremely time consuming, for reasons which are given below.
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handle. In addition, the fact that the data were weekly
caused further problems.27
Thus, this analysis did not get beyond the stage of
determining the degree of statioriarity of the data series.
Any estimated equations were unacceptable due to the fact
that the residuals themselves displayed autocorrellation.28
4.4: Polynomial Analysis
Because of the problems involved in estimating an
ARIMA model of the time series, another approach was used
in an attempt to identify moments of abnormal activity in
the demand for discount and advance facilities at the Bank
of England. This involved plotting the trend apparent in
the data and then identifying deviations from this trend.
27 Initial Box-Jenkins estimations gave results
displaying extremely high Q2 statistics. The chi squared
test tests the hypothesis that all the autocorrelations are
equal to zero, that is, that the series consists of white
noise. With a sample as large as this the test expects to
find little or no serial correlation since the sample size
should be approaching the population size. One way to
reduce the extent of the serial correlation would be to
include a large number of autoregressive (AR) lags, which
since the data are weekly and consist of a large number of
observations seems appropriate: a 52 period lag is only
equivalent to one of four quarters when dealing with
quarterly data. However, this need for a high number of AR
lags introduces a further complication: the increase in
serial correlation between the various orders of lags, and
in addition computer packages do not in general have enough
memory to deal with such a high number of lags. Because of
these problems, any further estimation had to be undertaken
with a reduced sample.
28 As mentioned above, autocorrelation in the
residuals is tested for by looking at the autocorrelation
function of the residuals from the estimated model and
performing a chi-squared test. See Pindyck & Rubinfeld
(1981) pp.549-550 for further details on this test.
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In effect, what we are doing here is de-trending the data.
In order to plot the trend in the data a polynomial
was specified of the form:
= Pb + fl 1T + fl2T2t + fl3T3t + ...+
Where: Yt = dependent variable (discounts or advances)
Tt = time variable
et = error term
Various specifications were estimated, the data deciding
which one was used. 29 This method was particularly
appropriate in this case because of two characteristics
possessed by the data: they displayed no cycle, but there
was a large degree of variation. Neither moving average nor
straight regression methods were therefore appropriate, the
former because it did not capture the best line
representing trend, and the latter because the trend
apparent in the data could not be represented by a straight
line.
The data were split into four ten year and one five
year sections: 1870-79, '80-'89, etc, and 1910_1914,30 for
29 See Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1981), pp.108, and Granger
& Newbold (l986),pp.33-36. In essence, the procedure
followed was to estimate the polynomial using T, T21...T8,
retaining only those terms which had significant 't'
statistics attached to them. T8 was the highest time
component used because of computer memory limitations: the
large number of observations meant that the numbers
involved (1-520 for most of the estimations) became too
large for the computer to handle.
30 Since Advances on Securities (VAOS) were not
brought into the Discount Office until 1894, a polynomial
covering the period 1894-1914 was estimated for this
variable.
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two reasons: firstly due to computer memory limitations,31
and secondly because, as previously discussed, the trend
effects of the data imply that comparison over ten-year
periods is more efficient in recognising periods of unusual
activity, since the standard deviation of the period
1870-1914 is greater than even two or three standard
deviations of some of the sub periods. 32
 Initially
polynomials were estimated for advances and for
discounts.
The aim of this process is to identify unusually large
outliers from trend. These could then be used as indicators
of financial tension. The residuals were plotted against
one, two and three standard deviations: one standard
deviation represents the 68 per cent "confidence interval",
two and three standard deviations represent 95 per cent and
99 per cent respectively. Thus, any residual that exceeds
two or three standard deviations can be regarded as
significantly different from the "trend" since the
likelihood of it occurring is less than five or one per
cent respectively. This then gives us an indication of
points at which an unusually large amount of activity was
taking place; it does so on a basis that is rather more
rigorous than visually identifying the points.
Once the appropriate polynomial for each data set had
31 Most statistical packages are not capable of
handling a time series of over 2000 observations.
32 See below.
See section 4.4.6.
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been specified, graphs were produced of actual and fitted
values, and residuals from the regression and standard
deviations. These graphs (for discounts only) are shown in
figures 6.1 to 6.10 respectively. Only residuals that
exceeded three standard deviations in value were considered
to be of interest.
Two things are inunediately obvious from the graphs:
firstly that some data periods exhibit a greater number of
residuals exceeding the three standard deviation (SD) point
than others, and secondly that the SDs themselves are very
different in size, depending on the period concerned. The
standard deviation and mean for the period as a whole and
for each sub-period are given in Table 6.1 below:
Table 6.1: TVB - Mean & SD
1870 - 1914	 SD =
3SD=
Mean =
1870 - 1879	 SD =
3SD =
Mean =
1880 - 1889	 SD =
3SD=
Mean =
1890 - 1999	 SD =
3SD=
Mean =
1900 - 1909	 SD =
3SD=
Mean =
190456
571368
60809
61465
184395
51400
17127
51381
17154
63021
189063
34412
113621
340863
69383
1910 - 1914	 SD = 509833
3SD = 1529499
Mean = 203038
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There are several points to notice about these summary
statistics. Firstly, there are very obvious fluctuations in
the mean and the standard deviation between the periods.
The decades of the 1880s and 1890s display relatively low
means, and it is only from 1900 onwards that the latter
starts to increase. Both the mean and the standard
deviation for the final period, 1910-1914, are biased
upwards as a result of the effects of the crisis occurring
in the summer of l9l4. In addition, it should be noted
that in four out of five periods, and in the 1870-1914
figures, the standard deviation exceeds the mean. This is a
reflection of the fact that there is a large degree of
variation in the data: there were frequently days when
there was a very low level of discounting, and less
frequently, days when there was no discounting at all.
Thus, there is a downward drag on the mean, and an upward
one on the standard deviation.
The upward trend in the data is evident in the
difference in the scales of the graphs: the maximum on the
vertical axis (size of residual) in 1870-79 is £500,000, in
1880-89 £170,000, in 1890-99 £500,000, in 1900-09 £700,000
and in 1910-14 £4m.35
If we calculate the mean and standard deviation for
1910 to 1913 (ie missing out 1914), the effects of this
bias are even more obvious: the mean is 127476 and the
standard deviation is 193500, 63 and 38 per cent of their
1910-1914 values respectively. The bias is further
accentuated because in this period we only have 260
observations, as opposed to 520 in the other four periods.
This illustrates the earlier point about the
efficiency of comparison over ten year periods.
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4.4.1: 1870-1879 - Figures 6.1 and 6.2
The estimated polynomial fit equation for this period was
as follows:36
TVBt= 52803 + 7.83T2t - 0 . 07T3t +0.0002T4t - (1.42*107)T5t
(4.45)	 (-4.73)	 (4.66)	 (-4.49)
R2 = 0.13 R2a = 0.12
In this period twelve residuals exceed three standard
deviations. However, some of these are very close or even
subsequent to one another, and so can be treated as being
one "episode". This leaves six episodes left to be
considered, which are as follows:38
1870	 - mid-end July
1871	 - end February
1872	 - mid February and end of March
1873	 - February and March
1873	 - August - September
1878/79 - end December and start of January.
These moments will be discussed in greater qualitative
detail in the next chapter.
36 I t' statistics in parentheses.
3 'R2 ' refers to the correlation coefficient
adjusted for the degrees of freedom available in the
regression.
38 Residuals exceeding three standard deviations which
occur during the two "window-dressing" points (the end of
June and December) are omitted throughout this analysis,
for the reason that the reason for the large residuals at
these times is known and can be included as being part of
the seasonal component of the data.
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4.4.2: 1880-1889 - Figures 6.3 and 6.4
The estimated polynomial fit equation for this period is as
follows:
TVBt = 29566 - 396Tt + 5.39T2t - 0.03T3t + (6.21*10S)T4t_
(-2.31)	 (2.65)	 (-2.89)	 (2.97)
- (4.73*108)TSt
R2
	0.074 R2a	 0.065
	 (-2.96)
At the following points the residuals exceed three standard
deviations:
1880 - mid March
1881 - middle of August
1883 - mid March to mid May
1886	 -	 end of April
1888	 - end of April
1889	 - mid August.
In general, this period displays a decreased volume of
business over those immediately preceding and subsequent to
it. This is obvious from the figure for the mean volume of
discounts: £17154, less than a third of the average for
1870 - 1914 and significantly less than the mean for 1870-
1879 or 1890 - 1899.
This decrease in the volume of discount business at
the Bank of England in this period does not necessarily
imply that there were no problems in the financial markets
for the Bank to deal with, although this is a possibility.
It is also possible that problems faced by the Bank were
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simply smaller in magnitude than was previously or
subsequently the case. In other words, when the financial
markets were not generally short of liquidity, they were
perhaps more able to help out one of their own members than
at other times of greater stringency.
This will be discussed again at a later point, along
with a further consideration of such pressure points as
there were in the 1880 - 1889 period.
4.4.3: 1890-99 - Figures 6.5 and 6.6
The estimated polynomial fit equation for this period is as
follows:
TVBt = 11699 + 13 78Tt - 17.59T2t +0.09T3t - O.0002T4t
(2.17)	 (-2.33)	 (2.31)	 (-2.29)
+ (1.37*107)TSt
R2 = 0.059 R2a = 0.050
	 (2.31)
In this decade the occasions when the residuals exceed
three standard deviations are as follows:
1890 - mid November
1891 - mid March
1893 - April and May
1898 - start March
1899	 -	 September.
One of these points (1890) is easily explainable. However,
this, and the other points, will be discussed in the
following chapter.
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4.4.4: 1900-1909 - Figures 6.7 and 6.8
The estimated fit equation for this period was as follows:
TVB+ = 82753 - 13 .31T2t + 0 .lOT3t - 0.0003T4t
(-4.01)	 (3.97)	 (-3.68)
+ (1.99*107)TSt
R2	 0.085 R2 a = 0.078
	 (3.33)
In this sub-period the points when the residuals exceed
three standard deviations are as follows:
1900	 -	 start of April
1901 - mid February
1902	 - mid September
1904 - end of November
1906 - September and October
1907	 - start March
start August
mid/end October
There is a far higher volume of business carried out
between 1900 and 1909 than there has been in the preceding
two decades, as shown by the increase in the mean volume of
discounts, and by the increase in the number of residuals
exceeding three standard deviations in size.
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4.4.5: 1910-1914 - Figures 6.9 and 6.10
The situation in this period is rather more complicated
than for the others, due to the bias introduced by the
extremely high levels of discounting which occurred in July
and August of 1914. The standard deviation for this period
(= 509,833) is more than two and a half times greater than
that of the 1870-1914 period as a whole (= 190,456), and so
in this case we have to look not only at instances where
the residuals exceed three standard deviations, but also at
those between two and three and even one and two standard
deviations.
The estimated fit equation for this period is as follows:
TVBs = - 58123 + 921T2t - 34.83T3t + 0.51T4t - 0.004T5t
(2.62)	 (-3.13)	 (3.60)	 (-4.02)
+ (1.14*10 5)T6t - (1.42*108)T7t
(4.37)	 (-4.66)
R2 = 0.24 R2a = 0.22
As would be expected the only instance here when the
residuals exceed three standard deviations is in the summer
of 1914. During this time, three residuals exceed this
value, in all cases by a large margin: the three residuals
are 3.08m, 3.85m and 2.49m.
In addition to two further points during July and
August 1914, there is one other residual which lies between
two and three standard deviations. This occurs in the
middle of February 1911.
There are several periods where the residuals fall
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between one and two standard deviations. These are:
1912	 - May
1913 - February and March
1914	 - Summer
These points will all be discussed in the next chapter.
4.4.6: Summary
This analysis has given us, for the volume of discounts
variable, TVB, twenty-seven points identified as being of
interest. Of these, five can be readily accounted for.39
This leaves twenty-two where there is no obvious
explanation for the increase in market activity.
In order to give a qualitative back up to the
analysis, further investigation of events occurring at
these particular moments was undertaken. 4 ° One of the
sources used was the Bank of England archives, which fairly
typically is not without its problems: the Bank is very
sensitive about releasing information that is "customer
sensitive" if it comes within their 100 Year Rule. 41 They
are thus reluctant to release any information that might be
detrimental to the reputation of particular customers. In
The Continental crisis in 1873, the City of
Glasgow Bank failure in 1878, the near collapse of Barings
in 1890, the American crisis in 1907 and the outbreak of
World War One in the summer of 1914.
40 The results of this will be reported later in the
chapter.
41 Anything less than 100 years old is subject to
restricted access.
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addition, sources other than the Daily Discount Books in
the Bank are interestingly barren in their coverage of the
financial markets in the late nineteenth century, 42 and so
sources outside the Bank have to be utilised. 43 This
qualitative evidence will be examined in section 5 later in
the chapter.
The empirical analysis has so far concentrated on the
volume of discounts variable, TVB. Polynomial analysis was
carried out on the advances variable, but with limited
success. This lack of success can be explained by the
relatively low degree of trend apparent in the advances
data. However, even with this limited success several
moments of greater than normal activity were identified and
will be discussed in the next section.
42 For example, as previously mentioned, the Minutes
of the Committee of Treasury, which at the outset seemed to
be a valuable source, soon proved not to be. The reason for
this, as previously mentioned, can be found in Sayers
(1976) Vol II,pp 630: the Secretary of the Bank of Englanct
acted as secretary to the Committee of Treasury, but did
not attend meetings, and so the Minutes of the Committee
consisted of what the Governor chose to record.
3 Such as the commercial bank archives, the British
Museum, etc.
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4.4.7: Advances Polynomials
Generating polynomials for advances was not as
straightforward a task as for discounts, because the
variable changes its composition halfway through the
period. This has already been discussed in detail, but in
brief: until the end of 1894, advances at the Bank of
England referred simply to advances received at the
Discount Office, secured on bills. However, from 1895
onwards the Discount Office took over the administration of
so called "floaters", bills advanced on short term
securities, which had previously been handled by the Chief
Cashier's Office. This meant that from this point there
were two advances variables: advances on bills and advances
on securities.
Because of this complication, the splitting of the
sample in order to produce the advances polynomial did not
always occur at the same point as for discounts. One
polynomial for advances was estimated for the period 1870-
1879, and then a further one for 1880-1894. Thereafter,
separate polynomials were estimated for the two types of
advances, covering the period 1895-1904 and 1905-1914. The
results of these are reported below, and the graphs are
depicted in figures 6.11 to 6.22.
In general, there was less trend apparent in the
advances data. This means that the polynomial produced a
relatively poor degree of fit. Thus, in certain cases it is
not advisable to undertake any further analysis on the
269
TVA1870 - 1879
TVA1880 - 1894
1895 - 1904	 TVA
1895 - 1904	 VAOS
TVA1905 - 1914
VAOS1905 - 1914
r
residuals from the polynomial, but better to consider the
raw data themselves. These cases will be pointed out in due
course.
The mean, standard deviation and the three standard
deviation (SD) point for advances on bills and on
securities are given below in Table 6.2:
Table 6.2: Advances Mean & SD.
	
1870 - 1914	 TVA	 SD = 183658
3SD	 550974
Mean = 67442
	
1894 - 1914	 VAOS	 SD = 251651
3SD = 754953
Mean = 112168
SD = 85410
3SD = 256230
Mean = 49338
SD = 73901
3SD	 221703
Mean = 34431
SD = 180684
3SD = 542052
Mean = 92412
SD = 319622
3SD = 958866
Mean = 175707
SD = 317521
3SD = 952563
Mean = 112486
SD = 150427
3SD = 451281
Mean = 58682
We will now continue by discussing the sub-periods
themselves, for both types of advance. The estimated
equations, together with any moments of interest, are
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pointed out below. In addition, we will also state whether
any of these points of high residuals coincide with similar
points in the polynomials for discounts. If and when this
does occur, it will be discussed more fully at a later
point.
4.4.7.1: 1870-1879 - Figures 6.11 and 6.12 (TVA)
The estimated equation resulting from the advances
polynomial for the period 1870 - 1879 was as follows:
TVAt = 87407 - (4.34*10 5)T4t + (1.72*107)T5t
(-4.34)	 (3.86)
- 
(1.74*10O)T6t
(-3 .50)
R2	0.10 R2a	 0.09
The above equation contains fewer terms than some of the
other polynomial equations. This is due to the fact that
none of the other time components carried significant It'
statistics, and is illustrated overleaf: there is very
little trend apparent in the data, and thus the trend line
is close to being horizontal.
Most of the points where the residuals from this
regression exceed three standard deviations in size can be
explained by seasonal pressure at either the end of June or
the end of December. Those that occur at other points are
as follows:
1870 -
	 mid-end July
1871 -
	 end September - start October
271
1872 -
	 end March - start April
Both the 1870 and 1872 points coincide with high residuals
from the discounts polynomial.
4.4.7.2: 1880-1894 - Figures 6.13 and 6.14 (TVA)
The estimated equation for this sub-period was as follows:
TVAt = 91661 - 519Tt + 1 .27T2t - 0.00lT3t
(-4.49)	 (3.71)	 (-3.30)
R2	0.043 	 R2a = 0.040
There is even less trend here than in the previous
decade, 44 aside from a slight downward movement at the
beginning of the period. After 1882, the trend line lies
approximately at the level of the mean for the period.
Since there is so little trend in the data, we would
expect there to be a greater number of increased residuals.
This is borne out by the results; points where the
residuals exceed three standard deviations are as follows:
	
1880 -	 July start
	
1883 -	 April start - mid*
	
1886 -	 March end*
	
1888 -	 April start*; September end
	
1894 -	 April start.
All those dates above marked with an asterisk are points
where advance and discount pressure coincide. They
generally occur around the end of March or start of April.
As shown by the low number of significant terms in
the regression and the very low 'R2'.
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4.4.7.3: 1895-1904 - Figures 6.15 and 6.16 (TVA)
The estimated polynomial equation for this period is
as follows:
TVAt = 13581 +2 .02T2t - (7.08*106)T4t
(6.11)	 (-5.19)
R2 = 0.08	 R2a = 0.07
There is slightly more trend here than in the previous
period. In addition, there is a significantly greater
volume of advance business undertaken at the Bank: both the
mean and the standard deviation are far higher here than
for 1880 - 1894: the former by 168 per cent and the latter
by 145 per cent. Although these figures show a large
increase, they are to be higher still in the following
period.
Residuals which exceed three standard deviations occur
in only three years (excluding seasonal pressure). These
are:
1900 -	 March end
1901 -	 April end
1903 -	 March start; May start.
The first of these coincides with a discount pressure
point.
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4.4.7.5: 1905-1914 - Figures 6.17 and 6.18 (TVA)
The estimated polynomial for this period is as follows:
TVAt = 44915 + 3472Tt - 6lT2t + 0. 42T3t - 0.00lT4t
(0.66)	 (-0.69)	 (0.66)	 (-0.61)
(2.06*10 6)T5t - (1.21*109)T6t
(0.56)	 (-0.51)
R2 = 0.006	 R2a = - 0.005
This is one of the occasions where it was impossible to
find a polynomial that produced significant 't' statistics
on any of the time components. In addition, the value for
R2 was particularly bad, even by the standards of some of
the other low trend periods. The line depicting the trend
lies fairly close to the mean for most of the period.
As in the period 1880 - 1894, there are a large number
of residuals exceeding three standard deviations, again as
a reflection of the lack of trend. However, most of these
tend to occur at the seasonal pressure points. Only in
August 1914 is there a large residual that cannot be
accounted for by "window-dressing". This phenonomen is
illustrated in Figure 6.18 by the fact that most of the
large residuals occur at equi-distant points, thus showing
that they occur at the same time(s) each year.
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4.4.7.6: 1895-1904 - Figures 6.19 and 6.20 (VAOS)
This is the first polynomial which uses the volume of
advances on securities, VAOS, as the dependent variable.
The estimated polynomial was as follows:
VAOSt = 168519 - 13430Tt + 277T2t - 2. 18T3t + 0.OlT4t
(-2.85)	 (3.52)	 (-3.86)	 (4.03)
- (1.34*10 5)TSt + (8.36*109)T6t
(-4.06)	 (3.99)
= 0.22	 R2a = 0.21
The results for this polynomial were noticeably better than
for some of the others, displaying higher 't' statistics
and several significant terms. The moments where the
residuals exceeded three standard deviations are as
follows:
	
1900 -	 March end
	
1903 -	 middle - end March; start - middle May
1903 saw a sudden increase in business, which was not
reflected in the discount figures: the increase occurred
solely in advances.
The first of these (1900) is coincident with a discount
pressure point.
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4.4.7.7: 1905 - 1914 (VAOS) - Figures 6.21 and 6.22
The estimated polynomial for this period was as follows:
VAOSt = 176893 - 1283Tt + 4.24T2t - 0.OlT3t
(-3.00)	 (2.22)	 (-1.96)
R2 = 0.07	 R2a = 0.06
The results here are much worse than for the previous
period, perhaps because the volume of business fell off
tremendously here, as displayed by the mean of only 58682,
as opposed to 112168 for 1895 to 1914 as a whole. Aside
from seasonal pressure points, there are two moments of
interest here:
	
1905 -	 end February
	
1910 -	 mid March.
Neither of these coincide with pressure points on
discounts.
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4.4.7.8: Summary
The results of the polynomials for advances are mixed.
Some periods display a great deal of trend, and others not
as much. Those periods with less trend have a greater
number of residuals exceeding three standard deviations,
and vice versa. In general, the volume of business
increases up to 1905 and then falls, discounts becoming
increasingly more important after this point. In addition,
advances display a much higher standard deviation than
discounts. Part of the reason for this can be explained by
the fact that there was no steady flow of advances as there
was for discounts; no group of Bank of England customers
who used the Bank at all times, not just when they were
illiquid.
Having carried out this analysis on both discounts and
advances, we will now turn first to other tests undertaken
on the residuals from the polynomial regressions, and then,
in the next chapter, to a qualitative discussion of events
occurring at the points which have been identified.
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4.5 Tests for "Runs" and for Kurtosis
In addition to tests based on confidence intervals,
the residuals from the polynomial regressions for both
discounts and advances were subjected to a "runs" test and
to tests for kurtosis (the "Tails" test). Both these test
whether the residuals are normally distributed: the former
tests for randomness in the signs of the residuals, and the
latter for "peakedness" in the distribution of the
residuals.
A runs test was carried out in order to detenDine
whether there was an unusual number of runs of positive and
negative residuals in the sample. Statistical analysis can
give us an idea of the number of runs in the residuals that
should occur if the sample is random. The occurrence of a
smaller number of runs than this would indicate that there
was prolonged negative or positive deviations from trend
apparent in the data.
The null and alternative hypothesis for this test are
as follows:
H0 : the order of the positive and negative residuals is
random.
H1 : the order of the residuals is not random.
Z (the deviation of observed values from the population
mean when the SD of the population is equal to one) is
calculated according to the formula:
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r - (2n1n2 + 1)
ni +
2n1n2 (2n1n2 - n1
 - n)
- (n1 + n2 ) 2 (n1 +	 - 1)
where: r = number of runs
n1 = number of negative residuals
= number of positive residuals.
The rejection region for this test consists of all values
of Z which are so extreme that the probability of their
occurrence under H0 is equal to or less than the
significance level, and thus this rejection region
includes all values of Z is greater than +1- 1.96.46
The procedure to carry out this test on the residuals
from both the polynomials for discounts and for advances
was thus simply to count the number of positive and
negative runs occurring in the residuals and the number of
positive and negative residuals themselves. These values
could then be utilised in the above formula and the
obtained 'Z' statistics be compared with the rejection
region noted above.
The 'Z' statistics obtained for the various sample
periods were as follows:
' That is, 5 per cent.
46 See Siegel, 1956, Table A, pp.247.
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1870 - 79 Z = -6.04
1880 - 94 : Z = -8.88
1895 - 04 : Z = -9.42
1905 - 14 : z = -3.47
TVB
TVA
1870 - 79 : Z = -7.16
1880 - 89 : Z = -3.18
1890 - 99 : Z = -3.30
1900 - 09 : Z = -6.48
1910 - 14 : Z = -8.33
VAOS
1895 - 04 : Z = -8.54
1905 - 14 : Z = -5.59
In all cases, Z is greater than +1- 1.96, and thus the null
hypothesis is rejected and we can conclude that in all the
sub-periods between 1870 and 1914 the order of the negative
and positive residuals is not random. This result comes as
no great surprise given that we would expect that there
would be a lower than normal number of runs in the
sample.47
The test statistic for kurtosis indicates whether or
not the distribution of the residuals is peaked: a normal
distribution will not display kurtosis and thus the co-
efficient of kurtosis will be equal to three.
The kurtosis statistics were calculated using the
computer package SPSS. The formula used by SPSS to
calculate the coefficient of kurtosis, K, is:
Since this would indicate prolonged periods of
discounts which are higher or lower than trend, and it is
those residuals which are higher than trend that we are
particularly interested in. One of the basic hypotheses on
which this analysis is based is that the residuals that
result from the polynomial regression should not display
normality: if they did, the analysis itself would be
fundamentally uninteresting.
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Use of this formula and SPSS gave results for the 'K'
statistic as follows:
TVB
1870 - 1879 : 14.14
1880 - 1889 : 27.10
1890 - 1899 : 5.65
1900 - 1909 : 8.62
1910 - 1914 : 33.00
TVA
1870 - 1879 : 22.12
1880 - 1894 : 22.55
1895 - 1904 : 13.95
1905 - 1914 : 23.80
VAOS
1895 - 1904 : 19.56
1905 - 1914 : 44.27
Most periods have a sample of 520, the only exceptions
being 1910-14 for TVB and 1880-94 for TVA, which have 260
and 780 observations respectively. The critical values at
the 5 per cent level are thus 3.37 for the 520 observation
samples and 3.52 and 3.29 respectively for the other two.
Since the kurtosis statistics for all sample periods are
greater than these critical values, all periods fail a
normality test indicating the presence of kurtosis.48
Again, this is not a great surprise since we would also
expect the distribution to show a marked degree of
kurtosis, a hypothesis which was again borne out by the
results.
48 See Pearson & Hartley (1970) Table 34 for further
details.
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5: Conclusions
This chapter has concentrated on presenting a
discussion of the empirical analysis carried out on the
Daily Discount data set. The most successful analysis
involved estimating polynomial equations in order to
separate unusual discount and advance activity of the Bank
of England from that which was part of the secular trend.
This has enabled the identification of a number of points
which will be discussed in the following chapter.
What results have been produced from this analysis?
Firstly, through estimating a relatively simple regression
equation, we have established that there are strong
indications that the Bank of England was acting as a LLR
during the 1870-1914 period, in that there is a positive,
statistically significant relationship between the volume
of discounts and advances and the level of Bank Rate.49
Secondly, we have compiled a list of moments when there was
something unusual occurring in the financial markets, even
if on some of these occasions the problems were relatively
minor. These points have been derived from a statistical
analysis of Daily Discount data, using a method which
allows for the existence of trend in the data. We have in
addition subjected the residuals from these regressions to
normality tests, with the a priori expectation that they
will not be normal, thus implying that the data do hold
There are however reservations associated with this
estimation, as expressed in section 4.1 earlier in this
chapter.
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some clues for further study of the Bank of England's
behaviour. Not surprisingly, it was found that the
residuals in all time periods failed both these tests,
indicating non-normality, a characteristic we would expect
given the nature of the data.5°
In the following chapter we will consider the
qualitative implications of the results of the statistical
procedures for each of the periods concerned, utilising
both primary and secondary sources in an attempt to present
as complete a picture as possible of events occurring in
the financial system during this period.
50 We are basically assuming from the outset that the
values taken by the data are not random but are determined
by other forces.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FURTHER QUALITATIVE MMJYSIS OV )A1L'L DISCOUWS DATA
1: Introduction: Discussion of Identified Points
The method described in the previous chapter enabled
the identification of thirty-two "points of interest",
moments at which the residuals from the appropriate
polynomial regression were unusually large. Five of these
points can be accounted for by recognised "events" in the
financial sector: 1873 (Continental crisis), 1878/9 (City
of Glasgow Bank failure), 1890 (Barings), 1907 (American
Crisis), and 1914 (outbreak of World War I). However,
rather than looking at these moments about which we have
more information first, we will look at all the points in
chronological order, in order that a historical perspective
is maintained.
In consideration of these points, the underlying aims
are as set out in section two of the previous chapter. In
brief, in all cases the following factors will be
discussed:
-	 the pattern of transactions: was there concentration
or diffusion of market pressure?
-	 the split of business between discounts and advances.
-	 the pattern of refusals at this point: did they too
reach a peak?
All the above deal with quantitative aspects of the
particular situation. However, there are also qualitative
questions that have to be considered:
-	 were certain institutions receiving more
accommodation (discounts or advances) than others?
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-	 were the eligibility requirements for bills relaxed,
either in general or for particular institutions?
These are all issues that have to be discussed in order to
determine what the Bank of England was actually doing at
certain times.
We will follow the same pattern of analysis for all
points, which is as follows:
(a) How large the particular residual(s) is/are compared
to the rest of the period. This is important in order
that we can place the increase in activity in
perspective.
(b) A consideration of the average size of transaction,
for discounts and for advances, in order to determine
the level of concentration of demand.1
(c) The split between discounts and advances: whether
activity was concentrated on discounts or on
advances. Since the type of customer for each
facility was often different, this will enable us to
get some indication of what sort of firm was short of
liquidity.
(d) A description of what was happening to interest rates
and to the volume of refusals. In order to be acting
as a Bagehotian LLR the Bank of England should have
been "lending freely at a high rate". It is thus
important to be aware of the sort of rates at which
1 Discussion as to the average size of transactions
obviously refers to the actual, as opposed to the residual,
value.
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these transactions were taking place. In addition, we
need to look at the volume of refusals: we would
expect the latter to increase as the volume of
discounts increases, for reasons which have already
been specified.2
(e) A qualitative account of what was occurring in the
economy in general and in the financial markets in
particular, in as much detail is as known, and a
collation of the qualitative and quantitative
information.
We will now continue with the discussion of all these
points. In all the following discussion, reference should
be made to Figures 6.1 to 6.22 in the previous chapter.
2 The volume of refusals applies to applications for
discounts that were refused, and thus have no relevance for
advance transactions.
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2.1: 1870 - July (Discounts and Advances)
(a) There are two fairly large residuals for both
variables at this time: for discounts the value is
around 240,000 and for advances around 350-400,000.
These are by no means the largest residuals for this
decade however.
(b) The average size of discount transaction (asdt) at
this point was around £8400, approximately twice the
average for the decade of 1870-79. However, although
the asdt increases here, the increase is not
considerable when compared to other cases, which
indicates a (relatively) wide demand for discount
facilities. When we look at who was receiving
discounts, we find that this is so; there are few
large transactions, and the only institution
receiving a large amount is involved in several
transactions, which obviously does not exert the
upward influence on the asdt as would occur if the
whole sum discounted occurred in one transaction.3
In this instance the institution concerned was
Bischoffsheim & Goldschmidt, who received almost £370,000
in discounts (six transactions) during ten days at the end
of July. There is very little known about this institution,
except that they were a German Bank who received large sums
in discounts at the Bank of England on only three
occasions: here, and once each in 1872 and 1873. They are
mentioned in the history of Deutsche Bank (SedenzahI,
1970): one of the senior partners of the London firm (Henry
Bischoffsheim) became a Director of Deutsche Bank in
Germany. At this point, Bischoffsheim & Goldschmitt were
apparently at the "height of their glory". However, the
London bank soon became the subject of an investigation
into its rather dubious issues of European and American
(continued...)
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The average size of advance transaction (asat) was
around £86000, more than three times the 1870-79
average, and the highest level for the decade. These
advances were in general being sought by Discount
Houses such as United Discount and Green Tomldnson,
which received £120,000 and £150,000 respectively.
(c) The split between advances and discounts is fairly
even at this point, but with many more discount than
advance transactions, hence the large differential in
the average size of transactions. The two variables
imply different things about the concentration of
market pressure: for discounts, pressure was widely
diffused: the average daily number of discount
transactions here was over 30, but for advances
pressure was far more concentrated.
(d) Interest rates in this period were moderately high:
Bank Rate rose to 5 per cent on July 28th and 6 per
cent on August 4th. Refusals were larger than normal:
just over £4000, 30 per cent higher than the decade
average. This of course is to be expected if there is
a large volume of discounts and a high number of
3(.. .continued)
railway paper, which had been issued on behalf of both
these railway companies and the Viceroy of Egypt, and thus
Henry Bischoffsheim gave up his seat on the Board of
Deutsche Bank in 1873. If the Bank of England had been
giving advances to Bischoffsheiin Goldschmidt, then we might
have questioned its wisdom, since the latter's credit
record cannot have been very good. However, since all the
funds it received from the Bank were in the form of
discounts, the regulations for the granting of which were
fixed, it seems that these transactions were fairly safe
for the Bank of England.
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transactions, although as we will see at a later
point this does not always occur.
	 -
(e) There is probably a fairly obvious explanation for
this period of pressure on discounts and advances:
the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in July 1870.
Britain's role in this war was not known at the
outset, and thus there was a precautionary rise in
interest rates, and, it seems, an increased demand
for liquidity, which was met by the Bank of England,
albeit at higher rates. As soon as it became apparent
that Britain was to be only a spectator in this
conflict, the markets settled down once again and
resumed normal activities.
What seems to have happened here is that many
firms came to the Bank of England for discounts and
advances as a precaution against Britain's
involvement in the Franco-Prussian war. Indeed, on
the announcement of the outbreak of hostilities there
was a panic on the Stock Exchange and failures
occurred on the settlement day. The Bank accommodated
this extra demand, which was of course the correct
course of action, since the problem was merely one of
insufficient information as to the participants of
the war, and thus the slight increase in tension
passed without any more serious consequences.4
However, it should be noted here that eight
discounters suspended payment in 1870, a relatively high
number. (Chapter Five, Section 2.2)
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2.2: 1871 - February (Discounts)
(a) Although there had been some slight increase in
activity in the previous two or three weeks, there is
only one residual which exceeds three standard
deviations. This is however the third largest
residual of the decade.
(b) The asdt here is twice the decade average, again, not
an enormous increase when compared with other
periods, since this still only gives a value of
slightly over £10,000. Much of the increase in
discounts went to banks or companies with foreign
connections: Agra Bank, Imperial Ottoman Bank, The
Borneo Company Ltd.
(c) There is some increase in advances in this period,
but most of the pressure is concentrated on
discounts.
(d) Interest rates here are low: 2½ - 3 per cent.
Refusals however are significantly above their decade
average: £9105 as opposed to an average of £2972.6
The average size of each refusal is slightly lower
than the decade average.
(e) Both primary and secondary sources give us little
clue as to any extraordinary event taking place at
the time. However, the French had surrendered in
60 per cent of total business is carried out on
discounts.
6 These figures refer to the average daily volume of
refusals.
290
January, and so it is possible that there was a
movement away from London. The increase in the demand
for discounts was in any case accommodated by the
Bank of England.
2.3: 1871: September and October (Advances)
(a) There are two consecutive weeks here of higher than
normal activity on advances. Both residuals just
exceed three standard deviations.
(b) The average size of advance transaction here is
slightly higher than the decade average, but not
significantly so. In each week there are eight
transactions, averaging around £44,000 each, which is
not an enormous sum for an advance transaction.7
Again, it was mainly the Discount Houses, together
with several foreign banks, who received facilities
at the Bank.8
(c) There was an increase in the volume of discounts in
the second of the two weeks, which took the form of a
large increase in the number of discount
transactions, and thus the asdt did not increase very
Advance transactions were often carried out in
multiples of £50,000, with firms sometimes receiving
several times that amount.
8 Such as:
General Credit & Discount : £850,000
Sandersons	 : £675,000
Reeves Whitburn	 : £405,000
Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London & China: £250,000
Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China : £200,000
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much. Overall however, most of the increase in
business was concentrated on advances.
(d) Interest rates were fairly high, lying between 4 and
5 per cent. Part of the explanation for these
increased rates was probably due to the possibility
of the occurrence of the normal autumnal reserve
drain to the U.S.: high rates had the effect of
reducing this slightly. Refusals are slightly higher
than their period average.
(e) There is no clear explanation of this increase in
activity, aside from the obvious one of an attempt to
stem the drain to the U.S. If this was the reason for
the increase in interest rates then it was a success,
since the (slight) pressure on discounts was soon
calmed and events returned quickly to normal.
However, The Economist, in its Economic Commentary
and History and Review of 1870, published in its
issue of March 16th 1872, mentions that in September
1871 there was some uncertainty in the London money
markets as to whether the Bank of England's reserve
would be drawn upon since much of the disposal of
German capital would be carried out in London. This
uncertainty about movements in the Bank's reserve was
apparently sufficient to bring about a precautionary
rise in Bank Rate and an increase in the demand for
advances at the Bank. In this case, the Bank acted in
a completely correct manner: accommodating the
increase in the demand for liquidity, whilst at the
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this period; discounts and advances followed a very
similar time path until the early l880s when advances
began to dominate.
(d) Bank Rate stood at 3 per cent between December 1871
and April 1872, but there were then two ½ per cent
moves in one week, to take it to 4 per cent. This was
the beginning of the upward trend in interest rates
which was to culminate in the very high rates
experienced the following year. Refusals were higher
during this period of increased activity, as would be
expected when an expansion of discount business
occurs.
(e) Again, there is little qualitative evidence
explaining this increase in activity. Clapham (1948)
talks about the "trade rush of the peace", and the
Bank reported moderate business, but this provides no
real explanation. There was an increase in economic
activity in 1872 however, part of the boom taking
place across Europe, especially in Germany, and which
was to lead to the 1873 economic and financial
crises.
2.5: 1873 - February/March and August/September (Discounts)
(a)	 For discounts, this is by far the busiest year of the
decade: the total volume of discounts in 1873 is over
£30m, a value which is not exceeded until 1893.
Although discounts are active all year, there are two
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main periods of concentrated activity: February/March
and August/September, during both of which times
there are two residuals greater than 3SDs and several
more between two and three.
(b) The average size of discount transaction in both
periods is generally around twice the decade average,
although in occasional weeks, particularly in the
early period, it is greater than this. In addition,
the largest observation (f433,952 - occurring in
September) is accompanied by an unusually high number
of transactions - 69 - giving a relatively low asdt,
indicating a widespread demand for discounts and a
diffusion of pressure. When we turn to examine who
was active in discounts at the Bank of England in the
earlier period, we find many unfamiliar names
receiving fairly large sums in discounts, together
with others who were involved in more frequent
business at the Bank. In the first category were
Seligman Brothers (fl18,176), Jay Cooke (flOO,000),
The International Bank of Hamburg (102,003), Moses
Levy & Co. (101,705) and A.Gibbs & Sons (C80,655),
none of whom was a regular discounter at the Bank,
together with many other unfamiliar names who
received much smaller amounts. In the second category
(more frequent discounters) were Raphaels (C530,000-
four transactions) and Imperial Ottoman Bank
(t276,573 - three transactions). The Discount Houses
were the most active institutions on advances: Green,
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Tomkinson & Co. received £300,000 arid Reeves Whitburn
£240, 000. 10
In August and September the story is very much
the same, with several of the firms who had received
discounts in the earlier period returning for more:
The International Bank of Hamburg had £155,295 (in
three transactions), Jay Cooke £100,000, Raphaels
£71,984. There were few transactions which exceeded
£100,000 here; the demand for discounts was very
diffused, even though it was high.
(c) Discounts are far more important than advances in
this period. Although there is some slight increase
in advances in certain weeks, especially at the end
of the half years, overall there is steady, but not
heavy, business throughout the year.
(d) Bank Rate starts and end the year at 5 per cent, but
rises as high as 9 per cent in the intervening
period. 9 per cent holds for two weeks in November,
which in fact is not at the points where the demand
for liquidity is at its greatest. The highest rates
are preceded and followed by several weeks of 6 and
7 per cent. Refusals are high all year, peaking at
(vetc4O)
over £50,000 in September4, a week which also saw the
peak in the volume of discounts. The average volume
10 The Discount Houses were not allowed to receive
discounts at the Bank of England until 1890, when
Lidderdale relaxed the 1858 rule which allowed them only
advances, and these only at certain periods. This rule had
been imposed after the 1858 crisis, for which the then bill
brokers were held to be mainly responsible. See Table 4.2
in Chapter Four for a summary of discount regulations.
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of refusals for the year as a whole is £7804, almost
three times the decade average. This increase in the
volume of refusals fits with the increase in the
volume of discounts, especially since many of the
firms discounting were not habitual discounters and
thus perhaps were not very aware of the regulations
governing discounts.
(e)	 1873 was a year of widespread crisis in Europe and in
the U.S. The European crisis commenced in Vienna in
the early summer, and soon spread to the rest of
Europe. It was at this stage that the first demands
for liquidity began to be felt at the Bank of
England. The second wave of the crisis gathered steam
in the early autumn, when the American markets begin
to contract, and it was during this stage that the
very high levels of interest rates were seen at the
Bank. However, these rates can, to a certain extent,
be seen as an attempt to keep gold in Britain, since
the internal demand for liquidity at the times when
high rates prevailed was not excessive. What is clear
from the Discount Data is how strong the demand for
liquidity was from foreign firms, or firms with
foreign connections. Although the facilities they
received were not enormous, names such as Bieber &
Co., Frangofuito and Varliano Brothers were obviously
Continental, and were very rarely involved in
business at the Bank. There was some internal demand
for liquidity, which the Bank of England
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accommodated, whilst at the same time trying to stem
the drain abroad. This policy seemed to work: Bank
Rate stood at 3½ per cent by the middle of January
1874, and the Bank had managed to survive the crisis
and simultaneously increase its experience of
dealing with such events.
2.6: November 1878 - January 1879 (Discounts)
(a) The pressure here Is on discounts and occurs towards
the end of 1878 and at the very beginning of 1879,
although the later part of the period sees the
greatest activity. The first week of 1879 has the
largest residual of the whole decade (423,000), which
is associated with an actual value of £465,000.
(b) The average size of discount transaction in the first
week of 1879 is just over £50,000, more than 15 times
the average for the decade. At this point there are
only eight discount transactions. 1' Elsewhere, there
are no noticeable increases in the asdt.
11 Although initially this enormous increase in the
average size of transaction seems very odd, in fact there
is an easy explanation for it: two large transactions which
force up the weeks' total. The recipient of the discounts
was the Secretary of State for India in Council, which
received almost £1.6m in the first week of 1879. The
"Indian business" had, according to Clapham (1944, pp.301),
been expanding since the late 1860s and was "becoming more
regular and formal". Thus, an instance to which our
attention is immediately drawn turns out to have a simple
and unambiguous explanation: loans to India were
"sovereign" and thus presumably almost risk-free, and yet
they provided a very useful source of business to the Bank
in times when it was often hard-pressed to raise income.
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(c)	 Advances here are not enormous: although they touch
£200,000 once in November, this is a one-off
increase.
(d) Interest rates reach 6 per cent in November, a level
at which they remain for five weeks. Refusals too are
high in November, not always coinciding with peaks in
discounts: one week sees the value of refusals at a
level which is twice that of discounts, thus of the
bills presented for discount, twice as many were
refused as were accepted.
(e) This of course was the period of the City of Glasgow
Bank failure, one of the most interesting episodes of
the decade. This bank failed as a result of gross
mismanagement, some of its directors actually being
imprisoned for fraud, and the Bank of England refused
to grant it direct aid. The secondary effects of the
crisis were severe but were in the most part confined
to the provinces, London itself being almost
unaffected. However, accounts of the English effects
of this failure tell us that by the end of the year
"caution had become paralysis in the market", and
talk of the "terrible panic which overwhelmed the
country" and of the "abatement of confidence being
severely felt".'2
 In addition to the City of Glasgow
12 The sources of these comments are various accounts
of the failure held in Commercial Bank Archives, for
example, Lloyds Bank Archives, Notes and Reminicences of
Lloyds Bank, 1862 to 1892 (Archive Reference 10/29). This
(unpublished) book was written by Howard Lloyd, who was the
General Manager of Lloyds between April 1871 and March
(continued...)
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failure, there had been closures of the Caledonian
Bank and of the West of England -and South Wales
District Bank in the first two weeks of December.
As already mentioned, compared with other points
this incident does not show up to any great extent in
the Daily Discount data, although there is a
noticeable increase in both the currency:deposit and
reserve:deposit ratios and a slight fall in the money
supply. 13 This small fall in the money supply fits in
with the notion that the crisis was severe outside
London, since the share of the note issue outside
London held by the provincial banks was still
considerable at this time, although it was of course
on the decline.
Even though there was no great surge in the
volume of discounts in November 1878, there were two
instances in November 1878 when firms, two of whom
were severely affected by the City of Glasgow's
failure, received discounts at the Bank of England
which amounted to over £100,000: £140,000 to the Bank
of New Zealand and £102,000 to the Yorkshire Banking
12 • • continued)
1902. It was the result of a diary kept by him, and was
eventually transcribed in 1917.
13 C/D increased from 0.180 at the end of 1877 to
0.203 at the end of 1878, and R/D from 0.110 to 0.120. It
should be noted however that the increase in the reserve-
deposit ratio could be part of the general secular increase
occurring in the period as a whole, as commercial banks
increased reserves and started to publish balance sheets.
The money supply (as measured by M3), fell by 7.73 per cent
between June 1878 and June 1879.
Source: Capie & Weber (1985) Table 1(3), pp.82.
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Company, which was itself experiencing a run on
deposits. On November 9th the Clydesdale Bank
received £315,000 in discounts.
Bank Rate at this point was 6 per cent, but
advances were being charged at 7 or even 8 per cent.
The policy of the Bank of England at this point seems
to have been to charge high rates to choke off
demand: or rather to force institutions to go
elsewhere if it was possible to obtain accommodation
at lower rates. High rates also had the advantage of
drawing in gold from abroad, especially from France,
and thus adding to the reserve. This does not explain
however why there seemed to be no real pressure at
the Bank of England, even though the country pressure
was considerable: LLoyds Bank, based at this time in
Birmingham, reported a decline in its liabilities on
current and deposit accounts of 20 per cent, 14
 and
Collins (1987) writes that, in his Opinion, "a
general panic was but a hair's breadth away".15
Thus this incident is particularly interesting
from the perspective of the Banks' actions as a LLR.
In this case the Bank acted as a true LLR, lending to
other institutions affected by the initial failure,
but not to the failed institution itself, riddled as
14 Op cit, Howard Lloyds' Reminicences, pp.36.
15 Collins (1987) pp.4.
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it was with poor and fraudulent management. 2- 6 In
addition, it should be noted that the "crisis", if
that is the best way to describe the problems
resulting from the City of Glasgow's failure, were
not centred on London, for almost the first time.
This of course causes problems in defining these
events as a "crisis": if the City of London was for
the most part unaffected by these events, and yet
London was by far the most important financial centre
16 In acting as a LLR and not intervening to save the
City of Glasgow Bank, the Bank of England was following the
precedent it had set with the Overend-Gurney affair.
However, this policy was not to last: when Baring Brothers
developed (self-inflicted) problems in 1890, the Bank acted
to organise a rescue fund in order that Barings should be
saved, as we shall see at a later point, thus retreating
some way from their established policy position.
The Bank of England's policy of acting as a LLR in the
Classical sense is reflected in the comments of Howard
Lloyd, in a discussion of Lloyds Bank's actions in 1878. He
says:
"Even in the limited area that Lloyds then
occupied, the counties of Warwickshire,
Staffordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire,
the abatement of confidence was severely felt,
and even affected at some of its centres the
ordinary customer and the country depositor. And
thus for the first time in the history of the
bank there took place a continual drain of cash
and a diminution of the total deposits lasting
for many months. It thus became needful to
recall loans and insist on a reduction of
overdrawn balances to meet the heavy and
continuous strain. But such an expedient at a
time of distrust is always attended with
difficulty and danger as giving emphasis to
anxiety, and affords little real relief. Indeed,
the true policy in times of panic and stringency
is to shew a willingness to lend freely and
generously within all limits of safety."
(Notes and Reminicences, pp.35)
Here Lloyd is outlining the Bagehotian LLR principle of
lending freely. It had obviously been understood and
accepted by him by this point.
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in the country, indeed, at this time, in the world,
and, following the definition in Chapter One above,
that there was certainly no threat to the means of
payment, then how can events that leave these areas
untouched be described as a financial crisis?17
Perhaps one possibility is to describe these
problems as being a different type of crisis, one
which threatened the fabric of English banking as it
was then structured, but only at its country origins.
This would fit with the numerous reports found of
various country banks being severely affected by the
initial failure and subsequent cash drains and
reduction in the volume of deposits.
2.7: 1880 - Mid March (Discounts) and July (Advances)
The first thing to notice about all the points of
interest in the l880s is that the standard deviation in
this period is, by comparison with other decades at least,
very low,' 8 and thus residuals which exceed three standard
deviations are not particularly large on a comparative
basis.
(a)	 Discounts: in March there is one residual which just
exceeds three SD5, and this point is very much on its
17 However, Pressnell (1968, pp.189) states that this
time the Bank considered suspending the 1844 Bank Act, an
indication that perhaps the situation was more serious than
other sources might suggest.
18 17127 on discounts and 73901 on advances. See
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for further details and comparisons.
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own: there is very little happening in the weeks
immediately preceding or following.
Advances: the pressure point here occurs in July, and
again it is a point very much on its own, and is only
just greater than the three SD level.
(b) For discounts, the average size of transaction (asdt)
in March is 2½ times larger than the average asdt for
the decade (which is equal to £2702). For advances in
July, the average size of advance transaction (asat)
is twice the period average. Neither of these asts
really indicate concentration in the demand for
discounts: the asdt appears always to increase when
the volume of discounts increases, but by a greater
or lesser amount, depending on the circumstances. In
this case the diffusion in pressure is clear,
especially on discounts, when we look at who was
receiving discounts, since there were no
transactions exceeding £70,000.19
(c) In the first period (March), when discounts are high,
advances are also higher than the period average,
although since the mean and the standard deviation
for advances is greater than for discounts the
increase in the volume of advances is not enough to
push the residual over three SDs. However, in the
second period (July), when advances are high,
discounts are around their trend growth.
The largest sum in discounts went to Samuel Montagu
(C69,5j7)
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(d) Refusals increase slightly at the same time discounts
increase, but are very low when advances are higher,
as would be expected. Interest rates on the discount
and advance transactions stand at 3 per cent for most
of 1880, falling to 2 per cent for only a very short
period. Bank Rate at this time stood at 3 per cent.
(e) Although there are two points in this year which
exceed the relevant three SD mark (one each on
discounts and advances), it is very tempting to
ignore both of them because of their relatively small
size: when the volume of business is greatly reduced,
even a small increase, which could possibly be
explained by a regular customer discounting a package
of bills, can look as if it is a significant and
important increase. Nevertheless, we must be careful
not to do this completely, since in ignoring it is
possible that we may miss something of importance; it
can be argued that significant deviations from low
trend are as important as deviations from a trend
that involves a far greater volume of business.
However, in this case there is no qualitative
evidence that suggests that anything important was
occurring in the financial markets at this time.
Interest rates (both Bank Rate and market rates) were
low, the latter averaging 2 per cent for the year and
the former changing only twice in the course of the
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year, 20
 and there are no other indications that
anything unusual was happening in the economy. Thus,
it seems that it is fairly safe to presume that these
two points are unimportant as regards the role of the
LLR.
2.8: 1881: Mid August - Discounts
(a) This point in mid August gives the second highest
residual on discounts in the 1880-89 period, although
as mentioned above, because of the low volume of
business this still involves a residual of only
£112,000. This is higher than the previous point, and
is more than double the three SD value.
(b) The average size of transaction increases here, to
approximately twice the decade average. This is a
similar increase to that seen on previous occasions.
There are no particularly large transactions taking
place.
(C) Advances are fairly busy throughout the year, without
ever increasing in size dramatically. The average
weekly advances total is around £50,000 for 1881,
only slightly greater than the mean for the 1880-1894
period. Although discount business too is steady
throughout the year, the August peak is just high
enough to make it noticeable.
20 Falling to 2½ per cent in June, and rising back to
3 per cent in December.
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(d) Interest rates here are on an upward trend: the rate
charged on advances and discounts starts the year at
3 per cent and ends it at 5 per cent, and Bank Rate
follows a similar path. Refusals are low for most of
the year, including during August, but increase
enormously in week 40 (September), when the volume of
refusals is almost as high as the volume of
discounts: in that week 49.7 per cent of the bills
presented for discount were refused, although there
were only three refusal transactions, as opposed to
eleven accepted discount transactions.
(e) This is another example of a point where there is
little of interest happening in the financial
markets: the 1880s were on the whole a very quiet
period.
2.9: 1883 - Mid March to Mid May - Discounts and Advances
(a) This is a pressure point on both discounts and
advances. The increase in advances occurs two weeks
before that in discounts, but the increase in
discount business is slightly more pronounced, with
two residuals exceeding the three SD level, as
opposed to only one on advances.
(b) The average size of transactions here is fairly high,
especially on discounts, giving some indication of a
concentrated demand, since the asdt is around three
to four times the decade average, whilst the asat is
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just over twice as large as its decade average. There
is only one discount transaction here which exceeds
£100,000: Morton, Rose & Co. received £103,787.
(c) Business is split relatively evenly between the two
variables: 55 per cent of the business in the eight
weeks covering mid March to mid May was carried out
on advances, and the remainder on discounts. This
means that there were more discount than advance
transactions, since discount transactions were
generally far smaller than advance transactions.
(d) The interest rate charged on these transactions was
between 3 and 4 per cent, with Bank Rate standing at
the same level. Refusals were low throughout the
period, significantly lower than the decade average.
(e) At around this time, the Bank of England was
attempting to increase its income in order to boost
its dividend relative to those of the Joint Stock
banks. This move came about as a direct result of the
fall off in business that has recently been
mentioned. 2 - It is possible that the increase in
discount and advance business that we are seeing in
these months is the first indication of the Bank's
new business generating ideas coming to fruition.
Other than this, it is difficult to find other causes
for this increase in activity, since the of
the money market" in 1883 was described by The
21 The reaction of the provincial banks to this new
source of competition will be discussed in the following
chapter.
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Economist as being "comparatively uneventful".22
2.10: 1886: March end (Advances) and April (Discounts)
(a) Here there is one residual each on discounts and
advances which exceeds the three SD mark, although in
neither case are they particularly large. Again this
is typical of the period, as previously mentioned:
the larger residuals occur as a one-off, with no
surrounding increase in activity.
(b) The average size of transaction of discounts and of
advances at the points of high residuals are between
two and three times the period average. The only
discount transaction which exceeds £60,000 is one to
the Chartered Bank of India of £107,400. The usual
names are receiving advances at the Bank, although
the institutions receiving the greatest funds are
slightly less frequent visitors to the Bank. Examples
of the latter category are Anglo-Foreign (C360,000)
and Harwood, Knight & Allen (i350,000).23
(c) At both points, activity in the other variable is
low, that is, when there is a large discount
residual, there is a low volume of advances, and vice
versa. For the rest of the year business on both
22 Economic Commentary and History and Review of 1883,
published in the issue of February 23rd 1884.
23 Some of these names were to appear more frequently
later in the period.
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variables is steady.
(d) Interest rates are low: between 2 and 3 per cent for
the first half of the year, although they increase
slightly later in the year. Refusals are generally
low throughout, especially at the points where
discount activity increases. The volume of refusals
does increase at certain points, even when advances
are low, and in these cases there are generally a low
number of refusal transactions 24 . Presumably at these
points people came in with a large package of bills
that were all, or almost all, found to be
unacceptable.
(e) The same comments apply here as in 2.9 (e) above:
that this slight increase in business has no obvious
explanation, but that perhaps it does not require an
explanation since aside from the (slight) increase in
business, there was little else of interest
occurring, apart from a slight ef flux of gold which,
according to The Economist, continued until May, and
which the Bank was unable to stop because of its lack
of control over the market. However, since Bank Rate
fell by a full percentage point in the middle of
February, and stayed at this level until May, it
seems that the Bank itself was not really trying to
take any preventative measures to stem these external
gold flows.
24 For example, in week 35 of 1886, £42117 of bills
offered for discount were refused. This was in fact a
Single transaction.
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The Economist here makes one of its (fairly
regular) complaints about the behaviour of the Bank
of England. "The Bank Directors", it says, "are
working on the principle that as long as the internal
demand for gold is satisfactory, the external demand
can be left unchecked." 25 Furthermore, it asserted
that the Bank was never quick in taking preventive
measures to prevent outflows, always leaving them
until the last possible moment. It ended its comment
by stating that:
"The events of the last twelve months have
shown that the Bank of England is unable to
discharge the duties placed on it by the
one reserve system."
Considering that this was written in 1887, fourteen
years after the publication of Lombard Street, in
which Bagehot had discussed the superior
characteristics of the multi-reserve financial
system, but had also noted that Britain's one-reserve
system was too far advanced for major changes to be
made, it is surprising that The Economist should
still be making this sort of statement. However, it
is probably best seen in the light of the latter's
campaign to get both the Bank of England and the
banking system to increase their reserve holdings,
and for the Bank to strengthen its position in
25 The Economist, Economic Commentary... of 1886,
February 19th 1887.
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relation to the other financial institutions.26
2.11: 1888 - May (Discounts and Advances), September
(Advances) and 1889 - August (Discounts)
These are three other cases very similar to the four
previous instances, in that the residuals exceed three SDs,
but not by a large amount, and there is nothing remarkable
happening to interest rates or refusals: in short, except
for the (slight) increase in discount and advance business,
there is little occurring in the financial markets.
The above applies to all three moments: April and
November 1888 and August 1889. The largest single discount
transaction in May 1888 went to the English Bank of The
River Plate (C12l,090). In November 1888 advances increase
quite suddenly, having been very quiet for most of the
year. 27
 However, the increase in business lasts for one
week only; thereafter there is little advance activity
until the end of year window dressing. The same
circumstances surround the 1889 increase in discounts,
except that in this case the interest rate charged at the
Bank of England was 6 per cent. In addition, the average
size of transaction here is large: more than five times the
26 We will discuss this issue again in the following
chapter.
27 Most of this increase in the volume of advances can
be accounted for by one firm: Corgialegno, which between
September 5th and 13th received advances of slightly over
£lin. This firm is discussed at a later point.
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1880-89 average.28
2.12: 1890 - November - Discounts
We now move back to a much busier period (in terms of
the volume of business), with far higher decade mean and
standard deviation.
(a) The residual in the relevant week29 is over £300,000
here, which is the fourth highest of the decade.
There is a steady volume of discount business taking
place in the weeks prior to the this point, and the
higher volume carries on for two weeks, thereafter
becoming quieter, with no real increase due to
seasonal pressure at the end of December.
(b) The average size of transaction here is very high, a
definite indication that there was a high
concentration in the demand for discounts.3°
(c) There is also an increase in the volume of advance
business carried out at the Bank, although not enough
of an increase to take the residual above the three
28 We do in fact know the destination of these
discounts: on the 27th and 28th August 1889 R.Raphael &
Sons received £75000 and £64625 in discounted bills. In a
busy time, these would not be large amounts, but because
there was so little business around they show up rather
nore clearly than would otherwise be the case. Although the
increase in the volume of discounts here was not enormous,
there was apparently at this time a drain of gold to South
America, and an expansion in the internal circulation. Bank
Rate was high, but the Bank found it hard to make this rate
effective.
29 This is in fact week 46 - mid November.
30 Recipients of discounts will be discussed below.
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SD point. Having said this however, advances
represented a significant portion of activity at the
Bank: of the business carried out in November, 35 per
cent was on advances.
(d)	 Interest rates charged on the advance and discount
transactions increased to 7 per cent in the last week
of November, but fell of f fairly quickly after the
tension was over. Bank Rate only reached 6 per cent,
lower than the rate charged on discounts and
advances. Refusals increased slightly, but only for
one week.
This was of course the period of the Baring "crisis", when
the Bank of England set up and led other financial
institutions into a rescue operation in order to salvage
one of the best known of City names. The story of Baring's
problems and subsequent rehabilitation has been told many
times elsewhere in the literature, and indeed in an earlier
chapter here, but it is important to study some aspects of
the episode again, paying particular attention to the role
the Bank took on, as compared to what would have perhaps
been the optimum policy at this time. In addition, it is
useful to look once more at the (raw) Daily Discount data
in order to see who was receiving facilities at the Bank
during this time. It is the latter that we will undertake
first.
The biggest borrowers from the Bank were the Discount
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Houses: 31
 Union Discount received a total of almost
£530,000 in discounts and a further advance of £400,000;
R.Cunliffe & Sons Ltd. almost £418,000 in discounts;
Harwood, Knight & Allen £223,000 in discounts, etc. Several
houses with South American connections also received
facilities: the English Bank of Rio de Janeiro had
discounts of £101,122, and Muriettas received a £35,000
advance. Some of these requests came before any formal
announcement of Barings problems, giving some indication of
the pressure the Bank of England was under.
Barings were in fact technically solvent at the time
their problems were announced, even though it took four or
five years for their affairs to show an excess of assets
over liabilities. 32 They had however become very involved
in railroad investment in South America, particularly in
Argentina, and it was in this area that they had over-
extended themselves. An appeal to the Bank of England was
31 The Discount Houses had of course only been re-
admitted to discount facilities at the Bank some five
months previously. This decision was taken by Lidderdale,
in an attempt to increase the Bank's influence in the
markets.
32 This provides a good example of the difficulties
inherent in distinguishing between illiquidity and
insolvency. When Barings presented their problems to the
Bank of England in November 1890 the Bank despatched two
people to determine what state their business was in. The
resulting report stated that there was in fact a surplus of
assets over liabilities. It took until 1895 however for
this surplus to niaterialise, and when it did it was not as
high as had been expected. (Bank of England Archives,
Baring Papers, Gl5/190, folio 177). It can be argued that
in many cases the division between illiquidity and
insolvency in many cases comes down to the length of time
needed to regain liquidity.
See Chapter Two, section 4 for further discussion of this
issue.
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answered by the latter setting up a guarantee fund, which
many of the major banks in the City subscribed to, and
Barings were able to continue in business.
From the perspective of the role of the Bank of
England as a LLR this is an extremely interesting event,
because this "crisis" represented the Bank's major test in
the 1870-1914 period. Its actions in rescuing Barings were
well received by most contemporary writers and bankers,
although with some exceptions. Howard Lloyd, a General
Manager of Lloyds Bank, writing of the crisis said this:
"Whether such intervention by the Bank of
England was sound in principle was in some
quarters held to be doubtful; but the danger of
the situation was grave and urgent,"33
However, Lloyd's own opinion on the matter was rather more
favourable:
"The failure or bankruptcy of Barings would have
shaken English credit all over the world, and
the result seemed to give full justification to
Mr. Lidderdale's courageous action."34
Despite this view, which of course was held by many
commentators, there are strong arguments suggesting that
the Bank over-reacted at this point, and it is this
possibility that we will now examine, in particular
concentrating on the similarities and differences between
this episode and the Overend-Gurney crisis that had
occurred 24 years previously.
This moment in November 1890 shows up in the Daily
Discount data, but it is not the most significant moment of
Howard Lloyd's Reminicences, op cit, pp.59.
op cit.
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the decade: there are several larger residuals. We are
faced therefore with two explanations for this absence of
an enormous increase in the demand for discount facilities
at the Bank: either the problem was dealt with so rapidly
and efficiently that there was no need for any individual
or institution to engage in a panic-stricken rush for cash,
or that the Bank itself made, to coin a phrase, a "mountain
out of a molehill".
What is certainly true is that the Bank did not act as
a LLR in the classical "Bagehotian" sense: it did not react
to the possibility of a financial crisis occurring by
supplying liquidity to the markets. Instead, it did exactly
what Bagehot, and Thornton before him, had said the LLR
should not do: bailed-out one specific institution.
The reasons this policy was pursued, rather than one
of simply providing large liquidity injections to the
markets, are far from clear, especially since the precedent
for letting institutions fail had already been set by the
Overend-Gurney affair. Possibly the Bank felt that Barings
was just too big and too important to be allowed to fail,
or that their fear was that the possible repercussions made
it of paramount importance that they intervene. 35 In any
case, once it had been established that Barings were merely
35 Another possible explanation is provided by
Batchelor (1986): that the Bank of England intervened to
save Barings but let Overend-Gurney fail mainly because
Barings had always supported the Bank, and had on frequent
occasions acted as an intermediary between it and other
central banks, whereas the relationship with Overends had
never been on the same terms and was frequently negative
rather than positive.
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illiquid, not insolvent, the genera], feeling at the Bank
was that "something had to be done".36
In order to try to determine whether the Bank was
correct in its intervention, we need to find out what the
mood in the City was at this time. A look at one
contemporary account of the crisis tells us that the fear
initially was that it was C. de Murietta & Co. who were
experiencing problems. 37 Edward Walter Hamilton, who in
1890 was in the Finance Division of the Treasury, reports
making several visits to the Bank of England during this
period. The first was on November 7th (before Barings'
appeal to the Bank), when he says that:
"there was a great deal of unease in the City...
I asked the Governor how true the rumours were
and he said he was frightened about one house -
Muriettas."38
On going to the Treasury three days later, he found that
the Chancellor of the Exchequer had gone to the Bank. At
36 However, as mentioned in Chapter Four, six weeks
after the initial investigation into Barings financial
position had been undertaken (by Benjamin Bucke Greene and
Bertram Currie), it transpired that there had been a
mistake made in the calculation of Baring's liabilities,
which had resulted in an underestimation of the latter to
the extent of around Lim. Since the (paper) surplus was
still considerable (estimated to be around £3.2m), this
would probably not have made any difference to the Bank of
England's decision to go ahead with the rescue. The
eventual surplus was around Lim, a sum considerably less
than was first thought, and was not achieved until 1895,
over four years after the formation of the Guarantee Fund.
' There will be an extended discussion of the
problems this institution caused for the Bank of England in
the next chapter.
38 Diaries of Edward Walter Hamilton, 7th November
1890. Held at the British Library, Department of
Manuscripts, reference Add 48,654.
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this point it seems that Hamilton realised that the
problems were fairly serious, since "Governors do not
summon Chancellors of the Exchequer without due cause."! On
Goschen's return, Hamilton questioned him about the reasons
for his visit:
"He said that things were very bad. I at once
said 'I suppose you mean that Murrieta's are in
difficulty?', to which he replied 'no, much
worse than that: it is Barings.'"
At this point, Hamilton felt that the Overend-Gurney crash
of 1866 was "nothing to that which is threatened". The
following day, he reports that business in the City was at
a complete standstill, even though the identity of the firm
with problems was still not publicly known.
At this meeting, Lidderdale had managed to get
Goschen's approval for the actions he wanted to. take, and
so proceeded to launch the Guarantee fund. Lidderdale had
few problems raising support for the fund, although on
November 15th Hamilton reports that he was "sorry to hear
that Rothschilds 'shillie-shallied' about joining the
Guarantee"; it was apparently not until Lidderdale let it
be known that Rothschild's participation was not necessary
that they agreed to contribute. Hamilton also tells of a
conversation he had with N.Rothschild on November 12th,
where the latter was fairly confident that the necessary
funds for the Guarantee would obtained, but felt that the
Bank of England might have difficulty justifying its
actions to its shareholders, given the rather poor quality
of Baring's securities, on the security of which huge
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advances had been made.39
It therefore seems clear that the situation in the
City at this point was one of apprehension, 4 ° made all the
worse because of the lack of information from official
sources as to the identity of the troubled institution and
the nature of its problems. Following the argument
discussed in Chapter 2, it can be argued that in cases of
this type as much information should be released as
possible, in order that the markets can make their decision
as to the appropriate policy to follow. At the same time
however, the central bank supplies (theoretically
unlimited) liquidity to the financial markets, on the
Another comment on the quality of Baring's
securities comes, again from Hamilton's Diaries, although
this time from a different source. On December 18th 1890,
after the successful completion of the Guarantee fund,
Hamilton tells of a meeting with Goschen, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, at which the latter talks of his "cautious"
brother, whose firm had committed £lOOm to the Guarantee.
This firm had apparently already written off 25 per cent as
a bad debt and had made this comment on the affair:
"It is clear that the best informed do not take
a rosy view of the ultimate out-turn of Baring's
estate."
Thus, even in the immediate aftermath of the affair, before
all the facts were known, the feeling, at least in some
parts of the City, was not altogether positive about the
whole affair.
40 Another example of this feeling of apprehension,
which was reflected in the desire not to engage in any
business, comes again from Howard Lloyds Reminicences (op
cit, pp.59). Lloyd tells how, when rumours of a major
failure first started to circulate, his bank decided to
liquidate £500,000 worth of Consols. With this in mind
they:
"...sent an order to the Stock Exchange
accordingly. The answer came back speedily that
no dealer there would make a price and that
reasonable quotations were not to be obtained."
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presentation of appropriate bills or securities to be
discounted or to be used as security for an advance. Thus,
according to this argument, the appropriate policy for the
Bank of England to follow regarding Barings would have been
first to have established the true state of their balance
sheet (something that they did actually do), and then to
have announced their position and the extent of their
problems. However, in order to avoid panic, they would
simultaneously announce the terms on which they would
discount bills and make advances, which should have been as
wide as possible, thus ensuring that institutions and
individuals were able to generate sufficient liquidity to
keep themselves afloat.
Under this scenario it is not clear that Barings would
have survived, at least not in the form as they were at the
time. It is not even certain that there would have been an
absence of panic, since for this to be so the Bank of
England's policy of non-intervention would have to have
been believed: to have been credible. What is very
possible however is that non-intervention would have helped
reduce the incidence of moral hazard, in that institutions,
especially large ones, who might have thought that they
were too important to be allowed to fail, would not rely on
the Bank of England to bail them out if they got into
difficulty. 41
41 One problem with this argument is that institutions
tend to get affected by "fire-sale" asset prices. Attempts
to liquidate assets in this type of situation may not pay
off since the price obtained for them may be far lower than
(continued...)
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As mentioned earlier, another casualty of over-
investment in South America on whom the Bank of England was
not quite so lenient was C. Murrieta & Co. This merchant
bank was experiencing problems with some of its South
American investments, and received loans from the Bank to
ease their liquidity problems. By September 1891 they owed
more than half a million pounds. The correspondence between
Murrieta's and the Bank commenced soon after the Baring
crisis, 42
 although the affair was not finally concluded
until June 1895, when the Bank was paid off by the Official
Receiver.
Various (secured) advances of anything up to £100,000
were given by the Bank to Murrietas between November 1890
and February 1891, at which point the Bank called a halt to
further advances, in view of the "...very large amount
represented by securities of an unavailable character and
consequent entire uncertainty as to the nature of our cash
advance... ". Despite several appeals from José de
Murietta, the Bank stood by its decision, and on March 18th
1891, after a particularly desperate plea, Lidderdale gave
41 
• .continued)
in normal circumstances. According to Hamilton, during the
Baring's affair N.M.Rothschild had checked their own
liability position and had found that their assets were
twice their liabilities. However, had they needed to
liquidate a large portion of these assets, the price
obtained would have been "ruinous", and thus their
realisation would probably in effect have been impossible.
(See Hamilton Diaries, December 15th 1890, Add 48654).
42 Bank of England Archives, Chief Cashier's Office,
G15/l56, letter from José de Murietta to Lidderdale, 1st
December 1890.
Lidderdale to J.de Murietta, 12th February 1891.
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them this reply:
"I have laid your application before such
members of the Committee of Treasury as are at
the moment within these walls, and regret that
I am unable to accede to it. Even after allowing
for the margin on the bills, the advances made
by the Bank will exceed half a million, arid the
nature of the securities is not such as to
warrant us reducing the cover.
Murrietas were eventually merged with the South American &
Mexican Co., but not before there was a protracted legal
dispute as the Bank tried to reclaim its debt.
The way the Bank of England dealt with Murrietas is
similar to its treatment of the City of Glasgow Bank. In
this case, Murrietas did not fail, but were taken over by
another institution, but the principle was the same: the
bank was, if not quite insolvent, certainly experiencing
problems which were verging on insolvency, and so the Bank
was not prepared to help. It is important however to
compare the Bank's treatment of Baring Brothers and C.
Murrieta & Co. Both these institutions had been involved in
similar types of South American investment, and both
therefore were affected in similar ways when some of these
investments turned sour. From this comparison, it is hard
to escape the conclusion that the main reason Murrietas
were not treated in the same way as Baring Brothers was due
to the former's far smaller size and consequent reduced
importance. There was no question of a major crisis
resulting from the failure of C. de Murrieta, and so the
Bank of England were content to accept their failure.
' Bank of England Archive reference G15/156.
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2.13: 1891 - End of March (Discounts)
(a) This is a far smaller residual peak than that which
immediately preceded it. It comes during a period
when business was steady: the trend in the volume of
discounts, having increased up to the end of 1890,
was by now fairly flat, before falling until the
middle of the decade.
(b) The average size of discount transaction here is
particularly large: more than five times the decade
average. This can however be fairly easily explained
by looking at who received funds. Most of the
borrowers from the Bank were Discount Houses: Union
Discount had over £370,000, Alexanders more than
£350,000, and Samuel Montagu £230,000.
(c) Advances here were almost non-existent: there was an
average of less than one advance transaction per day
for the first 19 weeks of the year.
(d) Bank Rate in March 1891 stood at three per cent,
having come down from the higher rates seen during
the Baring crisis. Refusals were very quiet, perhaps
because the recipients of discounts were mainly
Discount Houses, who presumably were well aware of
the Bank's rules and regulations governing discounts,
and thus did not offer bills for discount which they
knew were not acceptable.
(e) This moment of pressure is slightly more interesting
than some of the l880s peaks, in that it is possible
324
to see the Discount Houses coming to the Bank for
funds when they were obviously pressed for
liquidity. One aspect of the Baring affair now
started to have an effect: the Bank started to take
liquidity out of the market by asking the various
guarantors to produce the cash to which they had
committed themselves. Although some of the cash for
the Guarantee came from the Discount Houses
(approximately 5 per cent), the vast majority (65 per
cent) caine from the banks directly, particularly from
the London Banks (around one third). 45 Thus although
the Daily Discount data make it appear that it was
the Discount Houses themselves who were short of
liquidity, in fact this shortage was indirect; as in
many such cases it was the commercial banks which
needed cash, and they therefore called in loans from
the discount market, which then had to resort to the
Bank of England for aid.
2.14: 1893 - End of April an the start of May (Discounts)
(a) In comparison with other points in the decade, this
is a medium size peak, with two residuals which
exceed three standard deviations: one of slightly
over 300,000 and another of 255,000. There are also
The remainder came from the Finance Houses and
merchants, with a small amount (5 per cent) promised by
individuals, and of course the initial contribution of Cm
from the Bank of England. See Chapter Four, Table 4.1 for
further details and source.
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two other fairly high observations.
(b) The average size of transaction is very high: in the
four weeks of high discounts, the asdt is
respectively £46697, £21836, £32633 and £12492. When
we consider that the asdt for 1890-99 is £7749, we
can clearly see the concentration in the demand for
discounts.
As on the previous occasion, the recipients of
discounts are in the most part the Discount Houses:
Alexanders and National Discount received £150,000
respectively; Gilletts over £200,000;46 Cunhiffes
£100,000. In addition however, certain banks also
received large amounts: Anglo-Foreign got £320,000,
Chartered Bank of India, Australia, & China
£3l6,000.	 Merchant banks were also discounting
46 Gihletts too were mentioned in T.R.Hughes' Business
Reports (see footnote 44 below: this time from his visit of
12-14th May 1897). Smith, from the London & Westminster
Bank said of them:
"They are very respectable but small; and we
take bills from them, but only in small lines.
They fight shy when capital is talked about."
However, Hohier, again from London & Westminster, was not
so magnanimous:
"While things are smooth they will be all right,
but in times of pressure (when you would like to
know that you can have your money without delay)
they might have difficulty in finding it."
' Anglo-Foreign and The Chartered Bank of India were
involved in four and five transactions respectively, sone
of which occurred on the same day.
Very little appears to be known about the first of these
banks, although they received fairly large sums at the
Bank, especially at times of increased activity. We do have
one contemporary description of them however, emanating
(continued...)
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bills at the Bank, with Lazards receiving £240,000.
(c) Advances were slightly higher in May 1893 than they
had been previously, but the increase was not as
great as it was on discounts. Of the institutions
that received advances at the Bank at this point,
only Anglo-Foreign received discounts as well.48
(d) Bank Rate here stood at 3-3½ per cent, rising to 4
per cent in the middle of May. It was to rise to 5
per cent in August. Refusals were slightly increased
during the weeks of increased discount activity, but
were quiet for the rest of the year.
(e) On the face of it there seems to be little or no
explanation for the increase in activity in this
period. Interest rates were not unusually high, and
there is little in either primary or secondary
records which gives us any indication of extra-
ordinary events occurring. However, in early April
47. . .continued)
from the Business Reports of T.R.Hucihes (Midland Bank
Archives, Reference M153/44). Hughes was the Manager of the
Liverpool branch of the above bank, and was in the habit of
making regular visits to London in order to talk to leading
bankers and other financial commentators in order to gain
their opinions as to financial matters in general and the
credit worthiness of certain institutions in particular.
After his visit of June 3-5th 1896 he reported that
Whitburn, of the Discount House Reeves Whitburn, had this
to say about Anglo-Foreign:
"It is practically a foreign Discount House, but
their name is good for small amounts. They were
at one time involved with the Imperial Ottoman
Bank, and if the worst had happened in that case
they would have gone down; but that is now a
thing of the past."
48 This made Anglo-Foreign's total facilities amount
to approximately £420,000.
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there was a major banking crisis in Australia,
commencing with the failure of the Commercial Bank of
Australia, which was followed by the collapse of
several other banks. According to The Economist of
February 17th 1894, these failures set off a "spasm
of stringency" in the London markets, after three
months of comparative ease. Although London bankers
and financiers were not directly affected by this
crisis, they were keen to increase their liquidity by
calling in loans and borrowing from the Bank of
England. This caution was not without some
justification: by the time of the Stock Exchange
settlement day in mid May, there was, according to
The Economist, "something approaching panic", and a
large number of failures of firms in that market
occurred. 49 The increase in activity had calmed by
June however, to such an extent that there was little
sign of window dressing at the end of June. The
Bank's policy at this point seems to have been to
provide the extra liquidity desired by the markets at
relatively low rates. This policy appears to have
been effective, since there were no failures, and the
increase in tension calmed fairly rapidly.
There was one other event affecting the Bank of
England in 1893, although this occurred later in the
£ This also coincided with a banking panic in the
U.S., which occurred mainly as a result of the price
deflation which had preceded it, although there had also
been problems in the stock market (Friedman & Schwartz,
1963, pp.108)
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year. This was the resignation in November of the
Bank's Chief Cashier, Frank May, who was found to
have been involved in dubious transactions with
various companies over a period of several years. The
announcement of his resignation caused a flutter in
the markets, but this was soon calmed when the nature
of the problem became clear and it was obvious that
the Bank itself was in no danger.
2.15: 1894 - End March - Advances
(a) This is a relatively unimportant point in terms of
size of residual, since there is only one residual
which (just) exceeds three SDs. However, although
there is no one moment of very high advances, there
is an increased volume of advance business for most
of February and March.5°
(b) The average size of transaction here is fairly high,
although since the amounts concerned are quite low,
this is not surprising.51
(c) Discounts are fairly low: the majority of business is
50 "Increased" here is as compared to the year as a
whole: the average figure of daily advances (excluding
seasonal pressure) was only approximately £19,000, whereas
the average for February and March was £75,400.
51 Since advances are often given in multiples of
£50,000, when we are dealing with totals of £50-lOO,000 it
would not be unusual to have only two transactions, thus
giving an inflated average size of transaction. However,
the reason why the average size of transaction is lower
overall is that there are frequently no advances occurring
for days or even weeks on end.
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carried out on advances.
(d) Interest rates are very low, and furthermore they are
relatively constant for an exceptionally long period:
Bank Rate stands at 2 per cent between February 1894
and September 1896, and market rates are almost as
steady and are even lower.
(e) This was the "cheap money" period, when the Bank of
England reserve reached its highest recorded
level:C22.6m. However, low interest rates also
implied a reduced income for the Bank, which was to
be a recurrent problem for the next few years, and
was to lead to serious problems with respect to
bankers' rather antagonistic feelings towards the
Bank of England, especially in the provinces.52
Compared to some of the other moments where
there was increased pressure on advances and
discounts, March 1894 was not one of the more
important ones as regards the Bank's role as a LLR.
2.16: 1898 - March (Discounts)
(a) The highest residual 53
 of the 1890-99 decade falls in
March 1899. It is preceded by two weeks of higher
than normal discounts, but in terms of size it is a
very obvious peak.
52 See the following chapter for further discussion of
this problem.
3 Excluding seasonal pressure
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(b) The average size of transaction is approximately four
times the decade average, at around £35,000. The
destination of these discounts was in the main to
Discount Houses: £400,000 to Union Discount, £200,00
to National Discount. Of the banks, Anglo-Foreign
were again one of the most active, receiving almost
£310,000 of discounts.54
(c) In addition to this discount activity, there was also
an increased volume of advance business, although not
enough to show up when compared to the (rather large)
standard deviation for the period. When studied in
conjunction with discounts however, the extent of the
accommodation made available to the discount market
in particular becomes very clear. Vaile Allen & Co.,
for example, in the period between March 1st and
15th, received over £l.6m in advances, in addition to
over £100,000 in discounts. Other Discount Houses too
received large amounts in advances, in particular
Brunton Bourke & Co., which had £2.65rn.55
(d) Bank Rate stood at three per cent: it had not moved
since the previous October. Refusals too were low,
which is surprising given the volume of discounts.
(e) There is no obvious reason for this large surge in
These discounts were received in a series of small
transactions: on March 15th the bank was involved in six
different discount transactions averaging only £26,000
each. In every case the number of bills in each package
discounted was equal to 55.
Some of this was presumably a tiroll_overli of
previous advances.
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activity. The "cheap money" period had ended, and
economic activity in general was picking up. The Bank
had succeeded in its quest for new business, and
although there was no increase in its number of
customers there was a definite increase in its
income, which had seen a rise of over 50 per cent
since the low point of 1886-7. Much of this increase
had occurred at the Branches, where stringent efforts
had been made to attract more business.56
None of this explains this (relatively) sudden
increase in business, nor does it explain why certain
firms were receiving such huge sums of cash from the
Bank of England, particularly in the form of
advances. It is possible that it can be explained
simply in terms of the general increase in market
business.
2.17: 1899: Septenther (Discounts)
(a) This is a similar peak in the data to the previous
one, with residuals of just under 400,000. Week 39 is
the second largest observation (and residual) of the
decade.
(b) The average size of transaction is quite large in
weeks 38 to 40, at three to four times the decade
average. Anglo-Foreign was again one of the more
56 Provincial reactions to this search for more
business will be examined at a later point.
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active institutions, receiving £313,000 of discounts
in seven transactions. Of the Discount Houses, Union
had over £300,000 in discounts, and Alexanders
£170,000. Corgialegno received £250,966.
(c)	 Advances are very active in the first part of the
year, but by September they have quietened down
significantly, and thus form only 20 per cent of the
When data collection was being undertaken, it
became obvious that one particular firm, the name of which
is n t well known, was receiving huge amounts in discounts
and advances. This firm - Corgialegno - was active at the
Bank between 1881 and 1904: after 1904 there is no further
mention of them in the Daily Discount books. For example,
betw en 20th March and 4th April 1882 the firm received
advances totalling in excess of £2m, with transactions
occurring almost every day.
None of the standard references has any mention of
this firm. However, information from the Bank of England
tells us that they were a firm of bill brokers with offices
in George Yard, and that the Directors of the firm were
Marino Corgialegno, Herman Schmidt and Edward Temple Rose.
In addition, there are two further mentions of them in the
Midland Bank Archives, contained in the Business Reports of
T.R.Hucthes (reference earlier cited). One of these is
unfortunately not very illuminating: all that is said is
that "They have a capital of £300,000 in and out of the
business." However, the other is rather more detailed.
Hughes reports a conversation he had with Simpson, from the
Bank of Liverpool, about which Discount Houses the North &
South Wales Bank did business with. Their conversation
after Simpson had seen Corgialegno's name was as follows:
Simpson:	 "Do you do business with them?"
Hughes :
	 "Yes, but only of recent times"
Simpson:	 "I also used to do with them, but had to close
the account because it was not satisfactory."
Hughes : "At first, Corgialegno sent us the best paper we
got from London, but latterly they have fallen
off badly, so much so that I have not only had
to remonstrate with them but recently to return
paper which they sent us."
It seems strange that a firm that was very active in the
market between in the 1880s and 1890s, although seemingly
without a good reputation, should so completely disappear
without trace, without there being any indication as to the
reason for their demise.
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business carried out. This is in marked contrast to
other instances of increased pressure at this time,
since overall advances were far more important in
terms of volume than discounts in this period.
(d) Interest rates were on a rising trend in the second
half of 1899: starting at 3½ per cent in July, Bank
Rate rises to 4½ per cent on October 3rd, and 5 per
cent two days later, finally reaching 6 at the end of
November. Refusals meanwhile are very quiet
throughout the year.
(e) This is an interesting episode, for two main reasons.
Firstly, this is a drain of liquidity from the Bank
of England which is concentrated solely on discounts:
whereas the Discount Houses had become used to
utilising discount and especially advance facilities
at the Bank at all times, at this point they were
less active than some of the banks. Many of the banks
which received discounts were had some foreign
connection: Anglo-Foreign, Chartered Bank of India
Australia & China, London & Brazilian Bank, Anglo-
Egyptian, National Bank of India, and others besides.
This strongly suggests that this was an overseas
rather than an internal drain. There were apparently
spreading rumours of a forthcoming war.
The second reason why this episode is
interesting is because it occurred at one of the
points at which there was a (known) seasonal drain of
gold, in this case in the direction of the U.S. and
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South America. Sayers (1936) identifies two policies
the Bank was pursuing in order to - make Bank Rate
effective: firstly it raised its advances rate above
Bank Rate (to 3½ per cent), and secondly it refused
to accept bills of a longer currency for discount at
Bank Rate, thus forcing market rates to increase to a
level above Bank Rate.
Sayers also states that earlier in 1899 the Bank
had kept Bank Rate at 3 per cent but had granted very
large sums in advances, on both bills and securities,
and thus its gold reserve had fallen substantially.
It therefore had to recover its position, which
explains its actions to force up Bank Rate.58
The Bank's behaviour at this point was not very
consistent. At first it allowed the discount market
into the Bank and granted them large sums in
advances, then, apparently having realised that this
policy might later cause prob1es, ttempte& to cover
itself by utilising rather unusual measures. On this
occasion it succeeded in avoiding any major problems,
but at the cost of huge increases in the volume of
discounts and eventually a rather high level of Bank
Rate.
58 One of the methods it used was so-called Gold
Devices: interest-free advances offered to gold importers
in return for an agreement to repay the loan in gold. The
advantage of this for the Bank was that it was able to
obtain gold to supplement its reserve without increasing
Bank Rate. For further details see Chapter Four, section
4.7, and Sayers (1936), pp.74-101.
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2.18: 1900 - March and April (Discounts and Advances)
(a) On this occasion there is pressure on all three
variables: discounts, advances on bills and advances
on securities. However, although there are residuals
on all three variables which exceed three standard
deviations, by this point advances had become far
more important than discounts in terms of volume,
especially since the 1894 ruling that brought
"floaters" (advances on securities) under the
jurisdiction of the Discount Office. Thus the largest
residuals on discounts are of the order of £0.45m, on
advances on bills of £0.8m and on advances on
securities of £l.3in.
(b)	 From this point onwards there is a significant
increase in the average size of discount transaction.
The decade asdt for this period is just over £20,000,
far higher than in previous periods. Thus, although
at first sight the April/May figures for the asdt of
around £40-50,000 seem rather large, in fact, when
compared to the decade average, they are not,
implying a relatively diluted demand for discount
facilities. For advances, the average size of
transaction is lower, sometimes significantly so,
than the decade average, which is surprising, since
normally the average size of transaction (discount or
advance) is larger than the decade average during a
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period of increased activity.59
The largest players in the market at this point
were the discount houses: Corgialegno received in
total £3.3m of cash (C600,000 in discounts, £l.97m in
advances on bills and £0.79m on securities);
Cunliffes had £2.74m (fl.l2m in discounts and £1.62m
in advances on bills); Gilletts received £l.95rn
(C400,000 on discounts, £l.45m on bills and £100,000
on securities); Union Discount received a total of
£1.843m (Cl.1431n in discounts, £600,000 on bills and
£100,000 on securities). In addition, several other
institutions received over Lim: Mullens Marshall,
Hitchens Harrison and Reeves & Whitburn.
(c) As stated above, in volume terms advances far
exceeded discounts, although all three variables are
busy.
(d) Between January 25th and May 24th 1900, Bank Rate
stood at 4 per cent, a moderate rate. Again, refusals
were very low: for the first six months of the year
they average out at less than £30 per day.
(e) This is a good example of how well-established the
Bank of England's discount market business was by
this point. Most of this vast increase in the demand
for discounts and advances came from the Discount
Since data was only collected on the total number
of advance transactions, rather than the number of
transactions on advances on bills and on securities, the
average size of transaction here refers to the average of
all advance transactions, not that of the separate advances
variables.
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Houses, even though there seems to have been no
indication that the market, or any one institution in
particular, was particularly short of liquidity. It
should be noted however that the Bank's position at
this point was complicated by the fact that the Boer
war was still in progress, and therefore governmental
demands for finance were still of paramount
importance. This implies that the Bank would do its
utmost not to increase its discount rate, and instead
would utilise other demand-side measures to limit the
demand for liquidity. In addition, the Bank, and the
markets, were never sure as to what the governmental
demands for finance would be, which causes a certain
amount of uncertainty in the markets.
2.19: 1901 - February (Discounts)
(a) Here one residual from the discount polynomial just
exceeds three standard deviations. This represents
rather a sudden increase in discount activity, since
the demand for discounts at this time was in fact on
a downwards trend.
(b) The average size of discount transaction was around
two and a half times its period average in week nine
of 1901. In previous and subsequent weeks the asdt
was below the average. Given this (relatively) low
asdt, and the fact that no institutions seem to be
receiving huge amounts in discounts, it seems that
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discount demand was not concentrated. Again, it was
the Discount Houses which were most active at the
Bank: Union, Samuel l4ontagu and Cunliffes all
received fairly large amounts in several
transactions. 6° However, there were other companies
who came to the Bank, some of whom were either less
frequent discounters or slightly lesser known names:
in the first category, Lyon & Tucker received
£127,550 and King Foa £122,872, and in the second
Corgialegno received almost £175,000.
(c) Throughout this period there was also very active
business being done on advances, especially on
advances on bills. In terms of volumes, the advances
business was far larger than that on discounts, since
the individual transactions were so much bigger. Many
of the names receiving discounts also received
advances, as was the usual case, Aside from those
60 One of the descriptions of banks in T.R.Hughes'
Business Reports gives an indication of the extent of anti-
semitism which existed in the City at that time (1896).
Whitburn, of Reeves Whitburn, had this to say about Samuel
Montagu:
"They are quite good, but are not highly
principled and must be closely watched in
everything you do with them, and do not rely on
anything they y but get everything down in
black and white. They are dirty Jews."
Source: op cit.
Another source gives further proof of this anti-semitism.
when writing about the Baring crisis, Edward Walter
Hamilton notes in his diary:
"There is a feeling that not a few are sorry to
think that the downfall of Baring Brothers
means the undisputed supremacy of Jews in the
commercial world."
(Hamilton Diaries, op cit, November 16th 1890.)
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names already mentioned, the companies particularly
active on advances were Brunton Bourke & Co.
(C2.35m), Mullens Marshall (f950,000) and the
National Bank of India (C760,000).
(d) Interest rates here were on a downward time path,
although at the end of February they still stood at 4
per cent. Refusals were at very low levels, although
this was typical of the years between 1901 and 1909,
when the volume of refusals was almost insignificant.
(e) At this point the Bank of England was still feeling
the governmental pressures of the financing of the
Boer war. Already in 1901 it had experienced a drain
of gold, forcing it to increase Bank Rate to 5 per
cent, but this increase was only very temporary (one
month). The most interesting aspect of this situation
was the relatively low average size of discount
transaction: there is no one company receiving a
large amount of discounts, although certain companies
did receive huge advances. In general however, as
stated at the beginning of this section, the increase
in discount business is not enormous here, when it is
compared to other, especially later, points.
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often in very large amounts, but by far the largest
sums went to Mullens Marshall, who were the
Government's broker. This institution received
advances totalling over £7m in February, March and
April 1903, in transactions averaging over £0.5m
each. In addition, in May they received a further
£llm, which included advances on securities of £5.3m
on May 12th, out of the days' total of £6.92in. These
amounts dwarf the business other institutions were
involved in, although by comparison with other
periods it is still considerable: Brunton Bourke
received over £5.5m, Corgialegno over £3m in the
earlier period, followed by £l.lm and £2in
respectively in May. These advances were probably
somewhat different from those received by Mullens
Marshall however, for reasons which we will examine
below.
(c) Discounts in this period were relatively quiet, at
around their trend levels. There is some seasonal
increase at the end of June, but little at the end of
December.
(d) Bank Rate was constant until the end of this period
of increased advance activity, standing at 4 per cent
between October 1902 and the end of May 1903, and
which point it increased to 3½ per cent. Refusals are
literally non-existent for the first thirteen weeks
of the year, and even after this point they are very
low.
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(e) There is no indication in the literature as to what
may be causing this extra-ordinary demand for
discounts and advances. In addition, careful
searching in the financial magazines of the time,
such as The Economist reveal little of interest. The
main financial event of the spring of 1903 was the
issue of the Transvaal Loan, which occurred in the
second week of May. 63 There were apparently a huge
volume of applications for this loan, many of which
were unsuccessful. However, the applicants did borrow
massively at the Bank (The Economist estimated the
figure to be around LiOm), and so many people who
were unsuccessful in the issue were able to pay off
their loan at the end of the ten day term without
raising the cash elsewhere.
Of additional interest is the activities of
Mullens Marshall, who were presumably acting on
behalf of the Bank itself. What they seem to have
been doing was to borrow large sums at the Bank, thus
increasing the liquidity of the markets, perhaps a
further method of aiding the markets when they were
tight. Alternatively, it is possible that this was
the method in which transactions aimed at making Bank
Rate "effective", which have been referred to by
several writers, were recorded at the Bank. 64 Another
63 The Economist, 2nd, 9th, 16th and 23rd May 1903.
64 These actions were part of the Bank's attempts to
make Bank Rate "effective" and are referred to frequently
(continued...)
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possible explanation is that Mullens were in effect
"lead-managing" or underwriting a government debt
issue, and that the Bank of England was providing
funds to enable them to do this. It should be noted
however that these large borrowings did not take
place at a preferential rate; they all attracted
whatever was the current rate as charged on other
transactions.
2 i: 1905 - February end (VAOS)
(a) There is one residual here which just exceeds three
standard deviations, at slightly over 0.5m. It stands
on its own: most of the other residuals at this point
lie between one and two standard deviatiçns. Advances
on securities are above trend here, but not
significantly so.
(b) The average size of advance transaction here is
actually slightly below the 1905-1914 average, a
rather rare occurrence.
(c) From 1905 onwards, discounts are starting to increase
64	
.continued)
by Clapham (1944) and Sayers (1936). In brief, the Bank
would take funds off the market in order to reduce the
supply of funds and thus increase market rates. It would
therefore borrow funds, through Marshall Mullens, using
Consols as security.
Here however, if what appears in the Daily Discount Books
is correct, the Bank is lending cash to Mullens, instead of
the other way around, thus increasing the supply of market
liquidity. It thus seems that the Bank was certainly not
operating here in such a way as to make Bank Rate
effective, since it was certainly not attempting to take
funds off the market.
A more likely explanation for the increase in Mullens'
activity is their involvement in the second stage of
Goschen's Debt Conversion, the initial stage having been
carried out in 1888. This would have required the Bank to
support the market, more especially since the gilts market
was fairly weak at this time.
in importance: at this point they are fairly high in
the week before the increase in advances, but then
tail off.
(d) Bank Rate is low for the whole of 1905: it stood at 3
per cent between April 1904 and March 1905, when it
was reduced to 2½ per cent. Refusals, as we would
expect since this is an increase in the volume of
advances, are non-existent.
(e) There is little explanation for this increase in
advances. The increase itself is slight, and there is
little else happening to any of the other variables,
and thus it is probably safe to conclude that this
represents simply a desire by certain institutions to
increase their liquidity.
2.22: 1906 - September/October (Discounts)
(a) This was the start of a very busy period on
discounts: from the autumn of 1906 until the end of
March 1908 there was a great deal of activity. In
late September and early October of 1906 there are
two residuals which exceed three standard deviations,
separated by two weeks which are in themselves quite
busy. These residuals are amongst the largest of the
decade.
(b) The average size of transaction indicates a certain
degree of concentration in the demand for discounts,
since it is between three and four times the decade
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average. Many of the usual institutions appeared as
recipients of these discounts, most of them Discount
Houses, although there were a few new names. One of
these, the Canadian Banking Corporation, received a
total of almost £900,000, in average transactions of
£128,000. Barings were the recipient of the single
largest transaction: a package of discounts worth
£499,360 on October 3rd.
Samuel Montagu received a. large sum in discounts:
£871,773 in five transactions.
(c) Advances are relatively quiet: the only real
increases in advance activity in 1906 occurs at the
two seasonal pressure point. From 1905 onwards,
advances are on the decline.
(d) Bank Rate was increased from 3½ to 4 per cent on
September 13th, to 5 per cent on October 11th and
then to 6 per cent on October 19th, which was high
enough to arouse suspicion that the Bank had a
certain problems on its hands. Refusals are
particularly quiet throughout the year, totalling
only £32,142 for 1906 as a whole.
(e) The reserve drain that the Bank was encountering were
in fact the start of the problems which were to
culminate in the American crisis in the following
year. The American economy was over-heating at this
point, and it was the U.S. that was the destination
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of much of the gold that was leaving the Bank.65
Besides increasing Bank Rate to a level which had
only been seen once in the twenty-six years since the
Baring crisis, the Bank also (unofficially) kept its
advances rate at 1 per cent higher than its official
discount rate. This presumably explains why the
liquidity demand at the Bank was for discounts rather
than for advances: in the two weeks when the demand
for discounts was at its peak, the demand for
advances was negligeable.
In the weeks of increased pressure the Bank
seemed to handle its reserve, and the markets, very
well. Whilst keen to stem the overseas flow of gold,
and thus ready to increase the discount rate when
necessary, it was also aware of the needs of domestic
industry and trade, and thus was anxious to decrease
Bank Rate as soon as was practicable. 66 At the same
65 Clapham (l944,pp.388) states that in September 1906
almost £5m of gold was shipped to the United States.
66 After the Overend-Gurney crisis in 1866, Bank Rate
had remained at the historically high level of 10 per cent
for over three months. The Bank was severely censured for
this, since it was felt that the domestic economy had been
greatly harmed. This is illustrated by a supplement to a
report prepared by the Association of Chambers of Commerce
in July 1866 (the initial report was presented in February
1866) discussing the disparity in discount rates between
the Bank of England and the Banque de France. During the
Overend-Gurney crisis, and even at the point the supplement
to the Report was written, Bank Rate stood at 10 per cent,
whilst the discount rate of the Banque de France was only 4
per cent, at which level it was able to attract bullion
into its coffers. According to the writers of the Report,
these high rates were extremely detrimental to English
merchants and manufacturers, and the reason for the failure
of the Bank of England to attract gold was the distrust of
(continued...)
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(b) The average size of discount transaction is above
average, sometimes well above, for much of the
year. 69 However, although it is frequently above
average, at the points where discounts are
particularly high there is not as great an indication
of concentration in the demand for discounts as one
might imagine: the asdt is two to three times its
decade average. The Discount Houses were not as
active here as they were on previous occasions,
especially in the spring, although National Discount
still received well over Cnn during the three
periods. Amongst the most active institutions was
Lubbock Schmidt, which received £640,000 in discounts
in March and a further £300,000 later in the year.
There are several examples of the lack of market
concentration: on March 14th 1907 there is a total of
over Lim given in discounts, only 40 per cent of
which were in transactions of £80,000 or more. The
other 60 per cent were small transactions involving
various institutions, such as Fisher King & Co.
(C5634), Megaw & Morton (C9640) and The German Bank
of London (C25,140).
(c) Advances were very high at the end of June and
December, the seasonal pressure points, but aside
from this were fairly quiet for the rest of the year,
except between weeks 4 and 13, when there was more
69 Although only three residuals exceed three standard
deviations, in 30 weeks of the year the asdt exceeds the
decade average.
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activity, especially on advances on bills.
(d)	 Bank Rate commenced the year at 6 per cent, still at
a high level after the problems of the previous
autumn, and then fell in stages to 4 per cent before
rising back up to 5½ per cent on October 31st, 6 four
days later and finally 7 per cent three days after
that, a level at which it remained for the following
eight weeks. Refusals were low, and this is
illustrated by the fact that in 1907 the ratio of
the value of discounts accepted to discounts refused
was 852:1, as compared to 231:1 for the decade 1900-
09 and 31:1 for the 1870-1914 period as a whole. This
shows the remarkable decline in refusals over the
whole period. Although there were changes in the
regulations governing bills that were acceptable for
re-discount at the Bank of England, as earlier
discussed, these changes were not fundamental, and
thus we cannot explain the fall in the volume of
refusals by regulatory changes which made it easier
to receive discounts. One possible explanation is
that knowledge of the existing regulations had become
more widespread, and so "sub-standard" bills were not
presented for discount since it was known in advance
that they would be refused.7°
(e) This is a very important episode as regards the Bank
70 The sudden increase in the volume of refusals in
the summer of 1914 can perhaps still be accounted for by
the rather desperate nature of the situation: people were
willing to submit any bills to the Bank in the hope that
some or all of them would be accepted.
350
of England's role as a LLR, since it was this type of
situation which could so easily have led to widescale
financial distress, or even crisis, in Britain, but
which was somehow contained. The increase in the
volume of discounts in 1907 was a continuation of the
problems experienced throughout 1906, and the
American economy was reaching the point where a
crisis of some sort was inevitable. The various
stages of what were to be rather drawn out problems
occurred at similar times to the large increases in
the volume of discounts at the Bank of England. The
first stage occurred in March, when there was a panic
on the New York Stock Exchange. This was contained
however, and the situation calmed until the late
summer, when there were widespread rumours of new
troubles ahead. 71 The final crisis arrived in
October, with the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust,
and this set in motion a panic which swept across
America. In the States it was a true financial crisis
in the sense that the means of payment was actually
threatened, something which had last occurred in
England during the crisis following the Overend-
Gurney failure in 1866.
Although the crisis in the U.S. was very severe,
the U.K. escaped relatively unscathed. Industry and
commerce were affected to a certain extent by the
71 This again coincides with the next peak in the
volume of discounts.
351
high interest rates, and as has already been
discussed the Bank discounted heavily to both the
discount market and to other financial institutions,
but there were few serious problems: the high Bank
Rate had the desired effect of bringing in gold from
abroad, especially from France and Germany, which
substantially strengthened the Bank's position.72
Again, it had acted as a LLR and had ridden the storm
intact, and had this time avoided problems which at
one point threatened to become extremely serious.73
2.24: 1911 - February and March. (Discounts)
(a) This is a very unusual instance of a large residual,
because the increase in the volume of discounts is
vast and occurs for one week only. In week 9 of 1911
there are discounts of just over £100,000, in week 10
£l.4m and week 11 £240,000. Even though this
residual is enormous by comparison with other
periods, because of the upward bias here it does not
72 The role of the Governor of the Bank at this time,
W.M.Campbell, will be discussed in the following chapter.
The Economist suggested that the main reason for
England's escape was the existence of the Bank of England.
The U.S. at this point did not have a central bank,
something that was to change after the reports of the
American Monetary Commission in 1910. See Chapter Three
for further discussion.
It should be noted here that as previously
mentioned, the summary statistics for the data on discounts
for the 1910-1914 period contain an upward bias due to the
effects of the enormous discounting that occurred in the
summer of 1914.
352
exceed three standard deviations, although it is
clearly a peak. Most of the remainder of the year is
quiet.
(b)	 Since this is such a sudden increase in the volume of
discounts, it is no surprise to find that the average
size of transaction in week 10 is extremely large.75
In the previous and subsequent weeks the asdt is
slightly above the decade average, but in week 10
itself we find that it is almost seven times the
decade average. This results from there being an
average of only six transactions per day, a very low
number when we are dealing with such large volumes of
discounts.
When we look directly at which institutions were
receiving discounts we find that it is almost
exclusively the Discount Houses: Union received over
£1.5m, Blydenstein, Hohiers and Baker Duncoinbe over
£500,000 and Alexanders just under £500,000. They
were receiving discounts not only in week 9 but also
in the two previous weeks, although on a much smaller
scale, but which still forced up the asdt slightly.
(c)	 Both advances on bills and on securities are
negligeable at this point, the two variables together
representing less than 25 per cent of the total sum
discounted and advanced.
If there had been a more gradual increase in
pressure, which might reflect news of problems being
disseminated around the markets, we might have expected
there to be more institutions wanting discounts and thus
the asdt would be lower.
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(d) In the first half of 1911 there were no refusals.
Bank Rate was on a downwards trend: it stood at 4 per
cent in January, was reduced to 3½ per cent on
February 16th and then 3 per cent on March 9th, a
level which held until September.
(e) What can explain this sudden rush into the Bank by
the Discount Houses at a time when Bank Rate was both
low and falling and when general economic conditions
seemed to be fairly healthy? Neither secondary
sources nor sources at the Bank of England give any
indication of possible causes of this enormous
increase. 76 The only episode of note that seems to
have occurred in 1911 as the failure, and subsequent
rescue, of the Yorkshire Penny Bank, a Leeds based
savings bank which had 700,000 accounts held in
branches all over Yorkshire. 77 This bank got into
difficulty in July 1911, at which point it held
deposits of £l8.5m. It was not allowed to fail
however: a guarantee was organised by Edward Holden,
of the London City and Midland Bank, with the co-
operation of the Bank of England, which was one of
76 On March 10th, the third highest discount figure
for the pre-war period was recorded: £2,458,290. According
to the Bank's records, 1422 bills were discounted on this
day, which required the services of three "fixed" men and
nine assistants, and the Discount Office closed at 11pm.
Source: Bank of England Archive Reference C28/2. Folio 14
(Discount Office Accounts: Ancillary Records).
Daily Discount data at this point however shows no
movement away from trend: in general, the volume of
discounts during the time the YPB's future was in doubt is
less than £15,000 per day.
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the first guarantors with £250,000. The bank was
reconstituted and continued to operate under the name
Yorkshire Penny Bank Limited.78
2.25: 1912 - May (Discounts)
(a) At the start of May 1912 there is a peak in the
discount data, which although fairly large by the
standard of other periods, in the 1910-14 period lies
between two and three standard deviations. The
residual in week 22 of 1912 is over 700,000, which if
it had occurred in the middle of the period under
study would have been equal to more than eleven times
the standard deviation! This large residual is
somewhat on its own, although there is another
observation of a similar magnitude occurring some
eleven weeks previously (ie the middle of March).
(b) The average size of transaction at both of these
points was up on the average, but the May point
displays a greater tendency towards concentration
than that of February, since the asdt at the later
point is almost three times the half-decade average,
as opposed to only twice for the earlier one.
Discounting in late February and early March was very
much geared towards the Discount Houses, with all the
usual names present and discounting large volumes of
78 For a more detailed discussion of the rescue of the
Yorkshire Penny Bank, see Chapter Four, section 9.
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bills.79
(c) Advances are quieter than discounts for much of the
year, with the exception of the half-yearly pressure
points when there is a sharp increase in the volume
of advances on bills. At the points where discounts
are high there is little business on advances.
(d) Interest rates are low here: Bank Rate stands at 3½
per cent in February, falling to 3 per cent in May,
and market rates 8 ° are slightly lower still.
Refusals, as has become usual, are very small, both
in volume and in the number of transactions, although
there is some (very) slight increase at the points
where the volume of bills discounted peaks.
(e) There are few indications here that there is any real
tension, even though there is a large increase in the
volume of discounts. 8 ' There was concern about the
Bank of England's situation around this time, but it
was more to do with the long term reserve position,
and whether the commercial banks should themselves
hold an increased gold reserve, or indeed in some
cases a gold reserve at all, than with any immediate
For example, Union discounted over £2m of bills
(and received a further half million as an advance on
bills), Alexanders £900,000, Hohiers over £800,000, King
Foa £800,000. In addition, certain banks were also active;
Hong Kong and Shanghai had over £800,000, and the National
Bank of India £700,000 and Chartered Bank of India over
£600, 000.
80 As measured by the Prime Bank Bill Rate.
81 Towards the end of the year there was also concern
about the Balkan wars, which caused tension in the
financial markets.
356
worries as to the financial situation.82
2.26: 1913 - February and March (Discounts)
(a) This is another occasion when the residuals from the
polynomials peak, but do not in fact exceed three
standard deviations. In this case they lie between
one and two SDs, slightly smaller than in the
previous one. Looking at the raw data however, it is
clear that there is a significant increase in the
volume of bills discounted over a period of several
weeks (weeks 7 to 12). The maximum residual occurs
in week 11 (541,912), and the average residual over
these weeks is equal to almost £320,000. In all other
periods these figures would definitely be worthy of
further investigation, which is why we are relaxing
the three standard deviation rule here.
(B) The average size of transaction is only slightly up
on its decade average, at a maximum of twice the
latter figure. This occurs in week 10, one week
82 Edward Holden, Chairman of the London City &
Midland Bank between 1908 and 1919, called independently at
the start of 1914 not only for the joint stock banks to
include their gold holdings in their (published) balance
sheets, but also for these gold holdings to make up 6 per
cent of their liabilities.
Many banks at this point did not hold a gold reserve, and
most of those which did had only recently commenced doing
so. However, in 1897 Whitburn reported to T.R. Hughes that
the London & Westminster Bank held a reserve of £500,000 in
gold, and that they had been doing so for years. Of this
bank, Whitburn said "It is the first bank in London after
the Bank of England." (Business Reports of T.R.Hughes, 12-
14th May 1897; Midland Bank Archive Reference M153/47/4.)
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before the peak value is reached. This indicates a
fairly widespread demand for discounts, a view that
is borne out when we look at who was receiving
discounts, although in a slightly different way than
at other points, since there are frequent occasions
when the same institution was involved in several
transactions. For example, on February 25th the
National Bank of India received a total of slightly
over £400,000 in four transactions ranging from
£30,000 to £240,000. On February 26th, Alexanders and
Union Discount were involved in three transactions
each; the former totalling £203,100 and the latter
£313,000.The largest single transaction was to
Brightwen & Co., who received almost £350,000 on
February 26th.
(C)	 Advances on bills were also fairly active at around
this time, although the major part of the business
occurs just before and just after the increases in
discounts, reaching a maximum of around £600,000 in
week 5.
(d) Refusals are slightly higher here than they have been
previously, increasing at the points when discounts
increase. Bank Rate was quite high: it stood at 5 per
cent between October 1912 and April 1913.
(e) It is not clear what is happening here. As in the
previous case, there is an increase in the demand for
discounts, and, to a lesser extent, in the demand for
advances on bills. However in this case interest
358
rates are rather higher than previously, indicating
perhaps an inclination on the Bank's part to ration
discounts through the use of the price mechanism.
Although its gold reserve was high (by the standards
of the period, at least), the agitation about the
size of gold reserves in general was continuing, with
Holden remonstrating as to the need for larger
reserves. In addition, fears of war were starting to
mount, and had been accentuated by the coup d'etat in
Constantinople in January.
2.27: The summer of 1914
(a) The months of July and August, indeed much of the
second half of the year, represent by ar the peak
values for discounts during the 1870-1914 period. The
largest sums discounted occur in weeks 31 to 36, when
the peak average daily volumes of discounts were
£2.05m, £0.17m, £4.79xn, £3.44m and £1.90m
respectively. 83
 Advances were also busy, peaking at
around £2.4m in week 31, although after this point
there was little activity. Any extra demand was for
advances on bills, not on securities: the average
83 The monthly discount totals for the last seven
months of 1914 were as follows:
June	 £ 1,132,028	 September £28,155,834
July	 12,227,471	 October	 18,193,620
August	 78,458,571 November	 3,987,469
December £210,090
Note the almost complete absence of seasonal pressure due
to window dressing at the end of the year.
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value for VAOS for 1914 was less than £15,000.
(b) This is a classic example of a period of pressure
where the demand for discounts is extremely diffused.
Although the average size of transaction does
increase above its decade average, 84 this increase is
not substantial when compared to other occasions. In
general many institutions were coming to the Bank for
last resort aid in smaller amounts. However, the
Discount Houses did receive large sums of cash, but
much of this was allocated in several transactions,
thus not increasing the asdt to the same extent as
would have occurred if the discounts had been given
in large transactions.85
One of the interesting aspects of this increase
in the demand for discounts is that it is possible to
see the commercial banks coming in to the Bank of
England to obtain discounts on behalf of their
customers and also for other branches. For example,
on August 19th the London County & Westminster Bank
received discounts totalling £378,782, which were
divided as follows:
84 The highest value of the average size of discount
transaction is slightly over £100,000, occurring in week
33. This represents three times the decade average.
However, with the exception of this value, the asdt only
exceeds twice the decade average on two occasions between
the end of July and the end of December.
85 Because of the vast volume of business occurring,
it is difficult to pick out the individual institutions
receiving the greatest sums.
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London County & Westminster Bank (Lothbury)
a/c John Batt & Co.
a/c C.& E. Morton & Co.
a/c Southwark Branch
a/c George Wills & Sons Ltd
Lothbury
£ 54 493
146 393
9225
2562
11 882
20 573
133 654
This is the only time when discounts of this sort
appear in the Discount books, although of course it
is possible that on other occasions the destination
of the discounts was simply not stated.
(c) As stated above, most of the increase in pressure on
the Bank here took the form of a demand for vast
volumes of discounts, rather than of advances: in
1914 (total) advances accounted for only 22.25 per
cent of discount and advance business, as compared to
94.58 per cent in 1902.86
(d) Because of the nature of this crisis, Bank Iate moved
in a somewhat unusual fashion, increasing in
relatively large jumps. On July 30th it increased
from 3 to 4 per cent, after the first fears of war
and its consequences for international finance were
felt. The following day it doubled - an unprecedented
move - and then increased by a further 2 per cent the
day after, to stand at 10 per cent on August 1st.
This rate held throughout the extended Bank holiday
which lasted until Friday August 7th, before falling
86 There was a reason for this concentration of
business on discounts: an agreement between the government
and the Bank of England had been made allowing the latter
to discount any approved bill of exchange that had been
accepted before August 14th 1914. Once this guarantee came
into effect there was almost no business on advances. For
further details see Chapter Five, section 3.4.1.
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to 8 and then 5 per cent, which held until the middle
of 1916. As we would expect when there is such a
large increase in the volume of bills discounted, the
volume of refusals is also significantly higher in
1914 than in preceding years: the total for 1914 is
in fact over 17 times greater than the annual average
for the 1870-1913 period. Thus institutions were
bringing in bills for discount at the Bank that did
not meet the Bank's requirements on eligibility or
acceptances, perhaps hoping that the latter's
conditions would be relaxed given the unusual
circumstances. 87
(e) This was a major crisis, in every sense, totally
different from any other event that we have studied
in this period in that it was caused by external,
non-financial factors. When we are considering the
role of the LLR we normally differentiate between the
latter's role during crises that are financial in
origin, such as the aftermath of the failure of a
major financial institution, and its role during and
after a worldwide catastrophe, such as famine or, as
in this case, world war. However, even given this
distinction, the policy prescription for both types
87 As far as is known, the Bank's eligibility
conditions were not relaxed: bills still needed to be
accepted by two English names and to have less than 90 days
until maturity in order to qualify for discount. What the
Bank did do however to make it easier for institutions to
increase their liquidity, in addition to agreeing to
discount bills accepted before August 14th, was to lend
money to the acceptor of the bills if the latter were not
in a position to pay when they fell due.
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of crisis is more or less the same: to inject
liquidity into the financial system, without giving
special treatment to particular institutions. This
the Bank of England appeared to do in 1914: it lent
freely at high interest rates, abandoning any
intention it may have had of limiting its discounting
in accord with the 1844 Bank Charter Act. In its
actions it was backed by a government clearly keen to
re-establish a certain degree of calm in the
financial markets, presumably partly in order that
their demands for war finance would be more easily
dealt with. In short, the Bank of England acted as a
LLR, especially since it concentrated its activities
on discounts, which had quantitative guidelines
attached to them 88 and were therefore non-
discriminatory, rather than advances, which were more
easily granted in large volumes to specific
institutions.
88 In terms of length to maturity, acceptances, etc.
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3: Conclusions
This chapter has seen an attempt to examine the way in
which the Bank of England used its power to grant discounts
and advances to financial institutions in order to fulfil
its role as a Lender of Last Resort. We have looked at the
Bank's behaviour at times when there were known problems
occurring in the financial markets, and at times when the
Daily Discount data tell us that there was tension in the
markets, as shown by increases in the demand for discounts
and advances, but about which the existing secondary
literature has little to say.
Additional information about these other, less well
known moments is difficult to come by, since many sources
seem to be very short of the qualitative evidence that is
required. However, what information is available has been
pieced together in order to present (at least) a partially
complete picture of events occurring in the financial
markets, as concerns the demand for discounts and advances
and the role of the Bank, between 1870 and 1914. This
chapter has been a continuation of the previous one in
that we have looked at qualitative evidence from the period
to establish what was occurring at each previously
identified point, and also looked at other quantitative
indicators as to what was occurring, such as the average
size of transaction, whether the pressure occurred on
discounts, advances or both, the level of both market
interest rates and Bank Rate, and the volume of discount
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refusals.
In the following chapter, we will examine both the
existence of moral suasion in the 1870-1914 period, and the
importance of the Governor of the Bank of England in
shaping the Bank's actions. This will enable us in the
final, concluding chapter, to draw together all the aspects
of the Bank's behaviour and draw some conclusions about the
degree of harmonisation of both the Bank's discount and
advance behaviour in particular, and its regulatory
behaviour in general.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
MORAL SUAS ION AND THE IMPA OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND
GOVERNOR ON BANK POLICY
1: Introduction
In the previous chapter we saw how the volume of
discounts and advances granted by the Bank of England to
the discount market and associated financial institutions
fluctuated over time, and discussed possible explanations
for this phenomenon. In this chapter we will be looking at
two other qualitative aspects of the Bank's behaviour:
firstly, the extent of the Bank's regulatory control over
the financial markets, and secondly more specifically at
th influence that the Bank's Governor had on the actions
of the Bank itself.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We will
first look at the relationship between the Bank of England
and the financial markets and at the links between the Bank
and City institutions. This is basically a study of the
effectiveness of moral suasion in the pre-Worid War One
period. It will encompass an examination of the way
institutions viewed the Bank, both in London and in the
provinces, especially during the 1890s when the Bank was
expanding its provincial activities in order to increase
its income. We will follow this with a specific analysis of
the role of the Governor in Bank policy making, which will
include both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects
of the issue.
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2: Moral Suasion - Methods of Influencing the Markets
One of the issues that is always addressed when
considering the Lender of Last Resort in a contemporary
context, but is frequently overlooked in historical
studies, is the regulatory environment in which that lender
(normally, but not exclusively, a central bank) operates.
This is important since it involves the prevention of
problems before they arise, rather than their later cure.
Formal bank regulation is a comparatively recent
development, and followed the advent of the increasingly
sophisticated financial systems of the late 1960s and early
197 s. In policy terms it is often associated with the
implementation of monetary policy. However, the Bank of
England has for many decades used the informal powers it
possessed to influence the behaviour of the financial
sector, through the use of moral suasion: the exertion of
influence on the commercial banks and other institutions in
order to persuade them that their best course of action is
to follow the Bank's "advice" and behave in the indicated
manner. In this section we will firstly examine this
concept in a present-day context, and then discuss its
relevance and effectiveness in the 1870-1914 period.
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2.1: Contemporary Aspects of Moral Suasion
According to a Select Committee Report on the Bank of
England, after the Second World war the practice evolved
whereby the Bank would:
"...issue requests to the banks, specifying in
greater or lesser detail the wishes of the
Treasury and the Bank, originally about bank
lending exclusively, but increasingly about the
lending by virtually every financial institution.
These requests concern two aspects of lending,
the qualitative and the quantitative, and here
the banks, as the leading institutions involved
in the monetary sphere, are the main concern."1
The Bank of England would use its powers of persuasion not
just in purely central banking matters, but also concerning
the destination of lending: at certain times, the
Government of the day, and thus the Bank, was keen for
finance to be directed towards particular industries or
particular geographical areas. Qualitative controls were
therefore used to influence the type of bank lending, and
quantitative controls the amount of such lending. However,
both sorts of controls were essentially informal, in that
they were not backed by statutory powers, as opposed to
some of the other policy instruments utilised by the Bank
of England at that time.
There is no doubt that by the early l970s moral
suasion had become very important as one method of
implementing monetary policy. In the view of the 1969-70
First Report from the Select Committee on
Nat jpnalised Industries. Session 1969-70: The Bank of
England, Para.70.
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Select Committee, moral suasion formed:
• . much the most important control exercised by
the Bank over the monetary system... moral suasion
is unquestionably a major means by which the Bank
of England seeks to implement policy."2
In addition to being widely used, moral suasion seems to
have functioned effectively in the post second world war
period, with banks and other financial institutions
treating these calls emanating from the Bank for policy
changes as being more or less commands.3
The evidence to the Select Committee also mentions the
crucial importance of the relationships between the Bank of
England and the other financial institutions. 4 It was
possible to exploit these relationships in the post 1945
period only because of their development in the earlier
period, and thus in the next section we will examine the
development of these institutions, focussing especially on
nineteenth century experience.
2 Op cit, Para. 69.
The Treasury apparently assured the Select Committee
that "no institution receiving a request from the Bank of
England has ever refused to obey it". (Op cit, Para.75)
' Op cit, Para. 69.
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2.2: The Historical Development
To a limited extent, moral suasion must have existed
as soon as the Bank of England started to dominate the
financial world around the middle of the nineteenth
century. Although still a private institution, it was
firmly established both as the Government's banker and as
the regulator, however informal, of the financial
institutions which helped maintain London's dominance, and
thus it must have utilised informal channels in order to
achieve its objectives. 5 A (negative) example of this
occurred in the years following the withdrawal of the bill
brokers' discount facilities at the Bank of England in
1858: one of the problems the Bank experienced during these
years was that in withdrawing from the discount market it
also suffered a loss of much of the day-to-day contact it
had previously enjoyed, and therefore saw its influence
One way in which the Bank utilised quantitative
controls in its late nineteenth-early twentieth century
discount and advance activities was in its regulations for
the types of bills which it would accept. If banks knew
that they would be unable to get certain bills discounted
at the Bank of England, or that they were unsuitable for
use as security for an advance, presumably the banks
themselves would be less keen to accept these bills, given
that at the outset they had no way of knowing if they would
need to liquidate them quickly. Obviously, there would be
certain circumstances where the increased risks, in terms
of reduced liquidity etc, associated with holding such
"second-class" bills would be acceptable, but presumably on
other occasions liquidity would be of primary importance,
and thus bills which were unacceptable to the Bank of
England would be very unpopular.
Another informal avenue open to the Bank towards the end of
this period was the establishment in 1911 of the Committee
of Bankers' Clearing House. This committee held quarterly
meetings at the Bank to discuss matters of interest to both
the commercial banks and the Bank of England.
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wane, in terms both of regulation and of its ability to
affect desired changes in market interest rates.
In order to study the extent to which moral suasion
was operative in the 1870-1914 period, we first have to
address the issue of whether the Bank of England was able
to exert its influence on sometimes unwilling, even hostile
ma kets. 6
 For the Bank to be able to execute this function
efficiently, it had to be able to command respect for its
abilities to discharge its regulatory functions
effectively. This it appears not to have achieved,
especially before 1900, since it seems that its behaviour
was regarded in a somewhat unfavourable way in many parts
of the City. When looking at primary source material it is
difficult to find any praise for the Bank of England as an
institution: "lazy Old Lady" was one phrase that was used.
Bank Directors seemed generally (with some notable
exceptions) to be viewed as being somewhat inept, and until
well into the twentieth century there was little continuity
in its management since Governors were appointed for a
6 It can be argued that one way in which the Bank of
England aimed to increase its powers of moral suasion was
in its tacit acceptance of the amalgamation movement, which
gathered steam after 1900, although had commenced before
that date. Capie & Bali (1982) estimated that the ten
largest banks in England and Wales held 46 per cent of
deposits in 1900, rising to 97 per cent by 1920. This move
towards concentration in banking implied that informal
control of the system by the Bank of England would become
easier, since the Bank would have fewer institutions to
influence, although conversely it is possible that these
new, larger institutions may have been more able to take on
the Bank and to refuse to accept its "advice". However,
since we know that moral suasion increased in importance
after the first, and especially the second, world war, it
seems that the Bank of England was right to encourage the
amalgamation movement.
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fixed term of only two years.7
It seems clear that there was a feeling in the City
that the behaviour of the Bank of England left much to be
desired. How widespread this view was however is not clear,
although there are many examples of negative contemporary
views of the Bank's policies and management, and
particularly, as we shall see at a later point, of the role
of the Governor in general, and of certain Governors in
particular.
One of the clearest statements of discontent with the
Bank comes from Whitburn, of the Discount Company Reeves
Whitburn. 8
 He states that:
"The feeling is general in the City that there is
a want of competency in the management of the Bank
of England. What they require is a strong man with
a large salary who would be above suspicion. They
do some very queer things there, for instance, the
other day they agreed to an advance against the
Debentures of a Colliery with a guarantee of Lord
Masham."9
In some ways this lack of confidence in the Bank's
management is no surprise, given the way that the Governor,
There is a cross-over between this material and the
later section on the role on the Governor of the Bank,
although the latter will concentrate more on testing
whether specific Governors contributed very much to Bank of
England policy.
8 Whitburn is quoted extensively in Hughes' Business
Reports. This could either be because he was one of the
leading financial commentators in the City at this time, or
possibly simply because he was a particular friend of
Hughes'!
Midland Bank Group, Archive Reference M153/47/4.
(Business Reports of the Liverpool Manager of the North &
South Wales Bank, T.R. Hughes, 12-14th May 1897.)
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in particular, was selected. 1° However, most of the
Directors, from among whom the Governor and Deputy Governor
were chosen, were themselves involved in City firms in some
way, and thus unless the Bank was choosing the inept
personnel from City firms as Directors, this comment on the
Bank's management can be seen as a reflection of the
standard of management in the City as a whole.
Whitburn also commented on the Bank of England's
discount policy in 1900, in connection with competition
between the former and the country banks:
"Unless a person deals with them (the Bank)
exclusively, they decline to discount below the
official iniinua here in London. This is not so
however at their branches in the country. I hear
from all sides that at the branches they have
adopted an aggressive and irritating policy. I
suppose they have too much respect for the power
of the London bankers to go along the same lines
here."11
The above comment is interesting because it implies a
difference in Bank policy between the provincial banks and
the London based banks. The latter of course had far more
direct contact with the Bank of England, and were not in
general in direct competition with them in the same way as
were the country banks at certain times, since the Bank of
England was the only bank allowed to issue notes in the
10 See below.
1 Midland Bank Group Archives Reference M153/62. (Op
cit, 9-11th May 1900.)
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London area.'2
In summary therefore, it seems that there were few
people in the city with any favourable statements to make
about the behaviour of the Bank of England in general, as
opposed to about certain personalities, notably Lidderdale,
in particular. In the next section we will look in detail
at one particular dispute between the Bank of England and
oth r banks, before turning more specifically to the role
and position of the Governor.
2.2.1: Specific Complaints about the Bank of England's
Behaviour - Competition with the Country Banks
One of the most serious of the specific disputes
between the Bank of England and the provincial banks
concerned the "touting" for business by Bank Agents at the
Branches in the mid 1890s. The Bank was making strenuous
efforts to increase its income in order that its dividend
did not fall too far behind those of the joint stock banks,
12 Evidence from an earlier period confirms that in
many provincial areas country bank notes were preferred to
those issued by the Bank of England. Howard Lloyd, writing
in 1907 about the early 1860s, commented that:
"...the bank issued its own notes within the
statutory maximum as fixed by the Act of 1844. It
was customary to offer customers Bank of England
notes if they preferred them, but it was a
curious fact that farmers and country people, who
were numerous among the bank' s customers and
connections, preferred the Lloyd's notes, and
were uncomfortable if supplied with those of the
Bank of England."
(Notes and Reminicences of Llo yds Bank. 1862-92, pp.2,
Lloyds Bank Archives)
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and the bulk of these efforts was concentrated in the
provinces at the branches, much to the dismay of country
bankers.
Contemporary accounts give evidence of this, much of
it coming from reports of meetings of the Country Bankers
Association, one purpose of which seemed to be a forum at
which the provincial bankers laid down their complaints
about the policies of the Bank of England. In addition, the
meetings of the Central Association of Bankers were also
used to air grievances. The main body of evidence found
comes from 1896, a year when the Bank of England's actions
at the branches were apparently particularly competitive.
In letters and speeches to several meetings of the various
banking associations in May and June 1896, Faber, of Faber.
Beckett & Co.,Leeds, made strong complaints about the
Bank's discount policies. In a letter dated May 14th 1896,
he first identified the difficult position that the country
bankers were in, different as it was from that faced by
London banks. This was because their customers often
treated money left on deposit at their bank as an
investment, rather than as an alternative to using cash,
and only went to the bank once a year to collect the
interest paid on their deposit. From the banks' point of
view, this was a very satisfactory situation since the
deposits left with them could then be re-lent. However,
once the Bank of England started competing for business it
was no longer as easy to find willing borrowers for the re-
lent deposits, because the Bank was able to offer
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potential borrowers lower rates than the country banks.
According to Faber, the Bank's instructions to its Leeds
Agent appeared to be "Get business at fair rates if you
can, but get business". 13 Faber's complaints were thus:
"We do not complain about fair competition but
this is fostered by free money costing the lender
nothing at all. How can we country bankers who pay
well for our deposits meet such competition as
this? Our loans are taken from us; our bills no
longer exist in our cases and our current
accounts are 'touted' for."'4
He went on to prophesy that:
"The time is already arriving, if it has not
already arrived, when the Bank of England must
choose whether to be the banker for the
Government or a commercial bank. It cannot be
both, and if it will not choose the remedy it
would appear to be in the adoption of the
American plan. iil5
Faber then continued by discussing the present means by
which the way banks kept their reserves, and improvements
that could be made to this system. His primary question was
why London bankers kept such large (non-interest bearing)
13 Quoted in a letter from Faber of Faber, Beckett &
Co., Leeds, to the Central Association of Bankers, 14th May
1896. (Midland Bank Group Archives, reference M222/2:
George Rae's Papers).
14 
op cit.
15 op cit. There is no clue given in the letter as to
the nature of the "American plan" referred to. However,
Friedman & Schwartz (1963, pp.117) mention a "Baltimore
Plan" proposed by the American Bankers Association in
October 1894, aimed at reforming the American note issue.
The main proposal was to have an asset-backed currency
which would be guaranteed by the federal government, such
that national banks would be able to issue notes as long as
they were limited to the amount of the bank's capital, and
were backed by a fund of "legal tenders". It is possible
that it was this scheme that Faber was referring to, since
it would appear to fit with the idea of the Bank of England
choosing to be a commercial rather than central bank.
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sums at the Bank of England, and he postulated three (non-
mutually exclusive) answers. Firstly, he stated that the
banking environment was currently too competitive for there
to be sufficient co-operation between bankers, in order
that an new system with an alternative reserve could be set
up. Secondly, he said that it was thought that:
"..in times of panic the Bank of England (with the
government behind it) would alone be able to give
help and advance money against good securities
which at the moment might be unrealisable"
He is suggesting here that it is only the Bank of England
which is in a position to act as a LLR. His third point
was that balances were kept at the Bank of England because
the latter "clears".
He continued by adding his own comments to these
answers. He opinion on the first point was that these days
"jealousy among bankers is quite out of place", and thus
more co-operation between bankers would be desirable.
Secondly, he commented that (even without a central bank)
New York had survived through panics which were equally
serious as any in London, 16 and on the final point he
proposed that the commercial banks should set up their own
clearing house, and thus keep their own reserves,
16 New York banks had survived, Faber said, by issuing
Cash Certificates against good securities which were
guaranteed by all the banks and thus circulated as cash.
With hindsight, however it seemed at the time, it is
unlikely that the crises Faber was referring to were as
serious as the worst of the nineteenth century British
ones. One result of the American problems of 1907 was the
establishment of the Federal Reserve, because it was felt
that it was the lack of a central bank which had
accentuated the problems of the banking system. See section
8 of Chapter Four for further details.
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independently of the Bank of England.
Faber's letter was discussed at the meeting of the
Central Association of Bankers four days after it had been
written (May 18th 1896), and Simpson, from the Bank of
Liverpool, commented that Faber' s proposal to form a new
clearing bank to hold surplus deposits as reserves would
"leave the Bank of England out In the cold". 17 The proposal
received some support at the meeting, although it was too
revolutionary for most people, and thus there was a move
from Wade, Tritton and Schuster, 18 in favour of a more
mo erate course of action. Before any action was taken
towards the formation of an alternative clearing house,
they wanted a deputation to be sent to the Bank of England
to discuss the matter with them. Finally however, in best
committee tradition, a decision about what course of action
to take was postponed for several weeks until the decision
of the Northern Bankers was known.19
The next piece of evidence we have on this subject is
a letter from R.H.Inglis Paigrave to George Rae, 2 ° giving
17 Midland Bank Group Archives Reference M222/3
(T.R.Hughes' report of the meeting).
18 From the National Provincial Bank, Brightwen & Co.,
and the Union of London and Smiths Bank, respectively.
19 We do not know what the decision of this body was,
but it appeared not to matter since the deputation to the
Bank of England took place anyway (see below).
20 Midland Bank Group Archive Reference M222/4. Rae
was the author of The Country Banker: His Clients, Cares
and Work, published in 1885. He was General Manager of the
North & South Wales Bank for many years, and a well known
commentator on financial matters. Paigrave, author of Bank
Rate and the Money Market, published in 1903, was also
editor of The Economist for many years.
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evidence supporting Faber'ø points about the Bank of
England's behaviour in the provinces. According to
Palgrave, although the Bank did not actually allow interest
on deposits, they were prepared to place customer's money
on the Stock Exchange, the profit from the investment going
to the customer. In addition, bills, not necessarily first
class, could be discounted at the Bank's branches at very
low rates, and the latter had "sent to customers of other
banks and said they would do business there"; in effect,
"touting" for business. 21 The Bank was also guilty of
undercutting other banks in the issuing of Municipal loans,
offering to issue the same loans at lower rates than had
already been agreed.
Although, as noted above, Faber did not receive much
support from many quarters, Paigrave noted that at one
21 Further evidence of this occurring at a later date
comes from another source. There are reports in the records
of Lambton & Co., held at Lloyds Bank Archives (reference
4351), concerning the Bank of England offering very good
terms for the discount of bills. The Sunderland Shipping
Co. Ltd. opened an account with the Bank of England Branch
(presumably at Newcastle) in 1906 for the purpose of bill
discounting, much to the annoyance of their bankers,
Lambton & Co., who were left only with the (low profit)
transactions of withdrawing cash for wage paying etc.
Lanthton & Co. were unable to match the Bank of England's
terms for bill discounting, and were pleased when the
shipping company closed their account with theni
altogether.
The favourable terms offered by the Bank apparently
caused some local surprise, since many of the ship-building
companies in the area were in decline at that point. It
seems that the Bank was taking on business here that could
possibly have been fairly risky, at a time when its revenue
pressures had eased. This could however be explained simply
in terms of an over-zealous Bank of England Agent who was
keen to increase his business in any possible way, rather
than as the result of a policy directive from Head Office
aimed at increasing Branch business across the whole
country.
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meeting support was more forthcoming, 22 and he had this to
say about the meeting's general attitude towards the role
of the Bank of England as a L1 if Faber's proposals for a
separate reserve were put into action:
"The doubt whether, if bankers' balances were
removed from the Bank of England, the assistance
which might be needed in times of crisis would
still be available did not carry so much weight
as might have been expected. The idea was that
the banks would have to go straight to the
Treasury and ask the government for notes against
securities."
All these meetings were agreed that a deputation
should be sent to the Bank, and if received civilly, giving
reason to believe that the competition that the bankers
were complaining about would be discontinued, or at least
modified, the matter would be closed. This in fact seems to
be what occurred: at a meeting of the Country Bankers'
Association the following year, 23 Faber gave an account of
the deputation to the Bank, which had eventually consisted
of representatives of two London joint stock banks, two
London private banks and two country banks. 24 The result of
the deputation was positive: the Bank's Governor "promised
22 Unfortunately he did not mention which meeting this
was.
23 Reported by Hughes in the business Re ports of his
visit of May l2th-l4th 1897 (Midland Bank Group Archive
Reference 14153/47/2).
24 There is no indication given as to the reason for
the two-thirds weighting given to London institutions in
this deputation. It seems odd that the weighting was thus,
given that the complaints about the Bank of England's
competitive behaviour originated with the provincial banks.
Perhaps the reason for the inclusion of so many london
bankers was that they were better known and commanded more
respect at the Bank.
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to give instructions to their agents not to compete unduly
with their neighbours".25
Hughes also gives a report here of the Central
Association of Bankers' Dinner, where the Governor of the
Bank of England, Cohn Smith, gave a "short but effective "
speech in which he "regretted that he did not see more of
his banking friends and also the isolation of the Bank of
England except when bad times come". After this speech,
Tritton, then the Honorary Secretary of the London Clearing
Bankers, "expressed a hope that something may arise out of
the Governor's speech which would lead to a better
understanding amongst bankers".26
Over the next few years the problem of the Bank of
England competing against the country bankers resolved
itself, without necessitating further action from the
bankers themselves, in the main part because of a change in
the Bank's behaviour. Once the concerns over its income
became less serious in the early years of the twentieth
century, it became less aggressive in its search for new
business at the Branches, and so was no longer in direct
competition with the country banks.
This episode is interesting for the study of the Bank
of England's behaviour as a central bank, especially as
regards the regulatory aspects of this role, because it is
one of the few direct illustrations we have of how the Bank
25 Op cit.
26 All the above quotes appear in the last cited
reference.
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was viewed by other institutions. It is also a good example
of a case where the Bank tried to behave as a commercial
bank, since of course in terms of its statute it was still
a private, profit-making institution at that time, and yet
got criticised on all sides for this behaviour. It is clear
that the commercial banks regarded the Bank of England very
much as a central bank by this time.
Having said all this, it is important to realise that
the country bankers' complaints can also be regarded as an
outburst by a group of institutions involved in a
relatively sheltered industry, who suddenly found
themselves exposed to a bout of competition that they were
ill-equipped to deal with. Obviously, the initial policy
step to take in such circumstances was to cry "it's not
fair"!, and in doing this, the provincial bankers of the
late nineteenth century were no different from many other
earlier and later groups.
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3: The ImDortance of the Governor
How important was the particular Governor who held the
"Chair" for the conduct of Bank of England policy? This is
an interesting question, because if we can show that
certain Governors were very important in shaping the Bank's
policy at particular times, this will suggest very strongly
that the Bank did not have a coherent policy to deal with
the markets and with financial crises. What we are
basically asking here is to what extent the Bank of
England's actions at particular times can be accounted for
by the coincidence of certain Governor's terms of office?27
The idea that some Governors may have been more
important than others, in terms of the Bank's policy in
difficult situations, is not one which, in the words of a
recent writer, is "fashionable among economists" since it
undermines the idea of constitutional continuity and
stability". 28 However, it is an important concept and one
which is deserving of further study.
At the outset we would probably believe that most
Governors have little impact on Bank policy, but that some
27 The question we are really considering here is to
what extent individuals can influence Bank of England
policy. Normally, the individual in the best position to
achieve this was the Bank's Governor, which is why we are
concentrating on this aspect here, but occasionally there
were individuals In the financial world with enough
charisma to influence financial policy on a wide scale. One
such person was arguably Edward Holden, and we will discuss
his importance in connection with the Yorkshire Penny Bank
at a later point.
28 Fay (1987) pp.30.
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have a disproportionate influence. To examine this in
greater detail we first need to take a brief look at the
means by which men became Governor. The election to the
Bank's Court of Directors was made fairly early in a man's
career: in 1900, the average age of Directors when first
elected to the Court was thirty-seven, 29 and once elected
to the Court eventual promotion to the "Chair", as the
Governorship was known, was virtually automatic after a
certain length of time, normally around twenty years, had
been served. Until 1932 there was no fixed retireiient age,
and so most of the ex-Governors continued to serve on the
Court of Directors after their period in the "chair".3°
Since Governors were in effect chosen twenty years in
advance, and the eventual appointment to the Chair was
dependent on age and seniority rather than on ability, it
is therefore not surprising that many Bank of England
Governors were slightly lacking in personality, in the
sense that their Governorship was to them simply the
culmination of a perhaps distinguished career, and not
their chance to make a mark on Bank policy-making. There
were exceptions of course, Lidderdale being the most
obvious one: primary sources suggest that all the impetus
for intervention in the Baring affair came from him, and
without him perhaps the Bank would not have intervened.31
29 Sayers (1976) vol II, pp.595.
30 Retirement at seventy was introduced in 1932 on the
recommendation of the Peacock Report.
31 We will return to this issue at a later point.
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From the Bank's point of view it seems to have been
increasingly difficult to attract able men to serve on
their Court of Directors: by the 1890s, it appears that
being a Director of the Bank of England was no longer the
status symbol it had been. This is illustrated by the
following quote from Lidderdale, in answer to a question as
to whether or not he favoured the idea of a permanent
Governor:
"...it is difficult enough to get good men as
Directors: if we deprived them of the chance of
the Chair, a coveted distinction, we would
probably get even less good men to the Bank."32
There is no indication why attracting talented people to
serve on the Banks' Court of Directors should be so
difficult, except perhaps for the obvious explanation that
the tasks which it involved were rather time-consuming, and
people preferred to devote their time to their own
businesses rather than to serving the "public interest".
In Lombard Street, Bagehot discusses the roles of the
Governor and Directors of the Bank extensively. 33 He talks
of the considerable status attached to the positions, both
to the individual concerned and to the institution by whom
he was employed, and mentions the surprise he felt on
seeing a "very fresh and nice looking young man" and then
being told that he was a Bank Director. He felt however
that the system of picking the most talented people early
32 Source: The Diaries of Edward Walter Hamilton,
January 8th 1891. Held at the British Library, Department
of Manuscripts, reference Add 48,654.
Bagehot (1873), Chapter VIII.
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in their careers was correct, since the younger component
of the Court of Directors had little influence, and yet
sitting on it allowed young men to develop their expertise.
The real power of the Bank of England lay in the Committee
of Treasury, although these powers were ill-defined, and
depended on the personality of the incumbent Governor:
"A strong Governor does much mainly on his own
responsibility, and a weak Governor does
little. 4
Bagehot sununarises the weaknesses in the management
of the Bank very neatly:
"In theory, nothing can be worse than this
government for a bank - a shifting executive; a
board of directors chosen too young for it to be
known whether they are able; a committee of
management, in which seniority is the necessary
qualification, and old age the common result,;
and no trained bankers anywhere."35
He felt that the best means of introducing some measure of
stability and continuity into the functioning of the Bank
was to appoint a permanent Governor or Deputy Governor. The
problem with having a permanent Governor however was that
such a person would be a "little 'monarch' in the City" and
would therefore be too powerful:
"Everybody in business would bow down to him and
try to stand well with him, for he might in a
panic be able to save almost anyone he liked, and
to ruin almost anyone he liked."36
He thus preferred the permanent appointment to be one of
Deputy Governor, which would avoid many of the pitfalls
34 Op cit, pp.201.
Op cit, pp.207.
36 Op cit, pp.213.
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associated with a permanent Governor, and would be a paid
employee of the Bank. This person would be a trained
banker and would thus be able to advise Governors, who were
merely "Cautious merchants, not profoundly skilled in
banking". 37
 In Bagehot's words, he would:
"...give to the decisions of the Bank that
foresight, that quickness, and that consistency
in which those decisions are undeniably now
deficient."38
In this way some of the problems of having a continually
changing management of the Bank could be resolved,
facilitating an increased degree of policy continuity and
more expert knowledge within the Bank. 39 It would also
avoid some of the problems associated with less capable
Governors, since they would have a full-time, permanent
advisor always at hand, and thus situations such as this
described by Tritton, of Brightwen & Co., would be
eradicated, or at least reduced:
"The present Governor is unfortunately very self-
opinionated and will have his own way, and his
idea is to run the Bank on purely mercantile
lines, just as he would with his own business. He
would not, for example, increase the price of
gold though all his Co-Directors were against him
in this, and this went on for a long time until
the other day, when he at last gave way.
The management of the Bank is of course on a very
silly basis - there is no continuity in it - and
how we shall fare when the next Governor comes in
I do not know. He is a member of a declining firm
which is doing no good, and he has never shewn
37 Op cit, pp.223.
38 Op cit, pp.225.
These ideas were never practically implemented.
Today the Deputy Governor and Governor of the Bank of
England are appointed for five year terms. This was
introduced when the Bank was nationalised in 1946.
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any ras though in other respects he is decent
enough."
Here, according to Tritton, the Bank's selection procedure
for Governors seems to have gone very wrong, in that two
somewhat inept Governors followed each other to the Chair.
Because they were chosen so far in advance, once elected to
the Bank's Court it was extremely difficult to prevent men
who failed to fulfil their initial promise becoming
Governor. Having a full time, permanent Deputy Governor
would at least reduce the negative aspects of this
situation.
Having discussed the management of the Bank of
England and the role of the Governor in general, we will
now continue by looking more specifically at particular
governors, focussing especially on the impact that they
had during certain events, and on discussing the empirical
work that was carried out on this subject. We will commence
with the empirical analysis before discussing qualitative
aspects of the situation.
40 Midland Bank Group Archives, reference M153/62/2.
(Business Reports, as above, 9-11th May 1900.) The Governor
of the Bank in 1900 was Samuel Steuart Gladstone. Following
him, from 1901-03, was Augustus Prevost.
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3.1: Empirical Analysis
The main aim of this analysis was to test whether
certain Governors had a greater impact on Bank of England
policy than others, in terms of the behaviour of discounts
and advances. This is not easy to test empirically, since
we are in effect dealing with a qualitative rather than
quantitative concept, and thus the estimation procedure
used involved the use of both the Daily Discount data and
dummy variables to represent Governors who, a priori,
seemed to be more important than others.
Table 8.1 overleaf gives a list of the Governors of
the Bank of England between 1870-1914, together with their
dates of office. On first consideration, many of these
names are unfamiliar, even with a good knowledge of
monetary events in this period. It seems that many
Governors made little mark on the financial markets and
monetary affairs in general. However, several of them are
very well known. One of the questions we have to address is
why some of these names achieved so much notoriety, and
others so little? Was it purely an accident of fate that
caused certain people to react very effectively to crises,
and others to have no impact at all on Bank policy?
The method we shall use in an attempt to test the
hypothesis that certain Governors had a disproportionate
influence on the shaping of Bank of England policy is as
follows. Firstly, although certain value judgments are
involved in this estimation procedure, we can frame an
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Table 8.1: Bank of England Governors, 1870-1914.
	
1869 - 1871	 Thomas Newman Hunt
	
1871 - 1873	 George Lyall
	
1873 - 1875	 Benjamin Bucke Greene
	
1875 - 1877	 Henry HUCkS Gibbs
	
1877 - 1879	 Edward Howley Palmer
	
1879 - 1881	 John William Birch
	
1881 - 1883	 Henry Riversdale Grenfell
	
1883 - 1885	 John Saunders Gilliat
	
1885 - 1887	 James Pattison Currie
	
1887 - 1889	 Mark Wilks Collet
	
1889 - 1892	 William Lidderdale
	
1892 - 1895	 David Powell
	
1895 - 1897	 Albert George Sandeman
	
1897 - 1899	 Hugh Cohn Smith
	
1899 - 1901	 Samuel Steuart Gladstone
	
1901 - 1903	 Augustus Prevost
	
1903 - 1905	 Samuel Hope Morley
	
1905 - 1907	 Alexander Falconer Wallace
	
1907 - 1909	 William Middleton Campbell
	
1909 - 1911	 Reginald Eden Johnson
	
1911 - 1913	 Alfred Clayton Cole
	
1913 - 1918	 Walter Cunhiffe
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initial hypothesis about the way in which the Bank's
Governor affects the Bank's discount and advance
operations. We can postulate that the volume of discounts
will be a function both of the interest rate associated
with discount and advance transactions, and of a dummy
variable representing the Governor, which takes the value 1
when there is a Governor in office whom we consider to be
influential, and 0 for the others. In addition, we can add
other dummy variables to represent other qualitative
factors we consider to be important in determining the
value of the dependent variable. In this case two other
dummies were included: one to represent financial crises,
and another to represent the six-monthly seasonal pressure
apparent in the data.41
In terms of symbols, the hypothesis for each of the
variables is:
TVB = f ( R, DGOV, DSEAS, DFINcR )
WA = f ( R, DGOV, DSEAS, DFINR )
VAOS = f ( R, DGOV, DSEAS, DFINR )
where:
R	 =	 Interest rate on discount and advance
transactions
DCCV	 =	 Dummy variable representing Bank Governors
DSEAS =	 Dummy variable representing Seasonality
DFINR =	 Dummy variable representing Financial
Crises
Note above that these estimations were carried out for
41 As discussed earlier, this increase in activity was
due to "window dressing" by the commercial banks.
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discounts and both advances variables, TVB, TVA arid VAOS,
the first two for the whole time• period (2340
observations), and the latter for the period 1894-1914
(1092 observatIons).
We will now discuss the data on each of the variables
in turn, except for that on discounts and advances, which
has already been extensively discussed.
R: In a previous chapter42 we have already seen that,
using annual data, a positive relationship existed
between the volume of discounts and advances and
Bank Rate. We concluded from this result that there
was some indication that the LLR function existed
In the 1870-1914 period. It thus seems logical to
Include the interest rate in any other estimation
which aims to explain the behaviour of the Daily
Discount data. The data used were as shown In
Appendices A and B below.
DGOV: This is the dummy variable in which we are most
interested, since it reflects the importance of
the Bank of England Governor. It is this variable
which is most subject to valued judgments, since at
the outset we have to decide which Governors are
Important, and thus should have the value 1
assigned to them, and which are not, thus carrying
a zero value. This task was executed using prior -
knowledge of what the Bank was doing at certain
times. For example, we know that in 1878 the Bank
42 Chapter Six, section 4.
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of England did not intervene to save the City of
Glasgow bank. The decision not to intervene must
have been taken inside the Bank, either
collectively or independently, and we can postulate
that the governor of the time, Edward Howley
Palmer, had some input into the decision,
especially since Clapham (1944,pp.309) states that
Bank rate was "jerked up to 6" (per cent) b y the
Governor. Thus, the period covering Palmer's office
is assigned the value 1. Other Governors given
this value were Lidderdale, 44 W.X.Campbell45 and
W.Cunliffe. Several sources indicate that
Lidderdale was one of the most energetic of the
Governors in this period, and that he provided the
whole inspiration for the Bank's actions in the
Baring affair. In the words of two contemporaries:
• the endeavour seems to have come completely
from Lidderdale, without much seconding or
more than tacit support from his colleagues.
If my informant is correct then Mr. Lidderdale
is the sole and courageous author of the
endeavour which appears to have rescued the
City temporarily or otherwise from the
formidable embroilment that would have
The changeover in Bank Governors took place in
April of every second year, and therefore, the Governor
dummy for Palmer, for example, is equal to 1 from week 14
of 1877 until week 13 of 1879.
Between week 14 of 1889 and week 13 of 1892:
Lidderdale's term of office was extended in order that he
could continue negotiations he was involved in with
Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, concerning the
amounts the Bank charged the government for, among other
things, the management of the National Debt.
5 Governor between April 1907 and April 1909.
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followed the failure of Barings.w46
"The Government and commercial World at large
cannot congratulate themselves too much on
how lucky they are to have Lidderdale at the
helm"47
It seems that it was rare for a Governor to take
his position as seriously as did Lidderdale;
Sayers (1976, pp.640) reports that he had been so
fully occupied by the affairs of the Bank that
when his term as Governor ended the business from
which he had previously gained the major part of
his income was not in a strong position.
Campbell was included because the Bank came
through the problems of 1907 without any serious
problems, an experience totally different from that
of the U.S. in the same period, where the crisis
was admittedly more severe but was also dealt with
less efficiently. Cunliffe, of course, was at the
helm during the crisis that developed in the summer
of 1914 on the outbreak of World War One.
In addition to these names, A.F.Cole, Governor
between 1911 and 1913, was included because of his
actions during the problems of the Yorkshire Penny
Bank, when, guided and influenced by Edward Holden,
the Bank formed (and contributed to) a guarantee
46 Contained in a letter from Howard Lloyd to Hoare
dated November 18th 1890, held at Lloyds Bank Archives,
Reference 4050.
Diaries of Edward Walter Hamilton, 15th November
1890.
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fund to rescue this bank. 48 In setting up the
rescue of this bank, Holden used all the contacts
and influence available to him. For example, on
27th July 1911, soon after the bank's problems had
become evident, he wrote to the Chancellor, Lloyd
George, asking for his help:
"The Governor of the Bank of England and I
have been working day and night for a week
trying to prevent the most awful catastrophe
of the institution I discussed with you
coming down. Up to last night we had hopes,
but this morning I despair. I think you and
Mr. A(squith) should know exactly what the
position is as some help from you may enable
us to pull through."49
And then, two days later, he used a slightly more
desperate note:
"I know you are very much engaged with
policy affairs, but I should like to
point out to you that the matter I wrote
to you about is equally important. If
this debacle comes it will lay in ashes
the whole of Yorkshire and a great deal
of Lancashire. I cannot help but think it
would do a great deal of damage to the
Government in these districts."°
Holden's persistence here was rewarded, in that the
Governor of the Bank of England did meet with the
Chancellor, although the latter was keen that the
government itself should not get involved unless it
48 The Governor's report of this affair is discussed
in Chapter Four, section 4.9.
Letter from Holden to Lloyd George, July 27th 1911.
(Midland Bank Group Archives, Edward Holden's Private
files, YPB).
50 op cit, July 29th.
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was absolutely necessary.51
DSEAS: This dummy was included for obvious reasons. Again,
careful study of the data reveals clear six-monthly
moments of increased activity, and as discussed
elsewhere, this pattern can be explained by the
commercial bank's practice of "window dressing".
The seasonal dummy took a value of 1 in the last
week of June and of December, and zero everywhere
else, throughout the estimation period.
DFINcR: This dummy variable was included in the estimation
because it is fairly obvious, and indeed is a major
hypothesis of this thesis, that the volume of
discounts and advances increase when a financial
crisis is in progress. Again, in defining the
periods when this dummy would take a non-zero
value, qualitative evidence was considered,
51 Lloyd George in turn was keen to use whatever
influence he may have had with Holden, as can be seen below
by the extract from a letter written around two weeks after
the previous ones concerning the Yorkshire Penny Bank:
"The bearer of this letter is my brother and my late
partner in business. He, I understand, has come up
to town to see you in reference to some transaction
affecting the City & Midland Bank. He is acting on
the behalf of a gentleman who, through no fault of
his own, has found himself in some financial
difficulty. I gather from what my brother has told
me that the situation is a difficult one, but I have
seen you solve difficulties that were incomparably
greater than this one, and if you could in any way
assist in this matter I should be infinitely
obliged.
P.S. The Yorkshire Bank was a great triumph for
you.."
Letter from Lloyd George to Holden, August 10th 1911. (Held
at Midland Bank Archives, Holden's private files)
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particularly that contained in the secondary
literature, since it is not acceptable to use the
data that is to be used in the analysis to define
the periods when dummy variables should be
operative.
There were therefore four occasions when the dummy
variable representing financial crises took a non-
zero value: 1873 (autumn), 1890 (November), 1907
(March, August and November) and 1914 (July and
August). The theoretical justification for picking
these points has been made elsewhere in this
thesis.
3.1.1: Results
The regression results for two out of three estimated
equations were fairly good, and are displayed in Tables
8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 overleaf, one for each variable. We will
briefly discuss these results before going on to consider
their qualitative implications.
The top half of the tables overleaf give the results
for the initial ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations.
For all three variables, the explanatory power of the
regression (R2 ) is not very high, at just over 0.2. This
implies that there are factors other than those included
here which are important in the determination of the
dependent variable. However, most of the 't' statistics are
significant, indicating that the variables which are
included are important. The only regression equation that
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Table 8.2: Governor Regression Results
Dependent variable 	 TVB
Number of observations	 - 2340
Mean of dependent variable	 = 60810.86
Std. dev. of dependent variable 	 = 190496.54
R squared	 = 0.2140
Adjusted R Squared	 = 0.2127
F-statistic (4, 2335)	 = 158.94
Durbin Watson statistic
	
= 0.84
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-ratio Sig. level
Constant	 -2534 (0.11*105) -0.24	 0.79580
R	 13295 3194	 4.16	 0.00006
DCOV	 40670 8339	 4.88	 0.23333
DSEAS	 41495 (0.18*105)	 2.28	 0.02176
DFINR	 588344 (0.27*105) 21.81	 0.00000
Adjusted Results after AR1 Estimation
New DW = 2.09
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-ratio Sig. level
Constant	 -20203 (0.15*105) -1.32	 0.18816
R	 19627 4355	 4.51	 0.00001
DGOV	 41632 (0.16*10 5 )	 2.65	 0.01652
DSEAS	 30235 (0.13*105 )	 2.40	 0.01652
DFINR	 482898 (0.37*105) 13.05	 0.00000
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Table 8.3: Governor Regression Results
Dependent variable 	 = TVA
Number of observations	 = 2340
Mean of dependent variable	 = 67442.36
Std. dev. of dependent variable	 183697.11
R squared	 = 0.2660
Adjusted R Squared	 = 0.2647
F-statistic (4, 2335)	 = 211.54
Durbin Watson statistic	 = 1.65
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-ratio Sig level
Constant	 -29032 9767	 -2.97	 0.00314
R	 25244 2977	 8.48	 0.00000
DGOV	 -18.19 7771	 -0.002	 0.94658
DSEAS	 459035 (0.17*10 5)	 27.02	 0.00000
DFINR	 6900	 (0.25*105)	 0.27	 0.77460
Adjusted Results after AR1 Estimation
New DW = 2.03
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-ratio Sig.level
Constant	 -43433 (0.11*105) -3.84	 0.00013
R	 29955 3431	 8.73	 0.00000
DGOV	 -876.2 9291	 -0.09	 0.92487
DSEAS	 452611 (0.16*105) 27.66	 0.00000
DFINR	 0.1799 (0.20*10 5) 0.44	 0.65942
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Table 8.4: Governor Regression Results
Dependent variable
	 = VAOS
Number of observations	 = 1092
Mean of dependent variable	 = 112168.29
Std. dev. of dependent variable
	
= 251651.51
R squared	 = 0.2155
Adjusted R Squared	 = 0.2126
F-statistic (4, 2335)
	
= 74.64
Durbin Watson statistic
	
= 0.85
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-ratio Sig.level
Constant	 -26070 (0.21*105) -1.29	 0.19357
R	 53530 6692	 8.00	 0.00000
DGOV	 -115463 (0.16*105) -7.31	 0.00000
DSEAS	 437152 (0.36*105) 12.29	 0.00000
DFINR	 -105454 (0.47*10 5) -2.24	 0.02408
Adjusted Results after AR1 Estimation
New DW = 2.20
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-ratio Sig.level
Constant	 -27117 (0.26*10 5) -1.03	 0.30386
R	 53660 7813	 6.87	 0.00000
DGOV	 -123194 (0.29*10 5) -4.28	 0.00002
DSEAS	 452685 (0.25*10 5 ) 17.94	 0.00000
DFINR	 -53139 (0.62*105) -0.86	 0.38884
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has 't' statistics associated with it that are not
significant is that of advances on bills, ¶IVA (Table 8.3).
The 't' statistics here on both the Governor and the
financial crises dummies are very low, implying that
neither the Governor nor the incidence of financial crises
had any impact on the value of this variable.
Although most of the variables in these estimations
are significant, in all three estimations they are biased
due to the presence of serial correlation in the residuals,
as shown by the low Durbin-Watson statistics. Because of
this bias, additional estimations were undertaken in
order to eradicate the (first-order) serial correlation.
The results obtained using a different procedure are shown
in the bottom half of the tables.52
These results give slightly lower 't' statistics than
previously, although the Governor dummy variable is still
significant for TVB and VAOS. The Durbin-Watson statistic
for all three variables is very much improved, standing at
slightly over two for all three equations, indicating that
the problem of first-order serial correlation has been more
or less eradicated.
A summary of the results for all the variables is as
follows:
R:	 Significant in every equation, whether serial
52 The computer package used to carry out these
regressions was LIMDEP, chosen because it was capable of
handling a larger number of observations than other
packages. The autoregressive procedure used by LINDEP is
the Prais-Winsten method. This is similar to the Cochrane-
Orcutt method, but includes an extra transformation on the
first observation.
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correlation is present or not, with consistently
high (positive) coefficients and 't' statistics.
This is as expected, since it seems logical that
the interest rate will be very important in
determining the demand for discounts and advances.
DGOV: Significant on OLS and AR1 estimations for TVB and
VAOS, but not for TVA, where the 't' statistics are
very low.
DSEAS: Consistently significant, displaying high 't'
statistics.
DFINcR: The only equation where the 't' statistic on the
dummy variable representing financial crises was
significant both before and after the application
of the AR1 process was that for discounts. This is
somewhat surprising, since we would expect the
incidence of financial crises to be very important
in determining the time path of both discounts and
advances and, according to these equations at
least, it appears not to be the case.
3.1.2: Implications of these Results.
The implications of these results are interesting,
although we must take care not to construe too much from
what is, after all, a series of fairly basic regressions.
Firstly, it comes as no surprise to find that the
interest rate is significant in all of the regression
equations, since, as mentioned earlier, we have already
402
identified the positive relationship which exists between
the volume of discounts and advances and the interest rate,
and concluded that this relationship gives some indication
that the LLR function is operative. This then is simply
confirmation of what was already thought to be the case. In
addition, the same comment can be made of the consistently
significant dummy variable representing seasonality; the
seasonal element in the data is obvious even to the naked
eye, and thus it is expected that a dummy variable
representing seasonality would be significant.
Of greater interest than these two are the results
obtained on the dummies for financial crises and for the
Governor. As mentioned above, the results for financial
crises were rather surprising, in that a priori one would
have expected this dummy variable to be very significant,
and it transpires that it was rarely so, except on
discounts, when it was very strong. 53
 In addition, prior
data analysis undertaken on the Daily Discount data did not
suggest that there was little or no relationship between
periods of crisis and the volume of advances granted by the
Bank of England.
These results indicate that the Governor is important
in determining the Bank of England's discount and advance
53 In some ways this result is slightly worrying in
terms of the analysis carried out in the two previous
chapters, since the primary hypothesis underlying the data
analysis was that the volume of discounts and advances
increases when a financial crisis is in progress. The
evidence here is not sufficient for us to abandon this
hypothesis, but we must bear these results in mind all the
same.
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policy, at least for discounts and for advances on
securities, since the dummy variable representing the
Governor is significant in the regressions with these as
independent variables. In some ways this significance is
surprising, since in essence this is a weak test relying on
qualitative assumptions, 54
 and uses a time series with a
large number of observations. 55
 In addition of course, the
finding that individual Bank Governors seem to be important
for Bank policy making runs contrary to much of the
perceived wisdom, which holds that the Bank was engaged in
institutional rather than individual policy making,
especially as regards policy towards financial crises.
However, there are major problems involved with this
type of empirical testing using dummy variables, especially
in the sphere in which we are currently involved. One of
these is that, as might be expected, the analysis only
54 In essence, the major problem with this analysis is
that in initially identifying the Governors thought to be
important, and then assigning them the non-zero dummy, we
are already assuming that these are the Governors in whom
we should be interested, and so a bias is introduced.
However, the only alternative to this sort of approach
would be to put in one dummy variable for each Governor
(twenty-two in all), and then to see whether any of them
were significant in a similar regression to that which was
carried out. The problem here again is in terms of computer
memory: no packages would be capable of running a
regression which included around twenty-five regressors, on
a sample of 2340 observations. Splitting the sample would
be one solution to this problem, but would not be
appropriate in this case, because we are interested in how
the variables relate to each other over the whole time
period.
The relevance of the long time series is that we
might not expect dummy variables which cover relatively
short spans to be significant when they are immersed in
such a long data run.
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picks up those events which actually affect the dependent
variable. Thus if, as actually occurred in -this period, the
Bank of England took extra-ordinary measures in order to
avoid what may have resulted in a financial crisis, such as
happened with Barings and also with the Yorkshire Penny
Bank, the discount data is not affected and thus these
actions would not show up in this type of analysis.
The implication of the above problem is that
empirical testing using dummy variables is perhaps not the
most efficient method of analysing whether the Bank of
England showed a consistent policy towards financial
crises, or whether the policies adopted by the Bank were
almost totally dependent on the personality and capability
of the individual who was currently in "the Chair".
However, given that it is not possible to utilise others
methods in this case, we cannot ignore the statistical
analysis carried out above which indicates the importance
of the Governor, since, taken in conjunction with
qualitative evidence, it points strongly towards the
conclusion that the Bank's Governor was potentially
important in Bank policy making, but in fact only so if the
man in question showed a sufficient grasp of monetary
affairs and of the problems faced by the Bank.
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4: Conclusions
This chapter has sought to focus attention on the
related issues of the Bank of England's links with the
financial markets and on the role of the Governor.
Using a combination of empirical investigation and
qualitative evidence it has addressed the question of
whether the Bank followed a consistent policy towards
financial crises in the 1870-1914 period, or whether the
actions it took in dealing with the problems it faced were
to some extent dependent on the wishes and feelings of the
people in charge of the Bank at the relevant times.
The chapter commenced with a discussion of moral
suasion, both in a contemporary sense and in relation to
its nineteenth century origins. This concept is ±niportant
in relation to the Bank of England's behaviour in the late
nineteenth century, because most of their regulatory
actions in this period involved simply making their views
known to the markets. The Bank was competing with certain
parts of these markets, and it appears that the
institutions concerned did not hold the Bank in very high
esteem.
Qualitative evidence on this subject confirms the idea
that many individuals and institutions were dissatisfied
with the Bank's behaviour and policies, especially during..
the 1890s when concerns about the latter's low levels of
income and consequent low dividends were at their peak.
Given that this was so, it must have been very difficult
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for the Bank to impose any strong discipline on the
financial markets: it is not easy to influence opinion in
your favour when your own behaviour leaves much to be
desired.
The next section of the chapter dealt with work
carried out on the importance of the Governor of the Bank
of England. Firstly, the ways in which men became Governor
were examined, followed by a discussion of nineteenth
century views on the role of the Governor. Included in the
latter section was an examination of Bagehot's views on the
Governor, including his proposals to have a permanent
Deputy Governor, which was aimed at introducing some
degree of stability into the management of the Bank.
The empirical analysis is discussed in the final
section of the chapter. Here the estimation method utilised
(that of representing Governors thought to have had greater
influence on Bank policy by a dummy variable carrying a
non-zero value) and results obtained are set out. In brief,
the major conclusion here was that it seems that certain
Governors did have a disproportionate effect on Bank of
England discount and advance policy, but that this
conclusion must be tentative due to the nature of the
analysis and the fact that actions taken by the Bank, such
as direct rescues, did not affect the demand for discounts
and advances and therefore would not show up in this
analysis.
Two things can therefore be concluded from this
analysis. Firstly, it appears that it must have been very
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difficult for the Bank to utilise moral suasion to any
great extent in this period, particularly in the late
nineteenth century, because of the lack of respect it
commanded among the banking community. Secondly, it seems
that the Governor of the Bank of England did have some
significant impact on Bank policy making at certain points
in this period, but that this was only so when the
individual concerned was sufficiently able and charismatic
to do justice to his position.
One aspect of the role of the Governor that has not
been addressed in this study is whether Governors who
appear to be more influential were inherently gifted at
central banking, or whether external problems which
occurred brought out the best in them. If the latter is the
case, there are strong arguiients suggesting that almost any
of the Governors could have been influential had events
forced them to act in a decisive manner on important
issues. However, testing whether Governors have greatness
thrust upon them is not easy. In effect we are questioning
whether the causality runs from a particular Governor being
capable of solving a particular problem, or from a problem
bringing out the best in a particular Governor. This is
intrinsically very difficult, and would in fact require a
major study in its own right.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS
1: Introduction
This thesis has sought to provide a thorough
examination of the behaviour of the Bank of England as a
central bank in the 1870-1914 period, concentrating on
aspects of its behaviour linked to its role as a Lender of
Last Resort. The thesis is historical in emphasis, although
no historical treatment of this subject is complete without
an extensive examination of the theoretical issues which
underlie the development and current position of the Bank
of England, In particular as regards its policies towards,
and reactions to, financial crises and bank failures.
The established view with respect to the changing
nature of the Bank of England's role is that, by the time
of the Overend-Gurney crisis in 1866, the Bank had accepted
its "duty" to act as a LLR and to aid the financial system
in times of need. 1 However, there was no clear policy
statement of the Bank's intent, and thus even by this time
there was no certainty that it would react in a consistent
manner during each individual crisis. This policy
statement was never forthcoming. What Thornton had earlier
discussed in theoretical terms, became a more established
practical proposition as a result both of the publication
of Lombard Street in 1873 and of Bagehot's editorials in
The Economist. The publication and general acceptance of
the arguments contained in Lombard Street were not in
themselves enough to make the Bank behave entirely
1 See Chapter One.
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consistently however, as we have seen in this study.
The aim of this concluding chapter is to suinmarise the
historical evidence of changes in the Bank's behaviour,
and to then draw general conclusions on the basis of this
evidence, With this in mind, we will discuss the evidence
on questions posed by the study, which can be divided into
three main areas:
(1) The role of the Bank as a Lender of Last Resort and
its attitudes to financial crises.
(2) The importance of the Bank's Governor in framing Bank
of England policy: to what extent the policies
implemented by the Bank were dependent on the
Governor of the time.
(3) The pattern of the Bank's discount and advance
operations in "normal" times: how the structure of
the Bank's customers was changing over the period,
and how the various Discount and Advance Committees
discharged their responsibilities.
We shall discuss conclusions derived from the historical
evidence on each of these questions in turn, before turning
to suggestions for future work that fruitfully could be
carried out in this area.
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2: The Role of the Bank of England as a LLR
This aspect of the Bank's behaviour forms the basis
of all other work undertaken in this study. The fundamental
question here is whether, in relation to its reactions to
bank failures and financial crises, the Bank of England
altered its behaviour towards the financial system in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, as a result of its
acceptance of its duty to provide the system with liquidity
when necessary.
There is no straightforward answer to this question.
However, it is possible to say that any change in the
behaviour of the Bank took place implicitly rather than
explicitly, since as already mentioned there were no great
policy statements made in this period. The only time the
Bank commented directly on its own behaviour was in the
evidence given to the American Monetary Commission in 1910,
and even then it gave little away.2
Throughout these years the Bank was becoming more
conscious of the conflict between its position as a private
bank, with profit maximisation a primary aim, and its role
as a central bank, charged with the keeping of the
country's sole gold reserve. There is no doubt that this
conflict of interest existed. It was evident in two,
contradictory, ways. Firstly, against all the principles of
prof it-making banking, it was forced by its role as the
country's final source of liquidity, to keep a large
2 See section 9 of Chapter Four.
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reserve of idle balances, which earned no interest and
therefore no income for the Bank. Secondly however, periods
of crisis, which necessarily carried with them high
interest rates, were extremely profitable for the Bank, in
terms of the income it derived from advances and discounts,
which during a crisis would be very high. 3
 Thus in one way
its role as a LLR was very unprofitable for the Bank, and
in another very profitable. In general, because of the
rarity of crises, it was more unprofitable than profitable.
Other bankers at this time were aware of the conflict
of interest between the Bank's dual role, and were keen for
it to concentrate on its role as a central bank, leaving
aside its profit-making activities, as least those which
involved commercial banking. 4 A large amount of evidence
on this matter was presented in Chapter Eight, from which
it is clear, unsurprisingly in view of the dominant
position reached by the Bank by this time, that the
commercial banks were very keen to remove this source of
Clapham (1944, volume II, pp. 440-442), graphs the
Bank's income from bills discounted and from short loans
and advances, which display peaks in many of the years
when Bank Rate was high. We should recognise here however
that, as discussed extensively in Chapter Seven, there were
several occasions when the volume of bills discounted
and/or advances was high, without the existence of a high
level of Bank Rate. Several of these can be explained by
other events occurring at the time, but for others there is
no clear explanation.
The commercial banks were not in competition with
the Bank of England for the latter's governmental business,
which was in any case not highly profitable. One of the
other major functions of the Bank of England, not discussed
in this thesis, is its duties as the banker to the
government.
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competition from their markets.5
The concern over profitability and its status as a
private bank did not stop the Bank behaving like a central
bank however. The pattern of intervention in the affairs of
financial institutions experiencing problems which seemed
to be, in the view of contemporaries at least, serious
enough to threaten financial stability, can perhaps be best
seen in the light of the recent illiquidity-insolvency
debate, which was discussed extensively in Chapter Two. The
Bank's decision whether or not to intervene seems to have
been made on the basis that it intervened directly only
when there was a "lock up" of funds involved rather than
the insolvency of the institution concerned. Thus, since
both Barings and the Yorkshire Penny Bank (YPB) were
involved in a situation of illiquidity rather than
insolvency, the Bank was involved in setting up guarantee
funds for both of them. 6
 However, when the City of Glasgow
Bank failed in 1878, the Bank was willing to intervene only
5 One of the reasons explaining the strength of
bankers' feelings was presumably the powerful position the
Bank of England was in: its name was known throughout the
country, and thus it could presumably go into any
(geographical) area with its initial reputation already
established, before it even started to push for new
business.
6 We do not know whether the illiquidity-insolvency
debate was ever discussed, or even identified, but the
Bank's actions in this period certainly seem to provide
examples of the main issues involved in this debate.
However, the feeling during both these rescues seems to
have been that the Bank of England would only have
considered forming guarantee funds of the problem was one
of illiquidity rather than insolvency; see for example the
comment made In The Times of 25th November 1890, which is
reproduced in section 5 of Chapter Four.
41.3
to the extent of providing extra liquidity to the firms
affected by the failure, and so the Clydesdale Bank and the
Yorkshire Banking Co. were both granted discount
facilities. 7 In addition, Murrietas were refused aid after
the Baring crisis of 1890, when the securities they were
able to provide were not acceptable.8
In the light of the illiquidity-insolvency debate, the
question which then needs to be addressed however, which is
as relevant these days as it was in the late nineteenth
century, is how the Bank judged whether an institution was
illiquid or insolvent. As discussed in an earlier chapter,
Barings were said to be illiquid, but it took over four
years for a surplus of assets over liabilities to
niaterialise. Many institutions initially regarded as being
insolvent would be able to recover their position if they
were given several years in which to do so. This issue
comes down to opinions on the current worth of various
assets, or rather, their likely value when liquidated, and
as such is based to a large extent on judgments. Given this
is the case, it is difficult to have a coherent and
consistent policy towards bank failures, unless the policy
is simply to judge each failure in terms of the
institution's net worth, although, as detailed in Chapter
One and again above, it is extremely difficult to make this
judgement accurately.
In some ways, the debate about insolvency versus
See Section 2.6 of Chapter Seven.
8 See section 2.12 of Chapter Seven.
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illiquidity is irrelevant if the view taken of the role of
the LLR is that it should aid the system in times of need,
by discounting and lending on "good" paper. If this is the
view taken, then aid would never be given directly to
institutions which were experiencing problems, unless they
could produce securities which the LLR was willing to
accept as collateral for a loan or were eligible for
discount. In this sense the troubled institution would be
treated in exactly the same way as any other institution
which came to the LLR.
There are obvious problems with this approach, as
detailed in Chapter Two, one of the most important of which
is the issue of depositor protection. In terms of the Bank
of England's nineteenth century interventions, only in the
case of the Yorkshire Penny Bank was any mention made of
the losses depositors would face if the bank was to close.9
The YPB however was in essence a savings bank, its
clientele being mainly small depositors, and thus its
failure would hit those least able to cope.
In addition to evidence on those Bank of England last
resort interventions discussed above, the analysis in
Chapters Six and Seven also identified other moments when
the Bank was pumping liquidity into the financial system,
often in fairly large amounts. Some of these moments have
obvious explanations, and others do not, but they all form
interesting examples of the Bank of England acting as a
Since Barings was a merchant bank, this was not an
issue, and thus the argument of depositor protection cannot
be utilised in this case.
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true LLR: increasing its liquidity injections into the
financial system. In some of these cases, 10 the Bank acted
as a LLR in the "Bagehotian" sense: increasing Bank Rate,
in order that the liquidity it provided would be at a
higher cost than that available elsewhere, but at the same
time discounting and lending freely. In short, it was
putting into action Bagehot's first rule of "lend freely at
a high rate".
Thus by 1914 the Bank of England appe.re4, to
arrived at a policy towards financial crises that had two
components: in the case of a general drain of cash from the
system, it would provide an injection of liquidity by
stepping up its discount and advance operations, but if
the survival of a major participant in the financial world
was at risk, it would, if the troubled institution could
show itself to be solvent, take on the organisation of a
bail-out operation. 11 In this sense the Bank appeared to
have learned from its experience (and mistakes) of the
previous century, and was successful in preventing serious
crises from arising. This was in marked contrast to
previous eighteenth and nineteenth century experience, when
financial crises were commonplace. What remains to be
decided is to what extent this policy towards financial
10 For example, 1870, 1873, 1899, 1903, 1906, 1913 and
especially in 1907, when the Bank of England managed to
keep under control a situation which could very easily have
developed into a system-wide crisis. See Chapter Seven for
further discussion of all these points.
In these two ways the behaviour of the Bank has not
changed very much since 1914; see for example, the Bank of
England's actions during the 1974 Secondary Banking crisis.
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crises was consistent: how much the chosen policy route
was dependent on the personalities which were around at the
time problems arose.
This conclusion does not overturn the existing
literature on the role of the Bank of England as a LLR in
this period. As discussed in Chapter One, the established
view is that the Bank had accepted its role in this sphere
by the early 1870s. 12 However, much of the literature does
not concentrate explicitly on the Bank's function as a LLR,
but rather treats this as only one aspect of its overall
role. This study has extended the existing view, in
concentrating more specifically on the evolution of the
Bank's last resort activities, and providing greater detail
as to how these were carried out and which institutions
gained by them.
12 Chapter One, section 3.
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3: The linDortance of the Governor and Moral Suasion
How much influence did the Governor of the Bank of
England bring to bear on Bank policy? The importance of
this issue lies in the suggestion that if it can be shown
that certain Governors had a disproportionate effect on
Bank policy making, this would indicate that the Bank could
have had no coherent policy towards financial crises in
particular, and towards the financial system in general,
during this period.
This subject was discussed in Chapter Eight, and it
was found that there is evidence that suggests that, during
the 1870-1914 period at least, the Governor of the Bank of
England did have some significant impact on Bank policy
formation. During this period, there were certain "strong"
Governors, such as Lidderdale, who were innovative, hard-
working, and keen to implement new policies. However, there
were also others who at best left no mark on the Bank, and
at worst, in the eyes of contemporaries at least, were
rather inept in their handling not just of the affairs of
the Bank of England, but also in their involvement with the
institutions by whom they were employed.13
In Chapter Eight the importance of the Governor was
illustrated through the use of regression analysis which
included dummy variables representing the Bank Governors,
13 See, for example, the comments made by Tritton, of
Brightwen & Co., about the Governors in the first years of
the twentieth century, which is reproduced in section 3 of
Chapter Eight.
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seasonality and financial crises. Somewhat surprisingly, in
view of the length of the data series and other associated
problems, the coefficient on the dummy variable which
represented the Governor was significant, at least in the
regression for discounts and advances on securities.' 4
 This
result implies that the Governor did have an impact on Bank
policy making, but only if the individual in the "Chair"
was sufficiently capable to make decisions which would
stand up in the long run, such as occurred with Lidderdale,
who, as previously mentioned, provided all the initiative
for the formation of the Barings Guarantee, and later with
Holden, who provided the leadership in the later case of
the YPB. Holden of course was not a Governor, but his
views carried sufficient weight in financial circles for
the Governor at the time to listen to and take action on
the basis of what he said.
It is of course possible that, had Lidderdale not come
up with the idea of forming the Guarantee fund that enabled
Barings to recover from their difficulties, the City of
London would today be without one of its more famous names.
As argued in Chapter Eight, this would not necessarily have
been a bad thing.
14 The coefficient on advances on securities was not
significant. See Tables 8.2 - 8.4 for a full list of the
results.
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4: The Chanin Pattern of the Bank's Discount and Advance
ODerations
Because of the nature of data collection and other
work carried out at the Bank of England Archives, much
information was acquired on changes in the pattern of the
Bank's discount and advance behaviour as a by-product of
the primary analysis. However, once obtained, it was worth
using this information in attempt to answer various
questions on the Bank's activities. This has been achieved
through examining long term fluctuations in the Daily
Discount data. In addition, there has been a brief study of
the various Discount and Advance Committees which were in
existence during this period, in order to examine the
regulatory environment in which the Bank of England
operated, and to see if these Committees had any regulatory
impact.
The Bank conunenced the period with a fairly healthy
private clientele, although business with them had been
falling over the previous few years. However, over the
following decades, the number of customers receiving
discounts at the Bank fell enormously, from 424 in 1870 to
197 in 1914, a fall of over 50 per cent. This occurred
despite the fact that for much of the period the Bank was
struggling for income, at times competing with commercial
banks for business, especially outside London. This
situation came about as its role as a central bank
increased, and as the commercial banks began to offer
customers attractive facilities, which the Bank of England
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were unable to match.
The main trend in the Banks' discount and advance
operations is the decline in importance and then subsequent
revitalisation of the volume of bills discounted, which,
aside for odd peaks, was fairly constant up until the turn
of the century, before increasing, to such an extent that
in 1914 by far the greatest part of business carried out at
the Bank involved the discounting of bills, rather than the
granting of advances secured on bills or securities. 15 This
is again a reflection of the decline of the Bank's private
custom, since the volume of discounts increases quickly
again when any tension developed in the markets.
A study of the Committees on Advances and Discounts
operative during the 1870-1914 period revealed that they
could play little or no regu1ator role. Since their
meetings were fairly infrequent, they were not available to
give immediate advice on particular issues, and thus their
views in day-to-day issues were not influential. However,
one role the Committees did fulfil over the longer term was
to note and advise on any changes to the regulations of
the Discount Office which would improve its functioning. In
this sense they had an impact on future discount policy.
15 There is a specific cause of this increase in
business on discounts in 1914, as was detailed in an
earlier chapter.
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5: Sununarv and Suestions for Future Work
This thesis has sought to address questions relating
to the three different aspects of the Bank of England's
behaviour, as outlined above, in the 1870-1914 period.
The most important aspect of the Bank's behaviour
studied is in its attitudes towards financial crises, On
this subject it seems that the Bank's policies did not
undergo a major change in the last part of the nineteenth
century; rather, that the Bank had taken on most of the
characteristics now associated with a lender of last
resort, and acted as such in several later moments when
activity in the financial markets increased. The Bank did
not however allow this increase in activity to reach
breaking point. In addition, certain other rescues of
financial institutions were undertaken by the Bank of
England, in circumstances which were sometimes rather
dubious, but where the institutions concerned were
suffering from a liquidity rather than insolvency problem,
as then defined.
One area where future work would be very appropriate
is in a greater statistical use of the data set on Daily
Discounts. 16 Perhaps, as estimation techniques improve, and
computer packages become even more advanced, a more
sophisticated econometric evaluation of this data set can...
be made.
Another area where additional work is needed concerns
16 Included here in Appendices A and B.
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the role of the Bank's Governor. As earlier mentioned, this
study has left some questions unanswered inthis sphere, in
particular concerning the issue of causality between a
Governor's term of office and extra-ordinary events
occurring. Addressing these questions in a comprehensive
manner would in effect require a major study in its own
right, but this would be likely to reveal some extremely
interesting insights into relationships between
personalities and institutions.
423
APPENDIX A
DAILY DISCOUNT DATA: 1870-1893
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6
4
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
6
8
7
6
6
5
4
6
9
10
3
3
5
4
6
5.5
5.8
5.1
3.5
5.4
5.7
5.5
5.3
4.8
4.4
3.9
3.6
3.6
3.2
2.7
2.9
2.5
2.8
2.3
2.6
2.6
2.1
2.8
3.0
3.0
3.6
4.0
4.3
4.3
4.1
4.6
4.9
4.7
4.1
3.0
3.8
4.0
4.0
4.7
5.1
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.3
6.3
6.6
5.8
5.1
4.8
4.8
4.9
1250
60833
97417
53883
97167
29000
29983
51333
125917
3767
28167
127500
151167
44400
0
2500
333
917
1333
2967
0
900
1667
150500
1500
148833
217117
78767
50667
0
96583
300
8200
2033
68408
0
34167
3500
45833
123667
3917
2133
2833
17250
54667
212083
136667
10667
2500
75167
0
146167
1	 0
1	 167
2	 4500
2	 0
1	 2167
1	 67
	
1	 52
	
1	 0
	
2	 5360
	
1	 167
	
1	 140
	
1	 38
	
2	 129
	
1	 0
	
0	 0
	
1	 70
	
1	 0
	
1	 0
	
1	 188
	
1	 28
	
0	 283
	
1	 50
	
1	 0
	
1	 603
1 15217
2 31833
	
2	 70
2 21157
	
1	 462
	
0	 4178
	
2	 2793
	
1	 3600
	
1	 0
	
1	 0
	
1	 113
	
0	 155
	
1	 117
	
1	 520
1 18530
	
2	 2707
1 56033
10488
	
1	 525
	
1	 0
14 5993
	
3	 65
2 14900
	
1	 83
	
1	 0
1	 120
0	 0
2	 0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
2
1
2
1
:1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
444
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
WEEK TVB TNT	 TVA TNAT TVR TNR
(C)	 (%)	 (C)	 (C)
1891
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
9600
21767
16933
6975
27950
9567
49967
107983
165833
84333
12167
9667
247980
28320
3800
26917
116217
84117
40333
86500
5800
36667
4733
71050
4750
12100
15767
5917
16467
12700
9000
8600
8483
15317
3500
18167
5567
3383
33917
55833
23450
31717
73667
27333
7417
7567
19200
37100
7667
3067
19183
186625
3	 4.7
4
	
4.1
3	 3.0
4	 3.2
4
	
3.0
4	 2.3
3	 2.8
6	 3.0
9	 3.0
5	 3.0
	
5	 2.9
	
4	 3.0
	
6	 3.0
	
7
	 3.0
	
3	 2.8
	
6	 3.3
	
7
	
3.5
	7
	 3.6
	
6	 3.9
	
6	 4.7
	
3	 5.0
	
5	 5.0
	
3	 4.5
	
5	 3.8
	
3	 3.3
	
4
	 3.0
	
4	 2.7
	
4
	
2.5
	
3	 2.4
	
5	 2.5
	
5	 2.1
	
5	 2.2
	
3	 2.2
	
4	 2.3
	
3	 2.3
	
4
	
2.5
	
3	 2.4
	
3	 2.4
	
7
	 2.8
	
5	 3.0
	
5	 2.9
	
5	 3.0
	
4
	 3.0
	
4	 3.5
	
4	 4.0
	
4
	 3.8
	
3	 3.9
	
4
	 3.8
	
3	 3.7
	
2	 3.2
	
4
	 2.1
7
	 3.3
1333
54650
1333
5000
1583
9400
40200
5667
1000
5733
24567
5000
2800
20000
15750
933
1733
13083
9450
90133
97080
3583
417
22750
517
3083
0
19833
3217
0
2500
0
16000
0
1083
0
7767
2250
400
24417
6917
1083
200
2067
0
1500
5267
5833
817
767
0
43263
1	 0
1	 0
1	 0
1	 67
1	 0
1	 67
1
	 63
1	 367
1	 275
1	 80
1	 117
1	 72
1	 80
1 20000
	
1	 100
	
1	 280
	
1	 67
1 40367
	
1
	 1282
2 51883
1 18870
	
1	 83
	
1	 0
	
1	 467
	
1	 0
	
1	 0
	
0	 183
	
1	 0
	
1	 120
	
0	 950
	
1	 267
	
0	 0
	
1	 28
	
0	 33
	
1
	 0
	
0	 73
	
1	 37
	
1	 0
1 21600
	
1	 0
	
1	 3233
	
1	 217
	
1	 0
	
1	 4963
	
0	 33
	
1	 67
	
1	 1462
	
1	 183
	
1	 0
	
1	 0
0	 40
1 18620
445
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
:1.
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
	
WEEK TVB TNT R	 TVA TNAT TVR TNR
(C)	 (%)	 (C)	 (C)
1892	 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
37500
8513
40833
18617
10917
15167
20183
54067
145667
13717
6567
13167
10400
21333
6167
75720
10800
101500
13767
3667
12633
12833
6172
4900
4783
4367
50250
4917
29367
9317
6600
5860
27863
5067
3467
10483
2883
6517
5317
54920
5100
1583
7183
53933
17317
6667
2900
4800
46850
4333
5200
62415
6	 3.0
4	 3.2
3	 3.0
4	 3.0
3	 2.8
4	 2.8
4	 2.8
5	 3.0
6	 3.0
4	 2.8
4	 2.6
3	 2.1
3	 2.6
5	 2.8
	
4	 2.3
	
5	 2.0
	
4	 1.6
	
4	 2.1
	
4	 2.0
	
3	 1.8
	
3	 1.5
	
5	 1.8
	
3	 1.6
	
3	 2.0
	
4	 2.2
	
4	 1.8
	
3	 1.7
	
3	 1.7
	
4	 1.9
	
4	 1.9
	
3	 1.8
	
3	 2.0
	
3	 1.9
	
4	 2.0
	
2	 1.3
	
4	 1.8
	
2	 1.8
	
4	 1.8
	
3	 1.8
	
4	 1.7
	
3	 1.7
	
3	 2.0
	
4	 2.5
	
3	 2.5
	
5	 3.0
	
2	 2.5
	
2	 2.4
	
4	 3.1
	
4	 3.0
	
2	 2.0
	
4	 3.0
	
4	 2.6
0
1100
2233
0
1767
0
3667
2167
34300
0
1500
1333
250333
126500
317
1400
2240
9933
267
667
150
3567
200
0
1109
1817
116000
433
100
233
667
0
3833
0
3417
2667
0
1083
0
1467
267
2367
0
5567
0
0
1033
500
4833
1000
667
130545
0	 35
1	 833
1	 25
0	 0
1	 33
0	 83
1	 858
1	 383
1	 0
0	 1017
1	 117
1	 0
	
3	 153
	
2	 27
1	 38
	
1	 0
	
1	 0
	
1	 317
	
1	 50
	
1	 5033
	
1	 0
	
1	 2150
	
1	 0
	
0	 100
	
1	 0
	
1	 297.
	
2	 817
	
1	 0
	
1	 98
	
1	 0
	
1	 83
	
0	 0
	
1	 0
	
0	 100
	
1	 33
	
1	 158
	
0	 0
	
1	 400
	
0	 0
	
1	 150
	
1	 0
	
1	 33
	
0	 0
	
1	 233
	
0	 417
	
0	 0
	
1	 67
	
1	 57
	
1	 0
	
1	 50
	
1	 100
	
2	 0
446
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
WEEK TVB TNT	 WA TNAT 1W
(C)	 ()	 (C)	 (C)
1893	 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
9500
18067
3360
5550
12533
9567
6867
87583
8733
7483
5533
23033
19960
2740
10500
3783
280183
152850
326333
124917
89840
8233
4350
8000
4783
64615
6583
25317
9433
5017
18233
28000
5833
29033
5150
19608
4117
2067
19200
3700
5383
4500
6400
70983
7433
3767
6419
57000
4443
98783
208000
234000
5	 2.8
3	 2.8
3	 2.g
3	 2.3
2
	
1.9
4	 2.4
3	 2.4
5	 2.4
3	 2.3
3	 2.4
3	 2.3
3	 2.4
4	 2.3
2	 1.5
3	 2.3
	
3	 2.1
	
6	 2.5
	
7
	
2.8
	
10	 3.3
	
10	 3.8
	
5	 3.2
	
3	 4.0
	
3	 3.3
	
3	 1.6
	
3	 2.1
	
3	 2.5
	
3	 2.3
	
3	 2.0
	
3	 2.3
	
2	 1.9
	
4	 2.8
	
5	 3.6
	
2	 3.3
	
5	 4.5
	
1
	 3.3
	
3	 4.2
	
3	 4.3
	
2	 3.1
	
2	 2.8
	
4	 3.2
	
3	 3.0
	
3	 3.0
	
3	 3.0
	
3	 3.0
	
3	 2.9
	
3	 2.5
	
3	 3.0
	
4	 3.0
	
2	 3.0
	
4	 3.0
	
5	 3.0
	
5	 3.0
0
917
0
667
0
4433
0
17333
10717
0
42500
241500
100800
6220
867
0
153833
62817
94000
132967
80000
667
283
2250
833
152167
0
1050
250
867
1600
2020
667
4833
933
0
817
0
51500
350
667
0
833
2167
383
667
0
59500
900
967
87000
223000
0	 167
1
	 167
0	 110
1
	 0
0	 33
1
	 483
0	 60
1	 217
1	 0
0	 50
1
	 33
3	 0
2
	 0
1
	 0
1	 28
0	 0
3	 0
1 28450
1 19010
2	 8233
1	 3000
1
	 167
1
	 0
1	 67
1	 67
2	 533
0	 0
1	 0
1	 0
1	 0
1	 0
1 67820
1	 63
1 16917
1	 0
0	 0
1	 22
0	 0
1	 533
1	 50
1	 8
0	 0
1	 0
1	 1060
1	 23
1
	 0
0	 117
1	 50
1
	 50
1	 28
1	 1300
2	 133
447
APPENDIX B
DAILY DISCOUNT DATA: 1895-1914
TNR
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
3.
1
1
WEEK TVB
CL)
	
1894 :1.	 4283
	
2	 11125
	
3	 18200
	
4	 3283
	
5	 13683
	
6	 13583
	
7
	
7333
	
8	 22500
9 145667
	
10	 37750
	
1].	 97667
12 110000
13 123520
	
14	 4917
	
15	 36033
	
16	 6167
	
17	 70783
	
18	 2 1167
	
19	 13167
	
20	 4820
	
21	 10433
	
22	 7350
	
23	 8383
	
24	 5550
	
25	 4800
	
26	 28950
	
27	 5083
	
28	 4417
	
29	 2883
	
30	 4700
	
31	 4167
	
32	 7000
	
33	 10500
	
34	 4967
	
35
	 3317
	
36	 7550
	
37	 2567
	
38	 2833
	
39	 7017
	
40	 2933
	
41	 6633
	
42	 6900
	
43	 5583
	
44	 10167
	
45	 6417
	
46	 2783
	
47
	 4600
	
48	 8950
	
49	 5533
	
50	 4683
	
51
	 7450
52 172209
TNTR
(%)
3 3.2
3 2.8
1 2.6
3 2.9
3 2.7
3 2.5
2 2.1
4 2.2
5 2.0
4 2.0
5 2.0
5 1.6
4 2.0
3 2.0
3 2.0
4 1.8
4 2.0
4 2.0
2 1.6
3 1.5
3 1.7
2 1.5
3 1.8
3 2.0
3 1.8
3 1.7
3 2.0
4 2.0
2 1.6
3 1.8
2 1.6
4 2.0
3 1.7
3 1.9
2 1.6
3 1.8
2 1.3
2 1.3
3 2.0
3 1.6
3 1.8
3 1.8
3 1.8
2 1.5
3 2.0
3 1.6
3 1.5
3 1.8
3 1.9
2 1.8
3 1.5
6 2.0
VAOS
(C)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
164250
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
441300
TVA
(C)
0
500
667
0
38833
33333
61083
100000
58333
125000
58333
158800
244000
34650
25267
0
27000
0
1250
540
0
2000
533
167
0
40833
0
167
0
1000
0
0
2750
0
0
0
0
0
1167
0
0
250
0
0
4483
0
0
0
0
0
7700
300520
TNAT
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
3
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
11
TVR
(C)
133
155
500
0
0
38
1767
133
367
217
0
0
200
33
0
0
200
0
0
0
0
0
0
33
250
33
50
0
0
107
267
0
0
0
0
45
67
0
0
133
0
300
0
0
33
183
0
0
0
262
50
80
448
WEEK	 TVB TNT R	 'lAOS	 TVA THAT TVR TNR
	
(C)	 (%)	 (C)	 (C)	 (C)
	1895 1
	 4472	 2 1.9	 0	 0	 0	 200	 1
	
2	 8267	 2 1.6	 0	 0	 0	 33	 1
	
3	 7000	 2 1.5	 0	 167	 1	 533	 1
	
4	 3833	 2 1.1	 0	 4717	 1	 117	 1
	
5	 6383	 2 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 417	 1
	
6	 7817	 4 1.4	 0	 350	 1	 350	 1
	
7	 6833	 3 1.5	 0	 4833	 1	 0	 0
	
8	 4883	 2 1.9	 3333	 333	 2	 0	 0
	
9	 66833	 4 1.9 181167	 72667	 4	 277	 1
	
10	 8100	 2 1.3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
11	 15100	 3 1.6	 3333	 36967	 2	 117	 1
	
12	 10683	 2 1.9	 59167 105000	 3	 0	 0
13 112333	 5 1.8 170000 169167	 4	 0	 0
	
14	 3117	 2 2.0	 0	 0	 0	 100	 1
	
15	 4420	 3 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 200	 1
	
16	 2940	 2 1.9	 0	 0	 0	 140	 1
	
17	 10693	 3 1.7	 33333	 52500	 2	 0	 0
	
18	 4633	 2 1.4	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
19	 10567	 3 1.9	 0	 250	 1	 117	 1
	
20	 6067	 2 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
21	 8750	 3 1.7	 0	 1500	 1	 210	 1
	
22	 2867	 2 1.7	 0	 0	 0	 50	 1
	
23	 2860	 1 1.5	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
24	 3233	 3 1.5	 0	 833	 1	 0	 0
	
25	 3200	 2 1.3	 0	 833	 1	 33	 1
	
26	 43667	 4 1.7 131400	 80250	 3	 38	 1
	
27	 32200	 2 1.3	 0	 0	 0 13517	 1
	
28	 6500	 3 1.8	 0	 383	 1	 48	 1
	
29	 4723	 3 1.8	 0	 0	 0 16750	 1
	
30	 4450	 2 1.4	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
31	 26750	 3 1.5	 0	 0	 0	 50	 :1.
32	 6810	 2 1.5	 0	 1000	 1	 0	 0
33	 15925	 2 1.9	 16667	 5000	 2	 0	 0
34	 4600	 3 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 43	 1
35	 12867	 3 1.4	 13333	 0	 1	 0	 0
36	 24350	 3 1.5	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
37	 6367	 2 1.2	 12500	 16667	 2	 0	 0
38	 12333	 3 1.5	 0	 267	 1	 0	 0
39	 1058	 2 1.5	 4167	 19167	 2	 0	 0
40	 4383	 3 1.3	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
41	 8850	 3 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
42	 8583	 3 1.7	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
43	 2533	 2 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
44	 7333	 3 2.0	 0	 0	 0	 33
45	 5867	 2 1.8	 4167	 1667	 2	 133	 1
46	 6033	 3 2.0	 60833	 79367	 3	 50	 1
47	 65002	 3 2.0	 25500	 21150	 2	 0	 0
48	 5083	 3 1.7	 0	 0	 0	 67	 1
49	 10933	 3 1.8	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
50	 20583	 3 1.6	 0	 417	 1	 0	 0
5].	 40608	 5 1.9	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
52 228650	 5 2.0 542833 465750	 10	 0	 0
449
WEEK TVB
(C)
	
1896 1
	 39850
	
2	 4083
	
3	 27783
	
4	 4400
	
5	 5500
	
6	 7983
	
7	 9417
	
8	 6033
	
9	 35152
	
10	 6784
	
11	 16000
	
12	 10983
	
13	 39667
	
14	 8240
	
15	 5700
	
16	 8651
	
17	 4690
	
18	 37167
	
19	 13383
	
20	 36217
	
2].	 1767
	
22	 1867
	
23	 10133
	
24	 20167
	
25	 5567
	
26	 40783
27 124500
	
28	 7000
	
29	 7183
	
30	 5597
	
31	 4667
	
32	 9408
	
33	 7733
	
34	 22500
	
35	 12540
	
36	 11367
	
37	 5250
	
38	 10467
	
39	 35167
40 114167
	
41	 1667
	
42	 7300
	
43	 76883
	
44	 85850
	
45	 7550
46 110505
	
47	 2367
	
48	 43667
	
49	 75667
	50 	 7600
	
51	 65233
52 146625
TVR TNR
(C)
	
100	 1
	
117	 1
	
38	 1
	
63	 1
	
0	 0
	
143	 1
	
67	 1
	
0	 0
	
83	 1
	
50	 1
	
0	 0
	
50	 1
	
43	 1
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
833	 1
	
100	 1
	
100	 1
	
167	 1
	
33	 1
	
33	 1
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
267	 1
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
200	 1
	
0	 0
	
67	 1
	
0	 0
	
167	 1
	
0	 0
	
45	 1
	
0	 0
	
16750	 1
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
600	 1
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
0	 0
	
67	 1
100
	
0	 0
TNT R	 VAOS	 TVA	 TNAT
(%)	 (C)	 (C)
3 1.5	 0	 0	 0
2 1.0	 0	 0
4 1.9	 0	 0
2 2.0	 0	 0
4 1.8	 0	 0	 Q
2 1.6	 0	 0	 0
3 1.5	 0	 133	 2
2 1.8	 0	 0	 0
3 1.8	 81667	 0	 1
3 2.0	 3167	 0	 1
2 1.7	 0	 0	 0
4 1.8	 0	 0	 0
3 1.7	 0	 0	 0
3 1.8	 0	 0	 0
2 1.6	 0	 0	 0
4 1.8	 0	 333	 1
2 1.8	 0	 0	 0
4 1.3	 12500	 0	 1
4 1.6	 20833	 0	 1
4 1.8	 12667	 50000	 2
2 1.9	 0	 0	 0
2 0.9	 4167	 700	 2
2 1.9	 0	 1000	 1
2 1.9	 0	 0	 0
3 1.3	 0	 3333	 1
3 1.8	 50333	 16833	 2
5 1.6 257667	 266167	 5
2 1.5	 0	 1167	 1
3 1.3	 0	 0	 0
2 1.7	 0	 0	 0
3 1.6	 0	 4333	 1
3 1.7	 0	 320	 1
2 1.8	 0	 4333	 1
3 1.3	 0	 0	 0
1 1.2	 0	 0	 0
3 1.7	 0	 0	 0
2 1.8	 0	 7500	 1
3 2.3	 0	 400	 1
2 1.4	 0	 0	 0
4 2.8	 56667	 91167	 2
1 2.0	 0	 0	 0
4 3.0	 0	 6000	 1
3.3	 0	 12500	 1
3 4.0	 52833	 44417	 2
2 3.6	 3333	 47500	 2
4 2.6	 43333	 31667	 2
3 4.].	 0	 0	 0
3 3.3	 16667	 5167	 2
2 3.2	 0	 0	 0
2 3.7	 46167	 34217	 2
3 4.0	 66167	 46667	 2
5 4.2 563438	 542813	 12
450
WEEK TVB
(C)
	1897 1
	 1500
	
2	 3700
	
3	 4333
	
4	 4867
	
5	 4933
	
6	 2110
	
7	 6680
	
8	 2933
	
9	 27992
	
10	 4000
	
1].	 3133
	
12	 4817
	
13	 1583
	
14	 4750
	
15	 11517
	
16	 2517
	
17	 2350
	
18	 1900
	
19	 25333
	
20	 2383
	
21	 13683
	
22	 5483
	
23	 9533
	
24	 2240
	
25	 6733
	
26	 23600
27 129317
	
28	 4650
	
29	 4883
	
30	 5083
	
31	 4767
	
32	 3120
	
33	 7075
	
34	 7981
	
35	 4767
	
36	 38221
37 112583
	
38	 75133
	
39	 6983
	
40	 4083
	
41	 2123
	
42	 4333
	
43	 23167
44 128450
	
45	 11600
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